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Threat reportSurveillanceTL-2026-1673

Iran Exploits SS7 Cellular Roaming Protocol and Commercial Ad-Tech Location Data to Track and Target US Military Phones

highACTIVE

Citizen Lab's Mobile Surveillance Monitor project, shared with the Financial Times, documents Iranian-linked exploitation of SS7 roaming-protocol weaknesses combined with commercially purchased advertising-technology location data to track US military personnel before and during the Iran conflict. The activity helped identify specific hotels housing US government employees and contractors in Iraqi Kurdistan after forces dispersed from main bases.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1673
Also known asMobile Surveillance Monitor SS7/Ad-Tech Tracking Campaign, Iraqi Kurdistan Hotel Tracking Campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsGlobal Mobile Network Operators (Middle East roaming partners) SS7 Signaling Interconnect / Global Title Leasing Infrastructure; Multiple (mobile app ecosystem / ad-tech industry) Mobile Advertising ID (MAID/GAID/IDFA) real-time-bidding data pipelines; Verizon / T-Mobile / AT&T US carrier SS7 firewall implementations
Nation-state nexusIran
ToolsCommercial surveillance-vendor telecom access-as-a-service model
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1046 Network Service Discovery, T1074 Data Staged, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1119 Automated Collection, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1430 Location Tracking, T1565 Data Manipulation, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service, T1583 Acquire Infrastructure, T1585 Establish Accounts, T1588 Obtain Capabilities and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, defense, military
Target regionsMiddle East, iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, North America, united states of america
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-24, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1673 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Correlated SS7 Roaming Query and Ad-Tech RTB Location Ping — Combined-Source Targeting

Detects the campaign's C2/lateral-movement-equivalent combined-source targeting technique: an SS7 PSI/SRI/ATI location resolution for a device correlating within a short window with a real-time-bidding (RTB) bidstream location ping sharing the same Mobile Advertising ID (MAID), indicating cross-referencing of telecom signaling and ad-tech data to pinpoint a facility.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1213, T1430.002, T1119
  • Data sources: ss7_correlation_pipeline, adtech_rtb_bidstream_logs, location_correlation_pipeline
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=location_correlation (sourcetype="ss7:correlation" OR sourcetype="adtech:rtb_bidstream")
| eval device_key=coalesce(target_device_mock, maid_mock)
| transaction device_key maxspan=10m
| where mvcount(mvfilter(match(_raw, "SS7_PSI_QUERY"))) > 0 AND mvcount(mvfilter(match(_raw, "RTB_BIDSTREAM_PING"))) > 0
| table _time device_key resolved_cell_area_mock lat_mock lon_mock

Microsoft KQL

let ss7 = SS7CorrelationEvents | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h) | where EventType == "SS7_PSI_QUERY" | project SS7Time = TimeGenerated, DeviceKey = TargetDeviceMock, ResolvedCell = ResolvedCellAreaMock;
let rtb = AdTechRTBEvents | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h) | where EventType == "RTB_BIDSTREAM_PING" | project RTBTime = TimeGenerated, DeviceKey = MaidMock, Lat = LatMock, Lon = LonMock;
ss7
| join kind=inner rtb on DeviceKey
| where abs(datetime_diff('minute', SS7Time, RTBTime)) <= 10
| project SS7Time, RTBTime, DeviceKey, ResolvedCell, Lat, Lon

Sigma

title: Correlated SS7 Location Query and Ad-Tech RTB Bidstream Ping for Same Device Within Short Window
id: 8e2c1a1e-1b1a-4b0e-9f0a-100000000003
status: experimental
description: Detects coincident SS7 location-query resolution and ad-tech RTB bidstream location pings for the same device/MAID within a short window, indicating combined-source location targeting.
references:
    - https://citizenlab.ca/us-military-smartphones-targeted-through-roaming-and-ad-tech/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-24
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1213
    - attack.t1430.002
    - attack.t1119
logsource:
    category: application
    product: location_correlation_pipeline
detection:
    selection_ss7:
        type: 'SS7_PSI_QUERY'
    selection_rtb:
        type: 'RTB_BIDSTREAM_PING'
    timeframe: 10m
    condition: selection_ss7 and selection_rtb | correlate by device_identifier
falsepositives:
    - Coincidental co-location of unrelated roaming query and ad exchange bid for the same device due to shared device fingerprinting bugs
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Coincidental co-location of an unrelated roaming query and an ad-exchange bid for the same device due to shared/spoofed device fingerprinting

