# Sage Water Resources Utah saltwater disposal facility PLC intrusion — Iranian IRGC-CEC (CyberAv3ngers) logic manipulation bypasses pump safeguards

> On 2026-03-15, Sage Water Resources (SWR), a Ute Tribe-owned subsidiary of Sage Energy Partners, detected unauthorized activity on a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) at its saltwater disposal facility in Duchesne, Utah (Uinta Basin). An advanced nation-state threat actor — consistent with the Iranian IRGC-CEC-affiliated CyberAv3ngers/Shahid Kaveh cluster documented in CISA AA26-097A — manipulated the PLC's control logic, disabling critical shutdown and alarm safeguards that protected the injection pumps. The unauthorized logic changes were detected and mitigated before any physical or environmental damage occurred; no data breach resulted. SWR subsequently hardened the facility from a legacy network to an advanced PLC/VPN configuration.

- **Published:** 2026-08-04T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-04T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1882
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-sage-water-utah-plc-intrusion-tl-2026-1882.webp?v=e3e8b37b (Threadlinqs threat intel: Cyber Av3ngers Utah Water PLC Intrusion: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1882) — High severity, 37 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1882
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** ICS_SCADA
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Cyber Av3ngers (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 37 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Sage Water Resources (SWR), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sage Energy Partners and a Native American-owned (Ute Tribe) water and oilfield infrastructure operator, disclosed a targeted cyber incident affecting the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) automation system at its saltwater disposal (SWD) facility in Duchesne, Utah, within the Uinta Basin. The facility has the capacity to inject up to 22,000 barrels per day of produced/saltwater. On March 15, 2026, during early-morning operations, a vigilant truck driver noticed anomalous PLC behavior and alerted SWR's operations team, which rapidly responded.

Forensic analysis, conducted in coordination with federal law enforcement and cybersecurity experts (including automation firm Sasquatch Automation), determined that an advanced nation-state threat actor had performed malicious logic manipulation of the PLC. The activity was attributed to a broader, sophisticated campaign targeting critical infrastructure operators across the U.S. energy and water sectors. This matches the joint FBI/CISA/NSA/EPA/DOE/CNMF/Treasury advisory AA26-097A (published April 7, 2026; updated July 22, 2026), which documents Iranian-affiliated APT actors (linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber Electronic Command, the CyberAv3ngers/Shahid Kaveh cluster) exploiting internet-facing PLCs from Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, and Siemens across U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS), Government Services, and Energy sectors since at least March 2026. In that campaign, actors used vendor PLC programming software (Rockwell Studio 5000 Logix Designer, Schneider EcoStruxure Control Expert, Siemens TIA Portal) hosted on leased third-party infrastructure to connect to misconfigured victim PLCs, exfiltrate device project files, modify or delete project logic including Add-On Instructions (AOIs), manipulate HMI/SCADA displays, and disable critical shutdown and alarm logic. The SWR incident's bypass of pump safeguards is consistent with this pattern of disabling shutdown and alarm logic, which allows industrial systems to enter unsafe conditions without notifying operators. Here, the malicious logic changes were caught and neutralized before any physical or environmental damage occurred; SWR reported that core saltwater disposal operations remained functional, no sensitive data was accessed, and no disruption or data breach resulted.

In response, SWR restored the PLC operational logic and hardened the facility's network, transitioning from a legacy configuration (described by the company as its 'Chevy') to one of the most advanced PLC/VPN configurations in the oilfield (its 'Cadillac'), with the PLC now shielded by an extensive Virtual Private Network (VPN). The company announced the completion of comprehensive security hardening on June 10, 2026, with CEO Cleve Pike stating, 'We didn't just patch a hole; we built a fortress.' The incident was reported to the Utah Cyber Center and investigated with federal law enforcement. Attribution to Iran is established at the federal level via the AA26-097A campaign advisory; SWR's own disclosure named an 'advanced nation-state threat actor' but did not specifically name Iran. This intrusion demonstrates the real-world risk to small, independent OT/ICS operators from state-affiliated actors targeting industrial control logic, and the critical importance of removing PLCs from direct internet exposure.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T0869 Standard Application Layer Protocol
- T1491 Defacement
- T1565 Data Manipulation
- T1531 Account Access Removal

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**External Network Connection to PLC on OT/Industrial Protocol Ports — Exploitation Phase** (`TL-2026-1882-SPL-001`)

