# Royal Ransomware Uses Qbot and Cobalt Strike to Rapidly Compromise Windows Domains

> Royal ransomware operators, believed to be former Conti 'Team One' members, combine Qbot spearphishing delivery with Cobalt Strike post-exploitation to achieve rapid Windows domain takeover, deliberately trading stealth for speed. AdFind/PowerSploit-driven reconnaissance, pass-the-hash lateral movement, and Dropbox/MegaSync exfiltration precede deployment of Royal's partial-encryption ransomware.

- **Published:** 2026-07-22T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-22T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1626
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-royal-qbot-cobalt-strike-chain-tl-2026-1626.webp?v=e482caa1 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Royal Ransomware Group Qbot Chain: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1626) — High severity, 33 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1626
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Royal Ransomware Group
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 33 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Royal ransomware is operated by a private, non-affiliate threat group tracked historically as DEV-0569 and believed to consist largely of former Conti ('Team One') and Ryuk developers; the group briefly branded as Zeon in early 2022 before rebranding to Royal in September 2022. In the campaign profiled here, initial access is achieved via spearphishing emails carrying malicious attachments that deploy the Qbot (Qakbot) banking-trojan-turned-loader. Qbot establishes persistence through a Windows Registry Run key and injects into legitimate processes (explorer.exe, mobsync.exe, OneDriveSetup.exe) via a classic CreateProcess/WriteProcessMemory/ResumeThread hollowing workflow to evade detection, while also writing Windows Defender path exclusions and storing configuration under randomized subkeys of HKU\[SID]\Software\Microsoft. Qbot communicates over HTTPS using base64-wrapped, enciphered JSON C2 messages authenticated with a hardcoded, XOR-obfuscated public key.

Once network presence is established, operators deploy Cobalt Strike as a Windows service on multiple hosts, also injected into trusted processes, and pivot to peer-to-peer C2 over Windows named pipes to reduce egress traffic and evade network-based detection while beaconing externally over HTTPS to attacker-registered domains masquerading as cloud/security vendors (e.g., palaltocloud[.]online, kasperslkyupdate[.]com). Cobalt Strike beacons commonly escalate privileges via GetSystem named-pipe impersonation and UAC bypass through scheduled tasks / fodhelper and DLL search-order hijacking. Operators then run AdFind to map Active Directory structure, domain trusts, and local administrator groups, and use PowerSploit/PowerView modules for further host and credential reconnaissance. Stolen credential hashes are reused via pass-the-hash to mount administrative shares and move laterally, commonly assisted by PsExec and NetScan. Prior to encryption, data is staged and exfiltrated to consumer cloud storage (Dropbox, MegaSync) for double-extortion leverage. The ransomware payload itself uses a distinctive partial/intermittent encryption scheme (OpenSSL AES for file data, RSA-encrypted key/IV, selectable encryption percentage tied to file size via an '-ep' parameter) to speed up encryption of large files and reduce detection likelihood, appending the .royal extension and dropping a README.TXT ransom note per directory that directs victims to a Tor negotiation portal rather than stating a ransom amount up front. The group has also used callback phishing, SEO-poisoned BATLOADER installers, and exposed RDP/valid-account abuse as alternate initial access vectors in the broader campaign set, and has targeted healthcare, manufacturing, education, and local government with ransom demands reported as high as $25 million.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1559.001 Component Object Model
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1543.003 Windows Service
- T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1685.002 Disable or Modify Cloud Log
- T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1218.010 Regsvr32
- T1550.002 Pass the Hash
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
- T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1090.001 Internal Proxy
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1485 Data Destruction

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**AdFind / PowerSploit AD Reconnaissance + Pass-the-Hash Lateral Movement (SPL)** (`TL-2026-1626-SPL-002`)

