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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-1516

BMC FootPrints ITSM Pre-Auth RCE Chain via Auth Bypass + Java Deserialization (CVE-2025-71257/71258/71259/71260)

criticalACTIVE

watchTowr Labs disclosed a four-vulnerability exploit chain in BMC FootPrints ITSM (v20.20.02-20.24.01.001) that lets an unauthenticated attacker abuse the password-reset endpoint to obtain a guest SEC_TOKEN, pivot through two SSRF endpoints, and reach an insecure Java deserialization sink in the Mono-based ASP.NET VIEWSTATE handler to write a JSP web shell and gain RCE as LOCAL SERVICE.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1516, CVE-2025-71257, CVE-2025-71258, CVE-2025-71259, CVE-2025-71260
Also known asWT-2025-0069, WT-2025-0070, WT-2025-0071, WT-2025-0072
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS9.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
Exploitation statusPublic proof-of-concept exploit for a linked CVE
EPSSCVE-2025-71257: 44.5% (98.7th percentile); CVE-2025-71260: 34.3% (98.3th percentile); CVE-2025-71258: 17.4% (97.0th percentile)
Affected productsBMC Software FootPrints ITSM
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-306, CWE-502, CWE-918
MalwareCustom JSP web shell (watchTowr PoC)
ToolsAspectJWeaver gadget chain, ysoserial
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1087 Account Discovery, T1090.004 Domain Fronting, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1505.003 Web Shell and 3 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsitservices, government administration, health, finance, education, managedserviceproviders
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-03-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1516 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Unexpected JSP Web Shell Written to Tomcat Webroot Post-VIEWSTATE POST (CVE-2025-71260)

Detects a new .jsp file appearing under the FootPrints/Tomcat webroot shortly after a POST to /aspnetconfig/, consistent with the AspectJWeaver deserialization gadget writing a JSP web shell (e.g. watchTowr.jsp or a randomized filename) for post-exploitation persistence.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1505.003, T1036.005
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_defender_atp_deviceevents, windows_security
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11
( TargetFilename="*\\webapps\\ROOT\\*.jsp" OR TargetFilename="*BMC Software\\FootPrints\\web\\*.jsp" )
Image="*\\java*.exe" OR Image="*\\tomcat*\\*"
| eval filename=mvindex(split(TargetFilename, "\\"), -1)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(TargetFilename) as paths by Computer, Image, filename
| convert ctime(first_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let lookback = 24h;
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where FolderPath has_any ("webapps\\ROOT", "BMC Software\\FootPrints\\web") and FileName endswith ".jsp"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java.exe", "javaw.exe", "tomcat9.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), Count=count() by DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath

Sigma

title: New JSP File Written to FootPrints/Tomcat Webroot by Java Process
id: 8f2a1c34-1a11-4f2e-9b4a-tl20261516s2
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of a new .jsp file under the Tomcat webapps/ROOT or FootPrints install web directory by a java/tomcat process, consistent with the CVE-2025-71260 AspectJWeaver deserialization gadget dropping a web shell.
references:
    - https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/bmc-footprints-itsm-viewstate-deserialization-rce
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - cve.2025.71260
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 11
        Image|endswith:
            - '\java.exe'
            - '\javaw.exe'
            - '\tomcat9.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.jsp'
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - 'webapps\ROOT'
            - 'BMC Software\FootPrints\web'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate FootPrints application deployment/upgrade dropping new JSP files (verify against change-management records)
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate FootPrints upgrade or patch deployment writing new JSP application files; correlate with scheduled change windows

Tuning notes: Cross-reference filename against known-legitimate FootPrints deployment manifests; treat randomized/non-descriptive filenames (e.g. MNdeu12Wf.jsp pattern) as higher-confidence malicious versus predictable vendor filenames.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Blind SSRF via FootPrints import/searchWeb or externalfeed/RSS Toward Internal/Reserved Hosts (CVE-2025-71258/CVE-2025-71259) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Tomcat/LOCAL SERVICE Process Anomalous Child Process or File-Write Activity Post-Exploitation (CVE-2025-71260) · unlock with TL Creds
  • AspectJWeaver/ysoserial Gadget-Chain Java Serialized Object Delivered via Multipart POST (rO0AB Marker) · unlock with TL Creds
  • FootPrints Auth-Bypass Reconnaissance: Filter-Chain/Endpoint Enumeration Probing · unlock with TL Creds
  • Vulnerable Deserialization Classpath Libraries Present or Loaded ([indicator] / [indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Randomized-Filename JSP Web Shell Access Post-Deserialization (Detection-Evasion Variant) · unlock with TL Creds
  • BMC FootPrints Guest SEC_TOKEN Issued to Unauthenticated Client (CVE-2025-71257) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Full FootPrints Exploit-Chain Correlation: SEC_TOKEN + SSRF Pivot + VIEWSTATE POST from Single Source · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-03-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 22 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1516.

