# CVE-2023-36802 (Windows Streaming Service Proxy mskssrv.sys) — Full Exploitation Chain Without NtQuery*/PreviousMode Shortcuts

> STAR Labs published a novel exploitation chain for CVE-2023-36802, a type-confusion/use-after-free vulnerability in the Windows Streaming Service Proxy driver (mskssrv.sys), achieving local privilege escalation to SYSTEM on Windows 11 22H2 using heap manipulation and NPFS queue corruption instead of the previously public NtQuery* kernel-leak and PreviousMode-overwrite shortcuts.

- **Published:** 2026-06-24T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-24T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1539
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-mskssrv-sys-shortcut-free-system-chain-tl-2026-1539.webp?v=a0963569 (Threadlinqs threat intel: CVE-2023-36802 Windows mskssrv.sys LPE: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1539) — High severity, 20 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1539
- **Severity:** HIGH (CVSS 7.8)
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 20
- **CVEs:** CVE-2023-36802, CVE-2023-29360

## Description

CVE-2023-36802 is an Elevation of Privilege vulnerability (CVSS 3.1: 7.8 HIGH, CWE-416 Use-After-Free per Microsoft's advisory, described by STAR Labs as a type-confusion defect) in mskssrv.sys, the kernel-mode driver backing the Microsoft Streaming Service Proxy / Frame Server (NPFS-based media streaming IPC used by the Windows Camera Frame Server). The driver's FSRendezvousServer::FindObject helper accepted both FSContextReg (TypeId=1, 0x78 bytes, pool tag 'CreG', created via IOCTL 0x2F0400/IOCTL_FRAMESERVER_INIT_CONTEXT) and FSStreamReg (TypeId=2, 0x1D8 bytes, pool tag 'SreG', created via IOCTL 0x2F0404/IOCTL_FRAMESERVER_INIT_STREAM) objects without validating which type was actually supplied — specifically, IOCTL_FRAMESERVER_PUBLISH_RX and sibling handlers trusted whatever object type resided in the FsContext2 field. Calling the stream-only handlers PublishTx (0x2F0408), PublishRx (0x2F040C), ConsumeTx (0x2F0410), or ConsumeRx (0x2F0414) against a smaller FSContextReg object caused the driver to interpret it as the much larger FSStreamReg structure, producing out-of-bounds heap read/write. Microsoft's September 2023 patch (KB5030211 for Windows 10, KB5030219/KB5030217 for Windows 11, equivalent Windows Server KBs) renamed FindObject to FindStreamObject and added an explicit TypeId == 2 check, restricting the search exclusively to the StreamList and rejecting FSContextReg objects outright. A related, earlier vulnerability in the same driver, CVE-2023-29360, had been patched in June 2023, underscoring mskssrv.sys as a recurring attack surface. CVE-2023-36802 was exploited in the wild prior to patching, is listed in the CISA KEV catalog (added with an action-due date of 2023-10-03), and was reported to Microsoft by Guanghui Xia and Quan Jin of DBAPPSecurity WeBin Lab. Two public exploitation lineages exist: (1) an original CLFS-based chain (Valentina Palmiotti, IBM X-Force, Oct 2023) that leaks kernel object addresses via NtQuerySystemInformation, corrupts CLFS log-file structures, chains fake object vtables and kernel gadgets, and uses ObfDereferenceObject to zero the current thread's PreviousMode field, then abuses