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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-1814

Russian FSB/GRU Actors (UNC5792, UNC4221) Phish Signal Backup Recovery Keys for Persistent Account Takeover

highACTIVE

FBI- and CISA-attributed Russian intelligence clusters UNC5792 (FSB Border Guards) and UNC4221 (GRU) are impersonating Signal support in-app to trick high-value targets into pasting their 64-character Signal Secure Backup Recovery Key into chat, letting the operators restore and decrypt the victim's entire encrypted message archive to an attacker-controlled device.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1814
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsSignal Foundation Signal Messenger — Secure/Encrypted Backups feature; Signal Foundation Signal Messenger — Linked Devices feature; Meta WhatsApp
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-640, CWE-522
AttributionUNC5792, UNC4221 (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwarePINPOINT
ToolsKropyva-themed Signal phishing kit
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1098.005 Device Registration, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service, T1583.001 Domains, T1585.001 Social Media Accounts, T1587.001 Malware and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, military, defense, ngo, news - media, diplomatic, think-tank
Target regionsukraine, united states of america, Europe, moldova, georgia, france
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1814 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Backup-Sync / PINPOINT Recon Exfiltration Beacon to UNC5792/UNC4221 Infrastructure

Detects outbound HTTP(S) beaconing to UNC5792/UNC4221 command-and-control and exfiltration infrastructure — including helperanalytics.ru and the Kropyva/teneta-themed domains — consistent with the attacker pulling a stolen Signal encrypted backup archive (Data from Cloud Storage) or exfiltrating PINPOINT-style host/geolocation reconnaissance data over a legitimate-looking web service.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1102.002, T1567, T1530, T1614
  • Data sources: network_traffic, proxy_logs, netflow
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=network (sourcetype=stream:http OR sourcetype=pan:traffic) earliest=-24h
| eval c2_domain_hit=if(match(dest_url, "(?i)(helperanalytics\.ru|signal-security\.(online|site)|add-signal-group(s)?\.com|group\.kropyva\.site|teneta\.(group|join-group\.online|add-group\.site))"), 1, 0)
| where c2_domain_hit=1
| eval is_post=if(http_method="POST", 1, 0)
| stats count, values(uri_path) as uri_paths, values(http_method) as methods, earliest(_time) as first_seen, latest(_time) as last_seen by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_url
| where count >= 1

Microsoft KQL

let C2Domains = dynamic(["helperanalytics.ru","signal-security.online","signal-security.site","add-signal-group.com","add-signal-groups.com","group.kropyva.site","teneta.group","teneta.join-group.online","teneta.add-group.site"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (C2Domains)
| summarize BeaconCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Paths = make_set(RemoteUrl) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP
| where BeaconCount >= 1
| order by LastSeen desc

Sigma

title: Outbound Beacon to UNC5792/UNC4221 Signal Backup-Sync or PINPOINT Exfil Infrastructure
id: 7c8d9ea0-bf20-43b4-c5d6-e7f8a9b0c1d2
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound network connections to UNC5792/UNC4221 command-and-control and exfiltration infrastructure (helperanalytics.ru, Kropyva-themed and teneta.* domains, Signal-security typosquats), consistent with a backup-sync pull or PINPOINT reconnaissance data exfiltration over a legitimate-looking web service
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger
    - https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2026/PSA260626
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102.002
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1530
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1614
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: network
detection:
    selection:
        dest_hostname|contains:
            - 'helperanalytics.ru'
            - 'signal-security.online'
            - 'signal-security.site'
            - 'add-signal-group.com'
            - 'add-signal-groups.com'
            - 'group.kropyva.site'
            - 'teneta.group'
            - 'teneta.join-group.online'
            - 'teneta.add-group.site'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - None expected; these are attacker-registered domains with no legitimate business purpose
level: high

Known false positives:

  • None expected for named domains; if uri_path-based heuristics are added for generic /collect or /sync endpoints on unlisted infrastructure, benign SaaS sync clients could false-positive

Tuning notes: Pair with sinkhole/passive-DNS enrichment to catch newly-observed IPs hosting the same domains after infrastructure rotation; add a beacon-interval/jitter statistical model (stdev of inter-request timing) once enough baseline traffic exists to reduce reliance on the static domain list alone.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Click-Through to UNC5792/UNC4221 Signal-Themed Phishing Infrastructure via Email or Browser · unlock with TL Creds
  • New Signal/WhatsApp/Telegram Device-Link Authorization Without Preceding QR-Scan Event · unlock with TL Creds
  • Beaconing and PINPOINT-Style Geolocation Recon Exfil to Typosquat/C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Signal Group-Invite Phishing Domain & sgnl linkdevice URI Pattern (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • sgnl linkdevice URI Generated Outside Normal QR-Code-Scan Flow (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound Beacon to UNC5792/UNC4221 Signal Backup-Sync or PINPOINT Exfil Infrastructure (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Signal Backup-Key Phishing Domain Access & Malicious sgnl://linkdevice URI Request · unlock with TL Creds
  • Signal/WhatsApp/Telegram 'Support' Impersonation Recovery-Key Solicitation & Paste · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1814.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • Domain: add-signal-group[.]com
  • File hash: e078778b62796bab2d7ab2b04d6b01bf
  • Domain: add-signal-groups[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Because Signal's backup design uses a static key with no forward secrecy, the stolen key remains valid indefinitely — even after the victim creates a new account on the same phone number — and the State Department has posted a $10M Rewards for Justice bounty on UNC5792.

