# Token Jacking: Cybercriminals Steal and Resell AI API Keys/Tokens via Transfer Stations

> Token jacking is a criminal economy in which attackers steal AI API keys and tokens from legitimate developers — via phishing and infostealer-harvested privileged accounts, dark-web access brokers, keys exposed on file shares/code repos, and poisoned self-propagating npm packages (Shai-Hulud, Miasma) — then resell programmatic AI access through gray-market 'transfer stations' built on the open-source new-api/one-api gateways. Compromised accounts are used to create keys, provision models, remove billing limits, and disable usage alerts/logging, driving hundreds of thousands of dollars in unauthorized AI usage and nearly a million dollars in at least one case before containment. First-party research by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42.

- **Published:** 2026-08-06T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-06T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1911
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-token-jacking-llm-api-theft-tl-2026-1911.webp?v=0963c6b9 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Token Jacking LLM API Key Resale: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1911) — High severity, 30 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1911
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 30 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Token jacking is described by Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) as 'a new AI-oriented spin on an old technique of stealing access to computing resources.' The offense is the theft of API keys and bearer tokens that grant programmatic access to frontier AI platforms, enabling attackers to consume AI compute capacity while the legitimate account owner is billed. Because AI billing is token-based and many providers do not cap token consumption per account, billing occurs cyclically and victims often discover the theft only after massive consumption has already accrued. Unit 42 documents cases that accumulated 'hundreds of thousands of dollars' in usage fees, and 'nearly a million dollars in charges before discovery and containment' in at least one case, with the cost able to derail budgets or force smaller businesses into bankruptcy.

Token acquisition spans multiple vectors. (1) Account compromise: attackers compromise privileged corporate developer accounts harvested through infostealer malware and phishing campaigns, then use those accounts to create new API keys, provision models, remove billing limits, and disable usage alerts and logging. Such compromised accounts are 'readily available for sale by access brokers on dark web marketplaces.' (2) Direct key harvesting: attackers mine already-provisioned access keys from improperly secured file shares and code repositories. (3) Supply-chain compromise: poisoned, self-propagating npm packages (Shai-Hulud and its Miasma variant) are downloaded by developers; once installed they infect other code the developer builds and steal credentials and access tokens from each environment, amplifying impact. The infostealer pipeline is established: in March 2026 alone, one stealer-log service indexed 3.27 billion lines of compromised credentials, with Telegram now accounting for 68% of infostealer-log distribution; logs are sold to initial access brokers who enrich and resell them at premium.

Stolen tokens feed 'transfer stations' — fly-by-night gray-market vendors selling AI computing capacity at a fraction of retail cost. Advertised on Chinese-language marketplaces such as Taobao, they 'promise access to multiple AI services with seller-issued custom credits that are purchased anonymously.' Nearly every such relay runs on one of two open-source, OpenAI-compatible gateways — new-api (QuantumNous/new-api) and one-api (songquanpeng/one-api) — which handle obfuscation, rotation and authentication of real credentials, billing, model routing, and prompt normalization. The abuse is in the inventory, not the software: channels are stocked with stolen, leaked, or pooled credentials. An independent investigation (Matt Lenhard, Vectoral) mapped the resulting four-layer economy: upstream card/account merchants, midstream account pools that aggregate dozens to hundreds of accounts and manage auth tokens and rate limits, downstream relays/transfer stations that wrap the pool in a billed product, and end users including developers, startups, and commercial model-distillation buyers. The ten highest-traffic relays tracked pull a combined 3.6 million visits per month; the cheapest, 01Now Coding, offers a 97.8% discount off official pricing (for example $3,333 of official Anthropic credit sold for ~425 RMB). Unit 42 observed exposed credentials integrated into a transfer station 'within minutes.'

