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Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-1926

UNC6671 Automates Microsoft 365 Data Theft via Vishing-Driven AiTM Phishing and Session Hijacking

highACTIVE

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) attributes an escalating, financially motivated campaign to UNC6671, which uses helpdesk-spoofing vishing calls to lure employees onto fraudulent Okta/Microsoft passkey-enrollment portals that run adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) credential and MFA-token theft, then hijacks the resulting sessions to automate large-scale Microsoft 365/Graph data exfiltration for extortion.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1926
Also known asBlackFile, Redact, Pink, Helix, Falcon
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft 365; Microsoft Microsoft Graph API; Okta Okta Identity Cloud (SSO / MFA)
AttributionUNC6671 (medium confidence)
MalwarePink
Tools0811A9866E.com.okta.android.auth/8.18.0 DeviceSDK/1.0.94 Android/16, Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:146.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/146.0, WindowsPowerShell/5.1, python-requests/2.28.1
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1020 Automated Exfiltration, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1070.008 Clear Mailbox Data, T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1090.002 External Proxy, T1098.005 Device Registration, T1213.002 Sharepoint, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice, T1583.001 Domains and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinancial services, private equity, hedge funds, legal services, professional services, health, technology, manufacturing, real estate, insurance, transport, hospitality
Target regionsNorth America, united kingdom, australia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1926 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: AiTM Phishing Infrastructure Contact — UNC6671 Reverse Proxy / Phishing-Kit Domains

Detects outbound proxy/DNS/firewall activity toward the IP addresses and lookalike domains hosting UNC6671's AiTM reverse-proxy phishing kits that relay Okta/Microsoft 365 passkey-enrollment and SSO credentials in real time. A hit indicates an employee likely reached a fraudulent helpdesk/passkey-enrollment portal after a vishing call and is at imminent risk of AiTM credential and MFA-token theft.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.004, T1656, T1036.005, T1557
  • Data sources: proxy, dns, firewall, web_traffic
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=proxy sourcetype="bluecoat:proxysg" OR sourcetype="zscaler:web" OR index=dns
(dest_ip IN ("31.7.56.61","31.7.56.52","193.34.212.132","185.178.208.153")
 OR dest_host IN ("myoktasso.com","setupssopasskey.com","mspasskey.com","passkeyportal.com","passkeydeploy.com","oskeysync.com","passkeyhelpdesk.com","addssopasskey.com","createssopasskey.com","idokta.com","passkeyms.com","setupsso.com","portalpasskey.com"))
| eval indicator=coalesce(dest_host, dest_ip)
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_contact latest(_time) as last_contact dc(src_ip) as unique_src_ips values(src_ip) as src_ips values(user) as users by indicator
| where count > 0
| sort -count

Microsoft KQL

let AitmIPs = dynamic(["31.7.56.61","31.7.56.52","193.34.212.132","185.178.208.153"]);
let AitmDomains = dynamic(["myoktasso.com","setupssopasskey.com","mspasskey.com","passkeyportal.com","passkeydeploy.com","oskeysync.com","passkeyhelpdesk.com","addssopasskey.com","createssopasskey.com","idokta.com","passkeyms.com","setupsso.com","portalpasskey.com"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP in (AitmIPs) or RemoteUrl has_any (AitmDomains)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: UNC6671 AiTM Phishing Infrastructure Contact
id: 8f2b6a2e-1c4d-4a9b-9e7a-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects proxy/firewall connections to IP addresses or domains hosting UNC6671's vishing-driven AiTM reverse-proxy phishing kits (fraudulent Okta/Microsoft 365 passkey-enrollment portals).
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc6671-targets-financial-services-and-enterprise-cloud-environments
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/07
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.004
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_ip:
        dst_ip:
            - 31.7.56.61
            - 31.7.56.52
            - 193.34.212.132
            - 185.178.208.153
    selection_domain:
        c-uri-host|contains:
            - myoktasso.com
            - setupssopasskey.com
            - mspasskey.com
            - passkeyportal.com
            - passkeydeploy.com
            - oskeysync.com
            - passkeyhelpdesk.com
            - addssopasskey.com
            - createssopasskey.com
            - idokta.com
            - passkeyms.com
            - setupsso.com
            - portalpasskey.com
    condition: selection_ip or selection_domain
falsepositives:
    - Threat-intel or SOC tooling deliberately fetching the phishing pages for takedown/evidence collection
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Security researchers or threat-intel analysts intentionally browsing the phishing domains for investigation
  • Passive DNS/threat-intel feed ingestion tools resolving the domains for enrichment rather than an actual user visit

