# RovoBlast: One-Click rovoChatPrompt Parameter-to-Prompt Injection in Atlassian Rovo Exposes Confluence, Jira, SharePoint, and Bitbucket Data

> Varonis Threat Labs (researcher Dolev Taler) disclosed RovoBlast, a one-click vulnerability in Atlassian's enterprise AI assistant Rovo: an unauthenticated rovoChatPrompt URL parameter let an attacker-crafted link seed arbitrary instructions directly into a victim's live, trusted Rovo chat session with no jailbreak, permission bypass, or confirmation prompt. Using Rovo's built-in ResearchAgent, the injected instructions could autonomously enumerate and exfiltrate Confluence pages, Jira tickets, SharePoint content, and other connected-system data to an attacker-controlled server via an HTTP image-fetch side channel. Atlassian deployed a server-side fix (2026-07-08) neutralizing automatic execution of rovoChatPrompt content before Varonis published its findings and presented at DEF CON 34 (2026-08-08).

- **Published:** 2026-08-08T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-08T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1939
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-rovoblast-rovochatprompt-injection-tl-2026-1939.webp?v=a6d61024 (Threadlinqs threat intel: RovoBlast rovoChatPrompt Injection: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1939) — Critical severity, 14 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1939
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** PATCHED
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 14 (1 shown free below)

## Description

RovoBlast exploits a Parameter-to-Prompt (P2P) injection flaw in the `rovoChatPrompt` query parameter accepted by Atlassian's Rovo AI assistant at `home.atlassian.com/chat?rovoChatPathway=chat&rovoChatPrompt=<prompt>`. When an authenticated user opens a specially crafted link, Rovo pre-fills and auto-executes the embedded text as if it were the user's own genuine chat query, with no warning, confirmation dialog, or visual indicator that the session had been seeded by an outside party. Varonis found that the organization-scoping portion of the URL (`/o/<org-id>/chat`) could be left blank, and Atlassian would silently route the request into the victim's own default organization, removing the need for an attacker to know or guess the target org ID.

Once seeded, the attacker-controlled prompt could invoke ResearchAgent, a built-in Rovo capability described by Varonis as able to "autonomously conduct multi-source web research and navigate across arbitrary sites." This let the injected instructions harvest sensitive data reachable through Rovo's federated access layer — Confluence pages, Jira tickets, Bitbucket repositories, and, via Rovo's 50+ third-party Connectors, Slack, Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, SharePoint, and other integrated systems, all evaluated with the victim's own live privileges.

The Bugcrowd technical disclosure underlying the research (submitted by researcher handle "loacker", reported 2025-11-04, triaged as P2 with a $6,000 bounty on 2026-01-06) documents a working proof-of-concept exfiltration channel: the crafted prompt used indirect, guardrail-evading phrasing (assigning the victim's harvested email address to an "emoji variable," then asking Rovo to "identify the bird" in an image at `https://<attacker-domain>/bird/<emoji>/bird.jpg`) to trick Rovo into requesting an attacker-hosted image whose URL path carried the exfiltrated data as an HTTP GET request — leaving no obvious trace in the visible chat transcript. The PoC used the domain `kizafair.com` as the attacker-controlled logging endpoint.

Atlassian remediated the issue server-side on 2026-07-08, disabling automatic execution of rovoChatPrompt-seeded instructions, and characterized the underlying issue as a "phishing-class" attack requiring a user to interact with untrusted, attacker-supplied content — consistent with vulnerabilities affecting AI systems industry-wide. Varonis Threat Labs published RovoBlast and presented it at DEF CON 34 on 2026-08-08, noting that Rovo cannot be fully uninstalled from an Atlassian Cloud tenant, and that no taint-labeling exists to distinguish externally seeded prompt content from a user's own input. No CVE has been assigned. This disclosure is distinct from, but thematically related to, a separate unpatched zero-click Rovo prompt-injection flaw disclosed by PromptArmor on 2026-08-05 that abuses Rovo's URL-retrieval tool even when web search is administratively disabled.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1213.001 Confluence
- T1213.002 Sharepoint
- T1213.003 Code Repositories
- T1213.005 Messaging Applications
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**RovoBlast — Image-Fetch HTTP Exfiltration Side Channel** (`TL-2026-1939-SPL-003`)

