# Project CAV3RN / Cavern Manticore: Iran-Linked Modular Cyberespionage Framework Abuses Outlook Calendar (Microsoft Graph API) and DNS AAAA Records for C2 and Credential Recovery

> Kaspersky GReAT identified AzureCommunication.dll, a new .NET Native AOT communication module for the modular Project CAV3RN cyberespionage framework, that exchanges commands and results via Outlook calendar events on a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox (using Microsoft Graph API) and falls back to exfiltrating replacement Entra credentials through DNS AAAA queries to actor-controlled infrastructure when Graph authentication fails. Check Point Research independently tracks the same/related framework as "Cavern Manticore," a modular, triple-compiled (.NET Framework, Mixed-Mode C++/CLI, .NET Native AOT) toolset deployed via SysAid software abuse and DLL sideloading against Israeli law firms, HR companies, IT providers, government, and defense contractors, with low-to-medium confidence attribution to Iran's MOIS and technical overlap with MuddyWater and Lyceum (an OilRig/APT34 subgroup).

- **Published:** 2026-07-21T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-21T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1588
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-cav3rn-outlook-calendar-c2-tl-2026-1588.webp?v=21626959 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Project CAV3RN Cavern Manticore: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1588) — High severity, 30 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1588
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** APT34 (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 30 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Project CAV3RN (internally "Cav3rn"/"Cavern") is a modular cyberespionage framework that Kaspersky has tracked since December 2025 and that Check Point Research independently tracks under the name "Cavern Manticore." The framework evolved from a monolithic Cav3rn-era agent using steganographic PNG-based transport and a WebShell command handler into a controller-based architecture (observed by April 2026) built around a persistent controller component, uxtheme.dll (the "Cavern Agent"), which manages an Agent ID, a polling loop, and command routing, and which loads swappable native communication and post-exploitation plugin modules.

Initial access in the Cavern Manticore intrusions leverages abuse of the SysAid IT service-management software's update feature to deliver a DLL sideloading chain: a legitimate loader is abused to load the trojanized uxtheme.dll (Cavern Agent), which in turn loads the native communication module n-HTCommp.dll for HTTPS/WebSocket-based C2 connectivity. Deliberate compilation-format diversity across the .NET Framework (IL-only, symbol-rich), Mixed-Mode C++/CLI, and .NET 8 Native AOT (fully native, metadata-stripped) forms is used as an explicit anti-analysis strategy, forcing defenders to switch reverse-engineering toolchains between modules; per-module AppDomain isolation further limits in-memory artifact recovery, and NativeAOT runtime descriptors hide P/Invoke API imports from standard import-table analysis.

The most recent and most novel module, AzureCommunication.dll, replaces the legacy n-HTCommp.dll HTTP/WebSocket channel with a covert channel built entirely on legitimate Microsoft 365 services. Compiled with .NET Native AOT (single exported function QueryInterface, accepting a null-terminated UTF-16 command string in the form get_;;_<agent-id>_,_<legacy-url> or send_;;_<agent-id>_,_<legacy-url>_,_<result>), the module stores its configuration in a file named logAzure.txt containing a hardcoded Microsoft Entra tenant ID, application (client) credentials, the target mailbox address, a DNS bootstrap hostname, and an embedded RSA key pair. Using the Microsoft Graph API against a compromised Israeli law-firm Microsoft 365 mailbox, the module creates and reads calendar events that function as an asynchronous C2 dead-drop: all events are scheduled inside a single fixed one-hour window (2050-05-13 22:00-23:00 UTC) far in the future so they never surface in a normal calendar view. Event subjects encode message type and agent identity: "Event ID: <agent-id>" carries operator-to-agent commands, "Boss update ID: <agent-id>1500" is an agent heartbeat, and "Boss Report ID: <agent-id>1500" carries agent-to-operator results. Command payloads embedded in event bodies are protected with RSA-OAEP-SHA256 (256-byte key-transport block) wrapping an AES-256-GCM-encrypted body; the implant decrypts using its embedded RSA private key and re-encrypts results before writing its own calendar event.

