Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-1751
US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk and UniPwn-Class Takeover Vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-35027)
US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk (TL-2026-1751), also tracked as UniPwn, is a high-severity supply-chain compromise scored CVSS 7.3, first published 2026-07-29. It is linked to a China-nexus actor with low confidence, affects Unitree Robotics Go2, references 7 CVEs (CVE-2025-35027, CVE-2025-60017, CVE-2025-60250), maps to 21 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1027, T1041, T1046), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 20 indicators of compromise.
- CVSS
- 7.3/10High
- CVEs
- 7Referenced vulnerabilities
- Techniques
- 21MITRE ATT&CK
- Actors
- 0Not attributed
- Detection rules
- 9SPL · KQL · Sigma
- IOCs
- 20Indicators of compromise
Key facts for TL-2026-1751
- Threat ID
- TL-2026-1751
- Also known as
- UniPwn
- Severity
- HIGH
- CVSS
- 7.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
- Status
- ACTIVE
- Category
- SUPPLY_CHAIN
- First published
- Last reviewed
- Attribution confidence
- LOW
- Nation-state nexus
- China
- Motivation
- ESPIONAGE
- Target sectors
- government administration, police - law enforcement, defense, academia, energy, manufacturing, robotics
- Target regions
- North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific
- Detection rules
- 9
- Indicators of compromise
- 20
Malware and tooling in US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk
Malware and tooling: UniPwn, UniPwn (Bin4ry/UniPwn)
How US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk works
On 2026-07-28 the FCC, acting on a White House National Security Determination, added foreign-made advanced robotic devices (humanoid and quadruped robots) and connected power inverters to its Covered List, blocking new equipment authorizations. The order explicitly cites UniPwn-class BLE takeover flaws (CVE-2025-35027 and related CVEs) in Chinese manufacturer Unitree's Go2/G1/H1/B2 robots, an unpatched cloud-tunnel backdoor in the older Go1 (CVE-2025-2894), and systemic risk from insecure over-the-air updates and always-on connectivity.
On July 27-28, 2026, an Executive Branch interagency national-security body sent the FCC a National Security Determination covering foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and connected power inverters, and the FCC (under Chairman Brendan Carr) formally added both categories to its Covered List under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act framework, barring new models from receiving the equipment authorization required to import, market, or sell wireless devices in the United States. The determination is prospective (already-authorized models may continue to be sold) and can be overridden with case-by-case approval from the Departments of War or Homeland Security; federal agencies retain purchasing authority.
The order's cybersecurity rationale rests heavily on a documented pattern of critical vulnerabilities in Unitree's robot line, the dominant Chinese humanoid/quadruped vendor (with Agibot and UBTech). Most prominently, the 'UniPwn' vulnerability chain (publicly disclosed 2025-09-20, tracked as CVE-2025-35027 plus CVE-2025-60017, CVE-2025-60250 and CVE-2025-60251) combines a hardcoded AES-CFB128 key/IV, a trivial string-match authentication bypass, and unsanitized command injection in the robot's Bluetooth Low Energy WiFi-configuration interface. An attacker in BLE range sends an AES-encrypted 'unitree' string to bypass authentication, then injects a shell command into the SSID/password fields (';$(cmd);#'), which executes as root via wpa_supplicant_restart.sh when the WiFi service restarts. The exploit is wormable: a compromised robot can scan for and infect nearby Unitree units over BLE without operator interaction, enabling a robot botnet. The flaw was privately reported to Unitree from April 2025 onward; the manufacturer was unresponsive and reportedly said a fix would take 'quarters or years,' prompting public disclosure five months later with no confirmed comprehensive patch.
A second, independently disclosed RCE chain affects the Unitree Go2 specifically (CVE-2026-27509, CVE-2026-27510; publicly documented 2026-02-27, patched in firmware V1.1.13). The Go2 runs Eclipse CycloneDDS for inter-process control messaging over an unauthenticated publish/subscribe bus; an attacker who joins DDS Domain 0 can publish a crafted 'Request_' message with api_id=1002 to the 'rt/api/programming_actuator/request' topic, causing the robot to write attacker-supplied Python to disk at /unitree/etc/programming/{uuid}.py and bind it to a physical controller hotkey — full root RCE requiring only a single button press to trigger, with no authentication or payload validation anywhere in the chain (CVE-2026-27509). When Unitree hardened DDS topic discovery, a companion vector (CVE-2026-27510) achieved the same outcome via tampering with the Android companion app's local SQLite database (dog_programme table) and re-syncing it to the robot.