Since at least 2024, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has tracked a cluster of Russia state-aligned actors — publicly designated UNC5792 (overlapping CERT-UA's UAC-0195, attributed by the FBI to FSB Border Guards officers) and UNC4221 (overlapping CERT-UA's UAC-0185, attributed to Russian military/GRU services) — running an evolving social-engineering campaign against Signal, WhatsApp, and Telegram users of intelligence value: government officials, military personnel, political figures, journalists, activists, and Ukrainian leadership.

The campaign has moved through three documented phases. In its first phase (reported in an FBI/CISA PSA around March 2026, PSA260320), operators phished SMS verification codes and account PINs to hijack accounts outright. A parallel and earlier-documented technique, detailed in GTIG's February 19, 2025 report 'Signals of Trouble,' abused Signal's legitimate linked-device feature: UNC5792 altered legitimate Signal 'group invite' web pages, replacing the benign sgnl://signal.group/ redirect JavaScript with a malicious sgnl://linkdevice?uuid=...&pub_key=... URI that silently authorizes an attacker-controlled device to link to the victim's account, enabling real-time, low-signature eavesdropping on all future messages without any device exploit. UNC4221 ran a parallel operation using a phishing kit that impersonates Kropyva, a tactical artillery-guidance and minefield-mapping application used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, embedding malicious device-linking QR codes directly into Kropyva-themed pages and deploying a lightweight JavaScript reconnaissance payload tracked as PINPOINT that harvests basic user information and precise geolocation via the browser GeoLocation API.

By May-June 2026, both clusters pivoted to a third and more damaging technique: soliciting the victim's Signal Secure Backup Recovery Key directly. Posing as an automated 'Signal Support' account with a spoofed display name and avatar, operators send a first message claiming a joint investigation uncovered 'account attacks from hackers in Iran and post-Soviet countries' and announcing a mandatory two-factor-verification rollout, then follow up with an urgent 'sync issue' warning that chats and media are about to be lost. Victims are walked step-by-step through Settings > Backups > Enable Backups > View Recovery Key, told to copy the 64-character key, and paste it directly into the chat with the impersonated 'support' account. Once obtained, the key lets the attacker restore the victim's full encrypted backup — including historical private and group message content that is not otherwise retrievable from Signal's servers — to a device they control, and to subsequently take over the account.

The underlying design flaw that makes this so damaging is cryptographic: Signal's Secure Backups (rolled out from September 2025, reaching all users by roughly February 2026) protect the archive with a single static recovery key that is never automatically rotated or ratcheted forward. A single disclosure at any point exposes the entire backup history with no bounded exposure window and no self-healing after compromise — the key keeps working against a freshly created account on the same phone number until the user manually regenerates it. An IACR preprint from IISc Bangalore, reported July 27, 2026, proposes STEBR, a three-layer fix using timed key erasure and Shamir secret sharing, but no formal patch had shipped as of this writing.

On June 26, 2026 the FBI and CISA jointly updated their advisory (PSA I-062626-PSA / PSA260626) to formally name UNC5792 and UNC4221 and describe the recovery-key pivot; Ukraine's SBU issued a coordinated joint disclosure the same day, and the State Department's Rewards for Justice program announced a reward of up to $10 million for information on UNC5792. Dutch (AIVD, MIVD), German (BfV, BSI), and French (ANSSI) services issued parallel warnings. No CVE applies — this is not an exploit against Signal's Signal Protocol encryption or the application's core security, and both agencies explicitly confirmed the actors did not break Signal's encryption; the attack is entirely social-engineering-driven abuse of a legitimate account-recovery feature.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Persistence

T1098.005 Device Registration

Command and Control

T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication

Credential Access

T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception

Execution

T1204.001 Malicious Link

Collection

T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Initial Access

T1566.002 Spearphishing Link; T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1585.001 Social Media Accounts; T1587.001 Malware; T1608.001 Upload Malware

