Threat reportICS/SCADATL-2026-1882
Sage Water Resources Utah saltwater disposal facility PLC intrusion — Iranian IRGC-CEC (CyberAv3ngers) logic manipulation bypasses pump safeguards
On 2026-03-15, Sage Water Resources (SWR), a Ute Tribe-owned subsidiary of Sage Energy Partners, detected unauthorized activity on a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) at its saltwater disposal facility in Duchesne, Utah (Uinta Basin). An advanced nation-state threat actor — consistent with the Iranian IRGC-CEC-affiliated CyberAv3ngers/Shahid Kaveh cluster documented in CISA AA26-097A — manipulated the PLC's control logic, disabling critical shutdown and alarm safeguards that protected the injection pumps.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1882 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Rockwell Automation CompactLogix PLC; Rockwell Automation Micro800/Micro850 PLC; Schneider Electric Modicon M340 (BMX P34) PLC; Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC |
| Attribution | Cyber Av3ngers (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Iran |
| Tools | Rockwell Studio 5000 Logix Designer, Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Control Expert, Siemens TIA Portal |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T0869 Standard Application Layer Protocol, T1491 Defacement, T1531 Account Access Removal, T1565 Data Manipulation |
| Motivation | HACKTIVISM |
| Target sectors | energy, oil-and-gas, water, wastewater, critical-infrastructure, municipal-government |
| Target regions | united states of america |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 12 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-08-04, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1882 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 37 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: External Network Connection to PLC on OT/Industrial Protocol Ports — Exploitation Phase
Detects external (non-RFC1918) hosts establishing sessions to Programmable Logic Controllers over vendor/industrial protocol ports — Rockwell CIP/EtherNet-IP (44818/2222), Siemens S7 (102), Schneider Modbus (502), and SSH (22, abused via Dropbear on victim modems). External engineering connections to internet-facing PLCs are the initial-access vector used by the IRGC-CEC CyberAv3ngers/Shahid Kaveh cluster per CISA AA26-097A. This is the earliest and most reliable signal for the SWR-style intrusion pattern, where actors connected to misconfigured, internet-reachable PLCs.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T0869, T0883, T0842
- Data sources: zeek:conn, netflow, firewall
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=network sourcetype="zeek:conn"
| where id.resp_p IN (44818, 2222, 102, 502, 22)
| where NOT (cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", id.orig_h) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", id.orig_h) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", id.orig_h) OR cidrmatch("127.0.0.0/8", id.orig_h))
| eval protocol = case(id.resp_p==44818 OR id.resp_p==2222, "Rockwell CIP/EtherNet-IP", id.resp_p==102, "Siemens S7", id.resp_p==502, "Schneider Modbus", id.resp_p==22, "SSH/Dropbear")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id.orig_h, id.resp_h, id.resp_p, proto, protocol
| where count >= 3
| sort - count
| table id.orig_h, id.resp_h, id.resp_p, proto, protocol, count, first_seen, last_seenMicrosoft KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemotePort in (44818, 2222, 102, 502, 22)
| extend External = not (ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "10.0.0.0/8") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "172.16.0.0/12") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "192.168.0.0/16"))
| where External
| summarize SessionCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, DeviceName
| where SessionCount >= 3
| project SessionCount, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, DeviceName, FirstSeen, LastSeenSigma
title: External Connection to PLC on OT/Industrial Protocol Ports
description: Detects external hosts connecting to Programmable Logic Controllers over Rockwell CIP/EtherNet-IP (44818/2222), Siemens S7 (102), Schneider Modbus (502), or SSH (22) ports. Matches the IRGC-CEC CyberAv3ngers internet-facing PLC exploitation pattern documented in CISA AA26-097A.
id: b1c2d3e4-f5a6-4b7c-8d9e-0f1a2b3c4d5e
status: experimental
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/05
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-335a
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t0869
- attack.t0883
- attack.t0842
- attack.tool.cyberav3ngers
logsource:
category: network
product: zeek
detection:
selection_ports:
id.resp_p:
- '44818'
- '2222'
- '102'
- '502'
- '22'
selection_internal:
id.orig_h|startswith:
- '10.'
