# Russian FSB/GRU Actors (UNC5792, UNC4221) Phish Signal Backup Recovery Keys for Persistent Account Takeover

> FBI- and CISA-attributed Russian intelligence clusters UNC5792 (FSB Border Guards) and UNC4221 (GRU) are impersonating Signal support in-app to trick high-value targets into pasting their 64-character Signal Secure Backup Recovery Key into chat, letting the operators restore and decrypt the victim's entire encrypted message archive to an attacker-controlled device. Because Signal's backup design uses a static key with no forward secrecy, the stolen key remains valid indefinitely — even after the victim creates a new account on the same phone number — and the State Department has posted a $10M Rewards for Justice bounty on UNC5792.

- **Published:** 2026-07-29T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-07-29T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1814
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-unc5792-signal-backup-key-phishing-tl-2026-1814.webp?v=1533460d (Threadlinqs threat intel: UNC5792 Signal Recovery Key Phishing: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1814) — High severity, 28 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1814
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UNC5792 (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Since at least 2024, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has tracked a cluster of Russia state-aligned actors — publicly designated UNC5792 (overlapping CERT-UA's UAC-0195, attributed by the FBI to FSB Border Guards officers) and UNC4221 (overlapping CERT-UA's UAC-0185, attributed to Russian military/GRU services) — running an evolving social-engineering campaign against Signal, WhatsApp, and Telegram users of intelligence value: government officials, military personnel, political figures, journalists, activists, and Ukrainian leadership.

The campaign has moved through three documented phases. In its first phase (reported in an FBI/CISA PSA around March 2026, PSA260320), operators phished SMS verification codes and account PINs to hijack accounts outright. A parallel and earlier-documented technique, detailed in GTIG's February 19, 2025 report 'Signals of Trouble,' abused Signal's legitimate linked-device feature: UNC5792 altered legitimate Signal 'group invite' web pages, replacing the benign sgnl://signal.group/ redirect JavaScript with a malicious sgnl://linkdevice?uuid=...&pub_key=... URI that silently authorizes an attacker-controlled device to link to the victim's account, enabling real-time, low-signature eavesdropping on all future messages without any device exploit. UNC4221 ran a parallel operation using a phishing kit that impersonates Kropyva, a tactical artillery-guidance and minefield-mapping application used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, embedding malicious device-linking QR codes directly into Kropyva-themed pages and deploying a lightweight JavaScript reconnaissance payload tracked as PINPOINT that harvests basic user information and precise geolocation via the browser GeoLocation API.

By May-June 2026, both clusters pivoted to a third and more damaging technique: soliciting the victim's Signal Secure Backup Recovery Key directly. Posing as an automated 'Signal Support' account with a spoofed display name and avatar, operators send a first message claiming a joint investigation uncovered 'account attacks from hackers in Iran and post-Soviet countries' and announcing a mandatory two-factor-verification rollout, then follow up with an urgent 'sync issue' warning that chats and media are about to be lost. Victims are walked step-by-step through Settings > Backups > Enable Backups > View Recovery Key, told to copy the 64-character key, and paste it directly into the chat with the impersonated 'support' account. Once obtained, the key lets the attacker restore the victim's full encrypted backup — including historical private and group message content that is not otherwise retrievable from Signal's servers — to a device they control, and to subsequently take over the account.

The underlying design flaw that makes this so damaging is cryptographic: Signal's Secure Backups (rolled out from September 2025, reaching all users by roughly February 2026) protect the archive with a single static recovery key that is never automatically rotated or ratcheted forward. A single disclosure at any point exposes the entire backup history with no bounded exposure window and no self-healing after compromise — the key keeps working against a freshly created account on the same phone number until the user manually regenerates it. An IACR preprint from IISc Bangalore, reported July 27, 2026, proposes STEBR, a three-layer fix using timed key erasure and Shamir secret sharing, but no formal patch had shipped as of this writing.

On June 26, 2026 the FBI and CISA jointly updated their advisory (PSA I-062626-PSA / PSA260626) to formally name UNC5792 and UNC4221 and describe the recovery-key pivot; Ukraine's SBU issued a coordinated joint disclosure the same day, and the State Department's Rewards for Justice program announced a reward of up to $10 million for information on UNC5792. Dutch (AIVD, MIVD), German (BfV, BSI), and French (ANSSI) services issued parallel warnings. No CVE applies — this is not an exploit against Signal's Signal Protocol encryption or the application's core security, and both agencies explicitly confirmed the actors did not break Signal's encryption; the attack is entirely social-engineering-driven abuse of a legitimate account-recovery feature.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1585.001 Social Media Accounts
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1608.001 Upload Malware
- T1598.003 Spearphishing Link
- T1598.004 Spearphishing Voice
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1098.005 Device Registration
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1614 System Location Discovery
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Backup-Sync / PINPOINT Recon Exfiltration Beacon to UNC5792/UNC4221 Infrastructure** (`TL-2026-1814-SPL-003`)