Detects the post-exploitation reconnaissance and credential-reuse chain: AdFind or PowerSploit/PowerView querying trusted-domain and group objects, followed by NTLM pass-the-hash authentication and PsExec/NetScan-driven lateral movement over administrative shares — the pivot step between Cobalt Strike deployment and ransomware staging.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1482, T1087, T1550.002, T1021.002, T1135
- **Data sources:** windows_security, sysmon, microsoft_defender_advanced_hunting
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4688 (New_Process_Name="*\\adfind.exe" OR CommandLine="*objectcategory=trustedDomain*" OR CommandLine="*objectcategory=group*" OR CommandLine="*PowerView*" OR CommandLine="*Get-NetDomainTrust*")) OR (EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Authentication_Package=NTLM) OR (EventCode=5145 Share_Name="*\\IPC$" OR Share_Name="*\\ADMIN$")
| eval stage=case(match(New_Process_Name,"adfind\.exe") OR match(CommandLine,"objectcategory"),"ad_recon", EventCode==4624,"pth_logon", EventCode==5145,"admin_share_access")
| stats count values(stage) as stages values(New_Process_Name) as processes values(Share_Name) as shares by Computer, Account_Name, src_ip, dest_ip
| where mvcount(stages)>=2
| sort -count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let recon = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "AdFind.exe" or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("objectcategory=trustedDomain", "objectcategory=group", "PowerView", "Get-NetDomainTrust");
let pth = DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where LogonType == "Network" and isempty(AccountDomain) == false and ActionType == "LogonSuccess";
recon
| join kind=inner (pth) on DeviceName
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, LogonType, RemoteIP
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: AdFind Execution Consistent with Royal Ransomware AD Reconnaissance
id: 9a1c2e3f-4b5d-4e6f-8a9b-0c1d2e3f4a5b
status: experimental
description: Detects AdFind or PowerSploit/PowerView command-line execution enumerating trusted domains or privileged groups, a hallmark of Royal ransomware pre-lateral-movement reconnaissance
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/royal-ransomware/
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-061a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-22
tags:
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1482
    - attack.t1087
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1550.002
    - attack.tool.adfind
    - attack.tool.powersploit
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_adfind:
        Image|endswith: '\adfind.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'objectcategory=trustedDomain'
            - 'objectcategory=group'
    selection_powersploit:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'PowerView'
            - 'Get-NetDomainTrust'
            - 'Get-NetGroupMember'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Authorized Active Directory administrators or auditors running AdFind/PowerView for legitimate domain health checks
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- IT/security teams running authorized AD audits with AdFind or PowerView from a known jump host or PAM session

**Tuning notes:** Exclude known privileged-access-workstation (PAW) or PAM jump-host source IPs used by the AD/security team; raise severity when AdFind/PowerView execution is directly followed (within 15 minutes) by an NTLM network logon and ADMIN$/IPC$ share access from the same host, since that chained sequence has very low false-positive rates.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Qbot Process-Hollowing Injection into Trusted Windows Processes (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cobalt Strike Service Installation with UAC Bypass / Scheduled-Task Escalation (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Rclone / Chisel Cloud-Storage Exfiltration to Dropbox or MegaSync (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Royal Ransomware File Encryption with .royal Extension and Ransom Note Drop (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Windows Event Log Clearing and Security Software Discovery Prior to Encryption (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Regsvr32 System Binary Proxy Execution Loading Masqueraded Payload (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Qbot Registry Run-Key Persistence + Defender Exclusion Abuse (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cobalt Strike Named-Pipe P2P C2 + Typosquat HTTPS Beaconing (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 33)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `181.118.183[.]98`
- Domain: `altocloudzone[.]live`
- File hash: `595c869f8ec7eaf71fef44bad331d81bb934c886cdff99e1f013eec7acdaf8c9`

Full set of 33 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Royal Ransomware Uses Qbot and Cobalt Strike to Rapidly Compromise Windows Domains](https://cybersecuritynews.com/royal-ransomware-qbot/)
- [#StopRansomware: BlackSuit (Royal) Ransomware (AA23-061A)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-061a)
- [QBOT Malware Analysis](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/qbot-malware-analysis)
- [Threat Assessment: Royal Ransomware](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/royal-ransomware/)
- [Conti Team One Splinter Group Resurfaces as Royal Ransomware with Callback Phishing Attacks](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/l/conti-team-one-splinter-group-resurfaces-as-royal-ransomware-wit.html)
- [Identification and Disruption of QakBot Infrastructure (AA23-242A)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-242a)
- [Royal Rumble: Analysis of Royal Ransomware](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/royal-ransomware-analysis)
- [Royal ransomware – among the most active threat actors entering 2023](https://www.forescout.com/blog/royal-ransomware-analysis-of-one-of-the-most-active-ransomware-groups/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1626
