# Forbidden Hyena Adopts AI-Generated BlackReaperRAT and Milkyway (Blackout Locker) Ransomware in Telegram-C2 Campaign

> The hacktivist-turned-extortion cluster Forbidden Hyena ran a multi-stage campaign (December 2025-January 2026) distributing RAR archives with obfuscated VBS/batch loaders and decoy PDFs to deploy a previously undocumented RAT, BlackReaperRAT, alongside a rebranded ransomware/locker (Blackout Locker, now 'Milkyway'). BI.ZONE observed AI/LLM-generated PowerShell and reverse-shell code across the tool chain, Telegram-channel-based C2 (commands hidden in HTML meta tags), and parallel use of garble-obfuscated Sliver C2 framework implants and a Linux AES-256-GCM wiper (viper_linux).

- **Published:** 2026-07-18T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-18T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1496
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-forbidden-hyena-blackreaperrat-milkyway-tl-2026-1496.webp?v=35d10b03 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Forbidden Hyena Milkyway Ransomware: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1496) — High severity, 41 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1496
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Forbidden Hyena
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 41 (3 shown free below)

## Description

BI.ZONE Threat Intelligence documented the evolution of Forbidden Hyena, a cluster it classifies within its 'Hyena' taxonomy tier for hacktivist (non-nation-state) actors, distinct from state-sponsored 'Werewolves'. Previously known for ideologically motivated website defacements, the group has pivoted toward high-stakes corporate intrusion, credential theft, and dual-use ransomware/wiper deployment between December 2025 and January 2026.

The intrusion chain begins with RAR archive delivery (via phishing or drive-by download) containing a batch script (1.bat) that launches an obfuscated VBScript loader (1.vbs) through cscript.exe/wscript.exe. The loader displays a decoy PDF to the victim while silently downloading the BlackReaperRAT payload from attacker infrastructure (confluence.dada-tuda[.]ru, big-tree[.]ru). BlackReaperRAT is a previously undocumented VBS-based RAT that establishes persistence via Registry Run keys (HKLM/HKCU), Windows Task Scheduler entries, and Startup-folder LNK files. Uniquely, it retrieves commands not from a conventional C2 channel but by parsing the HTML og:description meta tag of a private Telegram channel (t.me/+QFbPfHfSq3E0N2M6), supporting getid, cmd, dwl, update, and httpshell command primitives. The RAT stores a per-victim bot ID at %APPDATA%\BlackReaper.id and includes unused, dormant code for recursive filesystem searches across txt/log/csv/xml/script files, suggesting a broader data-collection capability not yet activated in observed samples.

A notable feature of this campaign is confirmed and suspected use of generative AI/LLM tooling in malware development: researchers assess the reverse-shell binary (4458.exe) was 'presumably generated using an LLM', and multiple VBScript and PowerShell deployment scripts show hallmark signs of AI-authored code (verbose, non-obfuscated structure, inconsistent-but-functional style) that let the operators rapidly iterate custom payloads per target with minimal manual engineering effort.

Following initial access, the actor pursues lateral movement using SSH key deployment (ssh.ps1), reverse shells over port 4458, and AnyDesk remote-access software for persistent hands-on-keyboard access. Credential theft is achieved via Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) abuse to extract NTDS.dit, SAM, and SYSTEM registry hives (using scripts such as ntds.ps1), and via SharpView for Active Directory reconnaissance. The group also runs garble-obfuscated Sliver C2 framework implants from a second infrastructure cluster (2.59.163[.]169) in parallel with BlackReaperRAT, indicating a mixed toolkit spanning custom and commodity C2.

For impact, Windows victims receive the Milkyway ransomware (a rebrand of the group's existing Blackout Locker with only minor code modification), which appends the .milkyway extension, terminates 46+ processes (including SQL Server, Oracle, Firefox, Veeam, OneDrive) and 22+ services (including Windows Defender, VSS, and backup utilities) before encryption, and displays a Cyrillic-titled ransom note ('СИСТЕМНОЕ УВЕДОМЛЕНИЕ' — 'SYSTEM NOTIFICATION') via a binary masquerading as WindowsSystemHelper.exe. Persistence for the locker itself is maintained through additional registry entries, a WindowsSystemMaintenance scheduled task, and LNK files.

Linux hosts in target environments instead receive viper_linux, a wiper that performs AES-256-GCM encryption/destruction of files across the filesystem (excluding /proc, /sys, /dev, /tmp, /boot and similar system paths), persists via /lib/systemd/systemd-svchelper and an hourly /etc/cron.d/systemd-cron cron entry, and self-deletes after killing its own process to hinder forensic recovery.

