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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-1906

ENDLESSDOORS: Zbtlink Router Firmware Contains rctl Backdoor (CVE-2026-66747) Across 20+ Models

criticalACTIVE

VulnCheck researcher Jacob Baines discovered that Zbtlink router firmware ships a persistent remote-access implant called ENDLESSDOORS (rctl/remote-control-linux) across 20+ router models. The backdoor runs as root, phones home over cleartext TCP to hardcoded C2 servers on ports 7000/7001 with no authentication or encryption, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution as root by anyone on the network path.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1906, CVE-2026-66747
Also known asENDLESSDOORS, rctl implant, Zbtlink kworker backdoor
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
EPSSCVE-2026-66747: 0.7% (54.9th percentile)
Affected productsZbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) CPE2801; Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) WE1026-5G-WD; Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) WE1326; Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) WE2007; Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) WE2008-DSIM; Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) WE2416; Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) WE3326; Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) WE5927 and 2 more
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-306
AttributionShenzhen Zhibotong Electronics (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareENDLESSDOORS
Toolsrctl (remote control linux)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1008 Fallback Channels, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1037.004 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer and 15 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstelecoms, small-business, consumer-iot, hospitality, education
Target regionsGlobal, North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1906 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — C2 Beaconing on Ports 7000/7001

Detects the ENDLESSDOORS C2 communication pattern — outbound TCP connections on ports 7000 (command channel) and 7001 (interactive reverse shell) to the known C2 infrastructure. The implant connects approximately every 35 seconds when the C2 is reachable, sends a fixed 39-byte payload (33-byte device class label + 6-byte MAC address), and receives arbitrary commands via popen() execution. This detection monitors firewall/proxy logs for the characteristic beaconing pattern and known C2 IPs.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1095, T1008, T1572
  • Data sources: firewall_logs, network_traffic_analysis, common_security_log
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=network (sourcetype=cisco:asa OR sourcetype=pan:traffic OR sourcetype=fortinet:utm)
| where (dest_port=7000 OR dest_port=7001)
| where dest_ip IN ("47.100.190.96", "47.107.224.89", "45.32.81.152", "43.248.136.125")
| eval c2_type=case(
    dest_port=7000, "command_channel",
    dest_port=7001, "reverse_shell_channel",
    1=1, "unknown_c2"
  )
| eval c2_host=case(
    dest_ip="47.100.190.96", "zbtctl.epplink.net",
    dest_ip="47.107.224.89", "backup_ip_shenzhen",
    dest_ip="45.32.81.152", "online-string.com",
    dest_ip="43.248.136.125", "rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com",
    1=1, "unknown_c2_ip"
  )
| table _time, src_ip, src_port, dest_ip, dest_port, c2_host, c2_type, bytes_out, bytes_in, action
| sort - _time

Microsoft KQL

// ENDLESSDOORS - C2 Beaconing Detection on Ports 7000/7001
// Detect outbound connections from network infrastructure devices to known C2 IPs
// on ports 7000 (command channel) and 7001 (interactive reverse shell)
let EndlessDoorsC2IPs = dynamic([
    "47.100.190.96",   // zbtctl.epplink.net - Alibaba Cloud Shanghai
    "47.107.224.89",   // Hardcoded backup IP - Alibaba Cloud Shenzhen
    "45.32.81.152",    // online-string.com - Vultr Holdings
    "43.248.136.125"   // rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com - Jiangsu Dongyun Cloud
]);
let EndlessDoorsC2Ports = dynamic(["7000", "7001"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where CommunicationDirection == 1  // Outbound
| where DestinationPort in (EndlessDoorsC2Ports)
| where DestinationIP in (EndlessDoorsC2IPs)
| where isnotempty(SourceIP) and isnotempty(DestinationIP)
| extend C2_Host = case(
    DestinationIP == "47.100.190.96", "zbtctl.epplink.net",
    DestinationIP == "47.107.224.89", "backup_ip_shenzhen",
    DestinationIP == "45.32.81.152", "online-string.com",
    DestinationIP == "43.248.136.125", "rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com",
    "unknown_c2"
  )
| extend C2_Type = iff(DestinationPort == "7000", "command_channel", "reverse_shell_channel")
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    SourceIP,
    SourcePort,
    DestinationIP,
    DestinationPort,
    C2_Host,
    C2_Type,
    DeviceAction,
    DeviceVendor,
    DeviceProduct,
    SentBytes,
    ReceivedBytes
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma

