# HollowGraph Malware Abuses Microsoft 365 Calendars for Covert C2 via Graph API

> HollowGraph is a Windows backdoor that turns compromised Microsoft 365 calendars into a covert command-and-control channel via the Microsoft Graph API, using DNS tunneling to deliver Entra ID credentials and hybrid RSA/AES-256-GCM encryption to protect Graph traffic. It is attributed with high confidence to the Cavern backdoor framework, which shows technical overlap with the Iranian-nexus actor Lyceum (an OilRig subgroup), though attribution to a specific named actor is not confirmed.

- **Published:** 2026-07-20T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-29T18:28:17.680Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1555
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-cavern-graph-api-calendar-c2-tl-2026-1555.webp?v=d9527c73 (Threadlinqs threat intel: HollowGraph Cavern Framework C2: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1555) — High severity, 45 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1555
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Cavern backdoor framework (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 45 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Group-IB researchers identified HollowGraph in a narrowly scoped campaign against Israeli entities, with 12 confirmed infected systems and observed activity spanning June 3, 2026 to July 9, 2026. Rather than beaconing to attacker-owned infrastructure, HollowGraph abuses the Microsoft Graph API to read and write Microsoft 365 calendar appointments on a compromised mailbox: a 'send' command generates calendar appointments carrying encrypted stolen files as attachments, while a 'get' command searches for operator-planted appointments and retrieves attached instructions. Because all C2 traffic transits Microsoft's own trusted infrastructure, the technique evades network-perimeter and reputation-based defenses that would flag contact with attacker-owned domains. Separately, an unencrypted DNS-tunneling channel is used to deliver and refresh Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) OAuth credentials needed to authenticate to Graph. Graph communications themselves are protected by a hybrid encryption scheme combining RSA (for key exchange) and AES-256-GCM (for payload confidentiality/integrity), with distinct RSA key pairs used per communication direction (inbound vs outbound). Command parsing follows a distinctive delimiter format (`<command>_;;_<arg0>_,_<arg1>_,_<arg2>`) and Base64-encoded numeric command IDs (e.g., `MzU=` decodes to `003`, a debug-logging toggle) consistent with artifacts previously documented in the Cavern / Cavern Manticore .NET post-exploitation framework. Cavern Manticore is a modular, multi-format (.NET Framework / Mixed-Mode C++/CLI / Native AOT) C2 framework linked to Iran's MOIS with technical overlap to OilRig's Lyceum subgroup and MuddyWater; it has previously been deployed via DLL side-loading against a trojanized WinDirStat.exe following a SysAid RMM supply-chain compromise, and includes modules for credential access (DPAPI decryption, LDAP/SMB brute force), lateral movement (SMB admin shares, network drive mapping), network reconnaissance (port scanning, SOCKS5 tunneling), and data staging/archival. The small, targeted victim count and exclusive focus on Israeli entities point to a deliberate espionage operation rather than opportunistic crimeware. HollowGraph and the broader Cavern/Lyceum technique set reflect a wider trend of nation-state actors abusing native Microsoft cloud services (Graph API, Outlook/OAuth tokens as seen in FINALDRAFT/SIESTAGRAPH) to host C2 inside traffic that blends into normal enterprise SaaS usage.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1204 User Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1114 Email Collection
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1102 Web Service
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1132 Data Encoding
- T1090 Proxy
- T1568 Dynamic Resolution
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1012 Query Registry
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1123 Audio Capture
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1129 Shared Modules
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027.002 Software Packing
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**M365 Application-Driven Calendar Event Creation with Attachment (HollowGraph Graph API C2)** (`TL-2026-1555-SPL-003`)