Token sourcing methods identified in the underground include free-trial abuse (mass automated account creation to claim free credits), chargeback attacks (reversing charges after usage, or starting with stolen cards), prepaid-card exploitation, open-inference abuse (proxying traffic through unprotected support chatbots or exposed /api/chat endpoints), and 'denial of wallet' attacks (flooding concurrent requests purely to burn a provider's spend). Beyond pure billing fraud, relays pose a data-exfiltration risk: prompts, code context, and multi-turn reasoning traces passing through a gateway are 'pre-labeled' training data, and pool inventory includes access harvested from application-layer tools. Competing nation-states are also documented customers of transfer stations, using discounted access to frontier models for training and refining their own models at a fraction of the cost.

The supply-chain vector is the highest-blast-radius path. The Shai-Hulud worm (MITRE ATT&CK S9008), first reported September 2025 and assessed by Wiz Research as downstream of the late-August 2025 s1ngularity/Nx GitHub-token compromise, self-propagates by stealing npm tokens and GitHub Personal Access Tokens, then automatically publishing malicious versions of any accessible package. Successor waves (Shai-Hulud 2.0, Mini Shai-Hulud, the 'Miasma' family) widened targets to AI tooling — Claude and MCP configuration files, cloud secret stores, CI/CD runner memory — and shifted from post-install to preinstall and import-time execution to evade static scanning. Campaigns include the May 2025 TanStack GitHub Actions pipeline hijack (373 malicious versions across 169 packages), the May 19 @antv maintainer-account wave (639 malicious versions across 323 packages in roughly one hour), the June 1 Red Hat @redhat-cloud-services compromise (32 packages, trojanized via a compromised employee GitHub account and OIDC trusted publishing), and the July 14 AsyncAPI compromise (import-time payload delivery with resilient multi-channel C2). Unit 42 warns that the huge volume of credentials stolen in these campaigns could 'fuel transfer stations for years.'

Mitigation recommended by Unit 42 and corroborating sources includes implementing AI spending limits with alerts for deviation from baseline, reviewing privileged accounts that can provision resources or adjust spending, migrating from long-term access keys to short-term bearer tokens, deploying an AI gateway with machine authentication for real-time monitoring, enforcing network boundaries on compute resources to restrict compromised keys, and tightly managing development environments to prevent malicious packages (cooldown periods, ignoring lifecycle scripts, version pinning with npm ci, private-registry proxying, provenance verification, egress filtering, and SBOM generation).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.007 JavaScript
- T1098 Account Manipulation
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files
- T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API
- T1555.006 Cloud Secrets Management Stores
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1496 Resource Hijacking

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Malicious npm Lifecycle Script Execution — Supply Chain Exploitation** (`TL-2026-1911-SPL-001`)

Detects npm lifecycle script execution (preinstall/postinstall/npm install) that spawns network downloads or shell activity. Shai-Hulud and its Miasma successor wave execute malicious payloads during package installation (and at import time) to steal npm tokens, GitHub PATs, and AI API keys that fuel transfer stations. This is the exploitation trigger for token jacking's supply-chain vector.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1195.001, T1195.002, T1059.007, T1204.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval cmdline=lower(CommandLine), image=lower(Image), parent=lower(ParentImage)
| where (image LIKE "%node.exe" OR parent LIKE "%npm%" OR cmdline LIKE "%npm install%" OR cmdline LIKE "%preinstall%" OR cmdline LIKE "%postinstall%")
| where (cmdline LIKE "%http%" OR cmdline LIKE "%curl%" OR cmdline LIKE "%wget%" OR cmdline LIKE "%powershell%" OR cmdline LIKE "%invoke-webrequest%" OR cmdline LIKE "%chmod%" OR cmdline LIKE "%.sh%")
| table _time, Computer, User, parent, image, CommandLine
| sort 0 - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("node.exe", "npm.cmd", "npm.exe") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("preinstall", "postinstall", "npm install", "npm i ")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("http://", "https://", "curl", "wget", "Invoke-WebRequest", "powershell", "chmod", ".sh")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ParentProcessName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Suspicious npm Lifecycle Script Execution with Payload Download
id: 7b3f9c1a-2e5d-4a8c-9f1e-5b2c6d7a8e01
status: experimental
description: Detects npm lifecycle script execution (preinstall/postinstall) that performs network downloads or shell activity, consistent with Shai-Hulud and Miasma npm supply-chain credential-stealing campaigns used to steal AI API keys and tokens.
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-token-jacking/
  - https://securelist.com/shai-hulud-worm-infects-500-npm-packages-in-a-supply-chain-attack/117547/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/06
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1195.001
  - attack.t1195.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.007
  - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    - Image|endswith:
        - '\node.exe'
        - '\npm.exe'
        - '\npm.cmd'
    - CommandLine|contains:
        - 'preinstall'
        - 'postinstall'
        - 'npm install'
  selection_payload:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'http://'
      - 'https://'
      - 'curl'
      - 'wget'
      - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
      - 'powershell'
      - 'chmod'
      - '.sh'
  condition: selection_process and selection_payload
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate npm packages that download platform binaries in postinstall scripts (e.g., esbuild, sharp)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate npm packages that run postinstall downloads (esbuild, sharp, puppeteer)