When Microsoft Graph authentication fails (e.g., revoked application credentials or blocked tenant), AzureCommunication.dll falls back to a DNS AAAA-based configuration-recovery channel against the actor-registered domain cloudlanecdn[.]com (registered 2025-12-24; delegated to dedicated nameservers ns1-ns4.cloudlanecdn[.]com on 2026-05-02). Agent IDs are converted to uppercase hexadecimal (e.g., SFmLgQZ -> 53466D4C67515A) and embedded into subdomain labels. A length query of the form d.<hex-agent-id>.<field-index>.p.<host> returns the size of a requested configuration field (TenantId, ClientId, ClientSecret, or UserEmail) encoded in bytes 2-3 of the returned AAAA (IPv6) address; the module then issues sequential data queries of the form d.<hex-agent-id>.<field-index>.<offset>.q.<host>, each returning a 14-byte chunk of the field value embedded in the AAAA response bytes, until the full value is reassembled. A sentinel response of 2001:4998:44:3507::8000 signals that no data is currently available for that query, allowing the implant to retry. This mechanism lets the operators silently rotate compromised Entra application credentials for the primary channel without needing a working authenticated session.

Check Point's overlapping "Cavern Manticore" reporting documents a broader plugin family alongside the Cavern Agent and communication modules: mhm.dll (file-manager, including DPAPI blob decryption), db.dll (SQL Server/database browsing and querying), ode.dll (LDAP/Active Directory reconnaissance and brute-forcing), n-ten.dll (network reconnaissance, port scanning, SMB brute-forcing), and n-sws.dll (SOCKS5 proxying and WebSocket protocol tunneling for pivoting into internal networks). The framework implements a command-ID taxonomy of roughly 60 numbered operator commands spanning agent self-management, host/token/DPAPI info gathering, SQL operations, file/directory manipulation, LDAP/AD enumeration and brute force, process/registry/service management (present in code but not deployed in the current modular build), archive/compression, network reconnaissance (DNS, interfaces, ping, ARP, port scan), SMB operations, and local/domain user and group enumeration -- consistent with an operational focus on credential harvesting, internal reconnaissance, and lateral movement following an initial IT-provider or professional-services foothold. Debug artifacts (a PDB path referencing a developer alias, English-language error strings with informal phrasing and typos) indicate hands-on human development, in some cases alongside apparent AI-assisted boilerplate.

Victimology centers on Israeli organizations -- specifically law firms and human-resources companies in the Kaspersky-documented AzureCommunication.dll intrusion, and IT service providers, government bodies, and defense contractors in the broader Cavern Manticore reporting, consistent with a supply-chain strategy of compromising IT/MSP infrastructure as a first-hop pivot into higher-value downstream government and defense targets; related reporting also references a wider Middle East footprint (aviation, energy, and public-sector targeting extending to Egypt and the UAE). Attribution to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)-linked activity is assessed at low-to-medium confidence, based on: use of trusted Microsoft-hosted services for C2 (paralleling known OilRig/APT34 tradecraft such as RDAT's use of Exchange Web Services and OilCheck's use of Microsoft Graph), a DNS-based secondary/fallback recovery channel for configuration data (paralleling OilBooster's HTTP-based token-recovery mechanism and OilRig's long history of DNS tunneling), targeting overlap and TTP overlap with MuddyWater and Lyceum (assessed as an OilRig/APT34 subgroup), and the abuse of compromised regional (Israeli) infrastructure consistent with prior OilRig-linked Solar and Whisper/Veaty malware activity. No CVE or exploited software vulnerability underlies this campaign; the SysAid abuse described in overlapping reporting is a feature/update-mechanism abuse rather than a documented CVE, and the framework's initial access relies on supply-chain/IT-provider trust abuse rather than a specific unpatched flaw.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1569.002 Service Execution
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1547.013 XDG Autostart Entries
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1027.004 Compile After Delivery
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1027.003 Steganography
- T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1538 Cloud Service Dashboard
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1021.006 Windows Remote Management
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1071.004 DNS
- T1008 Fallback Channels
- T1090.002 External Proxy
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
- T1102 Web Service
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Cavern Agent DLL Side-Loading via SysAid/WinDirStat Loader Chain — Initial Access** (`TL-2026-1588-SPL-001`)

