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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-1761

AI-Generated Extortion: Fabricated Data-Leak Sites 0APT and ALP-001 Impersonate Ransomware Groups

mediumACTIVE

Recorded Future's Insikt Group documents an evolution in extortion tactics in which threat actors stand up fake Tor data-leak sites and AI-generated victim lists to extort enterprises without conducting any actual intrusion.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1761
Also known as0APT Data Leak Site, ALP-001 Data Leaks / Access Market
SeverityMEDIUM
Affected productsFortinet FortiGate VPN appliances; Citrix Citrix Gateway / RDWeb; Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect VPN; Cisco internet-facing network appliances (unspecified models)
Attribution0APT, ALP-001 (low confidence)
Malware0apt, PromptLock
ToolsALP-001
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1021 Remote Services, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1133 External Remote Services, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact and 12 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorshealth, professional services, technology, transportation and logistics, energy, manufacturing, finance, banking, critical infrastructure
Target regionsunited states of america, france, germany, slovakia, poland, brazil, japan, italy, china, united kingdom, canada, spain
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources13 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1761 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: 0APT Ransomware Precursor Chain — Shadow-Copy Deletion, WMI/PowerShell Defense Evasion & .0apt/README0Apt.txt Encryption Artifacts

Detects the documented pre-encryption and encryption-stage behavior of the 0APT Rust ransomware encryptor (TL-2026-1761): vssadmin.exe/wmic.exe invoked with 'shadow'+'delete' arguments (backup-inhibition), WmiPrvSE-parented process creation consistent with the actor's remote WMI command execution, powershell.exe launched with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden immediately preceding those actions, and the resulting mass file-rename to the .0apt extension paired with a dropped README0Apt.txt ransom note. Also flags the documented case-sensitivity implementation bug — a README0Apt.txt sibling appearing alongside .0apt-encrypted files in the same directory — a strong 0APT-specific fingerprint that most other ransomware families do not exhibit.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1490, T1685, T1047, T1059.001, T1486, T1547.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

(index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
  (Image="*\\vssadmin.exe" OR Image="*\\wmic.exe")
  CommandLine="*shadow*" CommandLine="*delete*"
| eval evt="shadow_copy_deletion")
| append
    [ search index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
      Image="*\\powershell.exe" CommandLine="*-ExecutionPolicy*" CommandLine="*Bypass*" CommandLine="*-WindowStyle*Hidden*"
    | eval evt="powershell_execpolicy_bypass" ]
| append
    [ search index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
      ParentImage="*\\WmiPrvSE.exe"
    | eval evt="wmi_remote_process_creation" ]
| append
    [ search index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11
      (TargetFilename="*.0apt" OR TargetFilename="*\\README0Apt.txt")
    | eval evt="0apt_encryption_artifact" ]
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(evt) as evidence values(CommandLine) as command_lines by Computer, host, Image, ParentImage, TargetFilename
| where count > 0

Microsoft KQL

let shadow_deletion = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("vssadmin.exe","wmic.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "shadow" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, EventType = "shadow_copy_deletion", Detail = ProcessCommandLine;
let ps_bypass = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "ExecutionPolicy" and ProcessCommandLine has "Bypass" and ProcessCommandLine has "WindowStyle"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, EventType = "powershell_execpolicy_bypass", Detail = ProcessCommandLine;
let wmi_exec = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "WmiPrvSE.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, EventType = "wmi_remote_process_creation", Detail = ProcessCommandLine;
let encryption_artifacts = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName endswith ".0apt" or FileName =~ "README0Apt.txt"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, EventType = "0apt_encryption_artifact", Detail = FileName;
shadow_deletion
| union ps_bypass, wmi_exec, encryption_artifacts
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Events = make_set(EventType), Details = make_set(Detail) by DeviceName, AccountName

