# CubePilot Drone Autopilot Vendor Hit by DNS Hijacking, Enabling Traffic Interception and Fraudulent TLS Certificates

> On July 24, 2026, an unattributed attacker seized DNS control of cubepilot.org, obtained fraudulent TLS certificates covering all subdomains, and intercepted traffic to the OEM portal, community forum, documentation site, and ERP portal of CubePilot — a Blue UAS-listed Australian drone autopilot vendor. CubePilot regained control the same day, revoked the certificates, and flagged firmware downloaded during the July 24-25 window as potentially unsafe pending integrity checks.

- **Published:** 2026-07-28T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-28T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1749
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-cubepilot-dns-hijack-certificates-tl-2026-1749.webp?v=b5b26624 (Threadlinqs threat intel: CubePilot DNS Hijack and Forged Certs: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1749) — High severity, 16 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1749
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16 (1 shown free below)

## Description

CubePilot Global Pty Ltd, a Geelong, Australia-based manufacturer of drone flight-controller hardware (the Cube autopilot family) whose products sit on the US Department of Defense's Blue UAS cleared list through 2027, disclosed that an attacker gained control of the DNS settings for its primary domain, cubepilot.org, on July 24, 2026. Because DNS control determines which certificate authority domain-validation challenges resolve against, the attacker was able to obtain valid, fraudulently-issued TLS certificates covering every cubepilot.org subdomain. This let the attacker present browser-trusted HTTPS connections while redirecting visitors of CubePilot's OEM portal, community/support forum, documentation site, and ERP portal to attacker-controlled infrastructure — a domain-hijack-enabled adversary-in-the-middle position rather than a vulnerability in any CubePilot product.

CubePilot states that any credentials entered on its services on July 24, including the OEM portal and forum, may have been captured, and has urged affected users to rotate reused passwords. Because the compromise briefly sat astride CubePilot's software/firmware distribution channel, the company additionally flagged firmware images downloaded between July 24 and July 25, 2026 as not yet confirmed safe, while firmware obtained before July 24 is considered unaffected. CubePilot also warned customers that any payment request purporting to come from the company should be verified by phone before acting on it, anticipating possible follow-on business-email-compromise-style fraud using data or trust harvested during the compromise window.

CubePilot's response, per its public statement and CEO Philip Rowse, included regaining domain control same-day, revoking the fraudulent certificates, preserving evidence, notifying affected providers, taking the OEM portal, forum, documentation site, and ERP portal offline as a precaution, and reporting the incident to the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) and law enforcement. As of disclosure, no CVE, malware sample, attacker infrastructure (IPs/domains), or attribution had been published; the incident is a vendor-infrastructure/DNS-and-PKI-trust compromise rather than a code-level vulnerability, but it is supply-chain relevant because CubePilot's Cube autopilot hardware and ArduPilot/PX4-compatible firmware are widely used across defense, government, agriculture, surveying, and search-and-rescue drone deployments, including under the AUKUS-aligned Blue UAS program.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1590 Gather Victim Network Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1553 Subvert Trust Controls
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1565 Data Manipulation
- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1491 Defacement

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Self-Signed / Attacker-Issued Certificate Installed to User Trust Store (Windows)** (`TL-2026-1749-SPL-002`)

Detects PowerShell generating a self-signed certificate and importing it into the CurrentUser\Root trust store — the local-trust-subversion pattern reproduced in the DETECT-phase simulation as a stand-in for the fraudulently issued, domain-validated certificate CubePilot's attacker obtained via hijacked DNS. A cert trusted this way lets an AiTM proxy present browser-trusted HTTPS for the spoofed domain.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1553.004, T1588.004
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, powershell_operational
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h EventCode=1
    (CommandLine="*New-SelfSignedCertificate*" OR (CommandLine="*Import-Certificate*" AND CommandLine="*Cert:\\CurrentUser\\Root*"))
| table _time host User Image CommandLine
| sort - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "New-SelfSignedCertificate"
    or (ProcessCommandLine has "Import-Certificate" and ProcessCommandLine has @"Cert:\CurrentUser\Root")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Self-Signed Certificate Created and Imported to CurrentUser Root Store
id: 2e4f6a80-1c3d-4b5e-9f7a-8b9c0d1e2f3a
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell creating a self-signed certificate and importing it into the CurrentUser\Root trust store, the local trust-subversion pattern used to stand in for a fraudulently issued domain-validated certificate in the CubePilot (TL-2026-1749) DNS-hijack detection-validation simulation.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cubepilot-drone-software-dev-hit-by-dns-hijacking-to-intercept-traffic/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-29
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1553.004
    - attack.t1588.004
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_create:
        CommandLine|contains: 'New-SelfSignedCertificate'
    selection_import:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Import-Certificate'
            - 'Cert:\CurrentUser\Root'
    condition: selection_create or selection_import
falsepositives:
    - Approved internal PKI or dev-certificate provisioning tooling
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate internal PKI/dev-cert tooling that provisions self-signed certs to CurrentUser\Root for approved internal testing
- Software deployment tooling that installs code-signing or internal CA roots via similar cmdlets

**Tuning notes:** Allowlist known internal PKI automation accounts/hosts; alert with higher confidence when the certificate's Subject/SAN matches a monitored external vendor domain rather than an internal name.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Anomalous DNS Resolution for Registered Vendor Domain (Cloud DNS Telemetry) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unexpected Certificate Transparency Log Issuance for Monitored Vendor Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Anomalous Vendor-Domain DNS Resolution Correlated with Payment-Fraud Lure Email (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthorized /etc/hosts Modification Followed by Local HTTP Listener — Linux AiTM Staging (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Firmware Integrity Verification Failure — Supply-Chain Tamper Quarantine (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Loopback HTTP Listener or Command-Line Credential Submission — AiTM Capture Artifact (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthorized Hosts File Modification — DNS Hijack Precursor (Windows Endpoint) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AiTM Credential Capture on Hijacked Vendor Portal Login Endpoint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (1 of 16)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `cubepilot[.]org`

Full set of 16 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [CubePilot drone software dev hit by DNS hijacking to intercept traffic](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cubepilot-drone-software-dev-hit-by-dns-hijacking-to-intercept-traffic/)
- [Aussie UAS supplier warns of suspected cyber attack](https://australianaviation.com.au/2026/07/aussie-uas-supplier-warns-of-cyber-attack/)
- [Australian tech firm CubePilot secures long-term role in US drone supply chain](https://www.suasnews.com/2026/01/australian-tech-firm-cubepilot-secures-long-term-role-in-us-drone-supply-chain/)
- [CubePilot User Guides](https://docs.cubepilot.org/user-guides)
- [CubePilot Global Pty Ltd — official site](https://www.cubepilot.com/)
- [Cubepilot community forum (discuss.cubepilot.org)](https://discuss.cubepilot.org/)
- [CubePilot Cube Orange Flight Controller | PX4 User Guide](https://docs.px4.io/main/en/flight_controller/cubepilot_cube_orange)
- [CubePilot GitHub organization](https://github.com/CubePilot)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1749