NtReadVirtualMemory/NtWriteVirtualMemory for kernel read/write before copying the SYSTEM token and executing commands with elevated privileges; and (2) the June 2026 STAR Labs chain analyzed here, which deliberately avoids PreviousMode overwrites and NtQuery*-based kernel-address leaks (both now commonly instrumented/detected) in favor of: grooming the non-paged pool with NPFS queue-entry allocations (pool tag 'NpFr', 0x90- and 0x1000-sized LFH buckets) to build a predictable heap layout; using the FSStreamReg::GetStats leak primitive (invoked via the ConsumeTx IOCTL, copying ~32 bytes of queue statistics from object offsets 0x128 [PendingFrames.Count], 0x138 [PendingFrames.Pad3], 0x1a0 [CompletedFrames.Count], 0x1b0 [CompletedFrames.Pad3]) to read adjacent heap object contents including the NpFr2 NPFS queue Flink pointer from adjacent 0x90-sized chunks; triggering an arbitrary-decrement primitive inside FSStreamReg::PublishRx via ObfDereferenceObject on crafted FSFrameMdlEntry structures (MDL pointer fields at offsets 0xA0/0xA8/0xB0/0xB8, control flag Field_C8, requiring the target address+9 to be page-aligned to pass ObDereferenceObject sanity checks) to redirect the Flink pointer into attacker-controlled memory; injecting a fake usermode Dispatch Queue Entry (DQE) into the corrupted NPFS queue (reinforced by an arbitrary-write-of-constant-2 primitive against Field_10 in FSFrameMdl::UnmapPages, achieved by zeroing MDL pointer fields to skip MmUnmapLockedPages) to obtain a stable arbitrary read/write primitive — reads performed via Win32 PeekNamedPipe() against the corrupted pipe to copy controlled kernel addresses into a user buffer, writes performed via a crafted kernel-side IRP whose buffered-I/O completion through IofCompleteRequest() copies attacker data back through SystemBuffer/UserBuffer/IoStatus.Information; walking kernel structures from the leaked IRP (Tail.Overlay.Thread → ETHREAD) and KTHREAD→EPROCESS (offset 0x220) to locate the current process's EPROCESS, then walking ActiveProcessLinks to locate the SYSTEM process (PID 4) EPROCESS; and finally overwriting the current process's Token pointer (_EPROCESS + 0x4b8) with the SYSTEM process's token to complete the privilege escalation. The technique demonstrates that despite Microsoft's patch closing the type-confusion primitive itself, unpatched or legacy builds (Windows 11 22H2 prior to build 22621.2283) remain exploitable via a detection-evasive path that never touches the two artifacts most EDR/kernel-monitoring tooling instruments for this bug class (NtQuerySystemInformation with SystemExtendedHandleInformation / other NtQuery* kernel-leak calls, and PreviousMode field modification), materially raising detection-engineering priority for driver-level IOCTL telemetry, non-paged pool object lifetime/type validation, and NPFS queue-integrity monitoring around mskssrv.sys.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1134 Access Token Manipulation
- T1211 Exploitation for Stealth
- T1134 Access Token Manipulation
- T1070 Indicator Removal
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1106 Native API
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1543 Create or Modify System Process
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1592 Gather Victim Host Information

