Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-1466
Concentrated 21-IP Cluster (AS213438/ColocaTel) Behind ~50% of Global RDP Internet Scanning
GreyNoise identified a cluster of just 21 IP addresses, tied to ASN AS213438 (ColocaTel Inc., Mahe, Seychelles), that generated 49.7% of all global RDP Crawler scanning activity over a 48-hour window (April 5-7, 2026), peaking at 67.4% of worldwide RDP scan volume on April 7 before a 99.9% single-day crash on April 8.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1466 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | 21-IP RDP Crawler Cluster, AS213438 RDP/PostgreSQL Scanning Campaign |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| Affected products | Generic Internet-exposed RDP services (port 3389 and non-standard 3390-3392); PostgreSQL Global Development Group PostgreSQL Server; Oracle / MySQL MySQL Server |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-284, CWE-306 |
| Tools | Go HTTP Client |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1110 Brute Force, T1110.001 Password Guessing, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1583 Acquire Infrastructure, T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure, T1583.004 Server, T1583.005 Botnet, T1590 Gather Victim Network Information and 4 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | all-sectors, government administration, finance, health, manufacturing, technology, education, retail |
| Target regions | Global, North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 11 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1466 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 34 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Known Scanning-Fleet ASN/Subnet Inbound Connection + Burst-Crash Volume (SPL)
Flags any inbound connection sourced from the four documented AS213438/ColocaTel scanning subnets (193.142.147.0/24, 185.196.220.0/24, 79.124.8.0/24, 45.134.225.0/24) or the broader ASN, and separately flags the campaign's signature volumetric burst-and-crash cadence (a >95% single-day drop in scan-source volume from the same origin), which is the closest observable to this operator's C2/fleet-management pattern.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1583.004, T1583.005, T1583, T1219, T1595
- Data sources: pan:traffic, cisco:asa, DeviceNetworkEvents, perimeter firewall logs
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=network sourcetype IN ("pan:traffic", "cisco:asa", "stream:tcp")
| eval matched_subnet=case(
cidrmatch("193.142.147.0/24", src_ip), "193.142.147.0/24",
cidrmatch("185.196.220.0/24", src_ip), "185.196.220.0/24",
cidrmatch("79.124.8.0/24", src_ip), "79.124.8.0/24",
cidrmatch("45.134.225.0/24", src_ip), "45.134.225.0/24",
1==1, null())
| where isnotnull(matched_subnet)
| bin _time span=1d
| stats count AS daily_sessions BY src_ip, matched_subnet, _time
| streamstats current=f last(daily_sessions) AS prior_day_sessions BY src_ip
| eval pct_drop=round((prior_day_sessions - daily_sessions) / prior_day_sessions * 100, 1)
| where daily_sessions > 0 OR pct_drop > 95
| table _time src_ip matched_subnet daily_sessions prior_day_sessions pct_dropMicrosoft KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ipv4_is_match(RemoteIP, "193.142.147.0/24") or ipv4_is_match(RemoteIP, "185.196.220.0/24") or ipv4_is_match(RemoteIP, "79.124.8.0/24") or ipv4_is_match(RemoteIP, "45.134.225.0/24")
| summarize daily_sessions=count() by RemoteIP, bin(Timestamp, 1d)
| order by RemoteIP asc, Timestamp asc
| serialize
| extend prior_day_sessions=prev(daily_sessions, 1, 0)
| extend pct_drop=iff(prior_day_sessions > 0, round((todouble(prior_day_sessions - daily_sessions) / prior_day_sessions) * 100, 1), real(null))
| where isnotnull(pct_drop) and pct_drop > 95Sigma
title: Known Scanning-Fleet ASN/Subnet Connection with Burst-and-Crash Volume Pattern
id: 6a1e3d40-1c2a-4b7f-9a11-71c2f5f0aa03
status: experimental
description: Flags any inbound connection from the four documented AS213438/ColocaTel scanning subnets or ASN, and highlights the campaign's signature burst-and-crash volumetric cadence (>95% single-day session-count collapse) used as the closest observable proxy for this scanning-as-a-service fleet's infrastructure operations.