22 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

BMC shipped hotfixes in September 2025; CVEs were assigned March 2026 and disclosed publicly March 18, 2026 with a working Python PoC.

BMC FootPrints ITSM is an on-premises IT service management / help-desk platform. watchTowr Labs identified that the application's Spring Security filter chain contains an exception for the `/passwordreset/request/` endpoint: a custom `GenericGuestAuthenticationFilter` (backed by `PasswordResetRequestAuthenticationFilter`) calls `applyGuestForThisRequest()` before the standard `isAuthenticated()` check, and under qualifying conditions issues a valid opaque `SEC_TOKEN` session cookie (e.g. `87x0EkX5BFHyWaktfxK5gasnc_LfwWtYsCm5yIorFuwaexEtaK`) to an unauthenticated caller (CVE-2025-71257/WT-2025-0069, CWE-306, missing authentication for critical function). watchTowr reached this finding by systematically enumerating the 58 security-filter regex patterns defined in `deployment/non-version-specific/conf/footprints-application-beans.xml`, extracting `web.xml` and decompiling `.class` files to fingerprint which endpoints the filter chain treats as pre-authenticated.

That guest-authenticated `SEC_TOKEN` cookie is sufficient to reach two further endpoints that perform blind server-side request forgery: `/import/searchWeb?url=` (CVE-2025-71258/WT-2025-0070, `dataEncoding` parameter also accepted) and `/externalfeed/RSS?feedUrl=` (CVE-2025-71259/WT-2025-0071), both of which accept attacker-controlled URLs with no allow-listing or destination validation and confirm out-of-band via callback rather than response content — functioning as an internal-network proxy primitive attackers can use to reach otherwise unreachable internal services.

The critical link in the chain is CVE-2025-71260/WT-2025-0072 (CWE-502, deserialization of untrusted data, CVSS 3.1 8.8), rooted in FootPrints' use of Mono (an open-source .NET runtime implemented in Java) to host ASP.NET-style configuration pages. The `/aspnetconfig/` endpoint (routed through `VmwDynamicServlet` -> `GhDynamicHttpServlet`) accepts a `__VIEWSTATE` parameter that is Base64-decoded (serialized Java objects begin with the recognizable `rO0AB` prefix) and passed directly through `getRequestParameterMap()` -> `get_Form()` -> `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` inside `Mainsoft/Web/Hosting/BaseFacesStateManager.class` with no type filtering. watchTowr found that the parameter is only parsed by the framework when the request Content-Type is `multipart/form-data` (or, alternatively, a GET with a dummy `__VIEWSTATE` plus an `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` body) — a query-string-only VIEWSTATE resolves to null and is not exploitable. Using `ysoserial`'s `AspectJWeaver` gadget (`java -jar ysoserial.jar AspectJWeaver "filename.jsp;BASE64TEXT" | base64`, backed by vulnerable `aspectjweaver-1.9.2` and `commons-collections-3.2.2` on the classpath, gadget attributed to researcher "Jang"), the deserialization is coerced into an arbitrary file write with path-traversal support in the filename parameter, dropping a JSP web shell (e.g., `watchTowr.jsp` in the published PoC, or a randomized filename such as `MNdeu12Wf.jsp` for detection evasion) into the Tomcat web root (`webapps/ROOT/`, under the FootPrints install path `C:\Program Files\BMC Software\FootPrints\web`). Invoking the shell confirms code execution as the `LOCAL SERVICE` account with a working directory under `C:\Program Files\Apache Software Foundation\Tomcat 9.0`; the injected JSP retrieves `user.name` and `user.dir` Java system properties as an immediate post-exploitation discovery step, and file execution requires no separate compilation step since Tomcat interprets JSP directly.

watchTowr additionally notes the Mono/.NET-in-Java implementation detail as an incidental defense-evasion factor: the `__VIEWSTATE` parameter name is conventionally associated with ASP.NET applications, which can mislead defenders and static analysis tooling into treating the deserialization sink as a .NET-specific ViewState issue rather than a Java `ObjectInputStream` vulnerability, and the component's minimal prior CVE history (last CVE in 2014) suggests it received comparatively little security scrutiny prior to this research.