Tuning notes: Refresh the IP/domain watchlist from research.json and osint_context.json on each pipeline run — UNC6671 registers new root phishing domains roughly every 1.6 days; pair this alert with a mandatory forced session revocation for any matched user per the immediate remediation guidance.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Sign-In / Session Activity Correlated to UNC6671 AiTM Reverse-Proxy Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Exchange Mailbox Rule / Security-Notification Deletion — Indicator Removal After Account Compromise · unlock with TL Creds
  • Scripted Bulk File Access / Reconnaissance Search Against SharePoint and OneDrive · unlock with TL Creds
  • Proxy/Firewall Connection to UNC6671 AiTM Phishing Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • Okta Suspicious MFA/Passkey Factor Enrollment Following Failed Challenge · unlock with TL Creds
  • Automated SharePoint/OneDrive Bulk Download via Scripted User-Agent — UNC6671 Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • Okta MFA/Passkey Device Re-Enrollment Following Abandoned MFA Challenge · unlock with TL Creds
  • Automated Bulk SharePoint/OneDrive Exfiltration via Scripted User-Agent and Proxy-Fronted C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-07, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1926.

Sample indicators (3 of 25)

  • IP address: 31.7.56[.]61
  • Domain: myoktasso[.]com
  • IP address: 31.7.56[.]52

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

25 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

18 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

GTIG links the activity to a rotating set of public extortion brands (BlackFile, Redact, Pink, Helix, Falcon) that share phishing infrastructure and templates.

UNC6671 is a financially motivated intrusion cluster tracked by Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) since early 2026, first formalized under the 'BlackFile' extortion brand when its data-leak site went live on 2026-02-06. The group's core tradecraft has remained consistent across its lifespan: operators cold-call employees on personal mobile numbers, spoofing legitimate IT-helpdesk caller IDs and claiming an urgent, mandatory FIDO2 passkey or MFA migration is required. Victims are walked through a fraudulent 'passkey enrollment' or SSO portal that functions as an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) reverse proxy, relaying credentials and MFA approvals to the real Okta/Microsoft 365 login in real time while capturing the resulting authenticated session. Operators then reuse the hijacked session, in several observed cases registering an attacker-controlled MFA/passkey device for durable access, resetting passwords on non-SSO applications via the compromised mailbox, and deleting password-reset confirmations, MFA alerts, and other security notifications to delay detection.

Post-access, UNC6671 runs automated, scripted collection against Microsoft 365 and Okta-connected SaaS (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange), querying internal search functions for high-value string literals such as 'confidential' and 'SSN' before bulk-downloading files at volumes and speeds inconsistent with human browsing. Exfiltration traffic is fronted through residential and commercial proxy pools (AT&T, Comcast, Starry, Optimum/Suddenlink IP space) to blend with legitimate employee geography, and is frequently identifiable by scripting User-Agent strings (python-requests, WindowsPowerShell).

GTIG assesses that UNC6671 operates or supplies infrastructure for a family of nominally distinct extortion brands — BlackFile (retired/'shut down' 2026-05-11, though wallet cashouts continued the next day), Redact (launched 2026-06-27 claiming to have compromised BlackFile via an exiled affiliate), Pink, Helix, and Falcon — which share root-domain infrastructure, identical phishing-kit templates deployed same-day across brands, and overlapping victimology. GTIG could not fully resolve whether this reflects one coordinated group, a splintered affiliate structure, or shared phishing-as-a-service tooling used by distinct crews.

