# Astaroth (Guildma) Banking Trojan Uses Steganography and Ngrok Tunnels for C2 Resilience

> Astaroth (aka Guildma), a Delphi-based Windows banking trojan active since 2015/2017 and targeting Brazil and Latin America, routes C2 traffic through Ngrok reverse-proxy tunnels and pulls fresh configuration every two hours from steganographic GitHub-hosted images to survive C2 takedowns. Recent STAC3150/"Boto Cor-de-Rosa" campaigns deliver it via WhatsApp "View Once" messages with a self-propagating Python worm module, while it steals banking/crypto credentials via a system-wide keyboard hook and self-destructs on English (US) locale or sandbox detection.

- **Published:** 2026-07-28T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-28T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1738
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-astaroth-guildma-ngrok-c2-tl-2026-1738.webp?v=dc323135 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Astaroth (Guildma) Ngrok C2 Tunnels: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1738) — High severity, 30 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1738
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 30 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Astaroth (also tracked as Guildma, MITRE ATT&CK software S0373) is a Delphi-written banking trojan and information stealer first reported in the wild circa 2015 and publicly documented since late 2017, primarily targeting Brazil (over 90% of infections) with secondary spread across Latin America (Mexico, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela) and isolated hits in the United States and Austria.

Historically, Astaroth has been distributed via DocuSign-themed and government/HR-themed phishing emails containing geo-restricted ZIP archives with malicious LNK files. The LNK contains obfuscated JavaScript that fetches further JavaScript from hard-coded servers, which in turn drives an AutoIt loader that decodes shellcode to load a Delphi-based DLL, ultimately injected into RegSvcs.exe via process hollowing. Persistence is achieved by dropping the LNK into the Windows Startup folder or writing Registry Run keys. Two named 2024 distribution clusters — PINEAPPLE (abusing legitimate cloud services) and Water Makara (obfuscated JavaScript LNK loaders) — have been documented pushing Astaroth into Brazilian manufacturing, retail, and government-sector targets.

As of September 2025, a new campaign tracked by Sophos as STAC3150 (and by Acronis Threat Research Unit as "Boto Cor-de-Rosa") shifted the delivery vector to WhatsApp, abusing the "View Once" message feature to deliver ZIP archives containing malicious VBS or HTA files. Execution triggers PowerShell, which in early September 2025 retrieved second-stage payloads over IMAP from attacker-controlled email accounts, shifting to HTTP (PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest) by early October 2025. A PowerShell/Python script using Selenium Chrome WebDriver and the WPPConnect JavaScript library harvests the victim's WhatsApp contact list and session tokens; a newly added Python-based worm module then auto-forwards the malicious ZIP to every harvested contact, self-reporting delivery/failure/rate metrics in real time, giving the campaign worm-like self-propagation across WhatsApp's user base. By late October 2025, an MSI installer deploys the Astaroth payload itself via an AutoIt script masquerading as a .log file, establishing registry-based startup persistence. Sophos reported over 250 affected customers, ~95% located in Brazil.

For C2 resilience, Astaroth routes its custom binary-protocol traffic through Ngrok reverse-proxy tunnels to obscure the true operator-controlled server IP and bypass perimeter/firewall detection. When direct C2 contact is unavailable or infrastructure is taken down, the malware falls back to fetching configuration from images hosted on GitHub (and other public platforms, often reached via URL shorteners) with payload data appended after the image's EOF marker or hidden via steganographic encoding in pixel data — refreshed on a two-hour cycle so operators can restore control without needing victims to re-establish contact with primary C2.

Credential theft is performed via a SetWindowsHookExW WH_KEYBOARD_LL system-wide keyboard hook that polls the foreground browser window (Chrome, Firefox, IE/Edge) roughly once per second; keylogging activates only when a banking or cryptocurrency portal (e.g., caixa.gov.br, itau.com.br, santandernet.com.br, binance.com, metamask.io, bitcointrade.com.br) is detected in the active window, minimizing captured noise and analyst visibility.

Anti-analysis is extensive: nearly 1,000 internal strings are protected by a custom three-layer encoding scheme (XOR, byte reversal, session-key decoding); the malware enumerates and avoids running in the presence of debuggers (x32dbg, OllyDBG, IDA Pro, WinDbg), traffic analysis tools (Wireshark), virtualization indicators (QEMU-GA, VirtualBox), and SIEM/EDR agents (splunkd.exe); it fingerprints the volume serial number via GetVolumeInformationW; and — most notably — if the system locale resolves to English (United States), Astaroth treats the environment as a sandbox and triggers an automated system shutdown specifically to destroy forensic evidence rather than merely exiting.