title: Outbound Connection to ENDLESSDOORS C2 Infrastructure on Ports 7000/7001
id: a1b2c3d4-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound TCP connections to known ENDLESSDOORS C2 IP addresses on ports 7000 (command channel) or 7001 (reverse shell channel). The implant connects to zbtctl.epplink.net (47.100.190.96), backup IP 47.107.224.89, online-string.com (45.32.81.152), or rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com (43.248.136.125) over cleartext TCP. Connections on port 7001 specifically indicate an interactive root shell session.
references:
  - https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/zbt-endlessdoors
  - https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/zbt-endlessdoors
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-06
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1095
  - attack.t1008
  - cve.2026.66747
  - attack.tool.endlessdoors
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_c2_command:
    Initiated: 'true'
    DestinationPort: '7000'
    DestinationIp:
      - '47.100.190.96'
      - '47.107.224.89'
      - '45.32.81.152'
      - '43.248.136.125'
  selection_c2_shell:
    Initiated: 'true'
    DestinationPort: '7001'
    DestinationIp:
      - '47.100.190.96'
      - '47.107.224.89'
      - '45.32.81.152'
      - '43.248.136.125'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Compromised devices being analyzed by security researchers
  - Backscatter or scanning from internet-facing sensors
  - Very unlikely in normal enterprise environments
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Security researchers or analysts connecting to the C2 infrastructure for investigation
  • Honeypot or sinkhole devices deliberately simulating the implant behavior
  • Extremely unlikely in normal enterprise traffic

Tuning notes: Whitelist known security research and threat intelligence collection IPs. For full coverage, also monitor DNS queries to the C2 domains (zbtctl.epplink.net, online-string.com, rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com) as a broader detection. The 35-second reconnect cadence can be used for behavioral beaconing detection.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — popen() Command Execution via C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — DNS Queries to C2 Domains · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — 35-Second C2 Beacon Cadence Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — 39-Byte C2 Handshake Signature Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — Init.d Persistence via skworker Script · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — Reverse Shell Channel on Port 7001 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — kworker Masquerading Process Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — skworker Init.d Persistence Detection · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1906.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • IP address: 47.100.190[.]96
  • Domain: zbtctl[.]epplink[.]net
  • File hash: 00a1228648fffa7338076970037b89f679a166a08c4d9573f1f27973ec6ed497

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

No patch is available; Zbtlink denies the issue but has paused firmware downloads.

On August 5, 2026, VulnCheck zero-day research team disclosed CVE-2026-66747 (CVSS 9.8 CRITICAL), a deliberate root-level backdoor embedded in firmware for over 20 Zbtlink router models. The implant, designated ENDLESSDOORS by VulnCheck, is a customized build of the open-source ycsunjane/rctl tool ("remote control linux") — a C-based client-server framework uploaded to GitHub on January 14, 2015 and never subsequently updated.

The backdoor binary runs as /usr/sbin/kworker, a userland process deliberately named to masquerade as a Linux kernel thread. Legitimate kernel kworkers appear in ps output within brackets ([kworker/0:0H-kb]) and have zero VSZ; the implant runs as an unbracketed kworker with a real memory footprint. Two kworker processes run on each infected device. Persistence is achieved via /etc/init.d/skworker, an init.d boot script embedded in the firmware. Supporting files include /usr/lib/librctl.so (the rctl shared library compiled as an OpenWrt package), /etc/kworker.cfg (configuration), and a certificate path /etc/ssl/certs/wirelesser_ca.crt referenced in the binary.

Communication is over unencrypted cleartext TCP. The implant initiates outbound connections to hardcoded C2 servers on port 7000 (command channel) and port 7001 (interactive reverse shell). Outbound connections bypass NAT and firewall ingress rules since the device dials out. On each connection, the implant sends a fixed 39-byte payload: a 33-byte device class label padded with nulls, followed by the device's LAN MAC address. There is no handshake, key exchange, or authentication on the channel. The implant reconnects approximately every 35 seconds if the C2 is unreachable.