Tuning notes: Tune the 10-minute correlation window against observed baseline SS7-to-RTB latency for the deployed telemetry pipeline; restrict scope to MAIDs associated with monitored/government-issued device populations to reduce noise from the general subscriber base.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • SS7 PSI/SRI/ATI Location Query Surge From Unexpected Global Title (Sentinel) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SS7 Query Origin From Suspicious or Newly-Leased Global Title Entity (Sentinel) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Correlated SS7 Roaming Query and Ad-Tech RTB Location Ping — Combined-Source Targeting (Sentinel) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SS7 PSI/SRI/ATI Location Query Surge From Unexpected Global Title (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SS7 Query Origin From Newly Observed or Suspicious Global Title Leasing Entity (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Correlated SS7 Location Query and Ad-Tech RTB Bidstream Ping for Same Device (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SS7 PSI/SRI/ATI Location Query Surge From Unexpected Global Title · unlock with TL Creds
  • SS7 Query Origin From Suspicious or Newly-Leased Global Title Entity · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-24, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1673.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Regional telecom networks in the Middle East detected and blocked a wave of SS7 'Provide Subscriber Information' (PSI) location-request pings seeking to pinpoint the real-time location of specific phones roaming outside their home mobile networks, in what cybersecurity researchers characterized as a coordinated tracking campaign. Gulf officials suspected Iran or Iran-aligned actors of abusing existing international roaming agreements and Global Title (GT) leasing arrangements with local telecom providers to query the location of US personnel's devices. Citizen Lab senior research fellow Gary Miller, who reviewed underlying signaling data, stated that Iran 'absolutely has capabilities to get real-time, immediate, and continuous location information' and that at least some of the blocked tracking attempts were traceable to an Iranian mobile phone operator, describing the activity as 'very specific user targeting' rather than indiscriminate collection.

SS7 (Signaling System No. 7) is a decades-old inter-carrier signaling protocol built in the 1970s with no built-in authentication or encryption. Carriers commercially lease Global Title identifiers -- the addressing scheme that lets a network entity send and receive SS7 messages -- to third parties, a legitimate secondary market that surveillance-for-hire vendors and state actors have long abused to gain unauthorized message-injection access to the global telecom interconnect. Using this access, an attacker can send PSI, Send Routing Information (SRI), or Any Time Interrogation (ATI) queries that cause a victim's home network to return the serving cell/location area of the target device, without the subscriber's carrier ever authenticating the origin of the request. Citizen Lab's parallel April 2026 'Bad Connection' report on the same telecom-exploitation ecosystem documented over a dozen countries hosting the leased Global Title infrastructure used by commercial surveillance vendors, and separately detailed how Saudi Arabia allegedly exploited the same PSI mechanism to track its nationals traveling to the United States -- underscoring that this is a systemic, still-unpatched weakness in the global mobile-operator industry rather than an isolated incident.

In parallel with (and reportedly complementing) SS7 signaling abuse, a US official said Iran-linked actors also abused commercially available advertising-technology (ad-tech) location data to track phones in Iraqi Kurdistan. Nearly every free smartphone app transmits a persistent Mobile Advertising ID (MAID/advertising ID) together with an approximate GPS location as part of routine real-time-bidding (RTB) ad auctions; this bidstream data is aggregated, resold, and re-licensed through a largely unregulated chain of data brokers and location-data aggregators, with no background checks on downstream buyers. A US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement action against data brokers Gravy Analytics Inc. and its subsidiary Venntel Inc. found the companies collected and sold sensitive geolocation data -- including visits to military installations, healthcare facilities, and religious sites -- sourced indirectly from the mobile advertising marketplace and tied to device MAIDs; a 2024 sample from that ecosystem reportedly contained roughly three billion location points from eleven million devices, including over 12,000 devices detected near a US military installation in Germany that could subsequently be tracked away from the base. This is the same category of commercially available, non-hacking data-market exposure that intelligence officials assess Iran leveraged in Iraqi Kurdistan.

As the Iran conflict escalated, US forces dispersed from main operating bases to hotels and civilian office spaces in Iraqi Kurdistan for force protection. Iranian military intelligence reportedly cross-referenced ad-tech-sourced device location clustering with SS7 roaming queries to identify which specific hotels and buildings housed American government personnel and contractors -- a materially different and more dangerous outcome than passive advertising analytics, since it directly informed force-protection and potential targeting decisions during active hostilities.

The underlying vulnerability class is not new: mobile-security researchers publicly demonstrated SS7 location tracking of a smartphone as early as 2016, CISA documented confirmed SS7 exploitation attempts on US soil in 2022, and Citizen Lab separately recorded millions of SS7 location queries targeting Saudi dissidents and other individuals in the US in 2023. A classified April 2026 Defense Department memo -- later made public by Senator Ron Wyden -- confirmed that adversaries were using commercially available location data against US personnel and criticized DoD leadership for a decade-long failure to implement recommended telecom and data-market defenses; Kevin Briggs, CISA's lead telecom-vulnerability expert, had filed documented evidence of ongoing SS7 exploitation with the FCC. Major US carriers (Verizon, T-Mobile, AT&T) told the FCC in 2024 that existing SS7 firewalls were adequate and that no further audits or oversight were necessary, a position now contradicted by the continued success of roaming-based tracking against a US military target set. No CVE applies: this is protocol-level and commercial-data-market abuse of legitimate, long-standing telecom and ad-tech infrastructure rather than a software vulnerability.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1046 Network Service Discovery

Collection

T1074 Data Staged; T1119 Automated Collection; T1213 Data from Information Repositories; T1430 Location Tracking

