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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-1541

CVE-2025-20393 — Cisco Secure Email Gateway RPC Integer Overflow Enabling Auth Bypass and Unsafe Pickle Deserialization (CVSS 10.0), Exploited by China-Nexus APT UAT-9686

criticalACTIVE

A single-byte integer overflow in the EUQ RPC message header of Cisco AsyncOS Software (Secure Email Gateway / Secure Email and Web Manager) lets an unauthenticated remote attacker bypass serial-number authentication and trigger unsafe cPickle deserialization for arbitrary command execution as root.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1541, CVE-2025-20393
Also known asPickling the Mailbox, AsyncOS EUQ RPC Integer Overflow
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS10 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-20393 (added )
EPSSCVE-2025-20393: 32.3% (98.2th percentile)
Affected productsCisco Secure Email Gateway (formerly Email Security Appliance / ESA); Cisco Secure Email and Web Manager (formerly Content Security Management Appliance / SMA)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-20, CWE-190, CWE-502, CWE-287
AttributionUAT-9686 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareAquaPurge, AquaShell, AquaTunnel
ToolsChisel, ReverseSSH
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1059.006 Python, T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1090 Proxy, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1505.003 Web Shell and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, technology, critical-infrastructure, telecoms
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Asia-Pacific
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-02-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1541 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: AquaShell Backdoor Embedding in EUQ WebUI index.py (UAT-9686 Persistence)

Detects modification of the EUQ web server file /data/web/euq_webui/htdocs/index.py -- the documented location where UAT-9686's AquaShell Python backdoor is embedded post-exploitation, granting a persistent, passively-listening unauthenticated command execution capability that survives simple config resets.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1505.003, T1554
  • Data sources: linux:auditd, file:integrity, DeviceFileEvents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=os sourcetype="linux:auditd" OR sourcetype="file:integrity" (path="/data/web/euq_webui/htdocs/index.py" OR TargetFilename="/data/web/euq_webui/htdocs/index.py")
| eval action=coalesce(action, syscall)
| where action IN ("write", "create", "rename", "modify")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(user) as actor by host, path
| table first_seen, last_seen, host, path, actor, count

Microsoft KQL

let LookbackWindow = 24h;
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(LookbackWindow)
| where FolderPath endswith "/data/web/euq_webui/htdocs/index.py"
| where ActionType in ("FileModified", "FileCreated", "FileRenamed")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, ActionType, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| summarize Count = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName, FolderPath

Sigma

title: AquaShell Backdoor File Modification in EUQ WebUI Path
id: 8f2b6a5e-1c3d-4a9e-9b7f-cve202520393b
status: experimental
description: Detects file modification, creation, or rename events targeting the Cisco AsyncOS EUQ webUI index.py file, the documented embedding location for the UAT-9686 AquaShell Python backdoor following CVE-2025-20393 exploitation.
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-9686/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1505.003
    - attack.t1554
    - attack.tool.aquashell
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: linux
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '/data/web/euq_webui/htdocs/index.py'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Cisco-signed firmware upgrades that legitimately replace this file during a patch install (correlate against known maintenance/upgrade windows)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate AsyncOS firmware upgrade or patch installation that rewrites index.py as part of the update process

Tuning notes: Suppress alerts that fall within a documented, change-ticketed patch/upgrade maintenance window; otherwise treat every modification to this file outside a known upgrade as high-priority for immediate hash/diff review against a known-good baseline.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Unauthenticated cPickle Deserialization on EUQ RPC Network Input (CVE-2025-20393) · unlock with TL Creds
  • AquaPurge-Style Anti-Forensic Log Scrubbing on Appliance Logs (UAT-9686) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Non-Standard-Port Outbound Beacon from Email-Security Appliance to Known UAT-9686 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cisco AsyncOS EUQ RPC Exploitation Chain Correlation (Oversized Request + Deserialization) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Root-Level Process Spawned from Cisco AsyncOS EUQ WebUI Path (Post-Exploitation Command Execution) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Chisel/ReverseSSH-Style Tunnel Client Process or Non-Standard-Port Beacon (UAT-9686) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cisco AsyncOS EUQ RPC Oversized Destination-Length Auth-Bypass (CVE-2025-20393) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Chisel/AquaTunnel Reverse-SSH Tunnel Client Execution on Compromised Appliance · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-02-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1541.

