# HollowGraph Malware Abuses Microsoft Graph API and M365 Calendar Events (Future-Dated 2050) for Stealthy Command-and-Control

> HollowGraph is a .NET DLL espionage implant that abuses compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox credentials and the Microsoft Graph API to run a covert command-and-control channel through calendar events future-dated to May 13, 2050, backed by a DNS-tunneling channel over IPv6 AAAA records to cloudlanecdn[.]com for credential refresh. Group-IB links the malware's command syntax with high confidence to the Cavern/Cavern Manticore backdoor framework (assessed as Iranian MOIS-affiliated), with a low-confidence technical overlap noted to the Iranian espionage actor Lyceum (HEXANE/Siamesekitten), though no confident attribution to a specific named group has been made.

- **Published:** 2026-07-20T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-20T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1561
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-hollowgraph-graph-api-c2-tl-2026-1561.webp?v=1f1687bd (Threadlinqs threat intel: HollowGraph Calendar C2 via Graph API: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1561) — High severity, 15 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1561
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Cavern Manticore (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 15 (1 shown free below)

## Description

HollowGraph is a newly documented .NET DLL-based espionage implant discovered by Group-IB that weaponizes legitimate, trusted Microsoft 365 infrastructure as a command-and-control (C2) dead drop, requiring no exploited vulnerability -- only a compromised mailbox account and Microsoft Graph API access. The malware authenticates to the Microsoft Graph API using stolen Microsoft 365 mailbox credentials (Entra ID tenant ID, application/client ID, and client secret) and then uses the target mailbox's Calendar feature as a covert two-way communication channel. The operator plants tasking inside calendar events deliberately future-dated to 2050-05-13, with a fixed retrieval/activity window of 22:00-23:00 UTC on that date, so that the implant's beaconing traffic and the associated calendar objects blend into ordinary, rarely-audited M365 activity and evade time-based detection heuristics. Two commands are supported: GET, in which the implant searches the calendar for operator-planted events (subject patterns such as 'Event ID: <7-char-taskID>' or bare GUIDs), downloads the attached tasking, and decrypts it; and SEND, in which the implant creates new calendar events (subject pattern 'Boss{..}ID{..}') with encrypted stolen data attached as files named in a 'File{n}.txt' pattern for exfiltration. All Graph-channel payloads are protected with a hybrid RSA + AES-256-GCM encryption scheme using two distinct RSA key pairs -- one per communication direction (inbound tasking vs. outbound exfiltrated data) -- so that operator and implant traffic cannot be decrypted by intercepting a single key. A secondary, unencrypted DNS-tunneling channel is used strictly for credential refresh: the implant issues DNS queries for IPv6 AAAA records against the attacker-registered domain cloudlanecdn[.]com, and each returned IPv6 address is used to smuggle 14 usable payload bytes, which are reassembled to deliver updated Microsoft Entra ID credentials (tenant ID, client ID, client secret, target mailbox address) and the C2 domain itself. All configuration state -- credentials, RSA keys, C2 domain, mailbox target -- is persisted locally to a file named logAzure.txt, styled to blend in among legitimate Azure/Entra logging artifacts. Group-IB observed at least 12 infected systems, of which 3 were actively communicating with the C2 infrastructure between June 3, 2026 and July 9, 2026, indicating a small, deliberately narrow, highly targeted operation rather than a mass-scale campaign; targeting is assessed to be focused on an organization in Israel, consistent with an espionage rather than financially motivated objective. On the command syntax, Group-IB matched the implant's tasking format (compact key-value strings such as '{"cid": "oXhLaJ0ZvtPb9XB", "type": "self", "cmd": "003_;;__,_"}' and command codes such as base64 'MzU=' decoding to '003', a debug-logging toggle) to the previously catalogued Cavern backdoor framework with high confidence, attributing infrastructure overlap to the Cavern Manticore cluster, which is separately assessed by other researchers as linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and to share tradecraft with MuddyWater and Lyceum/OilRig-adjacent operators. A weaker, low-confidence technical overlap was additionally noted between HollowGraph and Lyceum (aka HEXANE, Siamesekitten, Spirlin, Chrono Kitten, MarnanBridge), an Iranian-nexus espionage group active since at least 2017 against energy, telecom, aviation, ISP, and government targets in the Middle East and Africa, previously known for DNS-based backdoors (DanBot, DnsSystem, Milan, Kevin, Shark) and use of the open-source tools Empire, Mimikatz, and PoshC2. Group-IB explicitly states it cannot confidently attribute HollowGraph to any single previously identified threat actor. Because the abuse relies entirely on legitimate Graph API functionality and valid (stolen) OAuth/Entra ID credentials rather than a software vulnerability, no vendor patch applies; defensive guidance centers on identity and access controls -- auditing and restricting client-credential OAuth applications with Graph permissions, alerting on newly created client secrets, enforcing Conditional Access and credential rotation, deploying anomalous token/impossible-travel detection, auditing Graph and mailbox audit logs for app-driven calendar create/read events (especially events dated far in the future), and hunting for anomalous outbound IPv6 AAAA DNS queries and high-entropy subdomain patterns consistent with tunneling.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1550.001 Application Access Token
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files
- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
- T1074.002 Remote Data Staging
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1071.004 DNS
- T1132.001 Standard Encoding
- T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver
- T1571 Non-Standard Port
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration
- T1565 Data Manipulation

