# ENDLESSDOORS: Zbtlink Router Firmware Contains rctl Backdoor (CVE-2026-66747) Across 20+ Models

> VulnCheck researcher Jacob Baines discovered that Zbtlink router firmware ships a persistent remote-access implant called ENDLESSDOORS (rctl/remote-control-linux) across 20+ router models. The backdoor runs as root, phones home over cleartext TCP to hardcoded C2 servers on ports 7000/7001 with no authentication or encryption, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution as root by anyone on the network path. No patch is available; Zbtlink denies the issue but has paused firmware downloads.

- **Published:** 2026-08-06T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-09T19:13:52.433Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1906
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-endlessdoors-zbtlink-rctl-backdoor-tl-2026-1906.webp?v=58212401 (Threadlinqs threat intel: ENDLESSDOORS Zbtlink rctl Backdoor: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1906) — Critical severity, 28 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1906
- **Severity:** CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics (China)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2026-66747

## Description

On August 5, 2026, VulnCheck zero-day research team disclosed CVE-2026-66747 (CVSS 9.8 CRITICAL), a deliberate root-level backdoor embedded in firmware for over 20 Zbtlink router models. The implant, designated ENDLESSDOORS by VulnCheck, is a customized build of the open-source ycsunjane/rctl tool ("remote control linux") — a C-based client-server framework uploaded to GitHub on January 14, 2015 and never subsequently updated.

The backdoor binary runs as /usr/sbin/kworker, a userland process deliberately named to masquerade as a Linux kernel thread. Legitimate kernel kworkers appear in ps output within brackets ([kworker/0:0H-kb]) and have zero VSZ; the implant runs as an unbracketed kworker with a real memory footprint. Two kworker processes run on each infected device. Persistence is achieved via /etc/init.d/skworker, an init.d boot script embedded in the firmware. Supporting files include /usr/lib/librctl.so (the rctl shared library compiled as an OpenWrt package), /etc/kworker.cfg (configuration), and a certificate path /etc/ssl/certs/wirelesser_ca.crt referenced in the binary.

Communication is over unencrypted cleartext TCP. The implant initiates outbound connections to hardcoded C2 servers on port 7000 (command channel) and port 7001 (interactive reverse shell). Outbound connections bypass NAT and firewall ingress rules since the device dials out. On each connection, the implant sends a fixed 39-byte payload: a 33-byte device class label padded with nulls, followed by the device's LAN MAC address. There is no handshake, key exchange, or authentication on the channel. The implant reconnects approximately every 35 seconds if the C2 is unreachable.

The C2 protocol supports exactly two operations. Any data received from the server is passed directly to popen() and executed as uid 0 (root) — arbitrary shell command execution. The reserved string "rctlbash" triggers a second connection to port 7001, where the implant allocates a pseudo-terminal, spawns /bin/sh, and bridges the TCP socket to it, granting an interactive root shell. There is no allow-list, sandbox, or verification mechanism on either operation.

Four C2 endpoints were identified by VulnCheck across the affected product line. The primary endpoint zbtctl.epplink.net (47.100.190.96) is hosted on Alibaba Cloud in Shanghai and is the only C2 domain connected to Zbtlink by registration. A hardcoded backup IP 47.107.224.89 is hosted on Alibaba Cloud in Shenzhen. Two additional secondary endpoints were identified: online-string.com (45.32.81.152, Vultr Holdings) and the DDNS domain rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com (43.248.136.125, Jiangsu Dongyun Cloud). The AX3000 model tested used the wikaba.com DDNS endpoint, which the researchers described as "sort of ideal for non-attribution"; all but two other models used the more overt zbtctl.epplink.net.

The confirmed affected models span both MIPS and aarch64 (ARM) architectures: CPE2801, WE1026-5G-WD, WE1326, WE2007, WE2008-DSIM, WE2416, WE3326, WE5927, WE5931, WE5931AC, WE826-T3-DSIM, WG108, WG1602, WG1608-DSIM, WG209, WG2105, WG2107, WG259, WG3526, and ZBT-Z8102AX-2SIM. Firmware versions span from v20.09.30 (WE3326, earliest confirmed at approximately 2020) through v23.10.11 (WG1602, approximately late 2023). Some models share identical kworker binary hashes, indicating the same compiled binary was reused across multiple firmware images; the Z8102AX used a distinct hash (31ee58a1...). Zbtlink offers OEM/ODM services, meaning devices branded as Wiflyer, ZBTWiFi, or sold under other white-label names with matching model numbers are equally affected.