- '172.'
- '192.168.'
filter_known_monitoring:
id.resp_h|endswith:
- '.local'
condition: selection_ports and not selection_internal and not filter_known_monitoring
falsepositives:
- Legitimate remote engineering access via an approved VPN/jump host (compare against engineering-workstation allowlist)
- Vendor remote-support sessions during scheduled maintenance
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate remote engineering access via approved VPN/jump host
- Vendor remote-support sessions during scheduled maintenance
Tuning notes: Maintain an allowlist of authorized remote engineering IPs/subnets and engineering-workstation VPN hosts. Add the AA26-097A IOC IPs (185.82.73.x, 175.110.121.x, 88.80.150.x, 192.142.54.79, 84.200.205.165, 185.225.17.225, 79.133.46.209, 141.11.164.153) as a high-priority match filter. Raise count threshold to >=3 to reduce scan noise; consider alerting on a single connection to a PLC NEVER previously contacted by an external host.
- Repeated Authentication Failures Against PLC/OT Services from External IPs — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- Unauthorized PLC Program Download / Engineering Connection over OT Protocols — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Account Access Removal / Unauthorized Account Modification on OT-HMI Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
- Network Reconnaissance Scanning of PLC OT Ports — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- Manipulation of Control: Modbus Write Function Codes to PLC Control Registers — Critical Safety Bypass · unlock with TL Creds
- HMI/SCADA Internal Defacement and Stored Display Manipulation · unlock with TL Creds
- Vendor PLC Programming Software Execution — Post-Exploitation / Program Download · unlock with TL Creds
- Theft of Operational Information: Large OT-to-External Data Transfer / PLC Project Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-08-04, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 37 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1882.
Sample indicators (3 of 37)
- IP address:
185.82.73[.]162 - File hash:
440b5385d3838e3f6bc21220caa83b65cd5f3618daea676f271c3671650ce9a3 - IP address:
185.82.73[.]164
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 37 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
The unauthorized logic changes were detected and mitigated before any physical or environmental damage occurred; no data breach resulted. SWR subsequently hardened the facility from a legacy network to an advanced PLC/VPN configuration.
Sage Water Resources (SWR), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sage Energy Partners and a Native American-owned (Ute Tribe) water and oilfield infrastructure operator, disclosed a targeted cyber incident affecting the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) automation system at its saltwater disposal (SWD) facility in Duchesne, Utah, within the Uinta Basin. The facility has the capacity to inject up to 22,000 barrels per day of produced/saltwater. On March 15, 2026, during early-morning operations, a vigilant truck driver noticed anomalous PLC behavior and alerted SWR's operations team, which rapidly responded.
Forensic analysis, conducted in coordination with federal law enforcement and cybersecurity experts (including automation firm Sasquatch Automation), determined that an advanced nation-state threat actor had performed malicious logic manipulation of the PLC. The activity was attributed to a broader, sophisticated campaign targeting critical infrastructure operators across the U.S. energy and water sectors. This matches the joint FBI/CISA/NSA/EPA/DOE/CNMF/Treasury advisory AA26-097A (published April 7, 2026; updated July 22, 2026), which documents Iranian-affiliated APT actors (linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber Electronic Command, the CyberAv3ngers/Shahid Kaveh cluster) exploiting internet-facing PLCs from Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, and Siemens across U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS), Government Services, and Energy sectors since at least March 2026. In that campaign, actors used vendor PLC programming software (Rockwell Studio 5000 Logix Designer, Schneider EcoStruxure Control Expert, Siemens TIA Portal) hosted on leased third-party infrastructure to connect to misconfigured victim PLCs, exfiltrate device project files, modify or delete project logic including Add-On Instructions (AOIs), manipulate HMI/SCADA displays, and disable critical shutdown and alarm logic. The SWR incident's bypass of pump safeguards is consistent with this pattern of disabling shutdown and alarm logic, which allows industrial systems to enter unsafe conditions without notifying operators. Here, the malicious logic changes were caught and neutralized before any physical or environmental damage occurred; SWR reported that core saltwater disposal operations remained functional, no sensitive data was accessed, and no disruption or data breach resulted.
