# npm Supply-Chain Compromise (chalk/debug + 17 packages, Sept 2025) — Motivates GitHub Dependabot 'Cooldown' Mitigation

> On 2025-09-08, a phishing attack against npm maintainer Josh Junon ('Qix') led to malicious, wallet-hijacking versions of chalk, debug, and 17 other packages (>2B combined weekly downloads) being published to the npm registry; the payload rewrote cryptocurrency transaction destinations in browser contexts. Help Net Security (2026-07-27) cites this incident as the motivating case for GitHub's new Dependabot 'cooldown' feature, which delays non-security dependency-update PRs (default ~3 days) to let the community flag malicious releases before auto-merge.

- **Published:** 2026-07-27T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-27T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1714
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-chalk-debug-sept-2025-clipper-tl-2026-1714.webp?v=aaa3de41 (Threadlinqs threat intel: npm chalk/debug Wallet-Hijack Attack: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1714) — High severity, 35 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1714
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** RESOLVED
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 35 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On September 8, 2025 at approximately 13:00 UTC, an attacker sent a convincing 2FA-reset phishing email from the fraudulent domain npmjs[.]help to Josh Junon (npm handle 'Qix'), maintainer of the widely depended-upon chalk and debug packages. The email harvested Junon's npm credentials and a live TOTP code, giving the attacker full control of the account within minutes. At 13:16 UTC — roughly 16 minutes after compromise — the attacker began publishing trojanized versions of 18-19 high-traffic npm packages (chalk, debug, ansi-styles, ansi-regex, strip-ansi, wrap-ansi, slice-ansi, has-ansi, color-convert, color-string, color-name, color, simple-swizzle, is-arrayish, backslash, error-ex, supports-color, supports-hyperlinks, chalk-template), which collectively receive over 2 billion weekly downloads.

The injected payload was heavily obfuscated JavaScript that activated only in browser execution contexts (it deliberately no-opped in Node.js/server environments to reduce detection, occasionally throwing 'ReferenceError: fetch is not defined' during server-side builds — an incidental detection signal). In-browser, it hooked fetch(), XMLHttpRequest, window.ethereum.request, and Solana signing calls, then silently rewrote outbound cryptocurrency transaction recipients and token-approval targets to attacker-controlled wallet addresses across Ethereum, Bitcoin, Solana, Tron, Litecoin, and Bitcoin Cash. To evade visual inspection, the malware used Levenshtein-distance address substitution to select look-alike attacker addresses resembling the legitimate recipient, and specifically targeted ERC-20 function selectors for approve, transfer, transferFrom, and permit. A global object named window.stealthProxyControl was used to coordinate the hooked behavior, and a remote WebSocket endpoint (websocket-api2.publicvm[.]com) alongside two BunnyCDN-hosted domains (static-mw-host.b-cdn[.]net, img-data-backup.b-cdn[.]net) served as supporting infrastructure.

The community first raised suspicion around 14:16-15:20 UTC via Bluesky/GitHub; Junon publicly acknowledged the compromise at ~15:15-15:16 UTC. npm began takedown at 17:17 UTC, and all impacted chalk versions were removed from the registry by 19:59 UTC, with residual malicious versions of other packages cleaned up September 9. JFrog subsequently reported the campaign's scope extended beyond Qix's own packages. Despite the massive reach (an estimated 99% of scanned cloud environments contained at least one affected package pre-attack, ~10% contained the malicious code post-distribution), actual reported cryptocurrency theft was minimal given the short ~2-hour live window and rapid community detection.