The full chain — guest-token auth bypass -> SSRF-capable pivot -> reach the deserialization sink -> AspectJWeaver gadget -> JSP web shell -> RCE — requires zero credentials and zero user interaction. watchTowr reported all four issues to BMC on 2025-06-06; BMC confirmed reproduction of the RCE on 2025-09-02 and shipped hotfixed builds for every affected release train. CVEs were formally assigned 2026-03-02 and the technical write-up, including a public Python PoC and GitHub repository, was released 2026-03-18.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Discovery

T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1087 Account Discovery

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Command and Control

T1090.004 Domain Fronting

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Persistence

T1505.003 Web Shell

Resource Development

T1588.005 Exploits; T1588.006 Vulnerabilities

Reconnaissance

T1592.002 Software

Remediation

Patches

  • BMC hotfixes for FootPrints 20.20.02 through 20.24.01.001, released 2025-09-02 (per-branch builds: 20.20.03.002, 20.21.02.002, 20.22.01.001, 20.23.01.002, 20.24.01)

Immediate actions

  • Apply the BMC-issued hotfix for your FootPrints version (20.20.02, 20.20.03.002, 20.21.01.001, 20.21.02.002, 20.22.01, 20.22.01.001, 20.23.01, 20.23.01.002, or 20.24.01) immediately
  • Restrict network access to the FootPrints web interface to trusted internal networks / VPN only until patched
  • Monitor for unauthenticated requests to /passwordreset/request/ that result in a SEC_TOKEN cookie being issued
  • Audit webapps/ROOT/ and C:\Program Files\BMC Software\FootPrints\web (and other Tomcat web roots) for unexpected .jsp files and recent web.xml modification timestamps
  • Search access logs for POST requests to /aspnetconfig/ with multipart/form-data bodies containing a __VIEWSTATE field, especially Base64 values beginning with the rO0AB serialized-object prefix

Workarounds

  • Disable or restrict access to /passwordreset/request/, /import/searchWeb, /externalfeed/RSS, and /aspnetconfig/ at a reverse proxy/WAF if hotfixing cannot occur immediately

Longer-term hardening

  • Remove or upgrade the vulnerable aspectjweaver-1.9.2 and commons-collections-3.2.2 library versions bundled with FootPrints where feasible
  • Deploy egress filtering / outbound proxy allow-listing on the FootPrints host to blunt SSRF-as-internal-proxy impact (CVE-2025-71258, CVE-2025-71259)
  • Deploy a WAF/RASP rule blocking multipart POSTs to /aspnetconfig/ containing serialized-object markers in the __VIEWSTATE parameter
  • Deploy EDR/behavioral detection on the Tomcat service account (LOCAL SERVICE) for anomalous file-write and process-spawn activity
  • Review and harden the footprints-application-beans.xml filter-chain configuration for any other pre-authentication endpoint exceptions

Affected and fixed versions

  • BMC Software — FootPrints ITSM
    Vulnerable versions: 20.20.02; 20.21.01; 20.21.02; 20.22.01; 20.23.01; 20.24.01.001
    Fixed in: 20.20.03.002; 20.21.01.001; 20.21.02.002; 20.22.01.001; 20.23.01.002; 20.24.01

Timeline

  • watchTowr Labs discloses all four vulnerabilities (auth bypass, two SSRF, deserialization RCE) to BMC
  • watchTowr provides BMC with the AspectJWeaver gadget-chain RCE technical details
  • BMC acknowledges receipt of the vulnerability report
  • BMC confirms reproduction of 3 of the 4 reported vulnerabilities and requests clarification on the RCE impact
  • watchTowr supplies a working Python PoC demonstrating the auth-bypass-to-RCE chain
  • Extended troubleshooting between watchTowr and BMC; watchTowr supplies file hashes and screenshots of successful exploitation
  • BMC reports internal email/communication issues and promises a status update
  • BMC confirms successful reproduction of the full RCE chain and releases hotfixes for all affected FootPrints version branches (20.20.02 through 20.24.01)
  • CVE-2025-71257, CVE-2025-71258, CVE-2025-71259, and CVE-2025-71260 are formally assigned
  • watchTowr Labs publishes full technical write-up, GitHub PoC repository, and the Python exploit chain publicly
  • The Hacker News covers the disclosure in its ThreatsDay Bulletin roundup

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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