Sigma

title: 0APT Ransomware Precursor Chain — Shadow-Copy Deletion, WMI/PowerShell Evasion & .0apt/README0Apt.txt Artifacts
id: a1b2c3d4-1761-4e5f-8a9b-0c1d2e3f4002
status: experimental
description: Detects vssadmin.exe/wmic.exe shadow-copy deletion, WmiPrvSE-parented process creation, powershell.exe launched with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden, and the resulting .0apt file-extension rename or README0Apt.txt ransom-note drop documented for the 0APT Rust ransomware encryptor (TL-2026-1761).
references:
    - https://www.halcyon.ai/ransomware-research-reports/0apt-credible-technical-depth-despite-inflated-victim-claims
    - https://theravenfile.com/2026/02/14/0apt-ransomware-the-real-fake/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-29
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.execution
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.tool.0apt
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_shadow_delete:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shadow'
            - 'delete'
    selection_ps_bypass:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ExecutionPolicy'
            - 'Bypass'
            - 'WindowStyle'
    selection_wmi_exec:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
    selection_artifact:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.0apt'
            - '\README0Apt.txt'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate backup-software-driven shadow-copy management (verify the parent process is a known backup vendor, not an unsigned or unusual binary)
    - Administrative PowerShell automation that legitimately uses -ExecutionPolicy Bypass for signed internal scripts
    - Legitimate remote administration via WMI from an authorized management server
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate backup-software-driven shadow-copy clearing (verify parent process/vendor before alerting)
  • Administrative PowerShell automation legitimately using -ExecutionPolicy Bypass for signed internal scripts
  • Authorized remote administration via WMI from a known management server

Tuning notes: Correlate selection_shadow_delete and selection_artifact within the same host/15-minute window to raise confidence to critical and auto-trigger EDR isolation; allowlist known backup/AV vendor process hashes for the WMI and PowerShell selections; watch specifically for a README0Apt.txt file appearing alongside .0apt-encrypted siblings in the same directory, which fingerprints the documented case-sensitive exclusion-list bug unique to this family.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ALP-001 IAB Perimeter-Device Valid-Account Abuse — Single Account, Multiple Source IPs Across VPN/RDWeb/SSH/FTP · unlock with TL Creds
  • 0APT Ransomware Precursor Chain — Shadow-Copy Deletion, WMI/PowerShell Defense Evasion & [indicator]/[indicator] Encryption Artifacts · unlock with TL Creds
  • 0APT Post-Encryption Archive Staging, SMB Admin-Share Lateral Movement & Tor/.onion C2/Exfil Check-in · unlock with TL Creds
  • ALP-001 IAB Perimeter-Device Valid-Account Abuse — Single Account, Multiple Source IPs Across VPN/RDWeb/SSH/FTP · unlock with TL Creds
  • 0APT Ransomware Precursor Chain — Shadow-Copy Deletion, WMI/PowerShell Defense Evasion & [indicator]/[indicator] Encryption Artifacts · unlock with TL Creds
  • 0APT Post-Encryption Archive Staging, SMB Admin-Share Lateral Movement & Tor/.onion C2/Exfil Check-in · unlock with TL Creds
  • ALP-001 IAB Perimeter-Device Valid-Account Abuse — Single Account, Multiple Source IPs Across VPN/RDWeb/SSH/FTP · unlock with TL Creds
  • 0APT Post-Encryption Archive Staging, SMB Admin-Share Lateral Movement & Tor/.onion C2/Exfil Check-in · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 22 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1761.

Sample indicators (3 of 22)

  • Domain: oaptxiyisljt2kv3we2we34kuudmqda7f2geffoylzpeo7ourhtz4dad[.]onion
  • File hash: 388810cade3472336809550d020f210b54cb9479a76c114a66ad371b108a715a
  • File hash: 13253c717371a7cb786804a96bedc0df2cc26f7137e37e9f652acac1e7fcf81b

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 22 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

22 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

4 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

0APT (launched late January 2026, claiming 200+ victims within a week, 61 by February 5) and ALP-001 (an initial-access-broker pivot that surfaced March 22, 2026) were both assessed by multiple threat-intel vendors to be largely or entirely fabricated, though 0APT's underlying Rust ransomware binary is cryptographically functional and genuinely dangerous.