In response, SWR restored the PLC operational logic and hardened the facility's network, transitioning from a legacy configuration (described by the company as its 'Chevy') to one of the most advanced PLC/VPN configurations in the oilfield (its 'Cadillac'), with the PLC now shielded by an extensive Virtual Private Network (VPN). The company announced the completion of comprehensive security hardening on June 10, 2026, with CEO Cleve Pike stating, 'We didn't just patch a hole; we built a fortress.' The incident was reported to the Utah Cyber Center and investigated with federal law enforcement. Attribution to Iran is established at the federal level via the AA26-097A campaign advisory; SWR's own disclosure named an 'advanced nation-state threat actor' but did not specifically name Iran. This intrusion demonstrates the real-world risk to small, independent OT/ICS operators from state-affiliated actors targeting industrial control logic, and the critical importance of removing PLCs from direct internet exposure.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
command-and-control
T0869 Standard Application Layer Protocol
Impact
T1491 Defacement; T1531 Account Access Removal; T1565 Data Manipulation
Remediation
Patches
- No CVE or vendor patch applies to this intrusion; apply relevant manufacturer security advisories and firmware updates for Rockwell, Schneider Electric, and Siemens PLC platforms
- For legacy Unitronics devices, update to VisiLogic 9.9.00 and latest firmware as recommended in CISA AA23-335A
Immediate actions
- Remove PLCs, HMIs, and other OT devices from direct internet exposure; place behind secure gateways/firewalls or VPN-protected jump hosts
- Query network and device logs for the AA26-097A IP IOCs and for suspicious traffic on OT ports 44818, 2222, 102, 502, and 22
- Replace all default and weak passwords on PLCs, HMIs, and modems; change default ports and device names
- For Rockwell Automation controllers, place the physical mode switch in the Run position to block remote program downloads
- Engage the Utah Cyber Center, CISA, FBI, and the PLC manufacturer if compromise is suspected
- Restore verified-good PLC program logic from a trusted backup and validate program integrity
Workarounds
- Disable remote access to PLCs except through authenticated VPN with multifactor authentication
- Disable default FTP, Telnet, and unneeded services on PLCs and OT gateways
- Apply security-related ladder-logic elements (TCP/IP passwords, upload passwords, INFO-mode passwords, SD-card passwords) to project files
Longer-term hardening
- Implement OT network segmentation and a dedicated DMZ between IT and OT/ICS networks
- Deploy OT-aware monitoring and alerting for engineering-workstation connections and vendor programming software traffic
- Implement integrity monitoring of PLC project files, Add-On Instructions (AOIs), and task/program parameters to detect unauthorized logic changes
- Establish a configuration-change-management and program-versioning process with cryptographically verifiable program integrity (SHA-2/SHA-3)
- Maintain air-gapped or secured vendor programming workstations and restrict access to authorized operators
- Conduct regular OT security assessments, tabletop exercises, and incident-response planning for ICS environments
Affected and fixed versions
- Rockwell Automation — CompactLogix PLC
Vulnerable versions: Internet-facing CompactLogix controllers (CIP/EtherNet-IP port 44818)
Fixed in: Remove from direct internet exposure; place mode switch in Run position - Rockwell Automation — Micro800/Micro850 PLC
Vulnerable versions: Internet-facing Micro850 controllers
Fixed in: Remove from direct internet exposure - Schneider Electric — Modicon M340 (BMX P34) PLC
Vulnerable versions: Internet-facing Modicon M340 controllers (Modbus port 502)
Fixed in: Remove from direct internet exposure - Siemens — SIMATIC S7-1200 PLC
Vulnerable versions: Internet-facing S7-1200 controllers (S7 protocol port 102)
Fixed in: Remove from direct internet exposure
Timeline
- IRGC-affiliated CyberAv3ngers/Shahid Kaveh actors begin targeting U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems operating internet-facing HMI-capable Unitronics Vision Series PLCs, exploiting default or no passwords on TCP port 20256.
- CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA, and Israel's National Cyber Directorate publish joint advisory AA23-335A documenting IRGC-affiliated targeting of Unitronics PLCs; at least 75 devices compromised, including 34+ in the U.S. WWS sector.
- U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctions six IRGC-CEC officials for their roles in the CyberAv3ngers operations against U.S. critical infrastructure.
- Iranian-affiliated actors begin an expanded, multi-vendor campaign against internet-facing PLCs; earliest associated IP IOCs (185.82.73.x) are active from January 2025.
- CISA observes Iranian-affiliated PLC exploitation activity across U.S. Government Services/Facilities, Water and Wastewater Systems, and Energy sectors 'since at least March 2026,' using Rockwell Studio 5000, Schneider EcoStruxure, and Siemens TIA Portal on leased infrastructure.
- Sage Water Resources detects unauthorized activity on the PLC at its saltwater disposal facility in Duchesne, Utah (Uinta Basin); an early-morning truck driver spots the anomaly and SWR's operations team responds, detecting malicious logic manipulation that bypassed pump safeguards before physical or environmental damage occurred.
- FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, DOE, U.S. Cyber Command (CNMF), and Treasury publish joint advisory AA26-097A warning of Iranian-affiliated cyber actors exploiting PLCs across U.S. critical infrastructure; campaign linked to the CyberAv3ngers/Shahid Kaveh cluster.
- Sage Water Resources announces successful recovery and completion of enhanced cybersecurity hardening, migrating the facility from a legacy ('Chevy') network to an advanced PLC/VPN ('Cadillac') configuration with extensive VPN shielding, assisted by Sasquatch Automation and federal partners.
- CISA updates AA26-097A, expanding scope to Schneider Electric (BMX P34/Modicon M340) and Siemens (S7-1200) PLCs, documenting modification/deletion of project logic including Add-On Instructions (AOIs), disabled shutdown and alarm logic, and publishing new IP IOCs.
- DataBreaches.net publishes detailed coverage of the Sage Water Resources incident, characterizing the malicious logic manipulation as an advanced nation-state intrusion consistent with a broader campaign against U.S. energy and water critical infrastructure.
Sources cited
- CISA AA26-097A — Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure CISA · Advisory · 2026-04-07
- CISA AA23-335A — IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities CISA · Advisory · 2023-12-01
- MITRE ATT&CK (ICS) — CyberAv3ngers group (G1027) MITRE · Research · 2026-01-01
- CrowdStrike — Hydro Kitten adversary profile (CyberAv3ngers / Shahid Kaveh) CrowdStrike · Research · 2026-01-01
- Trend Micro — Federal agencies warn of ongoing PLC exploitation Trend Micro · Research · 2026-04-01
- Orion Policy Institute — APT Profile: CyberAv3ngers orionpolicy.org · Research · 2026-07-01
- PRNewswire — Sage Water Resources announces successful recovery and enhanced cybersecurity hardening prnewswire.com · News · 2026-06-10
- Water Tech Online — Sage detects SWD cybersecurity attack watertechonline.com · News · 2026-06-10
- Smart Water Magazine — Cyberattack hits Utah water facility smartwatermagazine.com · News · 2026-06-10
- DataBreaches.net — Sage Water Resources says Utah saltwater disposal controller intrusion bypassed pump safeguards databreaches.net · News · 2026-08-04
- The Hill — FBI attributes Iran-linked hackers to U.S. oil, gas, and water infrastructure disruptions thehill.com · News · 2026-04-01
- Sage Energy Partners press release — Sage Water Resources announces successful recovery and enhanced cybersecurity hardening of Uinta Basin infrastructure sagenergypartners.com · Report · 2026-06-10
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.