The combination of a novel RAT, Telegram-based covert C2, AI-assisted tool development, commodity Sliver implants, and cross-platform ransomware/wiper impact reflects a maturing hacktivist actor operating with tradecraft approaching that of financially motivated ransomware crews, while retaining destructive/disruptive intent consistent with its hacktivist origins.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1059.005 Visual Basic
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1053.003 Cron
- T1543.002 Systemd Service
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1003.003 NTDS
- T1003.002 Security Account Manager
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1069.002 Domain Groups
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1021.004 SSH
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1025 Data from Removable Media
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1102 Web Service
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1489 Service Stop
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1561 Disk Wipe
- T1485 Data Destruction

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**BlackReaperRAT VBS Loader Execution from RAR-Extracted Path** (`TL-2026-1496-SPL-001`)

Detects cscript.exe/wscript.exe launching a .vbs sibling of a .bat first-stage script from a user-writable extraction path (Downloads/Temp/AppData), matching the Forbidden Hyena 1.bat/1.vbs loader pattern that drops a decoy PDF and silently fetches BlackReaperRAT.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.001, T1059.005, T1204.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval img=lower(Image), parent=lower(ParentImage), cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| where (img="*\\cscript.exe" OR img="*\\wscript.exe")
  AND cmd="*.vbs*"
  AND (cmd="*\\downloads\\*" OR cmd="*\\appdata\\*" OR cmd="*\\temp\\*" OR parent="*explorer.exe")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage
| where count > 0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has ".vbs"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("\\Downloads\\", "\\AppData\\", "\\Temp\\") or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| summarize Count = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Suspicious cscript/wscript Execution of VBS from User-Writable Path
id: 7c9f5c1a-3e2b-4b56-9e2e-1f6a8b2d4c11
status: experimental
description: Detects cscript.exe/wscript.exe launching a .vbs file from a RAR-extracted or user-writable path, matching the Forbidden Hyena BlackReaperRAT 1.bat/1.vbs loader chain.
references:
    - https://bi-zone.medium.com/forbidden-hyena-adopts-blackreaperrat-in-ai-powered-campaigns-26aa61dff896
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '.vbs'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Downloads\'
            - '\AppData\'
            - '\Temp\'
    filter_common:
        CommandLine|contains: '\Program Files\'
    condition: selection and selection_path and not filter_common
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate business VBScript automation launched from user profile paths
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate internal VBScript-based deployment tooling executed from a user profile directory

**Tuning notes:** Add an allow-list for known internal software-distribution paths that legitimately invoke cscript from user directories; narrow the path filter to specific extraction tools (WinRAR/7-Zip temp dirs) if false-positive volume is high.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Volume Shadow Copy Creation Chained to NTDS.dit/SAM Extraction (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AnyDesk Installation Following SSH Key Deployment (Lateral Movement Pivot) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Garble-Obfuscated Sliver C2 Implant Network Beacon (Non-Standard Port/IP) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Telegram Dead-Drop C2 Meta-Tag Command Retrieval Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Process/Service Termination Burst Preceding File-Extension Rename (Ransomware Pre-Encryption) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- viper_linux Masquerading Systemd/Cron Persistence with Self-Deletion (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BlackReaperRAT Triple-Persistence Pattern (Run Key + Scheduled Task + Startup LNK) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Mass File Rename to Ransomware/Wiper Extension (Milkyway / viper_linux) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 41)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `193.233.48[.]98`
- Domain: `dada-tuda[.]ru`
- File hash: `4fbd2f5b4625fa46b5706748dbb15d3f58fbeda723fc644d0db9174a78cbade1`

Full set of 41 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Forbidden Hyena adopts BlackReaperRAT in AI-powered campaigns](https://bi-zone.medium.com/forbidden-hyena-adopts-blackreaperrat-in-ai-powered-campaigns-26aa61dff896)
- [Forbidden Hyena adopts BlackReaperRAT in AI-powered campaigns (BI.ZONE original, Russian)](https://bi.zone/eng/expertise/blog/forbidden-hyena-atakuet-s-novym-troyanom-udalennogo-dostupa-blackreaperrat/)
- [Hacktivists Use AI Scripts to Launch BlackReaperRAT Attacks](https://www.security.land/ai-crafted-chaos-the-rise-of-forbidden-hyena-and-the-blackreaperrat/)
- [The AI-Powered Arsenal: How 'Forbidden Hyena' Uses Generative AI to Spawn BlackReaperRAT](https://securityonline.info/ai-powered-arsenal-forbidden-hyena-generative-ai-blackreaperrat-milkyway/)
- [Weekly Recap: Chrome 0-Days, Router Botnets, AWS Breach, Rogue AI Agents & More](https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/weekly-recap-chrome-0-days-router.html)
- [A striking resemblance: Gambling Hyena and Twelfth Hyena clusters compared](https://bi.zone/eng/expertise/blog/gambling-hyena-i-twelfth-hyena-u-dvukh-khishchnikov-odin-khozyain/)
- [Rainbow Hyena strikes again: new backdoor and shift in tactics](https://bi-zone.medium.com/rainbow-hyena-strikes-again-new-backdoor-and-shift-in-tactics-2dd99a10aea9)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1496