Because the channel is unauthenticated and unencrypted, control is not limited to the implant's original operator. Any party that answers at the C2 address, occupies the network path (DNS or route hijack), or acquires the hardcoded C2 domain can gain unauthenticated root-level remote code execution. VulnCheck built a PoC exploit using their go-exploit framework and demonstrated an interactive root shell on a Z8102AX device.

VulnCheck deliberately did not notify Zbtlink through coordinated disclosure, stating the behavior was intentional — shipped in every published firmware build, started at boot by the vendor's own init script, across twenty models and years of images. Zbtlink (Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics) denied the backdoor characterization to The Register on August 6, 2026, claiming the code "is solely intended for after-sales maintenance and serves no other purposes" and "will not be included in mass-production shipments." However, Zbtlink's download page simultaneously displayed a remediation notice acknowledging "firmware security vulnerabilities" and listing impacted versions as taken down — a direct contradiction. The vendor sells on Amazon, Alibaba, and Shopify. No fixed firmware has been released. VulnCheck's recommended mitigation is device replacement or strict network segmentation behind egress controls.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1543 Create or Modify System Process
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
- T1008 Fallback Channels
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1205 Traffic Signaling
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1583.004 Acquire Infrastructure: Server
- T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
- T1475 Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- T1543.004 Launch Daemon
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1571 Non-Standard Port
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1195.003 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain
- T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server
- T1037.004 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — C2 Beaconing on Ports 7000/7001** (`TL-2026-1906-SPL-003`)

