# HOLLOWGRAPH: .NET NativeAOT Malware Abusing Microsoft Graph API and M365 Calendar Events for C2, Linked to Cavern Manticore/Lyceum (Low Confidence)

> Group-IB identified HOLLOWGRAPH, a Windows .NET NativeAOT-compiled DLL that abuses the Microsoft Graph API to exfiltrate files and receive attacker commands via Microsoft 365 calendar events dated to year 2050, with IPv6 DNS tunneling to cloudlanecdn[.]com used to refresh Entra ID credentials. Twelve infected systems were identified (3 actively communicating) at Israeli entities during a June 3 - July 9, 2026 observation window, with low-confidence links to the Cavern backdoor framework and the Iranian MOIS-nexus actor Lyceum, a suspected OilRig sub-group tracked by Check Point as 'Cavern Manticore.'

- **Published:** 2026-07-20T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-21T18:56:54.758Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1553
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-hollowgraph-graph-api-backdoor-tl-2026-1553.webp?v=24bccec2 (Threadlinqs threat intel: HOLLOWGRAPH NativeAOT C2 Backdoor: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1553) — High severity, 42 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1553
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Cavern Manticore (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 42 (3 shown free below)

## Description

HOLLOWGRAPH is a Windows DLL malware component compiled with .NET NativeAOT, part of a modular toolset that Group-IB assesses shares command-format and plugin-loading overlaps with the Cavern backdoor framework independently profiled by Check Point Research as 'Cavern Manticore' (also tracked historically as 'Cav3rn'). The malware turns a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox/calendar into a bidirectional dead-drop C2 channel: operators create calendar events dated far in the future (2050-05-13) with subjects encoding a 7-character task ID (e.g. 'Event ID: <taskID>'); the implant polls the Microsoft Graph API for these events, downloads encrypted attachments named File{n}.txt, and decrypts them with an embedded RSA-2048 private key using RSA-OAEP-SHA256 to unwrap an AES-256-GCM session key. To exfiltrate data, the implant encrypts target files with a separate RSA-2048 public key, uploads the ciphertext as File{n}.txt attachments to newly created 2050-dated calendar events, and renames the event subject to a 'Boss{..}ID{..}' format for operator triage. A secondary channel uses DNS tunneling over IPv6 AAAA queries to cloudlanecdn[.]com (via the DnsClient.NET library) to refresh Microsoft Entra ID OAuth2 client-credential parameters (tenantId, clientId, clientSecret, target mailbox) when the primary Graph API token expires, encoding roughly 14 usable bytes per IPv6 response reassembled into UTF-8 data. Configuration (hardcoded Entra ID app registration client ID/secret/tenant ID, target mailbox, and both RSA key pairs) is persisted on disk disguised as a benign log file, logAzure.txt. The technique of using separate RSA key pairs for inbound versus outbound traffic prevents cryptographic correlation of the two data flows, and calendar events dated decades in the future keep the C2 artifacts out of normal calendar UI views. Group-IB assesses the campaign as narrowly and deliberately targeted -- 12 total infected Israeli hosts with only 3 actively communicating during the observation window -- consistent with a disciplined, low-noise espionage operation rather than opportunistic malware distribution. Command-format analysis (underscore-delimited '<command>_;;_<arg0>_,_<arg1>_,_<arg2>' structure, base64-encoded numeric self-commands such as '003' for debug-logging toggle) closely mirrors the Cavern backdoor framework, and Group-IB notes technical overlap with a Lyceum .NET backdoor observed in early 2025 (SHA-256 315bdba98c6fe863d39f6afccc727e17d5aea63bf21259444fa988cae56d61c1) and an earlier Lyceum sample referenced in prior state-sponsored-actor reporting (SHA-256 1573e125197ec77d8e9930c611ba2802ee59e19629396b5e99b426b46c53bd25), but explicitly states it 'cannot confidently attribute this activity to any previously identified threat actor.' Independently, Check Point Research's Cavern Manticore report (published 2026-07-06) documents the same broader framework operating against Israeli IT providers and government targets via multi-hop supply-chain compromise -- moving from an initially compromised IT service provider through a second-hop provider before reaching the intended victim, abusing RMM tooling (e.g. SysAid's legitimate software-deployment feature, with Check Point explicitly stating no SysAid vulnerability was involved) for lateral distribution of malicious 'updates.' The Cavern Manticore toolset spans multiple compilation formats (.NET Framework IL-only, Mixed-Mode C++/CLI, and .NET 8 NativeAOT) used deliberately as an anti-analysis layer to force reverse engineers across differing toolchains, and includes DLL-sideloaded agent (uxtheme.dll), communications (n-HTCommp.dll), file-manager (mhm.dll), SQL browser (db.dll), LDAP/AD-recon (ode.dll), network-recon (n-ten.dll), and SOCKS5/WebSocket tunnel (n-sws.dll) modules sideloaded via a trojanized WinDirStat.exe deployment. Check Point attributes Cavern Manticore to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) with overlap to Lyceum (OilRig sub-group) and MuddyWater tradecraft, citing a PDB path referencing developer alias 'rick,' WHOIS registration of hospitalinstallation[.]com through Iranian hosting provider Fars Data, and OilRig/Lyceum-consistent XOR obfuscation, Base64 encoding, and webshell-style ASP.NET handlers (cac.aspx).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1218.009 System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvcs/Regasm
- T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1550.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash
- T1550.003 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket
- T1550.004 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account
- T1087.004 Cloud Account
- T1010 Application Window Discovery
- T1217 Browser Information Discovery
- T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
- T1538 Cloud Service Dashboard
- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1021.003 Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model
- T1021.005 VNC
- T1021.006 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive
- T1025 Data from Removable Media
- T1074 Data Staged
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS
- T1008 Fallback Channels
- T1090 Proxy
- T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**HOLLOWGRAPH Graph API Calendar Event Dated 2050 (Dead-Drop C2 Task Retrieval)** (`TL-2026-1553-SPL-001`)