Almost eleven months later, Help Net Security (2026-07-27) reports that GitHub has shipped a Dependabot 'cooldown' option (configurable via the `cooldown` key in `dependabot.yml`) that delays non-security dependency-update pull requests by a default window (the article cites 3 days) so that malicious package versions have time to be flagged by the community before automated tooling (including Dependabot itself) proposes the update. Security updates for known vulnerabilities bypass the cooldown. GitHub's Advisory Database recorded over 6,500 npm malware advisories in the year ending May 2026 (~18/day), underscoring that this chalk/debug incident is illustrative of an ongoing, high-frequency npm malicious-package problem rather than an isolated event.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1566 Phishing
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1204 User Execution
- T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1480 Execution Guardrails
- T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1565 Data Manipulation
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Browser Payload Marker (stealthProxyControl) + ERC-20 Selector Abuse in Delivered JS** (`TL-2026-1714-SPL-002`)

Detects the crypto-clipper payload's global coordination marker `window.stealthProxyControl` and/or hooked-wallet-API footprint (fetch, XMLHttpRequest, window.ethereum.request, Solana signing) inside delivered/proxied JavaScript bundles, correlated with ERC-20 function-selector bytes (0x095ea7b3 approve, 0xa9059cbb transfer, 0x23b872dd transferFrom, 0xd505accf permit) — the live wallet-hijacking behavior once the payload activates in a real browser context.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1185, T1056, T1565, T1059
- **Data sources:** web_proxy_stream_http, endpoint_filescan, js_bundle_content_scan
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=web (sourcetype="stream:http" OR sourcetype="proxy") OR (index=endpoint sourcetype="filescan")
("stealthProxyControl" OR "window.ethereum.request" OR "0x095ea7b3" OR "0xa9059cbb" OR "0x23b872dd" OR "0xd505accf")
| eval matched_selector=case(
    match(_raw, "stealthProxyControl"), "stealthProxyControl_marker",
    match(_raw, "0xa9059cbb"), "erc20_transfer_selector",
    match(_raw, "0x095ea7b3"), "erc20_approve_selector",
    match(_raw, "0x23b872dd"), "erc20_transferFrom_selector",
    match(_raw, "0xd505accf"), "erc20_permit_selector",
    true(), "wallet_hook_reference")
| stats count values(matched_selector) as matched_indicators by src_ip, dest_ip, file_path, sha256
| where count > 0
| sort -count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
CustomJSBundleScan_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where FileContent_s has_any ("stealthProxyControl", "window.ethereum.request", "0x095ea7b3", "0xa9059cbb", "0x23b872dd", "0xd505accf")
| extend MatchedIndicator = case(
    FileContent_s has "stealthProxyControl", "stealthProxyControl_marker",
    FileContent_s has "0xa9059cbb", "erc20_transfer_selector",
    FileContent_s has "0x095ea7b3", "erc20_approve_selector",
    FileContent_s has "0x23b872dd", "erc20_transferFrom_selector",
    FileContent_s has "0xd505accf", "erc20_permit_selector",
    "wallet_hook_reference")
| project TimeGenerated, BundlePath_s, DeviceName_s, MatchedIndicator, FileHash_s
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Bundled JavaScript Containing stealthProxyControl Wallet-Hijack Marker or ERC-20 Selector Abuse
id: 7a3e9f10-4c2b-4e1a-9d6f-1b2c3d4e5f02
status: experimental
description: Detects the npm crypto-clipper payload's stealthProxyControl coordination marker, ERC-20 function-selector bytes for approve/transfer/transferFrom/permit, or hooked wallet-API references inside a delivered/proxied JavaScript bundle.
references:
    - https://www.sygnia.co/threat-reports-and-advisories/npm-supply-chain-attack-september-2025/
    - https://www.wiz.io/blog/widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack-breaking-down-impact-scope-across-debug-chalk
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-27
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1185
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1056
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1565
    - attack.t1059
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: any
detection:
    selection_marker:
        FileContent|contains: 'stealthProxyControl'
    selection_selectors:
        FileContent|contains:
            - '0x095ea7b3'
            - '0xa9059cbb'
            - '0x23b872dd'
            - '0xd505accf'
    selection_hooks:
        FileContent|contains:
            - 'window.ethereum.request'
            - 'window.solana'
    condition: selection_marker or (selection_selectors and selection_hooks)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Web3/DeFi dApp code that hooks window.ethereum.request and references standard ERC-20 selectors as part of normal wallet-connect functionality
    - Security research or SCA tooling that stores the known malicious string/selectors in a signature database bundled into a scanned artifact
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate Web3/DeFi dApp code that hooks window.ethereum.request and references standard ERC-20 selectors as part of normal wallet-connect UX
- SCA/threat-intel tooling that legitimately bundles the known malicious string/selectors into its own signature database

