# CVE-2026-42980: Windows NT OS Kernel Local Privilege Escalation via WMI Integer Underflow (Public PoC)

> CVE-2026-42980 is a CVSS 7.8 integer-underflow vulnerability in the WMI serialization path of the Windows NT OS Kernel (ntoskrnl.exe) that lets a locally authenticated, low-privileged attacker corrupt kernel pool memory and escalate to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Microsoft patched it in the June 9, 2026 Patch Tuesday cycle; researcher G4sp4rCS published a fully weaponized PoC, build tooling, and a detailed technical writeup to GitHub on July 7, 2026, documenting a complete pool-grooming-to-token-theft exploitation chain and creating exploitation risk on any host that has not applied the June 2026 cumulative update.

- **Published:** 2026-07-26T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-26T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1707
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-windows-wmi-kernel-escalation-tl-2026-1707.webp?v=51d4575d (Threadlinqs threat intel: CVE-2026-42980 Windows WMI LPE: Exploitation Status & Fix (TL-2026-1707) — High severity, 29 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1707
- **Severity:** HIGH (CVSS 7.8)
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 29
- **CVEs:** CVE-2026-42980

## Description

CVE-2026-42980 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the Windows NT OS Kernel caused by an unsigned 32-bit integer underflow (wraparound) in two related WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) serialization routines inside ntoskrnl.exe: `nt!WmipQueryAllDataMultiple` (reached via IOCTL 0x22812C) and `nt!WmipQuerySingleMultiple` (reached via IOCTL 0x228130). Both functions maintain a 32-bit remaining-output-buffer counter and perform an unchecked unsigned subtraction, `OutputBufferLength -= AlignedSize`, of the provider-reported aligned record size. A capacity gate uses an estimated size formula, `(DataSize + 73) & ~7`, to admit an item, while the later subtraction uses the actual aligned size, `(ReturnedDataSize + 7) & ~7` — the mismatch between these two roundings lets an attacker craft a WNODE record whose aligned size exceeds the remaining counter, causing the subtraction to wrap to a very large unsigned value (e.g. a `0x94`-byte remaining capacity minus a `0x98`-byte record wraps to `0xFFFFFFFC`). The kernel then treats this wrapped value as legitimate remaining capacity and permits a second WNODE item to be serialized far out of bounds, corrupting adjacent non-paged pool allocations.

The public PoC (`CVE-2026-42980-POC`, author G4sp4rCS) documents a full, reliable exploitation chain reachable by any authenticated low-privileged local user via `\Device\WMIDataDevice`, requiring no user interaction: (1) build/OS-version detection to select correct offsets; (2) dynamic resolution of `NtFsControlFile`, `NtDeviceIoControlFile`, and the advapi32.dll WMI wrapper APIs `WmiOpenBlock`/`WmiQueryAllDataW`, paired with a runtime scan of a bundled WMI GUID dataset (candidate provider classes include `MSNdis_CoTransmitPduErrors`, `WmiMonitorConnectionParams`, and `MSPower_DeviceEnable`) to locate a WMI provider whose capacity-gate/actual-size mismatch is exploitable on the current build/VM/hardware profile; (3) non-paged pool grooming by spraying roughly 4,096 named pipes (pool tag `NpFr`) sized to match the WMI `SystemBuffer` allocation bucket (`METHOD_BUFFERED` IOCTL with padded input length `0xff0`), then freeing one pipe to create a targeted hole; (4) triggering the vulnerable WMI query so the kernel allocates `SystemBuffer` into the freed hole adjacent to a live `NP_DATA_QUEUE_ENTRY` (named-pipe queue entry) structure; (5) the underflow-driven out-of-bounds write corrupts the `DataSize` field of that queue entry; (6) calling `PeekNamedPipe` on the corrupted pipe over-reads adjacent kernel pool metadata at a stable offset (`0xfd0`), leaking kernel pointers and resolving the exploiting process's own base addresses; (7) a second underflow trigger reshapes the corrupted queue entry into an IRP-backed object, yielding an arbitrary kernel-memory read/write primitive; (8) using that primitive, the exploit walks the kernel's `ActiveProcessLinks` list from the current `EPROCESS` to PID 4 (the `System` process), reads its `Token` field, and overwrites the calling process's own `EPROCESS.Token` with it (Access Token Manipulation / Token Impersonation-Theft); (9) the exploit repairs the corrupted named-pipe structure to restore kernel stability and avoid a bugcheck/crash-triggered detection; (10) it then spawns `cmd.exe`, which inherits the just-stolen NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM token, giving the attacker a fully privileged interactive shell.