**Tuning notes:** Maintain an allowlist of known-good package binaries (esbuild, sharp, node-sass) and trusted scoped registries; enable only for dev/build hosts with npm install activity; pair with registry provenance checks to suppress trusted publishers.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GitHub Actions Pipeline Hijack and npm Token Theft — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cloud Secrets Manager and Metadata API Token Access — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Anomalous AI API Token Consumption and Transfer-Station Egress — Resource Hijacking (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- npm Preinstall/Postinstall Script with Obfuscated Payload Delivery — Supply Chain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Credential Store Harvesting by Obfuscated Script — Token Jacking (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Miasma RAT and Shai-Hulud C2 Beaconing — Command and Control (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AI and Cloud Credential Store Harvesting — Post-Exploitation Token Theft (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound C2 and Transfer-Station Network Connections (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 30)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `3.235.109[.]125`
- Domain: `amutes[.]com`
- File hash: `46faab8ab153fae6e80e7cca38eab363075bb524edd79e42269217a083628f09`

Full set of 30 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Token Jacking: Cybercriminals Could Be Stealing Your AI Resources](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-token-jacking/)
- [The npm Threat Landscape: Attack Surface and Mitigations](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/monitoring-npm-supply-chain-attacks/)
- [Shai-Hulud 2.0: A New Generation of npm Supply Chain Attacks](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/npm-supply-chain-attack/)
- [Wiz Research: Inside the Shai-Hulud npm Worm](https://www.wiz.io/blog/shai-hulud-npm-supply-chain-attack)
- [Kaspersky Securelist: Shai-Hulud worm infects 500 npm packages](https://securelist.com/shai-hulud-worm-infects-500-npm-packages-in-a-supply-chain-attack/117547/)
- [Sonatype: New Shai-Hulud 'Miasma' wave hits hundreds of npm packages](https://www.sonatype.com/blog/new-shai-hulud-miasma-wave-hits-hundreds-of-npm-packages)
- [Microsoft Security Blog: Preinstall persistence inside Red Hat npm 'Miasma' credential-stealing campaign](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/02/preinstall-persistence-inside-red-hat-npm-miasma-credential-stealing-campaign/)
- [Microsoft Security Blog: Unpacking the AsyncAPI npm supply-chain compromise (import-time payload delivery)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/15/unpacking-asyncapi-npm-supply-chain-compromise-import-time-payload-delivery/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: Software S9008 — Shai-Hulud](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9008/)
- [Developers Digest: The AI token relay market — a fraud analysis](https://www.developersdigest.tech/blog/ai-token-relay-market-fraud-hn-analysis)
- [Simon Willison: The relay market for AI tokens](https://simonwillison.net/2026/Jul/26/relay-market/)
- [MagicTools: Anatomy of the LLM token relay market](https://tools.cooconsbit.com/en/articles/llm-token-relay-market-anatomy-en)
- [V2EX: A comprehensive guide to AI transfer station jargon (t/1196011)](https://v2ex.com/t/1196011)
- [SecurityWeek: Operation Bizarre Bazaar — exposed AI endpoints and LLM API abuse](https://www.securityweek.com/)
- [Oracle-42 Intelligence: The LLMjacking underground marketplace](https://oracle-42.com/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1911