references:
- https://www.greynoise.io/blog/ip-addresses-behind-nearly-half-rdp-internet-scanning
- https://ipinfo.io/AS213438
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-18
tags:
- attack.reconnaissance
- attack.t1595
- attack.resource_development
- attack.t1583.004
- attack.t1583.005
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1219
logsource:
category: firewall
detection:
selection:
src_cidr:
- '193.142.147.0/24'
- '185.196.220.0/24'
- '79.124.8.0/24'
- '45.134.225.0/24'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None expected; these are actor-attributed scanning-fleet subnets not associated with legitimate business traffic
level: highKnown false positives:
- None expected for the specific /24 subnet match; ASN-wide matches may require review if AS213438 is later reassigned/reused by a legitimate tenant
Tuning notes: Refresh the /24 subnet list on a ~30-day cadence given the operator's observed burst-and-crash reappearance cycle; add ASN-level lookup (AS213438) via a BGP/IP-intelligence feed to catch infrastructure reuse outside the four listed subnets.
- Multi-Port RDP/Database Scanning Sweep — Single Source (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Repeated Failed RDP Logon Burst — Bruteforce Precursor (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Known Scanning-Fleet ASN/Subnet Inbound Connection + Burst-Crash Volume (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Rapid Multi-Port RDP and Database Connection Sweep (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Repeated Failed RDP Authentication from Single External Source (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Known Scanning-Fleet ASN/Subnet Connection ([indicator] / ColocaTel) (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- Multi-Port RDP/Database Scanning Sweep — Single Source (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Repeated Failed RDP Logon Burst — Bruteforce Precursor (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-30, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 34 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1466.
Sample indicators (3 of 34)
- IP address:
193.142.147[.]111 - IP address:
193.142.147[.]177 - IP address:
45.134.225[.]47
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 34 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The traffic also targeted non-standard RDP, PostgreSQL, and MySQL ports, and the same burst-and-crash pattern recurred roughly 30 days after an identical, larger episode in March 2026 (10.7M sessions).
Between April 5 and April 7, 2026, GreyNoise's Global Observation Grid (GOG) recorded a sharp concentration of internet-wide RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) scanning traffic into a small, coordinated set of source infrastructure. Just 21 RDP Crawler IP addresses -- all mapped to autonomous system AS213438, RIPE-registered to ColocaTel Inc. of Mahe, Seychelles -- generated 49.7% of all RDP Crawler sessions observed globally across the 48-hour window, and spiked to 67.4% (1,856,167 of 2,753,274 global sessions) on a single peak day, April 7, 2026.
The 21 IPs concentrated into four /24 network blocks, split between hosting in Amsterdam and Lelystad, Netherlands: 193.142.147.0/24 (8 IPs, 715,147 sessions, hosted Amsterdam), 185.196.220.0/24 (5 IPs, 461,080 sessions, Lelystad), 79.124.8.0/24 (4 IPs, 368,557 sessions, Lelystad), and 45.134.225.0/24 (3 IPs, 290,092 sessions, Amsterdam). The single highest-volume IP was 193.142.147.111, first observed by GreyNoise in May 2025 and carrying the RDP Crawler, RDP Bruteforce Attempt, RDP Protocol, Web Crawler, Go HTTP Client, MySQL Protocol, and MySQL Login Attempt classification tags.
Scanning traffic was not limited to the standard RDP port 3389 -- it also probed the adjacent non-standard ports 3390, 3391, and 3392, consistent with fingerprinting RDP services deliberately moved off the default port. In parallel, the same infrastructure probed PostgreSQL on its default port 5432 and a wide spread of non-standard PostgreSQL alternates (5430, 5431, 5433, 5434, 15432, 25432, 30432, 35432, 55432), plus MySQL on port 3306 -- indicating the actor(s) behind this fleet are running multi-protocol database/remote-access discovery sweeps, not single-service RDP-only reconnaissance.