These acute flaws sit atop an older, still-unpatched supply-chain issue: the discontinued Go1 quadruped (CVE-2025-2894, disclosed by Austin Hackers Anonymous on 2025-03-27) ships with an undocumented backdoor — the CloudSail remote-access service operated by Chinese firm Zhexi Technology — that auto-starts on boot and opens a persistent peer-to-peer tunnel giving anyone with the correct API key full remote control, camera access, and network pivot capability, without owner knowledge or a patch. Vulnerable Go1 units were confirmed operating inside networks at MIT, Princeton, Carnegie Mellon, and the University of Waterloo, and Go2/G1/H1 units are deployed in sensitive contexts including UK police armed-response units and China's PLA. This recurring pattern of embedded/default-credential backdoors, unresponsive vendor disclosure handling, and unauthenticated network/BLE control surfaces is the direct evidentiary basis for the FCC's 'broad attack surfaces' and OTA-update-risk language in the National Security Determination. The same July 2026 action separately targets Chinese-made grid-connected solar/battery inverters (Huawei Digital Power, Sungrow, Growatt, GoodWe, Solis/Ginlong) over remote-firmware grid-disruption risk, following a June 2026 draft rule; note the Department of Energy's January 2026 inspection of 30 Chinese inverters had found no malicious hardware, so the inverter action rests on architectural/connectivity risk rather than a confirmed device-level compromise, unlike the robot vulnerabilities which are independently, technically confirmed.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-1751
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
Privilege Escalation
T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
Collection
Lateral Movement
T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services
Command and Control
T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1573 Encrypted Channel
Persistence
T1546 Event Triggered Execution
Credential Access
Impact
Resource Development
T1587 Develop Capabilities; T1588 Obtain Capabilities
Reconnaissance
T1592 Gather Victim Host Information; T1595 Active Scanning
defense-impairment
Affected products and versions in US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk
- Unitree Robotics — Go2
Vulnerable versions: <=1.1.8 (UniPwn/CVE-2025-35027); V1.1.7; V1.1.8; V1.1.9; V1.1.11; V1.1.11 EDU (CVE-2026-27509/27510)
Fixed in: V1.1.13 (CVE-2026-27509/27510 only; UniPwn BLE chain unconfirmed patched) - Unitree Robotics — G1
Vulnerable versions: <=1.4.4 - Unitree Robotics — H1
Vulnerable versions: <=1.4.4 - Unitree Robotics — B2
Vulnerable versions: <=1.1.8 - Unitree Robotics — Go1
Vulnerable versions: all firmware with CloudSail service enabled (CVE-2025-2894)
Remediation for US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk
Patches
- Unitree Go2 firmware V1.1.13 (fixes CVE-2026-27509 / CVE-2026-27510)
- No confirmed comprehensive firmware patch for UniPwn BLE chain (CVE-2025-35027 / CVE-2025-60017 / CVE-2025-60250 / CVE-2025-60251) as of public disclosure (2025-09-20)
- No patch issued for Go1 CloudSail backdoor (CVE-2025-2894)
Immediate actions
- Update Unitree Go2 units to firmware V1.1.13 or later (patches CVE-2026-27509/CVE-2026-27510)
- Disable BLE pairing/WiFi-reconfiguration mode on Unitree robots except during active, supervised setup
- Restrict or disable DDS Domain 0 participation to authorized devices only; disable topic discovery endpoints where not required
- Segment robot networks (eth0/wlan0) from corporate and campus networks; block unsolicited RTPS multicast/unicast from unknown hosts
- Audit /unitree/etc/programming/ and hotkey_list.txt for unexpected program bindings
- Inventory all deployed Unitree Go1/Go2/G1/H1/B2 units and treat Go1 CloudSail connectivity as an active unpatched backdoor pending manufacturer fix
Workarounds
- Physically disable or Faraday-shield BLE radios when not configuring WiFi
- Block outbound connections to CloudSail/Zhexi Technology tunnel infrastructure at the network perimeter for Go1 deployments
- Restrict physical controller access on units suspected of prior compromise
Longer-term hardening
- Implement DDS-Sec authentication/authorization on robotics middleware
- Require code signing and sandboxing for any user- or field-uploadable robot program/script
- Treat foreign-manufactured connected robotics/OT hardware as subject to supply-chain risk assessment prior to procurement
- Track FCC Covered List updates for procurement compliance
CVEs associated with US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk
CVE-2025-35027, CVE-2025-60017, CVE-2025-60250, CVE-2025-60251, CVE-2025-2894, CVE-2026-27509, CVE-2026-27510
Weaknesses (CWE) in US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk
Timeline of US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk
- Austin Hackers Anonymous (AHA!) discloses CVE-2025-2894: an undocumented CloudSail cloud-tunnel backdoor in Unitree Go1 firmware giving anyone with the API key full remote control, camera access, and network pivot capability.