Detects outbound HTTP requests for an image resource under a '/bird/<encoded-segment>/' path, or DNS/proxy activity involving the known proof-of-concept exfiltration domain kizafair.com — the RovoBlast pattern where a seeded ResearchAgent is tricked (via an 'identify the bird' prompt) into fetching an attacker-hosted image whose URL path carries exfiltrated data as an HTTP GET side channel.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1048.003, T1027, T1583.001
- **Data sources:** web_proxy, firewall, dns_logs
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy OR index=firewall sourcetype IN ("zscalernss-web","pan:traffic","stream:http")
| where match(url,"(?i)/bird/") AND match(url,"(?i)\.(jpg|jpeg|png|gif)(\?|$)")
| rex field=url "/bird/(?<encoded_segment>[^/]+)/"
| where len(encoded_segment) > 8
| eval is_kizafair=if(match(dest_domain,"(?i)kizafair\.com"),1,0)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(src_ip) as src_ips values(url) as urls by dest_domain, is_kizafair
| where is_kizafair=1 OR count > 0
| table first_seen, last_seen, dest_domain, src_ips, urls, count
| sort -first_seen
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has "/bird/" and RequestURL matches regex @"\.(jpg|jpeg|png|gif)(\?|$)"
| extend EncodedSegment = extract(@"/bird/([^/]+)/", 1, RequestURL)
| where strlen(EncodedSegment) > 8
| extend IsKnownPoCDomain = DestinationHostName has "kizafair.com"
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationHostName, RequestURL, EncodedSegment, IsKnownPoCDomain
| union (
    DnsEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
    | where Name has "kizafair.com"
    | project TimeGenerated, SourceIP=ClientIP, DestinationHostName=Name, RequestURL="", EncodedSegment="", IsKnownPoCDomain=true
)
| order by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Rovo Image-Fetch HTTP Exfiltration Side Channel (RovoBlast)
id: 1f4d7a9c-5e2b-4f6a-8d3c-7a9e1b2c4f6d
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound HTTP requests for an image under a '/bird/<encoded-segment>/' path, and/or DNS resolution of the known RovoBlast PoC exfiltration domain kizafair.com — the pattern used to trick Rovo's ResearchAgent into requesting an attacker-hosted image whose URL path carries exfiltrated data via an HTTP GET side channel.
references:
    - https://www.varonis.com/blog/rovoblast
    - https://bugcrowd.com/disclosures/bf1922fb-99d0-4d3b-b419-1728720d29ec/one-click-data-exfiltration-via-rovochatprompt-url-parameter-confluence-rovo
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-08
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048.003
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1027
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
    product: generic
detection:
    selection_path:
        c-uri|contains: '/bird/'
    selection_ext:
        c-uri|re: '\.(jpg|jpeg|png|gif)(\?|$)'
    selection_domain:
        r-dns|contains: 'kizafair.com'
    condition: (selection_path and selection_ext) or selection_domain
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate bird-identification or wildlife-photo requests to unrelated benign photo-hosting domains that coincidentally use a '/bird/' path segment
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Benign image requests to unrelated third-party photo-hosting or wildlife-identification services that happen to use a '/bird/' URL segment

**Tuning notes:** Add kizafair.com and any newly observed sibling PoC/attacker domains to a dedicated watchlist/lookup for exact-match alerting; keep the '/bird/' path-pattern rule as a lower-confidence hunt for copycat campaigns using different domains but the same encoding trick.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- RovoBlast — rovoChatPrompt Link Click via Safe Links / URL Click Telemetry (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RovoBlast — ResearchAgent Cross-System Mass Collection (Custom Atlassian Table) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RovoBlast — Image-Fetch Exfiltration via CommonSecurityLog / DNS (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RovoBlast — rovoChatPrompt Parameter Present on Rovo Chat Endpoint (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RovoBlast — Cross-Container Mass Enumeration by Rovo ResearchAgent (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RovoBlast — Bird-Image Exfiltration Path Pattern / [indicator] (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RovoBlast — rovoChatPrompt Link Click via Proxy/SWG Logs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- RovoBlast — ResearchAgent Cross-System Mass Collection (Atlassian Audit Log) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (1 of 14)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `kizafair[.]com`

Full set of 14 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Critical One-Click Vulnerability in Atlassian's Rovo AI Exposed Enterprise Data](https://www.securityweek.com/critical-one-click-vulnerability-in-atlassians-rovo-ai-exposed-enterprise-data/)
- [RovoBlast](https://www.varonis.com/blog/rovoblast)
- [One-Click Data Exfiltration via rovoChatPrompt URL Parameter (Confluence / Rovo)](https://bugcrowd.com/disclosures/bf1922fb-99d0-4d3b-b419-1728720d29ec/one-click-data-exfiltration-via-rovochatprompt-url-parameter-confluence-rovo)
- [Atlassian Rovo Exfiltrates Data, Bypassing Controls](https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/atlassian-rovo-exfiltrates-data)
- [A vulnerability has been discovered in Atlassian's AI 'Rovo' that allows internal company data to be transmitted externally simply by having it read documents](https://gigazine.net/gsc_news/en/20260806-atlassian-rovo/)
- [Atlassian Rovo Is Leaking Your Data — And the Admin Fix Doesn't Work](https://byteiota.com/atlassian-rovo-data-exfiltration-prompt-injection/)
- [Atlassian Rovo AI Leaks Jira and Confluence Data via Hidden Prompt Injection](https://zeli.app/en/story/49185983)
- [Explore Atlassian Rovo: Search, Chat, and Agents](https://www.atlassian.com/software/rovo/features)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1939