The C2 protocol supports exactly two operations. Any data received from the server is passed directly to popen() and executed as uid 0 (root) — arbitrary shell command execution. The reserved string "rctlbash" triggers a second connection to port 7001, where the implant allocates a pseudo-terminal, spawns /bin/sh, and bridges the TCP socket to it, granting an interactive root shell. There is no allow-list, sandbox, or verification mechanism on either operation.

Four C2 endpoints were identified by VulnCheck across the affected product line. The primary endpoint zbtctl.epplink.net (47.100.190.96) is hosted on Alibaba Cloud in Shanghai and is the only C2 domain connected to Zbtlink by registration. A hardcoded backup IP 47.107.224.89 is hosted on Alibaba Cloud in Shenzhen. Two additional secondary endpoints were identified: online-string.com (45.32.81.152, Vultr Holdings) and the DDNS domain rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com (43.248.136.125, Jiangsu Dongyun Cloud). The AX3000 model tested used the wikaba.com DDNS endpoint, which the researchers described as "sort of ideal for non-attribution"; all but two other models used the more overt zbtctl.epplink.net.

The confirmed affected models span both MIPS and aarch64 (ARM) architectures: CPE2801, WE1026-5G-WD, WE1326, WE2007, WE2008-DSIM, WE2416, WE3326, WE5927, WE5931, WE5931AC, WE826-T3-DSIM, WG108, WG1602, WG1608-DSIM, WG209, WG2105, WG2107, WG259, WG3526, and ZBT-Z8102AX-2SIM. Firmware versions span from v20.09.30 (WE3326, earliest confirmed at approximately 2020) through v23.10.11 (WG1602, approximately late 2023). Some models share identical kworker binary hashes, indicating the same compiled binary was reused across multiple firmware images; the Z8102AX used a distinct hash (31ee58a1...). Zbtlink offers OEM/ODM services, meaning devices branded as Wiflyer, ZBTWiFi, or sold under other white-label names with matching model numbers are equally affected.

Because the channel is unauthenticated and unencrypted, control is not limited to the implant's original operator. Any party that answers at the C2 address, occupies the network path (DNS or route hijack), or acquires the hardcoded C2 domain can gain unauthenticated root-level remote code execution. VulnCheck built a PoC exploit using their go-exploit framework and demonstrated an interactive root shell on a Z8102AX device.

VulnCheck deliberately did not notify Zbtlink through coordinated disclosure, stating the behavior was intentional — shipped in every published firmware build, started at boot by the vendor's own init script, across twenty models and years of images. Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) denied the backdoor characterization to The Register on August 6, 2026, claiming the code "is solely intended for after-sales maintenance and serves no other purposes" and "will not be included in mass-production shipments." However, Zbtlink's download page simultaneously displayed a remediation notice acknowledging "firmware security vulnerabilities" and listing impacted versions as taken down — a direct contradiction. The vendor sells on Amazon, Alibaba, and Shopify. No fixed firmware has been released. VulnCheck's recommended mitigation is device replacement or strict network segmentation behind egress controls.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Command and Control

T1008 Fallback Channels; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1205 Traffic Signaling; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Persistence

T1037.004 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts; T1543 Create or Modify System Process; T1543.004 Launch Daemon

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell

Initial Access

T1195.003 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain; T1199 Trusted Relationship

initial-access

T1475 Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store

Credential Access

T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Resource Development

T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1583.004 Acquire Infrastructure: Server; T1588 Obtain Capabilities; T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block outbound TCP traffic on ports 7000 and 7001 at network perimeter
  • Block DNS resolution and connections to zbtctl.epplink.net, online-string.com, rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com
  • Search internal networks for unbracketed kworker processes with non-zero VSZ on routers
  • Disable the skworker init script if shell access to the device is available

Workarounds

  • Apply YARA, Snort, and Suricata rules published by VulnCheck for detection
  • Block outbound TCP on ports 7000/7001 to any external destination
  • Deploy network-based detection for the 39-byte fixed C2 handshake pattern
  • Configure DNS sinkhole for all four known C2 domains