Targeting has shifted over the campaign's life: April-May 2026 saw broad opportunistic targeting of manufacturing, real estate, healthcare, and insurance; June 2026 pivoted to technology, transportation, and hospitality; by July-August 2026 the group concentrated on financial services, private equity, hedge funds, and law firms — sectors holding high-value M&A, deal, and litigation material — registering new root phishing domains at a rate of roughly one every 1.6 days, including a spike of seven domains in 72 hours in late July. Press reporting around the 2026-08-06 GTIG publication describes vishing activity against major hedge funds (Citadel, Millennium Management, Point72, Two Sigma), private-equity firms (Blackstone, KKR, Apollo Global Management), CME Group, and law firms including Paul Hastings (Greenberg Traurig was also named in reporting but has denied being breached). GTIG tracked roughly $10.69M (141.65 BTC across 18 wallets) in extortion payments to the cluster's wallets between January and May 2026 alone, with initial demands of $1-3M typically negotiated down to roughly $750K.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Exfiltration

T1020 Automated Exfiltration

Defense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.008 Clear Mailbox Data

Persistence

T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1098.005 Device Registration

Command and Control

T1090.002 External Proxy

Collection

T1213.002 Sharepoint; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Initial Access

T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information

stealth

T1684.001 Impersonation

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Verify unsolicited IT-helpdesk or passkey/MFA-enrollment phone calls through a known-good internal channel before acting on any instruction received
  • Block or alert on authentication and network traffic to/from the identified AiTM reverse-proxy and phishing-kit-backend IP addresses
  • Force session revocation and mandatory re-authentication for any account that completed an MFA/passkey enrollment triggered by an inbound call

Workarounds

  • Deploy conditional-access policies blocking authentication from known residential/commercial proxy ASNs and geographically anomalous sources
  • Alert on Okta system.multifactor.factor.setup events immediately preceded by an abandoned auth_via_mfa challenge
  • Alert on O365 FileAccessed/FileDownloaded bulk events carrying python-requests or WindowsPowerShell User-Agent strings

Longer-term hardening

  • Mandate phishing-resistant FIDO2/WebAuthn authenticators (hardware security keys or platform authenticators) so AiTM relay cannot replay captured credentials or tokens
  • Shorten Microsoft 365/Okta session lifetimes and enable Continuous Access Evaluation with IP- and device-bound session credentials
  • Consolidate SaaS authentication behind a single SSO provider (Entra ID or Okta) to remove configuration drift across individually-authenticated apps
  • Restrict authentication to managed, MDM/EDR-enrolled devices from defined trusted network zones

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft 365
    Vulnerable versions: cloud service - all tenants relying on password/MFA authentication susceptible to AiTM relay
  • Microsoft — Microsoft Graph API
    Vulnerable versions: cloud service - accessible via any hijacked authenticated session or access token
  • Okta — Okta Identity Cloud (SSO / MFA)
    Vulnerable versions: cloud service - passkey/MFA enrollment ceremony susceptible to AiTM relay when driven by social engineering

Timeline

  • BlackFile data-leak site (DLS) goes live, formalizing the extortion brand after months of unbranded vishing-driven intrusions.
  • First broad-wave passkey/Okta-themed AiTM phishing domain, locked-ioc-14, registered, opening a months-long domain-registration campaign.
  • locked-ioc-5 registered; later identified as shared phishing infrastructure bridging the Pink and Falcon extortion brands.
  • BlackFile publicly announces it is 'shutting down under this name,' taking its data-leak site offline.
  • Bitcoin wallets tied to BlackFile record cashout activity the day after the announced shutdown, contradicting the retirement claim.
  • Helix-branded AiTM infrastructure (locked-ioc-16) registered as part of a wave targeting technology, transportation, and hospitality victims.
  • The 'Redact' brand publicly launches, claiming BlackFile's infrastructure was compromised and repurposed by an exiled affiliate.
  • createmfa.com and passkeyactivation.com registered as campaign targeting pivots toward financial services and legal sectors.
  • Seven new root phishing domains registered within a 72-hour window, marking a sharp acceleration in operational tempo.
  • Vishing calls reported against major hedge funds, private-equity firms, and CME Group as part of the late-stage financial-services wave.
  • Google Threat Intelligence Group publishes 'UNC6671 Rebrands,' formally linking BlackFile, Redact, Pink, Helix, and Falcon to a single tracked cluster.
  • Cyber Security News and other outlets report on the GTIG findings; hunt phase ingests the coverage.

Sources cited

More from UNC6671

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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