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**HollowGraph — M365 Calendar Event Created With Far-Future Date via Application Identity** (`TL-2026-1561-SPL-001`)

Detects Microsoft Graph API calendar-event creation performed by a non-interactive (client-credential/application) identity where the event start date is set far in the future (e.g. year 2050), matching HollowGraph's dead-drop tasking mechanism that uses a fixed 2050-05-13 22:00-23:00 UTC window to blend into rarely-audited calendar activity.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1102.001, T1078.004
- **Data sources:** o365_management_activity, azure_ad_signin_logs, unified_audit_log
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=Exchange Operation IN ("New-CalendarEvent", "Update-CalendarEvent", "MailItemsAccessed")
| eval event_start=strptime(EventStartTime, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
| eval event_year=strftime(event_start, "%Y")
| where event_year >= 2040 AND (AppId!="" OR AuthenticationType="OAuth2:ClientCredentials")
| table _time UserId AppId MailboxOwnerUPN Operation EventStartTime EventSubject ClientIP
| where isnotnull(EventStartTime)
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Operation in ("New-CalendarEvent", "Update-CalendarEvent", "MailItemsAccessed")
| where isnotempty(ClientAppId)
| extend EventStartYear = datetime_part("year", todatetime(tostring(parse_json(Parameters).EventStartTime)))
| where EventStartYear >= 2040
| project TimeGenerated, UserId, ClientAppId, MailboxOwnerUPN, Operation, EventStartYear, ClientIP
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Microsoft Graph Calendar Event Created With Far-Future Date (HollowGraph Dead Drop)
id: 3f1a9c2e-4b6d-4a91-9e12-hg1561spl001
status: experimental
description: Detects M365/Graph API calendar events created or updated via an application (client-credential) identity with an event start date far in the future, consistent with HollowGraph's 2050-05-13 dead-drop tasking mechanism.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-hollowgraph-malware-uses-microsoft-graph-for-stealthy-c2-comms/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/07/20
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102.001
logsource:
    product: m365
    service: graph_api
category: application
detection:
    selection:
        Operation:
            - 'New-CalendarEvent'
            - 'Update-CalendarEvent'
        EventStartYear|gte: 2040
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate long-range recurring meeting placeholders or test-tenant seed data (rare)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate long-range recurring meeting placeholders or calendar test fixtures dated years ahead (rare in production tenants)

**Tuning notes:** Narrow the year threshold (>=2040) per environment norms; correlate with AppId reputation and exclude known scheduling/automation service principals with a documented business need for far-dated events.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- HollowGraph — Calendar Event Subject Matches Cavern/HollowGraph Tasking Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HollowGraph — Anomalous OAuth Client-Credential Secret Added to Graph App With Calendar/Mail Scopes (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HollowGraph — Encrypted [indicator] Attachment Staged to Application-Created Calendar Event (Exfiltration) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Application Access Token Reuse for Mailbox Calendar Dead-Drop C2 (Initial Access / Valid Cloud Accounts) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Backdoor Command Syntax Observed in Decrypted Graph API Tasking Payload (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Data Staged for Remote Exfiltration via Encrypted Calendar Attachment (RSA+AES Hybrid Scheme) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HollowGraph — [indicator] Credential-Blend Artifact Written Outside Legitimate Azure Paths (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HollowGraph — High-Entropy IPv6 AAAA DNS Queries Consistent With Credential-Refresh Tunneling (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (1 of 15)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `cloudlanecdn[.]com`

Full set of 15 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [New HollowGraph malware uses Microsoft Graph for stealthy C2 comms](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-hollowgraph-malware-uses-microsoft-graph-for-stealthy-c2-comms/)
- [HollowGraph Malware Hides C2 and Stolen Files in Microsoft 365 Events Dated 2050](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/hollowgraph-malware-hides-c2-and-stolen.html)
- [New HollowGraph Malware Hijacks Microsoft 365 Calendars for Covert C2](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/hollowgraph-microsoft-calendars/)
- [HOLLOWGRAPH: Attackers Turn Outlook Calendar Into a Secret Command Channel](https://windowsnews.ai/article/hollowgraph-attackers-turn-outlook-calendar-into-a-secret-command-channel.439660)
- [New Malware Campaign Exploits Microsoft Graph API to Infect Windows](https://hackread.com/malware-exploits-microsoft-graph-api-infect-windows/)
- [What We Can Learn from The New Malware Abusing Microsoft](https://www.firetail.ai/blog/what-we-can-learn-from-the-new-malware-abusing-microsoft)
- [HEXANE, Lyceum, Siamesekitten, Spirlin, Group G1001 | MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001/)
- [Active Exploitation Alert: Iranian Cavern Manticore APT Abuses SysAid Supply Chain With Modular Cavern C2 Malware Targeting Israeli Organizations](https://www.rescana.com/post/active-exploitation-alert-iranian-cavern-manticore-apt-abuses-sysaid-supply-chain-with-modular-cavern-c2-malware-targeti)
- [LYCEUM (Threat Actor) - Malpedia](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/lyceum)
- [TLP:WHITE A new .NET-based DNS Backdoor Used by Lyceum](https://www.ncsc.gov.bh/assets/images/51_Advisory_A_New_NET_based_DNS_Backdoor_Used_by_Lyceum_de90408416.pdf)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1561