Sample indicators (3 of 17)

  • IP address: 172.233.67[.]176
  • URL: hxxps://sec[.]cloudapps[.]cisco[.]com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sma-attack-N9bf4
  • File hash: 2db8ad6e0f43e93cc557fbda0271a436f9f2a478b1607073d4ee3d20a87ae7ef

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 17 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

17 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Cisco confirmed active exploitation since late November 2025 by China-nexus actor UAT-9686, which deployed the AquaShell Python backdoor, AquaTunnel (ReverseSSH-derived) and Chisel tunnels, and the AquaPurge log-cleaning utility.

CVE-2025-20393 affects the Spam Quarantine / End User Quarantine (EUQ) RPC service (TCP port 83, quarantine web UI commonly on port 6025) shipped in Cisco AsyncOS Software for Secure Email Gateway (formerly Email Security Appliance) and Secure Email and Web Manager (formerly Content Security Management Appliance). The EUQ RPC wire format uses the struct layout '>BBIIBB32s' (version, ttl, msg_len, msg_type, src_len, dst_len, txn_tag), where src_len and dst_len are single-byte unsigned-char fields (0-255). Because the service runs under Python 2.6 (EOL since 2013), struct.pack('>B', n) silently truncates n modulo 256 instead of raising struct.error as modern Python does. An attacker can therefore craft a payload whose true length is 256 or 289 bytes so that the encoded destination-length byte wraps to 0 (or to a value matching the appliance's known serial number). When the receiver's read_message() function evaluates 'if destination_length:', a wrapped-to-zero length causes destination to be set to an empty string, which bypasses the check that normally validates the message's destination against the appliance's serial number. The now-unauthenticated message body is then passed directly to cPickle.loads(), Python's insecure object deserializer, allowing an attacker-supplied pickle object with a __reduce__ gadget to execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges via a single crafted HTTP request — no credentials, no user interaction. Cisco's advisory (cisco-sa-sma-attack-N9bf4, published 2025-12-17, updated 2026-01-15) describes the flaw generically as 'Insufficient validation of HTTP requests by the Spam Quarantine feature'; STAR Labs' 2026-02-05 patch-diffing research against AsyncOS 15.5.4 (which adds explicit destination-length validation) reverse-engineered the true integer-overflow/pickle root cause and published a working proof-of-concept demonstrating both the serial-matching and universal zero-length bypass techniques. Cisco Talos separately confirmed exploitation in the wild dating to at least late November 2025 by a Chinese-nexus actor tracked as UAT-9686 (moderate confidence), which Talos assesses shares TTP, infrastructure, and victimology overlaps with APT41 and UNC5174. Post-exploitation, UAT-9686 deployed a persistent Python backdoor (AquaShell) embedded into the appliance's existing EUQ web server file at /data/web/euq_webui/htdocs/index.py, a compiled Go ELF reverse-SSH tunneling implant derived from the open-source ReverseSSH project (AquaTunnel), the open-source Chisel tunneling tool for pivoting into internal networks, and a log-sanitization utility (AquaPurge) that uses egrep-style keyword filtering to strip incriminating lines from appliance logs. Exploitation requires the Spam Quarantine feature to be enabled and its EUQ/administrative interface exposed to the internet — not the default configuration, which limits the vulnerable population but does not reduce severity for exposed appliances. CISA added CVE-2025-20393 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-12-17 with a Federal Civilian Executive Branch remediation deadline of 2025-12-24. No workaround exists; Cisco recommends taking the Spam Quarantine feature off the internet, restricting access to trusted hosts, and rebuilding/reimaging any appliance confirmed compromised, since AquaShell and AquaTunnel persistence can survive simple config resets.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.004 Unix Shell; T1059.006 Python

Privilege Escalation

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Persistence

T1505.003 Web Shell; T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary

Lateral Movement

T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Resource Development

T1587.004 Exploits

defense-impairment

T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs

Remediation

Patches

  • Cisco Secure Email Gateway: upgrade to AsyncOS 15.0.5-016, 15.5.4-012, or 16.0.4-016
  • Cisco Secure Email and Web Manager: upgrade to AsyncOS 15.0.2-007, 15.5.4-007, or 16.0.4-010