Detects Microsoft Graph API calendar create/update calls where the event start date is in the far future (e.g. year 2050) and/or the subject matches HOLLOWGRAPH's 'Event ID: <taskID>' or exfil-triage 'Boss{..}ID{..}' subject patterns, indicating abuse of a compromised M365 mailbox as a dead-drop C2 channel.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1078.004
- **Data sources:** o365_management_activity, azure_ad_audit_logs, microsoft_graph_api_audit
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload="OneDrive" OR Workload="Exchange" (Operation="Create" OR Operation="Update") ItemType="Event"
| eval event_start=strftime(strptime(EventStartDateTime, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"), "%Y")
| where event_start>="2049" OR match(Subject, "(?i)Event ID:\s*\w{7}") OR match(Subject, "(?i)Boss\{.*\}ID\{.*\}")
| table _time, UserId, ClientAppId, Subject, EventStartDateTime, ClientIP
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where OfficeWorkload in ("Exchange", "OneDrive") and Operation in ("New-CalendarEvent", "Update-CalendarEvent", "Create", "Update")
| where EventStartDateTime startswith "2050" or Subject matches regex @"(?i)Event ID:\s*\w{7}" or Subject matches regex @"(?i)Boss\{.*\}ID\{.*\}"
| project TimeGenerated, UserId, ClientAppId, Subject, EventStartDateTime, ClientIP
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Microsoft Graph API Calendar Event Dated Decades in the Future (HOLLOWGRAPH C2)
id: 8f2b6b1a-5b1e-4a3f-9c1d-hollowgraph01
status: experimental
description: Detects Microsoft 365 calendar events created or modified via Graph API with a start date decades in the future or subjects matching HOLLOWGRAPH's task-ID/exfil naming convention, used as a dead-drop C2 channel.
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hollowgraph-microsoft-365/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-20
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1078.004
    - cve.na
logsource:
    product: m365
    service: graph_api
    category: application
detection:
    selection_future_date:
        event.start|contains: '2050-'
    selection_subject:
        event.subject|re: '(?i)(Event ID:\s*\w{7}|Boss\{.*\}ID\{.*\})'
    condition: selection_future_date or selection_subject
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate long-range calendar placeholders (rare)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate business use of far-future calendar placeholders (extremely rare, should be investigated)

**Tuning notes:** Narrow the future-date threshold to a specific year range (e.g. >=2040) if the tenant has known legitimate long-range calendar automation; whitelist known service-account UserIds that create recurring placeholder events.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- [indicator] Config Artifact Written Outside Normal Log Directories (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DLL Side-Loading via Trojanized WinDirStat / uxtheme.dll Module Load Chain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Pass-the-Hash / Pass-the-Ticket Alternate Authentication Material Following LDAP Recon (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- High-Entropy IPv6 AAAA Subdomain Query Volume to Suspected DNS-Tunneling Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SOCKS5/WebSocket Proxy Tunnel Module (n-sws.dll) Establishing Internal-to-External Multi-Hop Proxy (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Automated Data Staging and Exfiltration to Cloud Account via RSA-Wrapped Attachment Upload (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Entra ID Client-Credentials OAuth2 Grant with Anomalous Calendar/Mail Graph Scopes (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HOLLOWGRAPH Multi-Hop RMM (SysAid) Package Push to Downstream Client Tenant (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 42)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `cloudlanecdn[.]com`
- File hash: `75e51774b8f79e5f256eaae639635f911b3e744d4774fd6068dd980255621509`
- Domain: `hospitalinstallation[.]com`

Full set of 42 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [HOLLOWGRAPH: Microsoft 365 Abuse Campaign](https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hollowgraph-microsoft-365/)
- [Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/)
- [Iran-Linked Hackers Use New Cavern C2 Framework to Target Israeli Organizations](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/iran-linked-hackers-use-new-cavern-c2.html)
- [Iran-Linked Hackers Using Modular C&C Framework in Cyberattacks](https://www.securityweek.com/iran-linked-hackers-using-modular-cc-framework-in-cyberattacks/)
- [New Iran-Nexus Hacking Group Targets Israel Government and IT Sectors](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/new-iran-hacking-group-targets/)
- [Cavern Manticore Malware Uses Low-Detection .NET Modules for Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement](https://gbhackers.com/cavern-manticore-malware/)
- [Iran-linked hacker group Cavern Manticore targets Israeli IT, government sectors](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-901667)
- [HEXANE, Lyceum, Siamesekitten, Spirlin, Group G1001](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001/)
- [OilRig, COBALT GYPSY, IRN2, APT34, Group G0049](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1553