Longer-term hardening

  • Replace affected Zbtlink/Wiflyer routers with hardware from a trusted vendor
  • Segment any affected devices behind strict egress controls behind a firewall
  • Treat the LAN-side of affected routers as untrusted
  • Implement network monitoring for outbound connections on non-standard ports from network infrastructure devices

Affected and fixed versions

  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — CPE2801
    Vulnerable versions: 22.10.09
  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — WE1026-5G-WD
    Vulnerable versions: 21.04.07
  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — WE1326
    Vulnerable versions: 22.02.18_1
  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — WE2007
    Vulnerable versions: 23.08.12
  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — WE2008-DSIM
    Vulnerable versions: 23.08.11
  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — WE2416
    Vulnerable versions: 21.03.22_1
  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — WE3326
    Vulnerable versions: 20.09.30
  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — WE5927
    Vulnerable versions: 22.08.10
  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — WE5931
    Vulnerable versions: 22.05.31
  • Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) — WE5931AC
    Vulnerable versions: 22.05.31

Timeline

Last updated · 3 updates · revalidated 3× · latest source

  • rctl (remote control linux) uploaded to GitHub by ycsunjane. The repository receives 20 commits, then is never updated again.
  • Earliest confirmed affected firmware build: WE3326 router firmware v20.09.30 ships with the ENDLESSDOORS kworker implant.
  • Most recent confirmed affected firmware build: WG1602 router firmware v23.10.11 includes the kworker implant. Some models share identical binary hashes, indicating the compiled binary was reused across multiple firmware images.
  • Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton sues TP-Link Systems over alleged China ties, part of the broader regulatory scrutiny of Chinese-made networking equipment that forms the backdrop to the ZBTlink disclosure.
  • The FCC updates its Covered List to ban imports of new foreign-made consumer routers, citing severe cybersecurity risk to US critical infrastructure.
  • VulnCheck researchers demonstrate successful C2 hijack exploit against a Z8102AX-2SIM (AX3000) device, achieving interactive root shell through the unauthenticated rctl protocol.
  • VulnCheck purchases a ZBTlink Z8102AX-2DSIM (AX3000) router from Alibaba, discovers two unbracketed kworker processes with nonzero VSZ, and begins reverse engineering the implant.
  • Wayback Machine snapshot confirms Zbtlink firmware download page still lists all affected firmware versions as available for download.
  • Reuters is first to report the VulnCheck ENDLESSDOORS findings; the wire story is syndicated same-day/next-day by Nikkei Asia, WHBL, and AOL, quoting Zbtlink's initial characterization of the implant as an after-sales support tool used only upon customer request/authorization.
  • Zbtlink pauses firmware downloads on their website and posts a remediation notice acknowledging detected firmware security vulnerabilities, listing impacted versions as taken down.
  • CVE-2026-66747 published with CVSS 9.8 (v3.1)/9.3 (v4.0). VulnCheck public disclosure of ENDLESSDOORS including blog post, advisory, YARA/Snort/Suricata detection rules, and go-exploit PoC.
  • Zbtlink issues a further statement characterizing the component as a 'remote management component' used only for technical support upon customer request/authorization and claiming it has never been used for unauthorized access — in tension with VulnCheck's finding that the implant is present by default across all shipped firmware, not opt-in or sample-unit-only.
  • Cloud Security Alliance publishes a supply-chain risk research note framing ENDLESSDOORS as a shared ODM reference design propagated across at least four downstream consumer brands, estimating 100,000+ affected units worldwide, and cautioning against premature attribution of the C2 infrastructure.
  • Security community estimates 100,000+ ZBTlink-derived routers deployed worldwide across Wiflyer, CIOSWI, and unbranded OEM/ODM rebrands.
  • The Hacker News publishes the ENDLESSDOORS story, extending public awareness beyond the initial VulnCheck advisory and Register coverage.
  • Zbtlink spokesperson tells The Register that the backdoor is mischaracterized, stating the rctl feature is solely intended for after-sales maintenance and will not be included in mass-production shipments. The Register observes the contradiction between the denial and the concurrent remediation notice on Zbtlink's download page.
  • CVE-2026-66747 confirmed absent from the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (v2026.08.07) — no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation documented at time of research.

Update history

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .

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