Detects external (non-RFC1918) hosts establishing sessions to Programmable Logic Controllers over vendor/industrial protocol ports — Rockwell CIP/EtherNet-IP (44818/2222), Siemens S7 (102), Schneider Modbus (502), and SSH (22, abused via Dropbear on victim modems). External engineering connections to internet-facing PLCs are the initial-access vector used by the IRGC-CEC CyberAv3ngers/Shahid Kaveh cluster per CISA AA26-097A. This is the earliest and most reliable signal for the SWR-style intrusion pattern, where actors connected to misconfigured, internet-reachable PLCs.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T0869, T0883, T0842
- **Data sources:** zeek:conn, netflow, firewall
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=network sourcetype="zeek:conn"
| where id.resp_p IN (44818, 2222, 102, 502, 22)
| where NOT (cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", id.orig_h) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", id.orig_h) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", id.orig_h) OR cidrmatch("127.0.0.0/8", id.orig_h))
| eval protocol = case(id.resp_p==44818 OR id.resp_p==2222, "Rockwell CIP/EtherNet-IP", id.resp_p==102, "Siemens S7", id.resp_p==502, "Schneider Modbus", id.resp_p==22, "SSH/Dropbear")
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen by id.orig_h, id.resp_h, id.resp_p, proto, protocol
| where count >= 3
| sort - count
| table id.orig_h, id.resp_h, id.resp_p, proto, protocol, count, first_seen, last_seen
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemotePort in (44818, 2222, 102, 502, 22)
| extend External = not (ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "10.0.0.0/8") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "172.16.0.0/12") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "192.168.0.0/16"))
| where External
| summarize SessionCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, DeviceName
| where SessionCount >= 3
| project SessionCount, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP, DeviceName, FirstSeen, LastSeen
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: External Connection to PLC on OT/Industrial Protocol Ports
description: Detects external hosts connecting to Programmable Logic Controllers over Rockwell CIP/EtherNet-IP (44818/2222), Siemens S7 (102), Schneider Modbus (502), or SSH (22) ports. Matches the IRGC-CEC CyberAv3ngers internet-facing PLC exploitation pattern documented in CISA AA26-097A.
id: b1c2d3e4-f5a6-4b7c-8d9e-0f1a2b3c4d5e
status: experimental
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/05
references:
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-335a
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t0869
  - attack.t0883
  - attack.t0842
  - attack.tool.cyberav3ngers
logsource:
  category: network
  product: zeek
detection:
  selection_ports:
    id.resp_p:
      - '44818'
      - '2222'
      - '102'
      - '502'
      - '22'
  selection_internal:
    id.orig_h|startswith:
      - '10.'
      - '172.'
      - '192.168.'
  filter_known_monitoring:
    id.resp_h|endswith:
      - '.local'
  condition: selection_ports and not selection_internal and not filter_known_monitoring
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate remote engineering access via an approved VPN/jump host (compare against engineering-workstation allowlist)
  - Vendor remote-support sessions during scheduled maintenance
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate remote engineering access via approved VPN/jump host
- Vendor remote-support sessions during scheduled maintenance

**Tuning notes:** Maintain an allowlist of authorized remote engineering IPs/subnets and engineering-workstation VPN hosts. Add the AA26-097A IOC IPs (185.82.73.x, 175.110.121.x, 88.80.150.x, 192.142.54.79, 84.200.205.165, 185.225.17.225, 79.133.46.209, 141.11.164.153) as a high-priority match filter. Raise count threshold to >=3 to reduce scan noise; consider alerting on a single connection to a PLC NEVER previously contacted by an external host.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Repeated Authentication Failures Against PLC/OT Services from External IPs — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthorized PLC Program Download / Engineering Connection over OT Protocols — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Account Access Removal / Unauthorized Account Modification on OT-HMI Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Network Reconnaissance Scanning of PLC OT Ports — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Manipulation of Control: Modbus Write Function Codes to PLC Control Registers — Critical Safety Bypass (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HMI/SCADA Internal Defacement and Stored Display Manipulation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Vendor PLC Programming Software Execution — Post-Exploitation / Program Download (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Theft of Operational Information: Large OT-to-External Data Transfer / PLC Project Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 37)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.82.73[.]162`
- File hash: `440b5385d3838e3f6bc21220caa83b65cd5f3618daea676f271c3671650ce9a3`
- IP address: `185.82.73[.]164`

Full set of 37 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [CISA AA26-097A — Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a)
- [CISA AA23-335A — IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including US Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-335a)
- [Sage Energy Partners press release — Sage Water Resources announces successful recovery and enhanced cybersecurity hardening of Uinta Basin infrastructure](https://www.sagenergypartners.com/sage-energy-partners-wholly-owned-subsidiary-sage-water-resources-announces-successful-recovery-and-enhanced-cybersecurity-hardening-of-uinta-basin-infrastructure-following-targeted-geopolitical-cybe/)
- [PRNewswire — Sage Water Resources announces successful recovery and enhanced cybersecurity hardening](https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sage-energy-partners-wholly-owned-subsidiary-sage-water-resources-announces-successful-recovery-and-enhanced-cybersecurity-hardening-of-uinta-basin-infrastructure-following-targeted-geopolitical-cyber-incident-302797091.html)
- [Water Tech Online — Sage detects SWD cybersecurity attack](https://www.watertechonline.com/news-reports/news/55383528/sage-detects-swd-cybersecurity-attack)
- [Smart Water Magazine — Cyberattack hits Utah water facility](https://smartwatermagazine.com/news/smart-water-magazine/cyberattack-hits-utah-water-facility)
- [DataBreaches.net — Sage Water Resources says Utah saltwater disposal controller intrusion bypassed pump safeguards](https://databreaches.net/2026/08/04/sage-water-resources-says-utah-saltwater-disposal-controller-intrusion-bypassed-pump-safeguards/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK (ICS) — CyberAv3ngers group (G1027)](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027/)
- [CrowdStrike — Hydro Kitten adversary profile (CyberAv3ngers / Shahid Kaveh)](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/)
- [Trend Micro — Federal agencies warn of ongoing PLC exploitation](https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/26/g/plc-exploitation.html)
- [Orion Policy Institute — APT Profile: CyberAv3ngers](https://orionpolicy.org/apt-profile-cyberav3ngers/)
- [The Hill — FBI attributes Iran-linked hackers to U.S. oil, gas, and water infrastructure disruptions](https://thehill.com/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1882