The geographic source profile shifted sharply during the window: the Netherlands' share of global RDP scanning rose from a 7.17% baseline to 53.86%, overtaking Romania as the top source country, and the Netherlands' daily scan rate jumped roughly 15.4x (from ~64,894 sessions/day baseline to ~997,200 sessions/day).
On April 8, 2026, the campaign collapsed 99.9% in a single day (from 1,856,167 sessions on April 7 to 1,795 on April 8, reaching zero by April 9) -- an abrupt burst-and-crash cadence. This is not a novel behavior for this operator: the same ColocaTel Inc./AS213438 identity produced an earlier, larger campaign the week of March 5-11, 2026, generating approximately 10.7 million RDP scan sessions, peaking at 3.7 million sessions on March 6 before collapsing 97.7% to 86,953 sessions on March 7, then going quiet for roughly 30 days before the April reappearance. The recurring ~30-day burst-and-crash cadence, the consistent RIPE registrant identity (same organization name, same Seychelles address, same abuse contact) across both episodes, and the tight infrastructure reuse indicate a persistent, professionally operated scanning-as-a-service or reconnaissance fleet rather than a one-off event.
GreyNoise explicitly declines to attribute this activity to a named threat actor or nation-state, noting that IP geolocation reflects where routing infrastructure is hosted (Netherlands, via a Seychelles-registered ASN) rather than where the operator is physically located. AS213438 is a young BGP network (~1 year old at time of reporting) peering with roughly 152 other networks via 5 upstream carriers, consistent with a bulletproof/offshore-registered hosting reseller rather than a legitimate enterprise ISP.
From a defensive standpoint this is pre-exploitation reconnaissance: mass internet-wide scanning for exposed RDP and database (PostgreSQL/MySQL) services, including services deliberately relocated to non-standard ports in an attempt at security-through-obscurity. Hosts found by this fleet are highly likely to be enumerated further and targeted with credential brute-forcing or exploit attempts by downstream actors purchasing or consuming this scan data, making the 21-IP/4-subnet cluster and the broader AS213438 ASN high-confidence blocklist candidates for any internet-facing RDP or database infrastructure.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Credential Access
T1110 Brute Force; T1110.001 Password Guessing
Command and Control
Resource Development
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure; T1583.004 Server; T1583.005 Botnet
Reconnaissance
T1590 Gather Victim Network Information; T1590.005 IP Addresses; T1595 Active Scanning; T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks; T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block inbound traffic from the four identified /24 subnets: 193.142.147.0/24, 185.196.220.0/24, 79.124.8.0/24, 45.134.225.0/24
- Block or rate-limit inbound traffic from ASN AS213438 (ColocaTel Inc.) at the perimeter/firewall
- Block port 3389 (RDP) from direct internet exposure; do not rely on non-standard ports 3390-3392 as obfuscation
- Audit RDP and database authentication logs for connection attempts since April 5, 2026 originating from AS213438 or the listed /24 ranges
- Confirm no internet-facing RDP, PostgreSQL, or MySQL services are reachable on standard or the enumerated non-standard ports (5430-5434, 15432, 25432, 30432, 35432, 55432, 3306)
Workarounds
- Move RDP off port 3389 only as a defense-in-depth supplement, never as a primary control -- this campaign explicitly scans 3390-3392
- Enforce account lockout / rate-limiting on any RDP or database service that cannot be immediately firewalled from the internet
Longer-term hardening
- Eliminate direct internet exposure of RDP; require VPN or zero-trust broker with MFA before RDP reaches internal hosts
- Deploy an RD Gateway or equivalent brokered-access solution with Network Level Authentication (NLA) enforced
- Restrict PostgreSQL/MySQL listeners to internal networks only; never expose database ports directly to the internet regardless of the port number used
- Subscribe to or continuously ingest GreyNoise/threat-intel scanning-source feeds to proactively block emerging scanning fleets
- Track AS213438 and the ColocaTel Inc. RIPE registrant identity for future infrastructure reuse given the recurring ~30-day campaign cadence
Affected and fixed versions
- Generic — Internet-exposed RDP services (port 3389 and non-standard 3390-3392)
Vulnerable versions: Any internet-reachable RDP listener
Fixed in: N/A - exposure/configuration issue, not a software vulnerability - PostgreSQL Global Development Group — PostgreSQL Server
Vulnerable versions: Any internet-reachable PostgreSQL listener on port 5432 or non-standard alternates
Fixed in: N/A - exposure/configuration issue, not a software vulnerability - Oracle / MySQL — MySQL Server
Vulnerable versions: Any internet-reachable MySQL listener on port 3306
Fixed in: N/A - exposure/configuration issue, not a software vulnerability
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- Top individual scanning IP locked-ioc-3 (AS213438) first observed by GreyNoise's Global Observation Grid.