Detects the HollowGraph 'send'/'get' Graph API C2 signature: a non-interactive application/service-principal identity (rather than the mailbox owner) creating or modifying Microsoft 365 calendar events with attachments, or searching for operator-tagged appointments — the core covert C2 channel abusing Microsoft's trusted cloud infrastructure.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1102, T1071.001, T1114, T1560, T1041
- **Data sources:** m365_unified_audit_log, office_activity, azure_ad_signin_logs
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=m365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=Exchange
| where Operation IN ("UpdateCalendarEvent", "New-CalendarEvent", "UpdateInboxRules") OR (Operation="MailItemsAccessed" AND SearchQuery LIKE "%operator%")
| where AppId!="" AND LogonType!="1"
| eval reason="Non-interactive/application identity creating calendar event with attachment or searching operator-tagged appointment (HollowGraph Graph API C2)"
| table _time, UserId, AppId, ClientAppId, Operation, ItemName, AttachmentAdded, reason
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Workload == "Exchange"
| where Operation in ("New-CalendarEvent", "UpdateCalendarEvent") or (Operation == "MailItemsAccessed" and SearchQuery has "operator")
| where isnotempty(AppId) and LogonType != 1
| project TimeGenerated, UserId, AppId, ClientAppId, Operation, ItemName, LogonType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: HollowGraph Application-Driven Calendar Event with Attachment (M365 Audit Log)
id: 4f708fa3-70a2-4fb3-b3a4-708394051627
status: experimental
description: Detects a non-interactive application/service-principal identity creating or modifying an M365 calendar event with an attachment, or searching for operator-tagged appointments — the HollowGraph 'send'/'get' Graph API covert C2 channel.
references:
  - https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/hollowgraph-microsoft-calendars/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-20
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1102
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.t1114
  - attack.t1560
  - attack.t1041
cve.2026.hollowgraph: true
logsource:
  product: m365
  category: audit
detection:
  selection:
    Operation:
      - 'New-CalendarEvent'
      - 'UpdateCalendarEvent'
    AppOnlyContext: true
    AttachmentAdded: true
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate line-of-business apps (scheduling bots, meeting-room automation) that create calendar events with attachments via Graph API
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate scheduling/meeting-automation service principals that create calendar events with attachments as part of normal business workflows

**Tuning notes:** Baseline and allow-list known legitimate scheduling/automation AppIds; alert with higher confidence when the AppId has been recently granted Calendars.ReadWrite/Mail.Read scopes (correlate with Entra ID app-registration audit events).

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Cavern Loader Registry Persistence Following Trojanized WinDirStat Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DPAPI Credential Store Access Followed by LDAP/SMB Brute-Force Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- High-Volume DNS TXT Query Pattern Consistent with Entra ID Credential Tunneling (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern C2 Command Delimiter Pattern in Process Command Line (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Discovery-Stage Recon Chain: Process/Registry/File Enumeration by Non-Standard Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fixed Microsoft-Edge User-Agent with Custom X-User-token Header Across GET/POST (Cavern HTTPS/WebSocket C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HollowGraph Supply-Chain DLL Side-Loading — WinDirStat Loading [indicator] from User Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern SMB Admin-Share Enumeration and Lateral Tool Transfer (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 45)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `hospitalinstallation[.]com`
- File hash: `37e123bd7998af4eae32718ce254776f36365a80ba56952593dab46f536d4066`
- Domain: `adserviceupdate[.]com`

Full set of 45 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [New HollowGraph Malware Hijacks Microsoft 365 Calendars for Covert C2 Communications](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/hollowgraph-microsoft-calendars/)
- [Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/)
- [Lyceum .NET DNS Backdoor](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/lyceum-net-dns-backdoor)
- [Iranian hackers target energy sector with new DNS backdoor](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iranian-hackers-target-energy-sector-with-new-dns-backdoor/)
- [Lyceum .NET DNS Backdoor Detection: Iranian Nation-Backed APT Group Leverages New Hijacking Malware](https://socprime.com/blog/lyceum-net-dns-backdoor-detection-iranian-nation-backed-apt-group-leverages-new-hijacking-malware/)
- [Lyceum APT uses a DNS backdoor to hit the telecom and energy sectors](https://izoologic.com/2022/06/15/lyceum-apt-uses-a-dns-backdoor-to-hit-the-telecom-and-energy-sectors/)
- [From Graph API to Tor, malware gets creative with C2](https://www.thestack.technology/from-microsoft-graph-api-to-tor-new-malware-gets-creative-with-c2/)
- [Iranian Threat Actors: What Defenders Need to Know](https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/iranian-threat-actors-what-defenders-need-to-know)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1555