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**mskssrv.sys Type-Confusion IOCTL Burst — Exploitation Trigger (CVE-2023-36802)** (`TL-2026-1539-SPL-001`)

Detects the sequential IOCTL dispatch signature (INIT_CONTEXT 0x2F0400 -> INIT_STREAM 0x2F0404 -> PublishTx/PublishRx 0x2F0408/0x2F040C -> ConsumeTx/ConsumeRx 0x2F0410/0x2F0414) against \\.\mskssrv from a single process within a tight window, consistent with triggering the FindObject type-confusion primitive to exploit CVE-2023-36802.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1068, T1211
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, driver_ioctl_telemetry
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval driver_touch=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)mskssrv|FrameServer"), 1, 0)
| join type=inner ProcessGuid
    [ search index=endpoint sourcetype="driver:ioctl" DeviceName="\\Device\\mskssrv"
      IoctlCode IN ("0x2F0400","0x2F0404","0x2F0408","0x2F040C","0x2F0410","0x2F0414")
      | stats count dc(IoctlCode) as distinct_ioctls values(IoctlCode) as ioctl_sequence earliest(_time) as first_ioctl latest(_time) as last_ioctl by ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image
      | where distinct_ioctls >= 4 AND (last_ioctl - first_ioctl) <= 5 ]
| where NOT match(Image, "(?i)\\FrameServerService\.exe$|\\svchost\.exe$")
| table _time, ProcessId, Image, User, ioctl_sequence, distinct_ioctls
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "DriverIoControl" or AdditionalFields has "mskssrv"
| where AdditionalFields has_any ("0x2F0400", "0x2F0404", "0x2F0408", "0x2F040C", "0x2F0410", "0x2F0414")
| summarize IoctlCodes = make_set(AdditionalFields), DistinctCodes = dcount(AdditionalFields), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| where DistinctCodes >= 4 and datetime_diff('second', LastSeen, FirstSeen) <= 5
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("FrameServerService.exe")
| project DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, IoctlCodes, FirstSeen, LastSeen
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: mskssrv.sys Type-Confusion IOCTL Burst (CVE-2023-36802)
id: 1b7a3f10-1539-4c9e-9a3e-mskssrv-ioctl-burst
status: experimental
description: Detects a rapid sequential IOCTL dispatch pattern against mskssrv.sys consistent with triggering the CVE-2023-36802 FindObject type-confusion vulnerability from a non-FrameServer process.
references:
    - https://starlabs.sg/blog/2026/06-old-bug-harder-rules-exploiting-cve-2023-36802-without-the-usual-shortcuts/
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-36802
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-19
tags:
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1211
    - cve.2023.36802
logsource:
    category: driver_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_driver:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\mskssrv.sys'
    selection_ioctl:
        IoctlCode:
            - '0x2F0400'
            - '0x2F0404'
            - '0x2F0408'
            - '0x2F040C'
            - '0x2F0410'
            - '0x2F0414'
    filter_legit_service:
        Image|endswith: '\FrameServerService.exe'
    condition: selection_driver and selection_ioctl and not filter_legit_service
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Windows Camera Frame Server activity from FrameServerService.exe
    - Third-party camera/streaming software exercising the driver's documented API surface
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate Windows Camera Frame Server / streaming app exercising the same IOCTL surface

**Tuning notes:** Tighten the time window (currently 5s) based on observed baseline latency between legitimate INIT_CONTEXT/INIT_STREAM calls; exclude known camera/streaming vendor binaries by signed-publisher allowlist rather than image name alone.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- PublishRx Arbitrary-Decrement / UnmapPages Arbitrary-Write Primitive Pair (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PeekNamedPipe / IofCompleteRequest Anomalous Pairing Against NPFS-Backed FrameServer Pipe (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Detection-Evasive Lineage Indicator — SYSTEM Activity Without PreviousMode/NtQuerySystemInformation Artifacts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- EPROCESS Token-Swap Completion — Unattributed SYSTEM Privilege Acquisition (CVE-2023-36802) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Vulnerable Windows Build Actively Servicing [indicator] IOCTLs Outside Camera Frame Server Context (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Post-Escalation Command Execution From [indicator]-Exploiting Process (SYSTEM Shell Spawn / Credential Access) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- NPFS 'NpFr' Pool-Tag Heap-Grooming Burst Preceding Streaming-Service IOCTLs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- FSStreamReg::GetStats Adjacent-Heap Leak via ConsumeTx IOCTL (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [Old Bug, Harder Rules: Exploiting CVE-2023-36802 Without the Usual Shortcuts](https://starlabs.sg/blog/2026/06-old-bug-harder-rules-exploiting-cve-2023-36802-without-the-usual-shortcuts/)
- [CVE-2023-36802 - Security Update Guide - Microsoft MSRC](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-36802)
- [CVE-2023-36802 Detail - NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2023-36802)
- [CVE-2023-36802: Microsoft Streaming Service Proxy Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability | 0-days In-the-Wild](https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2023/CVE-2023-36802.html)
- [CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog - CVE-2023-36802](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-36802)
- [Microsoft Streaming Service Proxy Elevation of Privilege · CVE-2023-36802 · GitHub Advisory Database](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4v34-9x49-p452)
- [CVE-2023-36802: Windows 10 1809 Privilege Escalation Flaw - SentinelOne Vulnerability Database](https://www.sentinelone.com/vulnerability-database/cve-2023-36802/)
- [SB2023091251 - Privilege escalation in Microsoft Streaming Service Proxy](https://www.cybersecurity-help.cz/vdb/SB2023091251)
- [CVE-2023-29360 Detail - NVD (prior mskssrv.sys vulnerability)](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2023-29360)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1539