No CVE applies — this is a malware/social-engineering delivery threat, not a software vulnerability. No single threat actor has been formally attributed across the full campaign lineage; PINEAPPLE, Water Makara, and the STAC3150 operators are tracked as distinct but overlapping distribution clusters, all financially motivated and Portuguese-language/Brazil-focused.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1132 Data Encoding
- T1074 Data Staged
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1568 Dynamic Resolution
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1566 Phishing
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1129 Shared Modules
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1124 System Time Discovery
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1204 User Execution
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1102 Web Service
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1220 XSL Script Processing
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1090 Proxy
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Astaroth Registry Run-Key Persistence with RegSvcs.exe Hollow-Target Spawn** (`TL-2026-1738-SPL-002`)

Detects the STAC3150/Astaroth post-exploitation persistence chain: a script-host process (powershell.exe/wscript.exe) writes an HKCU/HKLM Run-key value and, within a short window, spawns RegSvcs.exe — the documented process-hollowing injection target for the Delphi-based Astaroth payload — with no legitimate .NET-installer command-line arguments.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1547.001, T1055.012, T1027.013
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_registry, windows_security
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
( (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*" EventType=SetValue (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\wscript.exe"))
  OR
  (EventCode=1 Image="*\\RegSvcs.exe" NOT CommandLine="*/i*" (ParentImage="*\\powershell.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\wscript.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\cmd.exe")) )
| eval evt_type=if(EventCode=13,"run_key_write","regsvcs_hollow_target_spawn")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(evt_type) as event_types by host, user, Image, ParentImage, TargetObject, CommandLine
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let RunKeyWrites = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has @"CurrentVersion\Run"
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe","wscript.exe");
let RegSvcsSpawns = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "RegSvcs.exe"
| where isempty(ProcessCommandLine) or ProcessCommandLine !contains "/i"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cmd.exe");
RunKeyWrites
| join kind=inner (RegSvcsSpawns) on DeviceName
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName1=FileName, ProcessCommandLine1=ProcessCommandLine
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Astaroth Registry Run-Key Persistence Followed By RegSvcs.exe Hollow-Target Spawn
id: 7c1e2a3b-4f5d-4a6c-9b7e-1a2b3c4d5e02
status: experimental
description: Detects a script-host process writing an HKCU/HKLM Run-key persistence value and spawning RegSvcs.exe with no legitimate installer arguments, consistent with Astaroth's documented process-hollowing injection target (S0373).
references:
    - https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/astaroth-guildma-uses-steganography-and-ngrok-for-c2-resilience
    - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1055.012
    - attack.t1027.013
    - malware.astaroth
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_regsvcs:
        Image|endswith: '\RegSvcs.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
    filter_legit:
        CommandLine|contains: '/i'
    condition: selection_regsvcs and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate .NET ServicedComponent installation via installutil-style RegSvcs.exe invocation with /i switches
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate .NET ServicedComponent installation workflows invoking RegSvcs.exe with proper /i or /u switches from an admin deployment script

**Tuning notes:** Correlate Run-key write and RegSvcs.exe spawn within a 5-minute window keyed on host+user to reduce coincidental matches; allowlist known software-management RegSvcs.exe invocations by parent process signer.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Astaroth/STAC3150 HTA-Triggered PowerShell Second-Stage Retrieval (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Astaroth AutoIt-Loader .log Masquerade with Anti-Analysis Debugger/Security-Tool Enumeration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Astaroth GitHub Steganographic Dead-Drop Config Refresh and Known STAC3150 C2 Domains (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Astaroth STAC3150 VBS/HTA Lure Chain to PowerShell (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Astaroth Keyboard-Hook Process Access to Browser Targeting Banking/Crypto Portal (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Astaroth WhatsApp Worm Selenium/WPPConnect Session Hijack and Mass Auto-Forward Burst (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Astaroth/STAC3150 WhatsApp-Lure VBS/HTA-to-PowerShell Downloader Chain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Astaroth Ngrok Reverse-Proxy C2 Tunnel Beacon (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 30)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `manoelimoveiscaioba[.]com`
- Domain: `varegjopeaks[.]com`
- Domain: `docsmoonstudioclayworks[.]online`

Full set of 30 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Astaroth (Guildma) Uses Steganography and Ngrok for C2 Resilience](https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/astaroth-guildma-uses-steganography-and-ngrok-for-c2-resilience)
- [WhatsApp Compromise Leads to Astaroth Deployment](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/whatsapp-compromise-leads-to-astaroth-deployment/)
- [Astaroth: Banking Trojan Abusing GitHub for Resilience](https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/astaroth-banking-trojan-abusing-github-for-resilience/)
- [Astaroth Banking Trojan Abuses GitHub to Remain Operational After Takedowns](https://thehackernews.com/2025/10/astaroth-banking-trojan-abuses-github.html)
- [WhatsApp Worm Spreads Astaroth Banking Trojan Across Brazil via Contact Auto-Messaging](https://thehackernews.com/2026/01/whatsapp-worm-spreads-astaroth-banking.html)
- [Astaroth unleashed (Boto Cor-de-Rosa campaign analysis)](https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/astaroth-unleashed/)
- [Astaroth, Software S0373](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373/)
- [Astaroth (Malware Family)](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.astaroth)
- [Guildma is now using Finger and Signed Binary Proxy Execution to evade defenses](https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Guildma+is+now+using+Finger+and+Signed+Binary+Proxy+Execution+to+evade+defenses/27482)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1738
