# AI-Generated Extortion: Fabricated Data-Leak Sites 0APT and ALP-001 Impersonate Ransomware Groups

> Recorded Future's Insikt Group documents an evolution in extortion tactics in which threat actors stand up fake Tor data-leak sites and AI-generated victim lists to extort enterprises without conducting any actual intrusion. 0APT (launched late January 2026, claiming 200+ victims within a week, 61 by February 5) and ALP-001 (an initial-access-broker pivot that surfaced March 22, 2026) were both assessed by multiple threat-intel vendors to be largely or entirely fabricated, though 0APT's underlying Rust ransomware binary is cryptographically functional and genuinely dangerous.

- **Published:** 2026-07-29T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-29T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1761
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-0apt-alp-001-fabricated-leak-sites-tl-2026-1761.webp?v=0dec6f02 (Threadlinqs threat intel: 0APT and ALP-001 Fabricated Leak Sites: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1761) — Medium severity, 22 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1761
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** 0APT
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 22 (3 shown free below)

## Description

In late January 2026 a previously unknown group calling itself 0APT launched a Tor-based data-leak site (DLS) at oaptxiyisljt2kv3we2we34kuudmqda7f2geffoylzpeo7ourhtz4dad.onion and, within about a week, claimed to have breached more than 150-253 organizations, listing 61 named victims by February 5, 2026. Independent analysis by Intel 471, GuidePoint's GRIT, Halcyon, and ReliaQuest converged on the same conclusion: the overwhelming majority of the claimed victims are fabricated. Uploaded 'proof' files were oversized (multi-gigabyte) but consisted of repeating null bytes or content piped from /dev/random directly into the browser, making them functionally undownloadable over Tor and impossible to verify. Several posted victims were generic, LLM-plausible company names (e.g., 'Metropolis City Municipal') mixed in with recognizable real organizations that had not actually been breached. Source-code artifacts contained comments in Hindi and Urdu, an attribution signal pointing away from the typical Russia/CIS ransomware center of gravity toward Southern Asia. 0APT also ran a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) affiliate program, initially charging a 1 BTC 'security bond' for onboarding (later dropped after backlash), a fraud structure resembling the 2024 'Mogilevich' affiliate-fee scam. Despite the fabricated victim roster, forensic teardown of the actual 0APT encryptor (Rust-based, ~5.6MB Windows PE / ~1.3MB Linux ELF, compiled with rustc/Visual C++ and gcc respectively) found a cryptographically robust and fully operational ransomware payload using AES-256 for file encryption, RSA-4096 (OpenSSL) for key wrapping, and additional stream-cipher support (ChaCha20/Salsa20, Speck, RC4 PRGA) — the Speck cipher choice drew comparisons to PromptLock, a previously identified AI-generated ransomware strain, reinforcing the assessment that 0APT's code itself may be partially AI-assisted. The encryptor verifies available RAM before encrypting each file, supports operator-configurable exclusion lists and thread counts via config2.txt, appends a .0apt/.0Apt extension, and drops a README0Apt.txt ransom note; a notable implementation bug means the ransom note itself can be accidentally encrypted if the operator's exclusion list isn't lowercase-normalized. On February 8, 2026 the DLS went dark after coordinated researcher scrutiny and returned a day later with a drastically pared-down list of ~15 multinational victims. On April 13, 2026 0APT published the leaked database of a rival operation, Krybit, in an apparent feud — the group's first verified real breach after months of fabrication. Separately, on March 22, 2026, a Tor site branding itself ALP-001 ('Data Leaks / Access Market') emerged, representing the pivot of a long-running initial access broker — tracked across Exploit and DarkForums since at least July 2024 under the aliases 'Alpha Group' and 'DGJT Group' — from selling perimeter-device access (FTP, SSH, Fortinet/FortiGate, Cisco, Citrix/RDWeb, Palo Alto GlobalProtect) into direct data-leak extortion. ALP-001 listed 17 named victims (Pellenc, Hikvision, JAXA, Iliad, Esprinet, and others) across 11 countries, but researchers found most claims unverifiable, some leaked material traced to misconfigured public FTP servers rather than genuine intrusions, and the operator cycled between forum handles as credibility was challenged; a matching Tox/Session ID and a prior January 2026 access-sale listing for Pellenc gave researchers confident attribution of the DLS to the known IAB account, even though the extortion claims themselves remain largely unsubstantiated. Both cases illustrate a broader Q1 2026 trend (2,638 ransomware/extortion posts across a record 91 active leak sites, up 22% year over year) in which the barrier to mounting a plausible-looking extortion campaign has collapsed: an actor with LLM access, a Tor hidden service, and a handful of scraped or purchased datasets can generate a leak site that is operationally indistinguishable from a genuine breach until a defender invests analyst time to disprove it. For defenders, the practical challenge is not attribution but triage: deciding, under compressed time pressure, whether a given DLS posting reflects a real intrusion, a recycled/resold dataset, or a wholly fabricated claim.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1596 Search Open Technical Databases
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1585.001 Social Media Accounts
- T1608.001 Upload Malware
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1543 Create or Modify System Process
- T1546 Event Triggered Execution
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1560.001 Archive via Utility
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**0APT Ransomware Precursor Chain — Shadow-Copy Deletion, WMI/PowerShell Defense Evasion & .0apt/README0Apt.txt Encryption Artifacts** (`TL-2026-1761-SPL-002`)

