# Kaseya VSA Supply-Chain Ransomware Incident — REvil/Sodinokibi Exploits CVE-2021-30116/30117/30118/30119/30120/30121 to Compromise 60 MSPs and 1,500+ Downstream Organizations

> The REvil/Sodinokibi ransomware-as-a-service operation chained multiple zero-day vulnerabilities (authentication bypass, SQL injection, arbitrary file upload, remote code execution) in Kaseya Virtual System Administrator (VSA) on-premises servers to push a trojanized 'Kaseya VSA Agent Hot-fix' to managed endpoints, disabling Windows Defender and side-loading the Sodinokibi encryptor via a signed, patched copy of MsMpEng.exe. Roughly 60 MSPs and 800–1,500 downstream businesses (including Coop Sweden, 800 stores) were encrypted; REvil demanded $70M for a universal decryptor before the FBI obtained the key and REvil's infrastructure vanished on July 13, 2021.

- **Published:** 2026-07-23T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-23T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1649
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-revil-kaseya-july-2021-attack-tl-2026-1649.webp?v=3933dd77 (Threadlinqs threat intel: REvil Kaseya VSA Attack Hit 60 MSPs: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1649) — Critical severity, 21 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1649
- **Severity:** CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** RESOLVED
- **Actor:** REvil (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 21 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2021-30116, CVE-2021-30117, CVE-2021-30118, CVE-2021-30119, CVE-2021-30120, CVE-2021-30121, CVE-2021-30201

## Description

On July 2, 2021, the REvil (Sodinokibi) ransomware-as-a-service affiliate operation launched one of the largest supply-chain ransomware attacks on record, exploiting Kaseya VSA — a widely deployed remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform used by managed service providers (MSPs) — to distribute ransomware to thousands of downstream customer endpoints in a single coordinated wave.

The intrusion began with exploitation of an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Kaseya VSA web interface (tracked publicly as part of the CVE-2021-30116/30117/30118/30119/30120/30121/30201 cluster first responsibly disclosed by the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure, DIVD, on April 6, 2021). Attackers used the authentication bypass to obtain an authenticated session on internet-facing on-premises VSA servers, then chained an SQL injection flaw and an arbitrary file upload / code injection primitive to gain administrative control of the VSA management console without valid credentials.

From the compromised VSA server, the attackers abused the platform's own legitimate agent-update distribution mechanism to push a fraudulent update, disguised as a 'Kaseya VSA Agent Hot-fix,' to every endpoint the server managed — a textbook software-supply-chain trust abuse. The malicious update was delivered as an encoded file named agent.crt, decoded on-endpoint to agent.exe. Execution first invoked a PowerShell one-liner that disabled Windows Defender real-time monitoring, disabled Windows Error Recovery, and cleared event logs, then renamed certutil.exe to cert.exe to base64-decode the embedded payload while evading naive detection rules keyed on certutil.exe invocation.

agent.exe was signed with a certificate issued to 'PB03 TRANSPORT LTD' (subsequently revoked) and dropped two components into C:\Windows\: a deliberately outdated, legitimately signed copy of the Microsoft Defender executable (renamed MsMpEng.exe) and a malicious mpsvc.dll. Because the vulnerable, legitimate MsMpEng.exe loads mpsvc.dll from its own directory without integrity verification, launching MsMpEng.exe caused Windows itself to load and execute the REvil encryptor via DLL side-loading — a living-off-the-land technique that let the ransomware execute under the guise of a trusted, digitally-signed Microsoft binary and evade many AV/EDR heuristics tuned to distrust unsigned executables.

Once loaded, the Sodinokibi/REvil encryptor created the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\BlackLivesMatter to store runtime configuration, including a per-victim public/private keypair generated via an embedded elliptic-curve scheme and the file extension to append to encrypted files. Files were encrypted using a Salsa20/AES hybrid scheme; the private key material needed for decryption was itself encrypted under a master public key controlled by the REvil operators and never transmitted off-host in plaintext, making the encryption cryptographically irreversible without cooperation from the attackers (or, ultimately, the FBI-obtained master key). Volume Shadow Copies were deleted and safe-mode boot recovery paths disabled to frustrate remediation.

The blast radius was compounded by Kaseya VSA's typical MSP deployment model: a single compromised on-premises VSA server often manages hundreds of downstream client endpoints across dozens of separate customer organizations, so encrypting one VSA console cascaded ransomware to every managed endpoint simultaneously. Kaseya identified roughly 50–60 MSPs running vulnerable on-premises VSA servers as the initial infection vector and proactively shut down its VSA SaaS infrastructure as a precaution, even though the SaaS environment itself was not confirmed compromised. Kaseya estimated 800–1,500 downstream businesses were ultimately encrypted; the highest-profile victim was Swedish supermarket chain Coop, which was forced to close roughly 800 stores for several days because point-of-sale systems were unusable, and several New Zealand schools also lost access to critical systems.