Reconnaissance

T1598.003 Spearphishing Link; T1598.004 Spearphishing Voice

Discovery

T1614 System Location Discovery

Remediation

Patches

  • No CVE or software patch exists for the core flaw; Signal's backup-key design (a static, non-forward-secret recovery key) remained unresolved as of 2026-07-29 — a cryptographic redesign (the STEBR proposal) was reported July 27, 2026 but had not yet been formally deployed
  • Apply Signal's prior device-linking hardening updates referenced by GTIG: Android commit 112874c08019a40b6f8f1dbbf84eb0ab4d796582 and iOS commit 498b97033254c514404345efc1d4c29c1b076f6c

Immediate actions

  • Generate a new Signal Backup Recovery Key immediately via Settings > Chats > Backups (or the platform-equivalent path) to invalidate any previously disclosed key for future backup downloads
  • Audit Settings > Linked Devices on Signal, WhatsApp, and Telegram for unrecognized device entries and unlink any unknown devices
  • Never paste, screenshot, photograph, or transmit a Backup Recovery Key, verification code, or account PIN into any chat, including messages purporting to be from 'Signal Support'
  • Treat any in-app message soliciting a recovery key, 2FA code, or account verification as hostile — legitimate Signal support never requests this inside the app and contacts users only via official email
  • Report suspected phishing attempts to IC3 (ic3.gov), the nearest FBI field office, or CISA (report@cisa.gov / 1-844-729-2472)

Workarounds

  • Disable or avoid enabling Signal Secure Backups for extremely high-risk individuals until a forward-secure key scheme ships
  • Use disappearing messages to reduce the volume of historical content exposed if a backup key is ever compromised
  • Verify any Signal group invite or device-linking QR code through an out-of-band channel before scanning it

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy user-awareness training for high-risk personnel (government, military, journalists, NGO staff) specifically covering messaging-app support impersonation and recovery-key solicitation
  • Enable registration lock / device-change alerts across all deployed secure messaging apps for at-risk populations
  • Establish monitoring for new-device-linking events and geographic/time-of-day anomalies on organizationally issued Signal/WhatsApp accounts
  • Track Signal's rollout of a forward-secure backup key scheme (e.g., STEBR-style timed key erasure / Shamir secret sharing) and migrate to it once available
  • Maintain a blocklist of known UNC5792/UNC4221 typosquat domains and monitor DNS/proxy logs for lookups against them

Affected and fixed versions

  • Signal Foundation — Signal Messenger — Secure/Encrypted Backups feature
    Vulnerable versions: All Signal client versions using the static, non-forward-secret Backup Recovery Key design in place from general availability (~Feb 2026) through July 2026
    Fixed in: No formal cryptographic fix shipped as of 2026-07-29; STEBR (timed key erasure + Shamir secret sharing) proposed July 27, 2026 as an unimplemented research fix
  • Signal Foundation — Signal Messenger — Linked Devices feature
    Vulnerable versions: Client versions predating the device-linking hardening referenced in GTIG's February 2025 report
    Fixed in: Android commit 112874c08019a40b6f8f1dbbf84eb0ab4d796582; iOS commit 498b97033254c514404345efc1d4c29c1b076f6c
  • Meta — WhatsApp
    Vulnerable versions: Linked-device and verification-code flows targeted by the same UNC5792/UNC4221 tradecraft

Timeline

  • Google Threat Intelligence Group publishes 'Signals of Trouble,' documenting UNC5792's abuse of Signal group-invite pages and UNC4221's Kropyva-themed phishing kit for device-linking account takeover of Ukrainian military and government targets.
  • Signal introduces Secure Cloud Backups, adding an encrypted backup archive protected by a single, user-held 64-character recovery key.
  • Signal's Secure Backups feature reaches general availability for all users, setting up the static recovery key as an attractive single point of compromise.
  • FBI/CISA issue initial public service announcement (PSA260320) on Russian-linked phishing of Signal verification codes and account PINs.
  • Malwarebytes reports Signal backup-key phishing messages impersonating 'Signal Support' actively targeting journalists, Chinese activists, and human rights defenders.
  • FBI and CISA jointly update their advisory (PSA I-062626-PSA / PSA260626) to formally name UNC5792 and UNC4221 and detail the pivot to Backup Recovery Key theft; Ukraine's SBU issues a coordinated joint disclosure; the State Department's Rewards for Justice program announces a $10 million reward for information on UNC5792.
  • An IACR preprint from IISc Bangalore proposes STEBR, a three-layer timed-key-erasure and Shamir-secret-sharing redesign of Signal's backup architecture, reported as the first formal cryptographic fix under consideration for the static-key flaw.
  • Cyber Security News publishes coverage summarizing the FBI attribution and the ongoing UNC5792/UNC4221 recovery-key phishing campaign.

Sources cited

Previous and next in phishing

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

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