# HollowGraph Malware Abuses Microsoft 365 Calendar as Covert C2 Channel (Cavern Framework, Suspected Cavern Manticore / Iran MOIS-Nexus)

> A newly documented .NET NativeAOT implant dubbed HollowGraph abuses compromised Microsoft 365 mailboxes and the Microsoft Graph API, treating the mailbox calendar as a two-way dead-drop for tasking and exfiltration secured with hybrid RSA-2048/AES-256-GCM encryption, with DNS tunneling over cloudlanecdn[.]com as a secondary channel for credential refresh. Group-IB attributes it with high confidence to the Cavern backdoor framework tracked by Check Point as used by the Iran MOIS-linked actor Cavern Manticore (low-confidence overlap with Lyceum/OilRig/MuddyWater); 12 Israeli victims identified, 3 actively communicating between June 3 and July 9, 2026.

- **Published:** 2026-07-21T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-24T13:21:59.752Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1601
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-hollowgraph-calendar-c2-implant-tl-2026-1601.webp?v=95a8f90e (Threadlinqs threat intel: HollowGraph NativeAOT Calendar Implant: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1601) — High severity, 36 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1601
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Cavern Manticore (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 36 (3 shown free below)

## Description

HollowGraph is a .NET NativeAOT-compiled DLL implant that eliminates direct communication with attacker-controlled infrastructure for its primary channel, instead abusing the legitimate Microsoft Graph API against a pre-compromised Microsoft 365 / Entra ID tenant. The malware treats the compromised mailbox's calendar as a bidirectional dead-drop: operators plant tasking as calendar events dated far in the future (2050-05-13, 22:00-23:00 UTC) so the mailbox owner never scrolls to them, with instructions delivered as File{n}.txt attachments and event subjects following a bare-GUID or 'Boss{...}ID{...}' naming convention. The implant supports exactly two commands - 'get' (poll the calendar for planted tasking and decrypt the attached instructions with an embedded RSA private key) and 'send' (encrypt exfiltrated data with the C2 operator's RSA public key and upload it as an attachment to a newly created calendar event) - using the delimiter grammar '<command>_;;_<arg0>_,_<arg1>_,_<arg2>' that matches the broader Cavern framework's command syntax. Cryptography is hybrid RSA-OAEP (2048-bit, separate key pairs for inbound tasking and outbound exfiltration) wrapping an AES-256-GCM payload key. Configuration - Entra ID tenant ID, application (client) ID, client secret, target mailbox address, C2 domain, and the two RSA keys - is written to disk disguised as a routine log file named logAzure.txt. A secondary DNS tunneling channel resolves IPv6 AAAA records against cloudlanecdn[.]com to refresh these credentials in place, using a two-phase length/data query encoding ('{random}.{taskID}.{fieldIndex}.p.cloudlanecdn.com' for length, '.q.' for data, extracting 14 usable bytes per 16-byte IPv6 response).

Group-IB attributes HollowGraph, with high confidence, as a variant of the Cavern backdoor framework based on matching command syntax, matching C2 tasking JSON structure ({"cid":...,"type":"self","cmd":"003_;;__,_"}), and the shared self-command 'MzU=' (base64 for '003', a debug-logging toggle). Check Point Research separately profiled the broader modular Cavern C2 framework - evolved from an earlier 'Cav3rn' codebase - as used by an Iran-nexus actor it tracks as Cavern Manticore, assessed as MOIS-linked with technical overlap to MuddyWater and the OilRig subgroup Lyceum (aka Hexane, SiameseKitten). Cavern's full toolset comprises a Mixed-Mode C++/CLI agent (uxtheme.dll) sideloaded via a trojanized WinDirStat.exe delivered by abusing SysAid's legitimate deployment/update feature as a post-compromise lateral-tooling mechanism (Rescana's July 7, 2026 alert was corrected on July 9, 2026 to clarify SysAid itself was NOT exploited or supply-chain compromised — attackers were already operating inside the victim environment) or other RMM software footholds, plus NativeAOT (.NET 8) and .NET Framework 4.7.2 modules for HTTPS/WebSocket transport, file operations with DPAPI blob decryption, SQL database enumeration, LDAP/Active Directory reconnaissance and brute-forcing, SMB network scanning/brute-force, and a full SOCKS5/WebSocket tunneling proxy. Each module runs in an isolated .NET AppDomain that is unloaded post-execution, leaving no persistent in-memory assembly artifacts - a deliberate anti-forensics design. Both Group-IB and Check Point caution that attribution to a named, previously-identified threat actor remains low confidence despite the strong Cavern-family technical linkage; targeting is exclusively Israeli organizations, with Cavern Manticore additionally observed exploiting supply-chain trust relationships with Israeli IT providers to reach downstream victims. No CVE or software vulnerability is involved - the technique abuses legitimate, correctly-functioning Microsoft Graph API functionality through already-compromised Entra ID application credentials.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1070 Indicator Removal
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
- T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS
- T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
- T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy
- T1568.003 Dynamic Resolution: DNS Calculation
- T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1129 Shared Modules
- T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**HollowGraph Calendar Dead-Drop Tasking Event — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-1601-SPL-001`)