Detects uxtheme.dll (Cavern Agent controller) or n-HTCommp.dll/AzureCommunication.dll loaded from a non-system directory by a legitimate SysAid or WinDirStat process image, consistent with the documented DLL side-loading initial-access chain used to establish the Project CAV3RN / Cavern Manticore modular framework.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1199, T1574.002, T1569.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_image_load
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7
| eval img=lower(Image), imgloaded=lower(ImageLoaded)
| where (imgloaded="*\\uxtheme.dll" OR imgloaded="*\\n-htcommp.dll" OR imgloaded="*\\azurecommunication.dll")
| where NOT match(img, "^c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\")
| where (like(img, "%sysaid%") OR like(img, "%windirstat%"))
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by Computer, img, imgloaded, Signed, SignatureStatus
| where count > 0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("uxtheme.dll", "n-HTCommp.dll", "AzureCommunication.dll")
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath !startswith @"C:\Windows\System32"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("SysAid", "WinDirStat")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Cavern Agent DLL Side-Loading via SysAid/WinDirStat Loader
id: 8c1a5b1e-3f7d-4a4e-9b0a-1c2d3e4f5a01
status: experimental
description: Detects side-loading of uxtheme.dll or related Cavern Manticore/Project CAV3RN modules from a non-system directory by a SysAid or WinDirStat process, consistent with the documented initial-access DLL side-loading chain.
references:
    - https://securelist.com/project-cav3rn-cyberespionage-framework-using-outlook-and-dns/120757/
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-21
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1199
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.defense-evasion
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_image:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\uxtheme.dll'
            - '\n-HTCommp.dll'
            - '\AzureCommunication.dll'
    selection_process:
        Image|contains:
            - 'SysAid'
            - 'WinDirStat'
    filter_system:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\'
    condition: selection_image and selection_process and not filter_system
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate SysAid or WinDirStat update activity in rare edge cases (verify hash/signature)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate SysAid or WinDirStat software update/maintenance loading unrelated non-system DLLs — verify file hash and code-signing certificate before escalation

**Tuning notes:** Add an allowlist of known-good SysAid/WinDirStat install paths and vendor code-signing thumbprints; expand imgloaded list with additional module names (mhm.dll, db.dll, ode.dll, n-ten.dll, n-sws.dll) as new samples are observed.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Anomalous Microsoft Graph Calendar Events Scheduled in Fixed Far-Future Window — Outlook C2 Dead-Drop (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Entra Application OAuth Grant Anomaly — Narrow Calendars.ReadWrite/Mail Scope Abuse (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SOCKS5 Proxy / WebSocket Tunneling Pivot Activity — [indicator] Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RSA-OAEP/AES-GCM Encrypted Calendar Payload Blob Characteristics — Dead-Drop Command Exchange (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sequential Hex-Labeled AAAA DNS Queries Against Non-Corporate Apex Domain — Config-Recovery Channel (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Named Mutex + DLL Side-Load + Far-Future Calendar Event Composite Chain — Full Cavern Agent Kill Chain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Agent Mutex Creation and Plaintext Entra Credential File Access — Persistence & Credential Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Post-Exploitation LDAP/AD Brute-Force and SMB Reconnaissance — [indicator] / [indicator] Plugin Activity (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 30)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `216.126.237[.]197`
- Domain: `cloudlanecdn[.]com`
- File hash: `CAF021DDA726B8BA049C2AA395E505A1`

Full set of 30 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Project CAV3RN: cyberespionage framework using Outlook and DNS](https://securelist.com/project-cav3rn-cyberespionage-framework-using-outlook-and-dns/120757/)
- [Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/)
- [Iran-Linked Hackers Use New Cavern C2 Framework to Target Israeli Organizations](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/iran-linked-hackers-use-new-cavern-c2.html)
- [OilRig, COBALT GYPSY, IRN2, APT34, Helix Kitten, Evasive Serpens, Hazel Sandstorm, EUROPIUM, ITG13, Earth Simnavaz, Crambus, TA452, Group G0049](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049/)
- [DNS Tunneling in the Wild: Overview of OilRig's DNS Tunneling](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-tunneling-in-the-wild-overview-of-oilrigs-dns-tunneling/)
- [OilRig (Threat Actor)](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/oilrig)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1588
