# 1337_GWTK: Malware-as-a-Service C2 Platform Masquerading as Server Administration Tool (Markas Escobar)

> 1337_GWTK (Malpedia family elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit, agent process gwtk_app) is a Malware-as-a-Service command-and-control platform for Linux hosts, marketed as an 'Advanced Server Administration Tools & Cyber Security Platform' but functioning as a full C2 dashboard with agent management, remote terminal command execution, file browse/preview/download, task queuing, and a self-logging honeypot module. It is attributed to an Indonesia-based group calling itself 'Markas Escobar' and is backed by four live C2 IP addresses.

- **Published:** 2026-07-31T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-31T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1791
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-1337-gwtk-markas-escobar-c2-tl-2026-1791.webp?v=daf335fa (Threadlinqs threat intel: 1337_GWTK Linux Malware-as-a-Service C2: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1791) — Medium severity, 18 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1791
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Markas Escobar (Indonesia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 18 (3 shown free below)

## Description

1337_GWTK is a Linux-targeting Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) command-and-control platform first documented by researcher Prtheus on 2026-07-30 and catalogued by Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE) under family ID elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit (alias 1337_GTWK), first observed/detected 2026-07-27. Malpedia classifies the family as a Linux rootkit combined with a code-execution agent, describing it as a modular program 'consisting of several modules, parts of which were likely programmed using AI.'

Operationally, 1337_GWTK presents itself publicly as an 'Advanced Server Administration Tools & Cyber Security Platform' -- a legitimate-sounding facade for what is in fact a full-featured C2 operator panel with mixed English and Indonesian-language content, gated behind an operator login. The panel enrolls compromised Linux hosts as agents (process name gwtk_app) and exposes seven distinct modules: (1) a Dashboard summarizing general information and agent installation/deployment guidance; (2) an Agents view listing hostname, IP address, operating system, uname output, current user, operator remarks, status, and last-seen timestamp for every enrolled host; (3) a Terminal module letting an operator select an agent and execute arbitrary commands on it; (4) a Files module to browse, preview, and download files from infected agents; (5) a System Files module surfacing recently modified files on compromised hosts; (6) a Tasks module that queues and logs current and historical operator tasks; and (7) a Honeypot module that records commands and login attempts made against the panel itself.

Four C2 IP addresses were documented as live at publication: 109.199.105.207, 109.199.110.80, 169.58.3.197, and 217.76.55.116. The source analysis attributes the platform to an Indonesia-based group operating under the name 'Markas Escobar.' The analysis further notes Google-cache evidence suggesting the operators had compromised at least one website (infrastructure compromise consistent with MITRE ATT&CK Compromise Infrastructure), though the finding could no longer be independently verified because the target site had returned online by the time of publication. The article states a follow-up 'Part 2' report is planned to disclose additional IOCs, which had not been published as of this RESEARCH pass. The family's classification AS a rootkit (rather than a plain remote-access agent) implies an artifact-hiding capability even though the source does not enumerate specific hiding techniques (see gap note below).

This threat is presently corroborated by a single primary source (the Prtheus/Medium technical writeup) plus its Malpedia catalog entry; no second independent source, victim count, initial-access vector, or persistence/hiding mechanism was identified during RESEARCH, consistent with the gaps flagged at HUNT. A dedicated re-verification pass on 2026-07-31 re-fetched both primary sources in full and ran supplementary WebSearch queries for 'Markas Escobar', 'gwtk_app', and 'elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit' -- no additional independent reporting, victim list, sample hash, or 'Part 2' publication was located. No CVE applies -- this is a malware/C2-platform threat, not a vulnerability. No YARA signatures are published in Malpedia for this family. BeaconBeagle was queried for all four C2 IPs on 2026-07-31 and returned no additional correlation data for any of them.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.004 Server
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1014 Rootkit
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**1337_GWTK Post-Exploitation (SPL) — Terminal-Module Command Execution, Hide-Artifacts Directory, Files-Module Bulk Read** (`TL-2026-1791-SPL-002`)