Detects the documented pre-encryption and encryption-stage behavior of the 0APT Rust ransomware encryptor (TL-2026-1761): vssadmin.exe/wmic.exe invoked with 'shadow'+'delete' arguments (backup-inhibition), WmiPrvSE-parented process creation consistent with the actor's remote WMI command execution, powershell.exe launched with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden immediately preceding those actions, and the resulting mass file-rename to the .0apt extension paired with a dropped README0Apt.txt ransom note. Also flags the documented case-sensitivity implementation bug — a README0Apt.txt sibling appearing alongside .0apt-encrypted files in the same directory — a strong 0APT-specific fingerprint that most other ransomware families do not exhibit.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1490, T1685, T1047, T1059.001, T1486, T1547.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
(index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
  (Image="*\\vssadmin.exe" OR Image="*\\wmic.exe")
  CommandLine="*shadow*" CommandLine="*delete*"
| eval evt="shadow_copy_deletion")
| append
    [ search index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
      Image="*\\powershell.exe" CommandLine="*-ExecutionPolicy*" CommandLine="*Bypass*" CommandLine="*-WindowStyle*Hidden*"
    | eval evt="powershell_execpolicy_bypass" ]
| append
    [ search index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
      ParentImage="*\\WmiPrvSE.exe"
    | eval evt="wmi_remote_process_creation" ]
| append
    [ search index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11
      (TargetFilename="*.0apt" OR TargetFilename="*\\README0Apt.txt")
    | eval evt="0apt_encryption_artifact" ]
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(evt) as evidence values(CommandLine) as command_lines by Computer, host, Image, ParentImage, TargetFilename
| where count > 0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let shadow_deletion = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("vssadmin.exe","wmic.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "shadow" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, EventType = "shadow_copy_deletion", Detail = ProcessCommandLine;
let ps_bypass = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "ExecutionPolicy" and ProcessCommandLine has "Bypass" and ProcessCommandLine has "WindowStyle"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, EventType = "powershell_execpolicy_bypass", Detail = ProcessCommandLine;
let wmi_exec = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "WmiPrvSE.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, EventType = "wmi_remote_process_creation", Detail = ProcessCommandLine;
let encryption_artifacts = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName endswith ".0apt" or FileName =~ "README0Apt.txt"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, EventType = "0apt_encryption_artifact", Detail = FileName;
shadow_deletion
| union ps_bypass, wmi_exec, encryption_artifacts
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Events = make_set(EventType), Details = make_set(Detail) by DeviceName, AccountName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: 0APT Ransomware Precursor Chain — Shadow-Copy Deletion, WMI/PowerShell Evasion & .0apt/README0Apt.txt Artifacts
id: a1b2c3d4-1761-4e5f-8a9b-0c1d2e3f4002
status: experimental
description: Detects vssadmin.exe/wmic.exe shadow-copy deletion, WmiPrvSE-parented process creation, powershell.exe launched with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden, and the resulting .0apt file-extension rename or README0Apt.txt ransom-note drop documented for the 0APT Rust ransomware encryptor (TL-2026-1761).
references:
    - https://www.halcyon.ai/ransomware-research-reports/0apt-credible-technical-depth-despite-inflated-victim-claims
    - https://theravenfile.com/2026/02/14/0apt-ransomware-the-real-fake/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-29
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.execution
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.tool.0apt
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_shadow_delete:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'shadow'
            - 'delete'
    selection_ps_bypass:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'ExecutionPolicy'
            - 'Bypass'
            - 'WindowStyle'
    selection_wmi_exec:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
    selection_artifact:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.0apt'
            - '\README0Apt.txt'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate backup-software-driven shadow-copy management (verify the parent process is a known backup vendor, not an unsigned or unusual binary)
    - Administrative PowerShell automation that legitimately uses -ExecutionPolicy Bypass for signed internal scripts
    - Legitimate remote administration via WMI from an authorized management server
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate backup-software-driven shadow-copy clearing (verify parent process/vendor before alerting)
- Administrative PowerShell automation legitimately using -ExecutionPolicy Bypass for signed internal scripts
- Authorized remote administration via WMI from a known management server