Immediate actions

  • Remove the Spam Quarantine / EUQ web interface (TCP port 83, quarantine UI commonly port 6025) from direct internet exposure immediately
  • Restrict administrative and EUQ interfaces to trusted internal hosts and VPN-only access via firewall ACLs
  • Hunt for AquaShell, AquaTunnel, AquaPurge and Chisel artifacts and outbound connections to known UAT-9686 infrastructure (172.233.67.176, 172.237.29.147, 38.54.56.95)
  • Inspect /data/web/euq_webui/htdocs/index.py and other EUQ web server files for unauthorized modifications
  • Rebuild or reimage any Secure Email Gateway / Secure Email and Web Manager appliance with confirmed or suspected compromise indicators — configuration resets alone do not reliably remove implanted persistence
  • Review appliance and upstream firewall/proxy logs for anomalous >256-byte payloads to the EUQ RPC service and unauthenticated HTTP POST requests carrying encoded/base64 command data

Workarounds

  • No vendor-supported workaround exists; the only mitigation prior to patching is removing internet exposure of the Spam Quarantine/EUQ feature

Longer-term hardening

  • Apply the vendor patch (AsyncOS 15.0.5-016 / 15.5.4-012 / 16.0.4-016 for Secure Email Gateway; 15.0.2-007 / 15.5.4-007 / 16.0.4-010 for Secure Email and Web Manager) across the full appliance fleet
  • Establish a policy that Spam Quarantine / EUQ interfaces are never directly internet-facing; require VPN or reverse-proxy with authentication in front of any externally reachable email-security management interface
  • Deploy EDR/host monitoring on appliances where supported and integrate appliance syslog into SIEM/XDR for anomaly detection
  • Enforce SAML/LDAP-based strong authentication for administrative access and disable unused services (HTTP, FTP, Telnet) on the appliance
  • Subscribe to Cisco PSIRT and Talos IOC feeds (Cisco-Talos/IOCs GitHub repository) to stay current on UAT-9686 and related infrastructure

Affected and fixed versions

  • Cisco — Secure Email Gateway (formerly Email Security Appliance / ESA)
    Vulnerable versions: 14.2 and earlier; 15.0; 15.5; 16.0
    Fixed in: 15.0.5-016; 15.5.4-012; 16.0.4-016
  • Cisco — Secure Email and Web Manager (formerly Content Security Management Appliance / SMA)
    Vulnerable versions: 15.0 and earlier; 15.5; 16.0
    Fixed in: 15.0.2-007; 15.5.4-007; 16.0.4-010

Timeline

  • The vulnerable AsyncOS 15.5.3 firmware build (running the legacy Python 2.6 EUQ RPC service later found to silently truncate struct.pack() length fields) is compiled, per STAR Labs' patch-diffing analysis of the firmware image.
  • UAT-9686 begins exploiting CVE-2025-20393 in the wild against internet-exposed Cisco Secure Email Gateway / Secure Email and Web Manager Spam Quarantine interfaces (activity later dated by Cisco Talos to at least late November 2025).
  • Cisco becomes aware of active exploitation activity targeting AsyncOS Spam Quarantine feature and begins incident investigation with Talos.
  • CISA adds CVE-2025-20393 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, setting a Federal Civilian Executive Branch remediation deadline.
  • Cisco publishes security advisory cisco-sa-sma-attack-N9bf4 disclosing CVE-2025-20393 (CVSS 10.0) as 'Insufficient validation of HTTP requests by the Spam Quarantine feature'; Cisco Talos publishes UAT-9686 campaign analysis detailing AquaShell, AquaTunnel, AquaPurge and Chisel.
  • CISA-mandated remediation deadline for Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to mitigate CVE-2025-20393.
  • Cisco updates advisory cisco-sa-sma-attack-N9bf4 to version 2.0 with confirmed fixed AsyncOS releases (15.0.5-016 / 15.5.4-012 / 16.0.4-016 for Secure Email Gateway; 15.0.2-007 / 15.5.4-007 / 16.0.4-010 for Secure Email and Web Manager).
  • STAR Labs researchers obtain the vulnerable AsyncOS 15.5.3 firmware image and begin binary-diffing it against the patched 15.5.4 release to isolate the exact code change addressing CVE-2025-20393.
  • STAR Labs publishes 'Pickling the Mailbox,' a patch-diffing deep dive that reverse-engineers the true single-byte struct.pack() integer-overflow / pickle-deserialization root cause and releases a working proof-of-concept covering both the serial-matching and universal zero-length authentication-bypass techniques.

Sources cited

More from UAT-9686

Other reports on CVE-2025-20393

Previous and next in vulnerability

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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