In late January 2026 a previously unknown group calling itself 0APT launched a Tor-based data-leak site (DLS) at oaptxiyisljt2kv3we2we34kuudmqda7f2geffoylzpeo7ourhtz4dad.onion and, within about a week, claimed to have breached more than 150-253 organizations, listing 61 named victims by February 5, 2026. Independent analysis by Intel 471, GuidePoint's GRIT, Halcyon, and ReliaQuest converged on the same conclusion: the overwhelming majority of the claimed victims are fabricated. Uploaded 'proof' files were oversized (multi-gigabyte) but consisted of repeating null bytes or content piped from /dev/random directly into the browser, making them functionally undownloadable over Tor and impossible to verify. Several posted victims were generic, LLM-plausible company names (e.g., 'Metropolis City Municipal') mixed in with recognizable real organizations that had not actually been breached. Source-code artifacts contained comments in Hindi and Urdu, an attribution signal pointing away from the typical Russia/CIS ransomware center of gravity toward Southern Asia. 0APT also ran a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) affiliate program, initially charging a 1 BTC 'security bond' for onboarding (later dropped after backlash), a fraud structure resembling the 2024 'Mogilevich' affiliate-fee scam. Despite the fabricated victim roster, forensic teardown of the actual 0APT encryptor (Rust-based, ~5.6MB Windows PE / ~1.3MB Linux ELF, compiled with rustc/Visual C++ and gcc respectively) found a cryptographically robust and fully operational ransomware payload using AES-256 for file encryption, RSA-4096 (OpenSSL) for key wrapping, and additional stream-cipher support (ChaCha20/Salsa20, Speck, RC4 PRGA) — the Speck cipher choice drew comparisons to PromptLock, a previously identified AI-generated ransomware strain, reinforcing the assessment that 0APT's code itself may be partially AI-assisted. The encryptor verifies available RAM before encrypting each file, supports operator-configurable exclusion lists and thread counts via config2.txt, appends a .0apt/.0Apt extension, and drops a README0Apt.txt ransom note; a notable implementation bug means the ransom note itself can be accidentally encrypted if the operator's exclusion list isn't lowercase-normalized. On February 8, 2026 the DLS went dark after coordinated researcher scrutiny and returned a day later with a drastically pared-down list of ~15 multinational victims. On April 13, 2026 0APT published the leaked database of a rival operation, Krybit, in an apparent feud — the group's first verified real breach after months of fabrication. Separately, on March 22, 2026, a Tor site branding itself ALP-001 ('Data Leaks / Access Market') emerged, representing the pivot of a long-running initial access broker — tracked across Exploit and DarkForums since at least July 2024 under the aliases 'Alpha Group' and 'DGJT Group' — from selling perimeter-device access (FTP, SSH, Fortinet/FortiGate, Cisco, Citrix/RDWeb, Palo Alto GlobalProtect) into direct data-leak extortion. ALP-001 listed 17 named victims (Pellenc, Hikvision, JAXA, Iliad, Esprinet, and others) across 11 countries, but researchers found most claims unverifiable, some leaked material traced to misconfigured public FTP servers rather than genuine intrusions, and the operator cycled between forum handles as credibility was challenged; a matching Tox/Session ID and a prior January 2026 access-sale listing for Pellenc gave researchers confident attribution of the DLS to the known IAB account, even though the extortion claims themselves remain largely unsubstantiated. Both cases illustrate a broader Q1 2026 trend (2,638 ransomware/extortion posts across a record 91 active leak sites, up 22% year over year) in which the barrier to mounting a plausible-looking extortion campaign has collapsed: an actor with LLM access, a Tor hidden service, and a handful of scraped or purchased datasets can generate a leak site that is operationally indistinguishable from a genuine breach until a defender invests analyst time to disprove it. For defenders, the practical challenge is not attribution but triage: deciding, under compressed time pressure, whether a given DLS posting reflects a real intrusion, a recycled/resold dataset, or a wholly fabricated claim.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services; T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.001 PowerShell

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1199 Trusted Relationship

Command and Control

T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1657 Financial Theft

impact

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

Persistence

T1543 Create or Modify System Process; T1546 Event Triggered Execution

Collection

T1560 Archive Collected Data; T1560.001 Archive via Utility

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1585.001 Social Media Accounts; T1608.001 Upload Malware

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1596 Search Open Technical Databases