**Tuning notes:** Correlate selection_shadow_delete and selection_artifact within the same host/15-minute window to raise confidence to critical and auto-trigger EDR isolation; allowlist known backup/AV vendor process hashes for the WMI and PowerShell selections; watch specifically for a README0Apt.txt file appearing alongside .0apt-encrypted siblings in the same directory, which fingerprints the documented case-sensitive exclusion-list bug unique to this family.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ALP-001 IAB Perimeter-Device Valid-Account Abuse — Single Account, Multiple Source IPs Across VPN/RDWeb/SSH/FTP (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 0APT Ransomware Precursor Chain — Shadow-Copy Deletion, WMI/PowerShell Defense Evasion & [indicator]/[indicator] Encryption Artifacts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 0APT Post-Encryption Archive Staging, SMB Admin-Share Lateral Movement & Tor/.onion C2/Exfil Check-in (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ALP-001 IAB Perimeter-Device Valid-Account Abuse — Single Account, Multiple Source IPs Across VPN/RDWeb/SSH/FTP (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 0APT Ransomware Precursor Chain — Shadow-Copy Deletion, WMI/PowerShell Defense Evasion & [indicator]/[indicator] Encryption Artifacts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 0APT Post-Encryption Archive Staging, SMB Admin-Share Lateral Movement & Tor/.onion C2/Exfil Check-in (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ALP-001 IAB Perimeter-Device Valid-Account Abuse — Single Account, Multiple Source IPs Across VPN/RDWeb/SSH/FTP (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 0APT Post-Encryption Archive Staging, SMB Admin-Share Lateral Movement & Tor/.onion C2/Exfil Check-in (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 22)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `oaptxiyisljt2kv3we2we34kuudmqda7f2geffoylzpeo7ourhtz4dad[.]onion`
- File hash: `388810cade3472336809550d020f210b54cb9479a76c114a66ad371b108a715a`
- File hash: `13253c717371a7cb786804a96bedc0df2cc26f7137e37e9f652acac1e7fcf81b`

Full set of 22 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Dealing with AI-Generated Extortion](https://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/ai-generated-extortion)
- [Likely fake ransomware operator 0APT causes panic — Our analysis](https://www.intel471.com/blog/likely-fake-ransomware-operator-0apt-causes-panic-our-analysis)
- [GRITREP: 0APT and the Victims Who Weren't](https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/gritrep-0apt-and-the-victims-who-werent/)
- [0APT: Credible Technical Depth Despite Inflated Victim Claims](https://www.halcyon.ai/ransomware-research-reports/0apt-credible-technical-depth-despite-inflated-victim-claims)
- [0APT ransomware group rises swiftly with bluster, along with genuine threat of attack](https://cyberscoop.com/0apt-ransomware-group-hoax-technical-capabilities/)
- [Ransomware and Cyber Extortion in Q1 2026](https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-ransomware-and-cyber-extortion-in-q1-2026/)
- [Ransomware.live: ALP-001](https://www.ransomware.live/group/ALP-001)
- [0APT RANSOMWARE: The Real FAKE!](https://theravenfile.com/2026/02/14/0apt-ransomware-the-real-fake/)
- [New Data Leak Site Uncovered Linked to Active Initial Access Broker on Underground Forums](https://cybersecuritynews.com/new-data-leak-site-uncovered-linked/amp/)
- [Fake Out: 0APT Data-Leak Ransomware Group Branded a Scam](https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/fake-out-0apt-data-leak-ransomware-group-branded-scam-a-30726)
- [Dark Web Profile: 0APT Ransomware](https://socradar.io/blog/dark-web-profile-0apt-ransomware/)
- [Emerging Ransomware Group: 0Apt](https://www.halcyon.ai/ransomware-alerts/emerging-ransomware-group-0apt)
- [0APT Ransomware Group Claims 200 Victims but Fails to Deliver Any Real Data](https://cybersecuritynews.com/0apt-ransomware-group-claims-200-victims/amp/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1761