Detects post-exploitation activity from an enrolled 1337_GWTK agent: a shell (sh/bash/dash) spawned as a direct child of the agent process 'gwtk_app', consistent with operator-issued arbitrary command execution via the panel's Terminal module (Command and Scripting Interpreter); creation of a dot-prefixed, restrictively-permissioned directory under /tmp consistent with the family's Malpedia rootkit classification and undisclosed Hide Artifacts mechanism; and bulk file touches under the same parent process consistent with the panel's Files-module browse/preview/download workflow.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1059, T1014, T1564, T1005
- **Data sources:** sysmon_for_linux, linux_auditd, edr_process_telemetry, edr_file_telemetry
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
`comment("TL-2026-1791: 1337_GWTK Terminal-module command execution (child shell of gwtk_app) + rootkit-style hidden directory creation + Files-module bulk read/copy")`
index=linux (sourcetype="sysmon:linux" OR sourcetype="linux:auditd") EventID=1 ParentImage="*/gwtk_app" (Image="*/sh" OR Image="*/bash" OR Image="*/dash")
| eval detection="terminal_module_command_exec"
| table _time, host, User, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, detection
| append
    [ search index=linux (sourcetype="sysmon:linux" OR sourcetype="linux:auditd") EventID=11
      (TargetFilename="/tmp/.*" AND TargetFilename="*hidden*") OR TargetFilename="*/.gwtk_hidden/*"
      | eval detection="hide_artifacts_dot_directory"
      | table _time, host, User, TargetFilename, detection ]
| append
    [ search index=linux (sourcetype="sysmon:linux" OR sourcetype="linux:auditd") EventID=11 ParentImage="*/gwtk_app"
      | stats count as files_touched values(TargetFilename) as files by host, ParentImage
      | where files_touched>=5
      | eval detection="files_module_bulk_read_copy"
      | table host, ParentImage, files_touched, files, detection ]
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// TL-2026-1791: 1337_GWTK Terminal-module command execution (shell child of gwtk_app) + hidden-directory creation (Hide Artifacts/rootkit) + Files-module bulk read/copy
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "gwtk_app"
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "dash")
| extend DetectionReason = "terminal_module_command_exec"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, DetectionReason
| union (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FolderPath has "/tmp/." and (FolderPath has "hidden" or FolderPath has ".gwtk")
    | extend DetectionReason = "hide_artifacts_dot_directory"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine=InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, DetectionReason
  )
| union (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "gwtk_app"
    | summarize FilesTouched = dcount(FileName), Files = make_set(FileName) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
    | where FilesTouched >= 5
    | extend DetectionReason = "files_module_bulk_read_copy", AccountName = "", FileName = strcat_array(Files, ","), ProcessCommandLine = "", InitiatingProcessFileName = "gwtk_app"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, DetectionReason
  )
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: 1337_GWTK Terminal-Module Command Execution — Shell Spawned as Child of gwtk_app
id: 8f3a2b1c-6d4e-4a9b-8c7f-1791000e0002
status: experimental
description: Detects a shell (sh/bash/dash) spawned as a direct child of the 1337_GWTK agent process 'gwtk_app', consistent with operator-issued arbitrary command execution via the panel's Terminal module (Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059). The family is Malpedia-classified as a rootkit (T1014) with an undisclosed Hide Artifacts (T1564) mechanism observed in lab simulation as dot-prefixed restrictive-permission directory creation under /tmp; pair this rule with a companion file_event rule for TargetFilename patterns '/tmp/.*hidden*' or '*/.gwtk_hidden/*' to cover that signal (see tuning_notes). The panel's Files module (browse/preview/download, T1005) is additionally covered in the companion SPL/KQL queries via a bulk-file-touch count under the same parent process.
references:
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit
    - https://medium.com/@prtheus/linux-malware-1337-gwtk-server-analysis-96e98ecca1fc
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/07/31
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1059
    - attack.t1014
    - attack.t1564
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.tool.1337_gwtk
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '/gwtk_app'
        Image|endswith:
            - '/sh'
            - '/bash'
            - '/dash'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate configuration-management or orchestration agents (Ansible, SaltStack, Chef) that spawn shells as children of a custom-named service process
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate configuration-management or orchestration agents (Ansible, SaltStack, Chef) spawning shells as children of a custom-named service process
- Application caches or temp-file libraries that legitimately create dot-prefixed directories under /tmp
- Backup or log-rotation jobs that read/copy a large number of files from the same parent process in a short window

**Tuning notes:** Scope ParentImage matching to the exact enrolled-agent binary path once a confirmed sample/hash is available (no public sample hash exists as of 2026-07-31 -- Malpedia notes a planned 'Part 2' disclosure); until then, alert on the process-name pattern fleet-wide and pair with the companion file_event rule referenced in the Sigma description for the hidden-directory signal.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- 1337_GWTK Agent Enrollment (KQL) — gwtk_app Masquerading Process + Discovery Command Burst (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 1337_GWTK Post-Exploitation (KQL) — Terminal-Module Command Execution, Hide-Artifacts Directory, Files-Module Bulk Read (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 1337_GWTK C2/Exfiltration (KQL) — Outbound to Documented C2 IPs or Agent Check-in/Exfil URI Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 1337_GWTK Agent Enrollment (Sigma) — gwtk_app Masquerading Process + Discovery Command Burst (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 1337_GWTK Post-Exploitation (Sigma) — Terminal-Module Command Execution, Hide-Artifacts Directory, Files-Module Bulk Read (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 1337_GWTK C2/Exfiltration (Sigma) — Outbound to Documented C2 IPs or Agent Check-in/Exfil URI Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 1337_GWTK Agent Enrollment (SPL) — gwtk_app Masquerading Process + Discovery Command Burst (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 1337_GWTK C2/Exfiltration (SPL) — Outbound to Documented C2 IPs or Agent Check-in/Exfil URI Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 18)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `109.199.105[.]207`
- IP address: `109.199.110[.]80`
- IP address: `169.58.3[.]197`

Full set of 18 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Malpedia library entry: elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/library/fd263fd9-4486-45ba-a610-18cd018c2bfc/)
- [Malpedia family page: elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/elf.1337_gtwk_rootkit)
- [Linux Malware 1337_GWTK Server Analysis (Prtheus)](https://medium.com/@prtheus/linux-malware-1337-gwtk-server-analysis-96e98ecca1fc)
- [BeaconBeagle C2 correlation check: 109.199.105.207 (no additional match found)](https://beaconbeagle.com/api/v1/beacons/109.199.105.207)
- [BeaconBeagle C2 correlation check: 109.199.110.80 (no additional match found)](https://beaconbeagle.com/api/v1/beacons/109.199.110.80)
- [BeaconBeagle C2 correlation check: 169.58.3.197 (no additional match found)](https://beaconbeagle.com/api/v1/beacons/169.58.3.197)
- [BeaconBeagle C2 correlation check: 217.76.55.116 (no additional match found)](https://beaconbeagle.com/api/v1/beacons/217.76.55.116)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1584 Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1564 Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1791