On July 5, 2021, a REvil-affiliated 'Happy Blog' post demanded $70 million in Bitcoin for a single universal decryptor capable of unlocking every victim encrypted in the campaign, while offering smaller individualized ransoms to specific organizations. Kaseya publicly stated it would not pay the ransom and worked with FireEye/Mandiant, the FBI, CISA, and Dutch researchers on incident response and a patch. On July 13, 2021, REvil's public-facing infrastructure — including its Tor payment portal and Happy Blog leak site — abruptly went offline; researchers assessed this reflected either a law-enforcement takedown, a voluntary shutdown by the operators fearing retaliation following high-level U.S.-Russia diplomatic pressure, or both. On July 21–23, 2021, Kaseya received a universal decryptor key from what it described as a 'trusted third party' — later confirmed via congressional testimony to be the FBI, which had obtained the REvil master decryption key through undisclosed means but withheld it from victims for roughly three weeks while weighing a disruption operation against REvil's infrastructure, a decision that drew significant criticism.

Attribution and downstream law enforcement action: Ukrainian national Yaroslav Vasinskyi was identified as a REvil affiliate responsible for deploying the ransomware in the Kaseya attack and was arrested in Poland on October 8, 2021, extradited to the United States, convicted, and sentenced on May 1, 2024 to 13 years 7 months in federal prison plus over $16 million in restitution. A second individual, Russian national Yevgeniy Polyanin, was separately charged for REvil-affiliate ransomware activity including Kaseya-related attacks; the U.S. Treasury and State Department additionally sanctioned REvil-linked infrastructure and offered a $10 million reward for information on REvil leadership. In November 2021, Russian authorities announced arrests of several individuals linked to REvil at the request of U.S. authorities, though the group's core leadership largely evaded lasting prosecution and REvil-derived tooling/personnel are assessed to have resurfaced in successor ransomware-as-a-service brands.

The incident remains a canonical case study in software-supply-chain risk for the MSP/RMM ecosystem: it demonstrated how a single vulnerable management platform can be weaponized to achieve mass simultaneous ransomware deployment across otherwise unrelated victim organizations that have no direct relationship with the attacker or even direct awareness that they run the vulnerable software, since the vulnerable server was operated by their MSP rather than by the victims themselves.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1106 Native API
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1505 Server Software Component
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1036.003 Rename Legitimate Utilities
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1553.002 Code Signing
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1090 Proxy
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1489 Service Stop
- T1491 Defacement
- T1584.006 Web Services
- T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Post-Exploitation: Certutil Rename Decode + Defender Impair + MsMpEng DLL Side-Load Chain** (`TL-2026-1649-SPL-002`)

Detects the on-endpoint post-exploitation chain observed in the Kaseya/REvil campaign: certutil.exe renamed to cert.exe used to base64-decode the staged agent.crt payload, a PowerShell one-liner disabling Windows Defender real-time monitoring and clearing the Security event log, and a relocated/outdated signed MsMpEng.exe side-loading the malicious mpsvc.dll encryptor.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1036.003, T1140, T1685, T1070.001, T1574.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, windows_defender_operational_log
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(
  (Image="*\\cert.exe" OriginalFileName="CertUtil.exe")
  OR (Image="*\\powershell.exe" CommandLine="*Set-MpPreference*DisableRealtimeMonitoring*")
  OR (Image="*\\wevtutil.exe" CommandLine="*cl Security*")
  OR (Image="*\\MsMpEng.exe" NOT Image="C:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\*")
)
| eval technique=case(
    match(Image,"cert\.exe$"), "T1036.003/T1140",
    match(CommandLine,"Set-MpPreference"), "T1685",
    match(CommandLine,"cl Security"), "T1070.001",
    match(Image,"MsMpEng\.exe$"), "T1574.002")
| table _time, ComputerName, Image, OriginalFileName, CommandLine, technique
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "cert.exe" and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "CertUtil.exe")
   or (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Set-MpPreference", "DisableRealtimeMonitoring"))
   or (FileName =~ "wevtutil.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "cl Security")
   or (FileName =~ "MsMpEng.exe" and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Kaseya/REvil Post-Exploitation Chain — Certutil Rename, Defender Impair, MsMpEng Side-Load
id: 4e5d2f43-9e60-4b7d-8a81-tlintel1649004
status: experimental
description: Detects the combined post-exploitation artifact chain used to detonate the Sodinokibi encryptor - renamed certutil (cert.exe) decode, Defender real-time monitoring disable + Security log clear, and MsMpEng.exe run from a non-standard path preceding mpsvc.dll side-load.
references:
    - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/kaseya-supply-chain-ransomware-attack-technical-analysis-revil-payload
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/07/23
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege_escalation
    - attack.t1036.003
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1070.001
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.tool.revil
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_certutil:
        Image|endswith: '\cert.exe'
        OriginalFileName: 'CertUtil.exe'
    selection_defender_impair:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Set-MpPreference'
            - 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
    selection_log_clear:
        Image|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 'cl Security'
    selection_sideload:
        Image|endswith: '\MsMpEng.exe'
    filter_standard_path:
        Image|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
    condition: selection_certutil or selection_defender_impair or selection_log_clear or (selection_sideload and not filter_standard_path)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate certutil-based certificate operations by administrators
    - Authorized security-tooling changes to Defender preferences during onboarding
    - Legitimate Defender platform upgrade relocating MsMpEng.exe during patch cycle
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate admin certutil use
- Authorized EDR/AV onboarding disabling Defender in favor of a third-party agent
- Genuine Defender platform update relocating MsMpEng.exe