Command and Control

T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol

Initial Access

T1199 Trusted Relationship

Impact

T1565 Data Manipulation

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1585 Establish Accounts; T1588 Obtain Capabilities

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1591 Gather Victim Org Information; T1596 Search Open Technical Databases

defense-impairment

T1599 Network Boundary Bridging

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Enforce and audit SS7/Diameter firewalls at all carriers serving personnel in theater; alert on PSI/SRI/ATI query surges from unexpected international Global Titles
  • Disable or restrict ad-supported app usage and advertising-ID collection on government-issued and personal devices carried by deployed personnel
  • Use mobile device management (MDM) to strip or randomize advertising identifiers (MAID/IDFA/GAID) on personnel devices in operational theaters
  • Move deployed personnel off commercial roaming plans onto hardened, carrier-vetted or military-controlled connectivity where feasible
  • Audit hotel/lodging Wi-Fi and cellular exposure before housing personnel in commercial facilities during contingency operations

Workarounds

  • Issue burner/non-advertising-ID devices without commercial app stores for high-risk deployments
  • Disable location services and background app refresh for all non-mission apps on deployed personnel devices
  • Prefer secure/military communications channels over commercial cellular roaming in contested regions

Longer-term hardening

  • Push FCC/telecom regulators to mandate independent SS7/SS7-over-IP and Diameter interconnect security audits rather than accepting carrier self-attestation
  • Expand FTC-style enforcement and legislative action (e.g., data broker sensitive-location restrictions) to close the ad-tech location data market abused for tracking
  • Implement DoD-wide policy restricting commercial ad-tech SDKs and third-party analytics on any device carried into operational areas
  • Fund and mandate remediation of decade-old SS7/telecom interconnect vulnerabilities per prior classified DoD recommendations
  • Establish routine cross-agency (CISA/DoD/FCC) monitoring of Global Title leasing arrangements tied to adversary-linked telecom entities

Affected and fixed versions

  • Global Mobile Network Operators (Middle East roaming partners) — SS7 Signaling Interconnect / Global Title Leasing Infrastructure
    Vulnerable versions: All deployed SS7 interconnect infrastructure lacking robust firewalling
    Fixed in: No universal fix; mitigated only by carrier-side SS7/Diameter firewall enforcement and GT leasing restriction
  • Multiple (mobile app ecosystem / ad-tech industry) — Mobile Advertising ID (MAID/GAID/IDFA) real-time-bidding data pipelines
    Vulnerable versions: Any device with advertising ID enabled and location-permissioned ad-supported apps installed
    Fixed in: Advertising ID reset/opt-out and location-permission restriction reduces but does not eliminate exposure
  • Verizon / T-Mobile / AT&T — US carrier SS7 firewall implementations
    Vulnerable versions: Self-attested-adequate firewalls per 2024 FCC filings, contradicted by continued successful roaming-query tracking
    Fixed in: None reported

Timeline

  • Mobile-security researchers publicly demonstrated real-time SS7-based smartphone location tracking, establishing the vulnerability class as long known within the industry.
  • CISA documented confirmed SS7 exploitation attempts against phones on US soil (March-April 2022 window).
  • Citizen Lab recorded millions of SS7 location-request queries targeting Saudi dissidents and other individuals located in the United States.
  • FTC announced enforcement action against data brokers Gravy Analytics and Venntel for unlawfully collecting and selling sensitive geolocation data, including data near military installations, sourced from the mobile ad-tech marketplace.
  • A classified Defense Department memo (later made public by Sen. Ron Wyden) confirmed adversaries were using commercially available location data against US personnel and criticized a decade of unaddressed DoD telecom/data-market defenses.
  • Citizen Lab published 'Bad Connection,' detailing global telecom-interconnect exploitation by covert commercial surveillance actors across 18+ countries, including SS7 Provide Subscriber Information abuse used by Saudi Arabia to track travelers to the US.
  • Wired reported the Pentagon had been warned for roughly a decade about commercial location-data tracking threats to personnel.
  • During the buildup to and early stages of the Iran conflict, regional telecom networks began detecting and blocking a surge of SS7 location-request pings targeting roaming phones believed to belong to US personnel.
  • As hostilities escalated, US forces in Iraqi Kurdistan dispersed from main operating bases into hotels and civilian office space for force protection; Iran-linked actors reportedly used combined SS7 and ad-tech location data to identify which facilities housed American personnel.
  • Financial Times, drawing on Citizen Lab's Mobile Surveillance Monitor project, first reported that Iran-linked actors abused roaming/SS7 infrastructure and commercial ad-tech data to track US military smartphones.
  • Citizen Lab published 'US Military Smartphones Targeted Through Roaming and Ad Tech,' with Gary Miller assessing Iran 'absolutely has capabilities to get real-time, immediate, and continuous location information.'
  • Citizen Lab published a follow-up expert-insight piece, 'How Iran Uses Cellular Infrastructure to Target US Military Phones,' reiterating that continued SS7 exploitation signals a persistent, industry-wide mobile-operator security problem.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

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