- AS213438/ColocaTel begins a large RDP scanning campaign, ultimately generating approximately 10.7 million RDP Crawler sessions during the week of March 5-11, 2026.
- March campaign peaks at 3.7 million RDP scanning sessions in a single day.
- March campaign collapses 97.7% overnight to 86,953 sessions, then goes largely quiet for roughly 30 days.
- Quiet period between the March and April bursts; only 4,934 sessions observed.
- Activity resumes (46,005 sessions), starting the second burst cycle about 30 days after March.
- A new, tighter 21-IP AS213438 fleet reappears, beginning a 48-hour window (April 5-7) that accounts for 49.7% of all global RDP Crawler scanning traffic.
- AS213438 reaches 180,293 sessions, up from 156,322 on April 5, ahead of the 2,011,365-session AS-wide peak on April 7.
- Campaign peaks at 1,856,167 RDP Crawler sessions in a single day -- 67.4% of the global total of 2,753,274 sessions observed worldwide. Netherlands' share of global RDP scanning source traffic rises from 7.17% baseline to 53.86%, overtaking Romania as top source country.
- Campaign volume collapses 99.9% in a single day, falling from 1,856,167 sessions to 1,795 sessions.
- AS213438 RDP Crawler session volume reaches zero, completing the burst-and-crash cycle.
- TL-Intel Harness ingests the GreyNoise disclosure via RSS hunt phase and opens threat skeleton TL-2026-1466.
- GreyNoise publishes blog analysis 'Just 21 IP Addresses Are Now Behind Nearly Half of All RDP Scanning on the Internet,' documenting the cluster, ASN, subnets, ports, and recurring cadence without threat-actor attribution.
Update history
- 2026-10-30 — 21 IPs in AS213438 (ColocaTel) Drive Nearly Half of Global RDP Crawler Scanning: What changed No severity, exploitability or status change. The update enriches indicators and the campaign history only. New indicators (9) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- Disable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) (CM0025) CISA · Government advisory · 2026-01-01
- Weak Security Controls and Practices Routinely Exploited for Initial Access CISA · Government advisory · 2022-05-17
- AS213438 ColocaTel Inc. AS details ipinfo.io · Research · 2026-04-10
- Routing Information from AS213438 radar.cloudflare.com · Research · 2026-04-10
- AS213438 ColocaTel Inc. bgp.tools · Research · 2026-04-10
- AS213438 ColocaTel Inc. bgp.he.net · Research · 2026-04-10
- AS Rank: AS213438 (ColocaTel Inc.) asrank.caida.org · Research · 2026-04-10
- AS213438 Colocatel Network - BGP Network Information bgpview.io · Research · 2026-04-10
- GreyNoise Tags Documentation docs.greynoise.io · Vendor report · 2026-04-10
- RDP Crawler | GreyNoise Visualizer Tag viz.greynoise.io · Vendor report · 2026-04-10
- Just 21 IP Addresses Are Now Behind Nearly Half of All RDP Scanning on the Internet greynoise.io · Blog · 2026-04-10
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated .