# HOLLOWGRAPH: Microsoft 365 Calendar-Based C2 Malware Targeting Israeli Organizations (Cavern Manticore)

> A stealthy .NET-compiled malware component dubbed HOLLOWGRAPH abuses the Microsoft Graph API and compromised Microsoft 365/Entra ID accounts to plant covert command instructions and exfiltrate data via calendar events dated 2050-05-13, targeting Israeli organizations in a suspected espionage operation. Group-IB attributes HOLLOWGRAPH with high confidence to the Cavern modular backdoor framework, which Check Point Research ties to an Iran-nexus actor tracked as Cavern Manticore (MOIS-linked), with technical overlap to MuddyWater and a low-confidence link to Lyceum.

- **Published:** 2026-07-20T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-20T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1567
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-hollowgraph-israel-calendar-c2-tl-2026-1567.webp?v=419d05ad (Threadlinqs threat intel: HOLLOWGRAPH Malware Targets Israel: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1567) — High severity, 30 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1567
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Cavern Manticore (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 30 (3 shown free below)

## Description

HOLLOWGRAPH is a .NET DLL implant that treats the calendar of a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox as a two-way covert dead drop, wrapping all command-and-control traffic inside legitimate Microsoft Graph API requests so that it blends into ordinary Microsoft 365 application traffic and never contacts an attacker-owned server directly for tasking. The implant supports exactly two commands: 'get' (retrieve operator tasking) and 'send' (exfiltrate stolen data). To pull tasking, HOLLOWGRAPH queries the compromised mailbox's calendar for an event planted by the operator and dated 2050-05-13 -- roughly 24 years in the future -- so the legitimate mailbox owner is unlikely to ever scroll to it. Event subjects follow bare-GUID or 'Event ID:' / 'Boss{..}ID{..}' naming patterns, and instructions are read from an attached File{n}.txt-style attachment. To exfiltrate, the malware reverses the process: it encrypts the stolen file, creates its own far-future calendar event, and uploads the data as one or more attachments. All calendar-borne communications are secured with a hybrid RSA + AES-256-GCM encryption scheme, using distinct RSA key pairs for inbound tasking versus outbound exfiltration.

A secondary channel supports credential refresh: HOLLOWGRAPH performs DNS tunneling over IPv6 AAAA record queries to the attacker domain cloudlanecdn[.]com, extracting roughly 14 usable payload bytes per 16-byte IPv6 address, reassembling multiple query responses into a UTF-8 payload that updates locally cached Entra ID (Azure AD) credential material. This DNS channel is unencrypted, unlike the calendar channel. A local artifact, logAzure.txt, disguises stored credentials and encryption key material as a routine Azure logging file.

Group-IB ties HOLLOWGRAPH to the Cavern framework with high confidence based on shared command syntax and matching internal tasking structure, but states it cannot confidently attribute the campaign to a previously identified threat actor at high confidence. Check Point Research separately documented Cavern -- a modular, three-format .NET backdoor framework (standard .NET Framework IL, Mixed-Mode C++/CLI, and .NET 8 NativeAOT) -- and attributed it to an Iran-nexus, Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)-linked cluster it calls Cavern Manticore, which overlaps technically with the known Iranian actors MuddyWater and OilRig's Lyceum subgroup. In a related, separately reported intrusion, Cavern Manticore abused the legitimate software-deployment feature of an already-compromised SysAid RMM instance (no SysAid vulnerability was involved) to push a DLL-sideloading package -- WinDirStat.exe alongside a trojanized uxtheme.dll (the Cavern Agent) -- to a second host inside the same victim network, from which additional Cavern modules (n-HTCommp.dll for HTTPS/WebSocket transport, mhm.dll for file operations and DPAPI credential decryption, db.dll for SQL database enumeration, ode.dll for LDAP/AD reconnaissance and brute-force, n-ten.dll for network/SMB reconnaissance, n-sws.dll for SOCKS5/WebSocket tunneling) were deployed on demand. Cavern's C2 infrastructure is registered through the Iranian hosting/registrar Fars Data, with domains including hospitalinstallation[.]com and its subdomains auth.hospitalinstallation[.]com and google.com.hospitalinstallation[.]com (the latter using a lookalike subdomain for visual obfuscation), plus legacy infrastructure adserviceupdate[.]com and hygienehistory[.]com. Group-IB observed at least 12 infected systems, three of them actively communicating with the operator, across a campaign window running from 3 June to 9 July 2026, consistent with a small, selective footprint indicative of targeted espionage rather than opportunistic crime.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1072 Software Deployment Tools
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1001 Data Obfuscation
- T1090 Proxy
- T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1102 Web Service
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**HOLLOWGRAPH Far-Future Calendar Dead-Drop Event via Graph API** (`TL-2026-1567-SPL-001`)

Detects Microsoft Graph API calendar events dated far in the future (e.g. 2050-05-13) with bare-GUID or 'Boss{..}ID{..}' subjects and File{n}.txt-style attachments — the HOLLOWGRAPH covert tasking/exfiltration dead-drop pattern.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1001.002, T1027
- **Data sources:** o365_management_activity, microsoft_graph_audit_logs, exchange_online_audit
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=Exchange Operation IN ("New-CalendarEvent","UpdateCalendarEvent","MailItemsAccessed")
| eval event_start=strftime(strptime(EventData.start, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"), "%Y")
| where event_start>"2049"
| eval subj=EventData.subject
| where match(subj, "^(Boss\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}ID\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}|[0-9a-fA-F-]{36})$") OR match(EventData.attachment_name, "File[0-9]+\.txt")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by user_id, subj, EventData.attachment_name
| where count>=1
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Workload == "Exchange" and Operation in ("New-CalendarEvent","UpdateCalendarEvent")
| extend EventSubject = tostring(parse_json(Parameters).subject), EventStart = tostring(parse_json(Parameters).start)
| where EventStart startswith "2050-" or EventStart startswith "2049-"
| where EventSubject matches regex @"^(Boss\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}ID\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}|[0-9a-fA-F-]{36})$"
| project TimeGenerated, UserId, EventSubject, EventStart, ClientIP
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: HOLLOWGRAPH M365 Calendar Dead-Drop Event with Far-Future Timestamp
id: 8b1f6e3a-hollowgraph-calendar-deaddrop
status: experimental
description: Detects a Microsoft Graph calendar event dated far in the future with a bare-GUID or Boss{..}ID{..} subject, consistent with HOLLOWGRAPH's covert dead-drop tasking/exfiltration channel.
references:
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/hollowgraph-malware-hides-c2-and-stolen.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-20
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1001.002
    - cve.2026.hollowgraph
logsource:
    product: m365
    service: graph_api
    category: application
detection:
    selection_subject:
        EventSubject|re: '^(Boss\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}ID\{[0-9a-fA-F-]+\}|[0-9a-fA-F-]{36})$'
    selection_date:
        EventStartDate|startswith: '2050-'
    selection_attachment:
        AttachmentName|re: 'File[0-9]+\.txt'
    condition: selection_date and (selection_subject or selection_attachment)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate far-future placeholder events (rare)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate far-future placeholder/test calendar events created by scheduling automation

**Tuning notes:** Tune the year threshold (currently >2049) to the organization's realistic scheduling horizon; correlate matches with the account's Calendars.ReadWrite OAuth grant history to reduce noise.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Anomalous OAuth App Registration with Calendars.ReadWrite/Mail.Read Graph Scopes (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DPAPI Credential Decryption Consistent with Cavern mhm.dll Module (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- LDAP/AD Enumeration and SMB Brute-Force Consistent with Cavern ode.dll/n-ten.dll (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern C2 HTTPS Beacon with Static User-Agent and X-User-token Header (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SOCKS5/WebSocket Tunnel Proxy Consistent with Cavern n-sws.dll (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Disguised Credential/Key-Material Artifact Files ([indicator], [indicator], [indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- WinDirStat.exe DLL Side-Load of Trojanized uxtheme.dll (Cavern Agent) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- High-Volume AAAA DNS Tunneling to Cavern C2 Domains (Entra ID Credential Refresh) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 30)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `cloudlanecdn[.]com`
- File hash: `37e123bd7998af4eae32718ce254776f36365a80ba56952593dab46f536d4066`
- Domain: `hospitalinstallation[.]com`

Full set of 30 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Hackers Weaponizing Microsoft 365 Calendar Invites Into Malware](https://cybersecuritynews.com/microsoft-365-calendar-invites-into-malware/)
- [HollowGraph Malware Hides C2 and Stolen Files in Microsoft 365 Events Dated 2050](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/hollowgraph-malware-hides-c2-and-stolen.html)
- [New HollowGraph malware uses Microsoft Graph for stealthy C2 comms](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-hollowgraph-malware-uses-microsoft-graph-for-stealthy-c2-comms/)
- [New HollowGraph Malware Hijacks Microsoft 365 Calendars for Covert C2](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/hollowgraph-microsoft-calendars/)
- [Microsoft 365 calendars become spy drop boxes in HOLLOWGRAPH campaign](https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/07/20/microsoft-365-calendars-become-spy-drop-boxes-in-hollowgraph-campaign/5274982)
- [HOLLOWGRAPH: Attackers Turn Outlook Calendar Into a Secret Command Channel](https://windowsnews.ai/article/hollowgraph-attackers-turn-outlook-calendar-into-a-secret-command-channel.439660)
- [Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/)
- [From Graph API to Tor, malware gets creative with C2](https://www.thestack.technology/from-microsoft-graph-api-to-tor-new-malware-gets-creative-with-c2/)
- [Cavern Manticore Malware Uses Low-Detection .NET Modules for Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement](https://gbhackers.com/cavern-manticore-malware/)
- [Active Exploitation Alert: Iranian Cavern Manticore APT Abuses SysAid Supply Chain With Modular Cavern C2 Malware Targeting Israeli Organizations](https://www.rescana.com/post/active-exploitation-alert-iranian-cavern-manticore-apt-abuses-sysaid-supply-chain-with-modular-cavern-c2-malware-targeti)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1567