Microsoft addressed the flaw in the June 9, 2026 Patch Tuesday cycle (Windows 11 24H2/25H2 via KB5094126, Windows 11 23H2 via KB5093998, and corresponding Windows 10 and Windows Server cumulative updates) by replacing the unchecked subtraction with saturating arithmetic gated behind an internal feature flag (`Feature_1045423416`): if the aligned size is less than the remaining length the subtraction proceeds normally, otherwise the remaining length saturates to zero instead of wrapping, which breaks the exploitation chain at the arithmetic layer by preventing the second WNODE from landing in the groomed adjacent object. At the time of patch release the vulnerability was not known to be exploited in the wild and carried no public exploit; NVD's CVSS 3.1 base score is 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), impact subscore 5.9, exploitability subscore 1.8, with weaknesses classified as CWE-191 (Integer Underflow) and CWE-122 (Heap-based Buffer Overflow); no CVSS v4.0 score had been published as of the last NVD update (2026-07-23). FIRST.org's EPSS model scores CVE-2026-42980 at 0.0695 (6.95% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days), placing it in the 93.43rd percentile of all scored CVEs — a comparatively high percentile for a vulnerability with no confirmed in-the-wild activity, driven by the public, fully weaponized PoC. The June 2026 Patch Tuesday cycle also addressed several other Windows elevation-of-privilege and remote-code-execution issues in adjacent components — a use-after-free RCE in the Windows Kernel (CVE-2026-45657), and use-after-free EoP flaws in DWM Core Library (CVE-2026-42905), the Microsoft Graphics component (CVE-2026-42986), and Winlogon (CVE-2026-42989) — released the same day but tracked as separate, technically unrelated vulnerabilities.

On July 7, 2026, security researcher G4sp4rCS published the fully working proof-of-concept to the public GitHub repository `G4sp4rCS/CVE-2026-42980-POC`, including C source (`src/cve_2026_42980_lpe.c`, `src/helpers.c`, `src/wmi_guids.h`), a `Makefile` and PowerShell build script (`build.ps1`), a proof screenshot (`assets/photo-poc-system.jpg`), and English/Spanish technical writeups (`writeup-en.md`, `writeup-es.md`), explicitly framed for educational, defensive-research, and authorized-testing use only, to be run exclusively in isolated lab systems. Cyber Security News covered the public release on July 22, 2026, and vulnerability-intelligence platforms (cvereports.com, cvemon/intruder.io) published independent technical breakdowns of the exploitation chain around the same date. As of this writing CVE-2026-42980 has not been added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, and there is no confirmed evidence of active in-the-wild exploitation — its elevated 93.43rd-percentile EPSS score reflects the public PoC's reliability and reach, not observed campaign activity.

The vulnerability affects a broad range of currently supported Windows client and server releases (Windows 10 1607/1809/21H2/22H2, Windows 11 23H2/24H2/25H2/26H1 across x86/x64/ARM64, and Windows Server 2012/2012 R2/2016/2019/2022/2025), making it broadly relevant to enterprise and consumer estates that have not applied the June 2026 or later cumulative security update.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1078.003 Local Accounts
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
- T1106 Native API
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft
- T1134 Access Token Manipulation
- T1027.007 Dynamic API Resolution
- T1211 Exploitation for Stealth
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery
- T1588.005 Exploits

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Low-Privilege Process Spawning cmd.exe as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM Outside Known Service Context (CVE-2026-42980 Token-Theft Indicator)** (`TL-2026-1707-SPL-002`)