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Treat any new data-leak-site posting naming your organization as unverified until an IR team confirms an actual ransom note, actually-decryptable sample files, or corroborating log/EDR evidence of intrusion — do not negotiate or pay based on a DLS listing alone
  • Attempt to download and validate any 'proof' data sample; repeating null-byte content, /dev/random-style noise, or file trees far larger than plausible for the claimed dataset are strong fabrication indicators
  • Cross-check claimed breach dates and data volumes against internal logging, DLP, and egress monitoring before treating a claim as credible
  • Rotate credentials and review access logs for internet-facing FTP, SSH, Fortinet/FortiGate, Citrix Gateway/RDWeb, and Palo Alto GlobalProtect appliances if named on an IAB forum access-sale listing

Workarounds

  • Monitor dark-web/DLS trackers and forums (Exploit, DarkForums, ransomware.live) for your organization's name or domain to get early warning ahead of media pickup
  • Restrict or retire unused internet-facing FTP, SSH, and legacy remote-access gateways where feasible to reduce the IAB access-sale attack surface exploited by groups like ALP-001

Longer-term hardening

  • Build a Diamond Model-based DLS-claim triage workflow (adversary, capability, infrastructure, victim) into the CTI function so extortion claims can be scored for credibility quickly under time pressure
  • Deploy EDR tuned to detect the TTPs actually observed with 0APT-linked tooling: WinRAR-based archive staging, remote WMI command execution, nonstandard SMB traffic, shadow-copy deletion (vssadmin/wmic), and PowerShell execution-policy tampering or file-download cradles
  • Harden and monitor internet-facing perimeter devices (VPN gateways, RDWeb, FTP/SSH) with phishing-resistant MFA, since these remain the specialization of IAB-turned-extortion actors like ALP-001/Alpha Group
  • Establish cross-functional data-governance participation (security, legal, compliance, comms) so a fabricated-claim assessment can be communicated consistently to executives, customers, and regulators without over- or under-reacting

Affected and fixed versions

  • Fortinet — FortiGate VPN appliances
    Vulnerable versions: internet-facing perimeter deployments
  • Citrix — Citrix Gateway / RDWeb
    Vulnerable versions: internet-facing perimeter deployments
  • Palo Alto Networks — GlobalProtect VPN
    Vulnerable versions: internet-facing perimeter deployments
  • Cisco — internet-facing network appliances (unspecified models)
    Vulnerable versions: internet-facing perimeter deployments

Timeline

  • Actor later branded ALP-001 begins operating as an initial access broker under the handles 'Alpha Group' and 'DGJT Group' on the Exploit and DarkForums underground forums, selling access to internet-facing FTP/SSH, Fortinet/FortiGate, Cisco, Citrix/RDWeb, and GlobalProtect appliances.
  • The forum account later linked to ALP-001 advertises unauthorized network access matching French manufacturer Pellenc's profile, later used by researchers to attribute the ALP-001 leak site to this seller.
  • 0APT surfaces as a new ransomware-as-a-service operation with a Tor-based data-leak site at locked-ioc-9.
  • Within roughly one week of launch, 0APT's DLS claims 200-253 breached organizations, an implausible operational tempo for a newly formed group.
  • 0APT's leak site lists 61 named victims with plans to leak 115 additional organizations, per Recorded Future's Insikt Group.
  • 0APT's data-leak site goes offline following intensified scrutiny from security researchers questioning the authenticity of its victim claims.
  • 0APT's site returns online with a drastically pared-down roster of roughly 15 multinational victims, dropping the bulk of the previously claimed names.
  • ALP-001's first tracked victim listing (irco.com) is discovered by ransomware monitoring services, marking the group's earliest observed extortion activity.
  • ALP-001 publicly launches its Tor-based 'Data Leaks / Access Market' site and lists Pellenc as its first named victim, evidencing the IAB group's pivot from access sales to direct extortion.
  • ReliaQuest's Q1 2026 threat spotlight documents 2,638 total ransomware/extortion posts across a record 91 active data-leak sites, citing 0APT and ALP-001 as examples of newer leak-site actors leaning on fabricated or unverifiable claims.
  • ALP-001's last tracked victim discovery date recorded before the group goes inactive, per ransomware.live monitoring.
  • 0APT publishes the complete database of rival ransomware operation Krybit in an apparent feud, producing its first verifiable, real breach after months of fabricated claims.

Sources cited

More from 0APT

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 13 sources; published ; last updated —.

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