**Tuning notes:** Require at least two of the four sub-selections to fire within a 5-minute window on the same host to reduce single-signal false positives; exclude known SOAR/EDR-onboarding automation accounts.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Anomalous Kaseya VSA Admin Console Session Preceding Mass Agent Push (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Registry Persistence: WOW6432Node\BlackLivesMatter REvil Config Key Creation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Mass Ransom-Note Drop + File Extension Rename Consistent With Sodinokibi Encryption Wave (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Kaseya VSA Exploit Chain — Fraudulent Hot-Fix Distribution (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MsMpEng.exe Executed From Non-Standard Path (DLL Side-Load Precondition) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound HTTP With [indicator] User-Agent to Internet-Facing RMM Console (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Kaseya VSA Auth-Bypass Exploitation Chain — Trojanized Agent Hot-Fix Push (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- C2/Fan-Out: Campaign User-Agent Beacon + Mass Simultaneous File-Rename/Ransom-Note Drop Across Managed Endpoints (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 21)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `18.223.199[.]234`
- File hash: `939aae3cc456de8964cb182c75a5f8cc`
- IP address: `161.35.239[.]148`

Full set of 21 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Customer Advisory: Kaseya VSA Ransomware Incident](https://www.mitiga.io/blog/customer-advisory-kaseya-vsa-ransomware-incident)
- [CISA-FBI Guidance for MSPs and their Customers Affected by the Kaseya VSA Supply-Chain Ransomware Attack](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/07/04/cisa-fbi-guidance-msps-and-their-customers-affected-kaseya-vsa-supply-chain-ransomware-attack)
- [Kaseya Ransomware Attack: Guidance for Affected MSPs and their Customers](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/kaseya-ransomware-attack-guidance-affected-msps-and-their-customers)
- [CVE-2021-30116: Multiple Zero-Day Vulnerabilities in Kaseya VSA Exploited to Distribute Ransomware](https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2021-30116-multiple-zero-day-vulnerabilities-in-kaseya-vsa-exploited-to-distribute-ransomware)
- [Kaseya patches VSA vulnerabilities used in REvil ransomware attack](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/kaseya-patches-vsa-vulnerabilities-used-in-revil-ransomware-attack/)
- [REvil ransomware hits 1,000+ companies in MSP supply-chain attack](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/revil-ransomware-hits-1-000-plus-companies-in-msp-supply-chain-attack/)
- [TTPs Used by REvil (Sodinokibi) Ransomware Gang in Kaseya MSP Supply-Chain Attack](https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/revil-sodinokibi-ransomware-kaseya-vsa-msp-supply-chain-attack)
- [KASEYA Supply Chain Ransomware Attack — Technical Analysis of the REvil Payload](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/kaseya-supply-chain-ransomware-attack-technical-analysis-revil-payload)
- [Rapid Response: Mass MSP Ransomware Incident](https://www.huntress.com/blog/rapid-response-kaseya-vsa-mass-msp-ransomware-incident)
- [REvil Returns: Diving Deeper Into the Kaseya VSA Ransomware Attack](https://www.seqrite.com/blog/revil-returns-diving-deeper-into-the-kaseya-vsa-ransomware-attack/)
- [Kaseya VSA Ransomware Attacks: Overview and Mitigation](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-kaseya-vsa-ransomware-attacks/)
- [Kaseya VSA Downed by REvil in a Monumental Supply Chain Attack](https://www.securin.io/articles/kaseya-vsa-downed-by-revil-in-monumental-supply-chain-attack)
- [REvil Ransomware Attack on Kaseya VSA: What You Need to Know](https://www.varonis.com/blog/revil-msp-supply-chain-attack)
- [Kaseya VSA ransomware attack — Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaseya_VSA_ransomware_attack)
- [DFIR Resources REvil Kaseya — YARA rules and IOC list](https://github.com/cado-security/DFIR_Resources_REvil_Kaseya/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1649