Detects the post-exploitation signature of a successful CVE-2026-42980 run: a low-privileged parent process spawning cmd.exe that executes as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM with no corresponding legitimate service/scheduled-task lineage — the process-tree shape produced by the exploit's ActiveProcessLinks-driven EPROCESS.Token overwrite (token theft from PID 4/System).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1134.001, T1134, T1068, T1059.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security_event_log
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image="*\\cmd.exe" User="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
| where NOT match(ParentImage, "(?i)\\\\(services|svchost|wininit|smss|winlogon|taskeng|schtasks)\.exe$")
| eval parent_low_priv=if(match(ParentUser, "(?i)^(?!NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM).*$"), "true", "false")
| where parent_low_priv="true"
| table _time ComputerName ParentImage ParentUser ParentProcessId Image User CommandLine ProcessGuid
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where AccountName has "SYSTEM"
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !has "SYSTEM"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("services.exe", "svchost.exe", "wininit.exe", "smss.exe", "winlogon.exe", "taskeng.exe", "schtasks.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessId, FileName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Low-Privilege Process Spawning cmd.exe as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM (CVE-2026-42980 Token-Theft Indicator)
id: 8f2e5b1a-42a0-4d21-9c1e-tl20261707a2
status: experimental
description: Detects cmd.exe executing as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM whose parent process ran under a standard/low-privileged account and is not a recognized service host, consistent with an EPROCESS.Token swap achieved via the CVE-2026-42980 arbitrary kernel read/write primitive.
references:
    - https://github.com/G4sp4rCS/CVE-2026-42980-POC/blob/main/writeup-en.md
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-26
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1134.001
    - attack.t1134
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - cve.2026.42980
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
    service: sysmon
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\\cmd.exe'
        User: 'NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM'
    filter_known_services:
        ParentImage|contains:
            - '\\services.exe'
            - '\\svchost.exe'
            - '\\wininit.exe'
            - '\\smss.exe'
            - '\\winlogon.exe'
            - '\\schtasks.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter_known_services
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate SYSTEM-context scheduled tasks, PsExec-style admin tooling, or software-deployment agents spawning cmd.exe from a non-standard parent
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- PsExec-style remote administration or software-deployment agents that legitimately spawn SYSTEM-context cmd.exe from a non-service parent

**Tuning notes:** Add an allow-list for known remote-admin/deployment tool parent images (e.g. PsExec service binary paths) observed in the environment; correlate ParentProcessId/ProcessGuid lineage back to the pipe-burst and WMI-access detections (Row 1) to raise confidence to critical.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Non-Standard Process Reaching [indicator] via Native WMI IOCTLs Without WmiPrvSE Context (CVE-2026-42980) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthorized Process Discovery of PID 4 (System) Immediately Preceding SYSTEM-Context Child Process (CVE-2026-42980 ActiveProcessLinks Token-Theft Chain) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowerShell Compilation of Unsigned Native Exploit Binary via nmake/[indicator] (CVE-2026-42980 Build Chain) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- WMI Provider/GUID Enumeration Against CVE-2026-42980 Candidate Classes by Standard User (Exploit Reconnaissance) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Endpoint Patch-Verification Gap: Feature_1045423416 Not Enabled Despite June 2026+ KB Installation Record (CVE-2026-42980 False Sense of Patch Coverage) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PeekNamedPipe-Style Read Against Just-Created Pipe Immediately After WMI Query (CVE-2026-42980 Kernel Pointer-Leak Primitive) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Named-Pipe Pool-Grooming Burst Correlated with WMI Multi-Instance IOCTL Access to [indicator] (CVE-2026-42980 Exploitation Trigger) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CVE-2026-42980 PoC Tooling Staged on Disk (Exploit Source, Build Scripts, Compiled Binary) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

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## Sources

- [PoC Exploit Released for Windows NT OS Kernel Privilege Escalation Vulnerability](https://cybersecuritynews.com/poc-windows-nt-os-kernel/)
- [CVE-2026-42980 Detail - NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42980)
- [CVE-2026-42980 - Security Update Guide - Microsoft - NT OS Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2026-42980)
- [G4sp4rCS/CVE-2026-42980-POC](https://github.com/G4sp4rCS/CVE-2026-42980-POC)
- [G4sp4rCS/CVE-2026-42980-POC — writeup-en.md (technical writeup)](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/G4sp4rCS/CVE-2026-42980-POC/main/writeup-en.md)
- [CVE-2026-42980: Windows Kernel Local Privilege Escalation via WMI Integer Underflow](https://cvereports.com/reports/CVE-2026-42980)
- [Microsoft and Adobe Patch Tuesday, June 2026 Security Update Review](https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2026/06/09/microsoft-and-adobe-patch-tuesday-june-2026-security-update-review)
- [CVE-2026-42980 - Overview, Insights & Trends](https://cvemon.intruder.io/cves/CVE-2026-42980)
- [June 9, 2026-KB5094126 (OS Builds 26200.8655 and 26100.8655)](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/june-9-2026-kb5094126-os-builds-26200-8655-and-26100-8655-1a9bcba6-5f53-4075-8156-fe11ac631737)
- [FIRST.org EPSS API — CVE-2026-42980](https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-42980)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1707