Detects the HollowGraph calendar dead-drop pattern: a non-interactive/application identity creating or modifying a Microsoft 365 calendar event dated far in the future (2040+), with a bare-GUID or 'Boss{...}ID{...}' subject and a File{n}.txt attachment. This is the malware's initial tasking-channel establishment via legitimate, already-compromised Graph API credentials rather than a software vulnerability.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1102.002, T1078.004
- **Data sources:** office_365_management_activity, exchange_online_audit_log, microsoft_graph_activity_logs
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload=Exchange Operation IN ("UpdateCalendarEvent","New-CalendarEvent","Set") 
| eval subject=coalesce(ItemName, Subject) 
| where match(subject, "^(Boss\{.*\}ID\{.*\}|[0-9a-fA-F-]{36})$") 
| eval event_year=strftime(strptime(StartTime,"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"),"%Y") 
| where event_year >= 2040 
| where match(AttachmentNames, "File\d+\.txt") 
| table _time, UserId, ClientAppId, MailboxOwnerUPN, subject, StartTime, AttachmentNames 
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where OfficeWorkload == "Exchange"
| where Operation in ("UpdateCalendarEvent", "New-CalendarEvent")
| extend Subj = tostring(Item.Subject)
| where Subj matches regex @"^(Boss\{.*\}ID\{.*\}|[0-9a-fA-F-]{36})$"
| extend EventYear = toint(substring(tostring(Item.Start), 0, 4))
| where EventYear >= 2040
| where tostring(Item.AttachmentNames) matches regex @"File\d+\.txt"
| project TimeGenerated, UserId, ClientIP, MailboxOwnerUPN, Subj, Item.Start, Item.AttachmentNames
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Suspicious Far-Future Calendar Event with GUID/Boss-ID Subject and File Attachment (HollowGraph-style)
id: 8f2a1c3e-1601-4000-8000-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects HollowGraph-style calendar dead-drop tasking events created by an application identity with a far-future date, GUID/Boss{}ID{} subject, and File{n}.txt attachment.
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hollowgraph-microsoft-365/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-21
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102.002
    - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
    product: m365
    service: graph-activity-logs
detection:
    selection_subject:
        Subject|re: '^(Boss\{.*\}ID\{.*\}|[0-9a-fA-F-]{36})$'
    selection_date:
        EventStartYear|gte: 2040
    selection_attachment:
        AttachmentName|re: 'File\d+\.txt'
    condition: selection_subject and selection_date and selection_attachment
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate long-range calendar planning or test/automation mailboxes coincidentally matching the subject regex
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate far-future recurring calendar entries created by scheduling/automation tools that coincidentally match the subject regex

**Tuning notes:** Narrow the year threshold if the environment has legitimate long-range calendar automation; cross-reference the acting identity against a known service-principal allow-list to reduce noise.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Cavern App-Only OAuth Grant Enabling Calendar Dead-Drop — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Config-as-Log Artifact Lifecycle and Anti-Forensic Cleanup — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Hybrid-Encrypted Web-Service C2 with SMB Lateral Tool Transfer — C2/Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HollowGraph App-Only Graph Access + Far-Future Calendar Event — Exploitation (Sigma Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern DLL Side-Loading via WinDirStat/uxtheme.dll Pattern — Post-Exploitation (Sigma Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- High-Entropy IPv6 AAAA DNS Tunneling to [indicator]-style Domain — C2/Lateral Movement (Sigma Primary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern DLL Side-Loading via WinDirStat/uxtheme.dll + Config-as-Log Drop — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- High-Entropy IPv6 AAAA DNS Tunneling to [indicator]-style Domain — C2/Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 36)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `cloudlanecdn[.]com`
- File hash: `75e51774b8f79e5f256eaae639635f911b3e744d4774fd6068dd980255621509`
- Domain: `hospitalinstallation[.]com`

Full set of 36 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [New HollowGraph Malware Abuses Microsoft 365 Calendar for C&C Communication](https://www.securityweek.com/new-hollowgraph-malware-abuses-microsoft-365-calendar-for-cc-communication/)
- [HOLLOWGRAPH: Turning Microsoft 365 Calendars into Covert Command-and-Control Channels](https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hollowgraph-microsoft-365/)
- [Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/)
- [HollowGraph Malware Hides C2 and Stolen Files in Microsoft 365 Events Dated 2050](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/hollowgraph-malware-hides-c2-and-stolen.html)
- [New HollowGraph malware uses Microsoft Graph for stealthy C2 comms](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-hollowgraph-malware-uses-microsoft-graph-for-stealthy-c2-comms/)
- [New HollowGraph Malware Hijacks Microsoft 365 Calendars for Covert C2](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/hollowgraph-microsoft-calendars/)
- [HOLLOWGRAPH Malware Abuses Microsoft Graph API for C2](https://securityonline.info/hollowgraph-malware-microsoft-graph-api/)
- [Iran-Linked Hackers Use New Cavern C2 Framework to Target Israeli Organizations](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/iran-linked-hackers-use-new-cavern-c2.html)
- [Iran-Linked Hackers Using Modular C&C Framework in Cyberattacks](https://www.securityweek.com/iran-linked-hackers-using-modular-cc-framework-in-cyberattacks/amp/)
- [Active Exploitation Alert: Iranian Cavern Manticore APT Abuses SysAid Supply Chain With Modular Cavern C2 Malware Targeting Israeli Organizations](https://www.rescana.com/post/active-exploitation-alert-iranian-cavern-manticore-apt-abuses-sysaid-supply-chain-with-modular-cavern-c2-malware-targeti)
- [Iran-linked hacker group Cavern Manticore targets Israeli IT, government sectors](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-901667)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1601