- Axios reports on the Go1 backdoor finding, confirming vulnerable units were operating on university networks at MIT, Princeton, Carnegie Mellon, and University of Waterloo.
- Researcher Andreas Makris discovers the UniPwn BLE vulnerability chain in Unitree Go2/G1/H1/B2 firmware (hardcoded AES key, auth bypass, command injection).
- Working UniPwn proof-of-concept exploit developed.
- First private disclosure attempt to Unitree via LinkedIn and GitHub.
- Unitree tells the researcher a fix would require 'quarters or years'; engagement is effectively declined.
- UniPwn is publicly disclosed after Unitree goes silent following its IPO announcement; no comprehensive patch is confirmed.
- CVE-2025-35027 (command injection, CVSS 7.3) is published via GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-27p8-m7h9-xchc, alongside related CVE-2025-60017, CVE-2025-60250, and CVE-2025-60251.
- Coordinated disclosure period begins for a separate Unitree Go2 DDS-based unauthenticated RCE chain.
- CVE-2026-27509 (unauthenticated DDS RCE) and CVE-2026-27510 (Android-app database tampering RCE) are publicly documented; Unitree ships firmware V1.1.13 to patch both.
- US officials report drafting a rule to ban new Chinese-made solar and battery inverters over grid-disruption security concerns.
- Unitree launches commercial sales in Europe, becoming the first Chinese-made humanoid robot to reach a Western commercial market.
- An Executive Branch interagency national-security body transmits a National Security Determination on advanced robotic devices and power inverters to the FCC.
- The FCC adds foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and connected power inverters to its Covered List, effective immediately, citing UniPwn-class vulnerabilities, OTA-update risk, and always-on connectivity; Chairman Brendan Carr issues a statement citing supply-chain security.
Sources cited for US FCC Bans Imported Advanced Robots Over Supply-Chain Risk
- America bans imported robots due to supply chain and security risks
- FCC Adds Foreign-Produced Power Inverters and Robots to Covered List
- United States Bans Chinese Humanoid & Quadruped Robots, Citing National Security
- FCC Bans Chinese Humanoid Robots and Power Inverters Linked to Confirmed Backdoors
- Unitree Humanoid Robot Enters Europe Days After Pentagon Flags It as Chinese Military Tech
- GHSA-27p8-m7h9-xchc: Multiple robotic products by Unitree sharing a common firmware command injection (CVE-2025-35027)
- NVD CVE-2025-35027 Detail
- Bin4ry/UniPwn — Unitree BLE exploitation toolkit and disclosure writeup
- From DDS Packets to Robot Shells: Two RCEs in Unitree Robots (CVE-2026-27509 & CVE-2026-27510)
- CVE-2025-2894 - Unitree Go1 Robot Dog Backdoor Control Channel
- Chinese robotics manufacturer left backdoor in product
- FCC bans foreign-produced solar inverters, grid lockout begins today
- US FCC Bans Sales of Foreign-Made Power Inverters and Robots
Detection coverage for TL-2026-1751
As of 2026-07-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1751 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.