Detects outbound HTTP(S) beaconing to UNC5792/UNC4221 command-and-control and exfiltration infrastructure — including helperanalytics.ru and the Kropyva/teneta-themed domains — consistent with the attacker pulling a stolen Signal encrypted backup archive (Data from Cloud Storage) or exfiltrating PINPOINT-style host/geolocation reconnaissance data over a legitimate-looking web service.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1102.002, T1567, T1530, T1614
- **Data sources:** network_traffic, proxy_logs, netflow
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=network (sourcetype=stream:http OR sourcetype=pan:traffic) earliest=-24h
| eval c2_domain_hit=if(match(dest_url, "(?i)(helperanalytics\.ru|signal-security\.(online|site)|add-signal-group(s)?\.com|group\.kropyva\.site|teneta\.(group|join-group\.online|add-group\.site))"), 1, 0)
| where c2_domain_hit=1
| eval is_post=if(http_method="POST", 1, 0)
| stats count, values(uri_path) as uri_paths, values(http_method) as methods, earliest(_time) as first_seen, latest(_time) as last_seen by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_url
| where count >= 1
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let C2Domains = dynamic(["helperanalytics.ru","signal-security.online","signal-security.site","add-signal-group.com","add-signal-groups.com","group.kropyva.site","teneta.group","teneta.join-group.online","teneta.add-group.site"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (C2Domains)
| summarize BeaconCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Paths = make_set(RemoteUrl) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP
| where BeaconCount >= 1
| order by LastSeen desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Outbound Beacon to UNC5792/UNC4221 Signal Backup-Sync or PINPOINT Exfil Infrastructure
id: 7c8d9ea0-bf20-43b4-c5d6-e7f8a9b0c1d2
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound network connections to UNC5792/UNC4221 command-and-control and exfiltration infrastructure (helperanalytics.ru, Kropyva-themed and teneta.* domains, Signal-security typosquats), consistent with a backup-sync pull or PINPOINT reconnaissance data exfiltration over a legitimate-looking web service
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger
    - https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2026/PSA260626
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-02
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1102.002
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1530
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1614
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: network
detection:
    selection:
        dest_hostname|contains:
            - 'helperanalytics.ru'
            - 'signal-security.online'
            - 'signal-security.site'
            - 'add-signal-group.com'
            - 'add-signal-groups.com'
            - 'group.kropyva.site'
            - 'teneta.group'
            - 'teneta.join-group.online'
            - 'teneta.add-group.site'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - None expected; these are attacker-registered domains with no legitimate business purpose
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- None expected for named domains; if uri_path-based heuristics are added for generic /collect or /sync endpoints on unlisted infrastructure, benign SaaS sync clients could false-positive

**Tuning notes:** Pair with sinkhole/passive-DNS enrichment to catch newly-observed IPs hosting the same domains after infrastructure rotation; add a beacon-interval/jitter statistical model (stdev of inter-request timing) once enough baseline traffic exists to reduce reliance on the static domain list alone.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Click-Through to UNC5792/UNC4221 Signal-Themed Phishing Infrastructure via Email or Browser (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- New Signal/WhatsApp/Telegram Device-Link Authorization Without Preceding QR-Scan Event (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Beaconing and PINPOINT-Style Geolocation Recon Exfil to Typosquat/C2 Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Signal Group-Invite Phishing Domain & sgnl linkdevice URI Pattern (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- sgnl linkdevice URI Generated Outside Normal QR-Code-Scan Flow (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound Beacon to UNC5792/UNC4221 Signal Backup-Sync or PINPOINT Exfil Infrastructure (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Signal Backup-Key Phishing Domain Access & Malicious sgnl://linkdevice URI Request (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Signal/WhatsApp/Telegram 'Support' Impersonation Recovery-Key Solicitation & Paste (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `add-signal-group[.]com`
- File hash: `e078778b62796bab2d7ab2b04d6b01bf`
- Domain: `add-signal-groups[.]com`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Hackers Phish Signal Backup Keys](https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-phish-signal-backup-keys/)
- [FBI Warns Russian Intelligence Hackers Target Signal Backup Recovery Keys](https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/fbi-warns-russian-intelligence-hackers.html)
- [FBI: Russian hackers now target Signal backup recovery keys](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fbi-russian-hackers-now-target-signal-backup-recovery-keys/)
- [SBU and FBI Expose Russian FSB and GRU Signal Key Theft Campaign](https://dailysecurityreview.com/cyber-security/sbu-and-fbi-expose-russian-fsb-and-gru-signal-key-theft-campaign/)
- [US offers $10M reward for Russian hackers who steal Signal backup keys](https://www.paubox.com/blog/us-offers-10m-reward-for-russian-hackers-who-steal-signal-backup-keys)
- [New FBI Alert: Russian Intelligence Uses Signal Recovery Keys to Access Messages](https://securityaffairs.com/194360/intelligence/new-fbi-alert-russian-intelligence-uses-signal-recovery-keys-to-access-messages.html)
- [Signal Recovery Key Phishing Scam: How It Works, What to Do](https://phishfort.com/signal-recovery-key-phishing-scam/)
- [Russian cyberespionage groups target Signal users with fake group invites](https://www.csoonline.com/article/3828182/russian-cyberespionage-groups-target-signal-users-with-fake-group-invites.html)
- [Russia-linked APTs target Signal messenger](https://securityaffairs.com/174397/cyber-warfare-2/russia-linked-threat-actors-exploit-signals-linked-devices-feature.html)
- [FBI/CISA Public Service Announcement I-062626-PSA](https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2026/PSA260626)
- [Signals of Trouble: Multiple Russia-Aligned Threat Actors Actively Targeting Signal Messenger](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger)
- [Signal users targeted in backup-stealing phishing attacks](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2026/05/signal-users-targeted-in-backup-stealing-phishing-attacks)
- [UNC5792 – Rewards For Justice](https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/unc5792/)
- [Signal Backup Recovery Key Flaw Exploited by Russian Spies Gets Formal Cryptographic Fix Today](https://www.techtimes.com/articles/321712/20260727/signal-backup-recovery-key-flaw-exploited-russian-spies-gets-formal-cryptographic-fix-today.htm)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1814