Detects the ENDLESSDOORS C2 communication pattern — outbound TCP connections on ports 7000 (command channel) and 7001 (interactive reverse shell) to the known C2 infrastructure. The implant connects approximately every 35 seconds when the C2 is reachable, sends a fixed 39-byte payload (33-byte device class label + 6-byte MAC address), and receives arbitrary commands via popen() execution. This detection monitors firewall/proxy logs for the characteristic beaconing pattern and known C2 IPs.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1095, T1008, T1572
- **Data sources:** firewall_logs, network_traffic_analysis, common_security_log
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=network (sourcetype=cisco:asa OR sourcetype=pan:traffic OR sourcetype=fortinet:utm)
| where (dest_port=7000 OR dest_port=7001)
| where dest_ip IN ("47.100.190.96", "47.107.224.89", "45.32.81.152", "43.248.136.125")
| eval c2_type=case(
    dest_port=7000, "command_channel",
    dest_port=7001, "reverse_shell_channel",
    1=1, "unknown_c2"
  )
| eval c2_host=case(
    dest_ip="47.100.190.96", "zbtctl.epplink.net",
    dest_ip="47.107.224.89", "backup_ip_shenzhen",
    dest_ip="45.32.81.152", "online-string.com",
    dest_ip="43.248.136.125", "rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com",
    1=1, "unknown_c2_ip"
  )
| table _time, src_ip, src_port, dest_ip, dest_port, c2_host, c2_type, bytes_out, bytes_in, action
| sort - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// ENDLESSDOORS - C2 Beaconing Detection on Ports 7000/7001
// Detect outbound connections from network infrastructure devices to known C2 IPs
// on ports 7000 (command channel) and 7001 (interactive reverse shell)
let EndlessDoorsC2IPs = dynamic([
    "47.100.190.96",   // zbtctl.epplink.net - Alibaba Cloud Shanghai
    "47.107.224.89",   // Hardcoded backup IP - Alibaba Cloud Shenzhen
    "45.32.81.152",    // online-string.com - Vultr Holdings
    "43.248.136.125"   // rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com - Jiangsu Dongyun Cloud
]);
let EndlessDoorsC2Ports = dynamic(["7000", "7001"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where CommunicationDirection == 1  // Outbound
| where DestinationPort in (EndlessDoorsC2Ports)
| where DestinationIP in (EndlessDoorsC2IPs)
| where isnotempty(SourceIP) and isnotempty(DestinationIP)
| extend C2_Host = case(
    DestinationIP == "47.100.190.96", "zbtctl.epplink.net",
    DestinationIP == "47.107.224.89", "backup_ip_shenzhen",
    DestinationIP == "45.32.81.152", "online-string.com",
    DestinationIP == "43.248.136.125", "rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com",
    "unknown_c2"
  )
| extend C2_Type = iff(DestinationPort == "7000", "command_channel", "reverse_shell_channel")
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    SourceIP,
    SourcePort,
    DestinationIP,
    DestinationPort,
    C2_Host,
    C2_Type,
    DeviceAction,
    DeviceVendor,
    DeviceProduct,
    SentBytes,
    ReceivedBytes
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Outbound Connection to ENDLESSDOORS C2 Infrastructure on Ports 7000/7001
id: a1b2c3d4-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound TCP connections to known ENDLESSDOORS C2 IP addresses on ports 7000 (command channel) or 7001 (reverse shell channel). The implant connects to zbtctl.epplink.net (47.100.190.96), backup IP 47.107.224.89, online-string.com (45.32.81.152), or rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com (43.248.136.125) over cleartext TCP. Connections on port 7001 specifically indicate an interactive root shell session.
references:
  - https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/zbt-endlessdoors
  - https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/zbt-endlessdoors
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1095/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-06
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1095
  - attack.t1008
  - cve.2026.66747
  - attack.tool.endlessdoors
logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_c2_command:
    Initiated: 'true'
    DestinationPort: '7000'
    DestinationIp:
      - '47.100.190.96'
      - '47.107.224.89'
      - '45.32.81.152'
      - '43.248.136.125'
  selection_c2_shell:
    Initiated: 'true'
    DestinationPort: '7001'
    DestinationIp:
      - '47.100.190.96'
      - '47.107.224.89'
      - '45.32.81.152'
      - '43.248.136.125'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Compromised devices being analyzed by security researchers
  - Backscatter or scanning from internet-facing sensors
  - Very unlikely in normal enterprise environments
level: critical

```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers or analysts connecting to the C2 infrastructure for investigation
- Honeypot or sinkhole devices deliberately simulating the implant behavior
- Extremely unlikely in normal enterprise traffic

**Tuning notes:** Whitelist known security research and threat intelligence collection IPs. For full coverage, also monitor DNS queries to the C2 domains (zbtctl.epplink.net, online-string.com, rbdg4nzqadui.wikaba.com) as a broader detection. The 35-second reconnect cadence can be used for behavioral beaconing detection.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — popen() Command Execution via C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — DNS Queries to C2 Domains (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — 35-Second C2 Beacon Cadence Detection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — 39-Byte C2 Handshake Signature Detection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — Init.d Persistence via skworker Script (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — Reverse Shell Channel on Port 7001 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — kworker Masquerading Process Detection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zbtlink ENDLESSDOORS — skworker Init.d Persistence Detection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `47.100.190[.]96`
- Domain: `zbtctl[.]epplink[.]net`
- File hash: `00a1228648fffa7338076970037b89f679a166a08c4d9573f1f27973ec6ed497`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [VulnCheck Blog: ENDLESSDOORS — Zbtlink Router Implant](https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/zbt-endlessdoors)
- [VulnCheck Advisory: CVE-2026-66747 — Zbtlink Endlessdoors](https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/zbt-endlessdoors)
- [NVD Entry: CVE-2026-66747](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-66747)
- [The Register: Chinese router vendor denies its firmware contains backdoors](https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/08/06/chinese-router-vendor-denies-its-firmware-contains-backdoors-but-pauses-downloads-to-fix-security-issues-anyway/5283794)
- [GitHub: ycsunjane/rctl — Remote Control Linux](https://github.com/ycsunjane/rctl)
- [Zbtlink Router Firmware Download Page](https://www.zbtlink.com/pages/zbt-router-firmware-download)
- [VulnCheck go-exploit C2 Framework](https://github.com/vulncheck-oss/go-exploit/blob/main/docs/c2.md)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1906