**Tuning notes:** Weight `selection_marker` (the stealthProxyControl string) as high-confidence standalone; require the selector+hook combination for the lower-specificity ERC-20 selectors to cut false positives from legitimate wallet-connect libraries; exclude known-good vendor bundle paths (e.g. verified wallet SDK CDN origins) via an allowlist.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- npm/Node Process Resolving Compromised chalk/debug Package Versions (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Custom JS-Bundle Content Scan — Wallet-Hijack Payload Indicators (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DeviceNetworkEvents — Connection to Documented npm Crypto-Clipper C2/Phishing Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma: Compromised chalk/debug Package Resolution in npm Registry Logs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma: stealthProxyControl Marker or ERC-20 Selector + Wallet-Hook Combination (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma: Network Connection to npm Crypto-Clipper C2/Phishing Domains or IP (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Trojanized npm Install — chalk/debug Compromised Versions + Build Guardrail Error (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound Beacon to npm Crypto-Clipper C2 Infrastructure (publicvm/BunnyCDN/[indicator]) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 35)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.7.81[.]108`
- Domain: `npmjs[.]help`
- Domain: `static-mw-host[.]b-cdn[.]net`

Full set of 35 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [GitHub Dependabot gets a cooldown to block npm-style supply chain attacks](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/07/27/github-dependabot-cooldown/)
- [16 Minutes to Impact: npm Supply Chain Abuse Deploys Crypto-Draining Malware](https://www.sygnia.co/threat-reports-and-advisories/npm-supply-chain-attack-september-2025/)
- [Widespread npm Supply Chain Attack: Breaking Down Impact & Scope Across Debug, Chalk, and Beyond](https://www.wiz.io/blog/widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack-breaking-down-impact-scope-across-debug-chalk)
- [chalk, debug and color on npm compromised in new supply chain attack](https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/chalk-debug-and-color-on-npm-compromised-in-new-supply-chain-attack/)
- [npm Chalk and Debug Packages Compromised](https://www.sonatype.com/blog/npm-chalk-and-debug-packages-hit-in-software-supply-chain-attack)
- [npm debug and chalk packages compromised](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised)
- [20+ Popular NPM Packages Compromised (Chalk, Debug, Strip-ANSI, Color-Convert, Wrap-ANSI...)](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/20-popular-npm-packages-compromised-chalk-debug-strip-ansi-color-convert-wrap-ansi)
- [npm Supply Chain Attack: Massive Compromise of debug, chalk, and 16 Other Packages](https://www.upwind.io/feed/npm-supply-chain-attack-massive-compromise-of-debug-chalk-and-16-other-packages)
- [When Dependencies Turn Dangerous: Responding to the NPM Supply Chain Attack](https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2025/09/10/when-dependencies-turn-dangerous-responding-to-the-npm-supply-chain-attack)
- [Version 5.6.1 published to npm is compromised (RESOLVED)](https://github.com/chalk/chalk/issues/656)
- [Questions on scope and impact of npm malware advisories (2025-09-09)](https://github.com/github/advisory-database/issues/6103)
- [GHSA-2v46-p5h4-248w — chalk malicious code advisory](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2v46-p5h4-248w)
- [GHSA-8mgj-vmr8-frr6 — debug malicious code advisory](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8mgj-vmr8-frr6)
- [GHSA-p5rr-crjh-x7gr — ansi-styles malicious code advisory](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p5rr-crjh-x7gr)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1714
