Metabase Zero-Day (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf) Exploited in the Wild for Unauthenticated Admin Access

Metabase Zero-Day (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf) Exploited in the (TL-2026-1940) is a critical-severity software vulnerability scored CVSS 10, first published 2026-08-08. It has no confirmed attribution, affects Metabase Metabase (self-hosted and Metabase Cloud), maps to 10 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1078.004, T1087.004, T1098.001), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 9 indicators of compromise.

Key facts for TL-2026-1940

Threat ID
TL-2026-1940
Severity
CRITICAL
CVSS
10 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Status
ACTIVE
Category
VULNERABILITY
First published
2026-08-08
Last reviewed
2026-08-08
Attribution confidence
LOW
Motivation
UNKNOWN
Target sectors
technology, consumer-electronics, software, legal-services, data-analytics
Target regions
Global
Detection rules
9
Indicators of compromise
9

A maximum-severity (CVSS 10.0) zero-day in Metabase's /api/session/reset_password endpoint let unauthenticated remote attackers inject arbitrary SQL and forge administrator sessions. Attackers exploited it in the wild against Metabase Cloud on August 3, 2026, breaching PC maker Framework, form-builder Tally, and data broker LexisNexis before Metabase publicly disclosed and patched the flaw on August 6-7, 2026.

How Metabase Zero-Day (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf) Exploited in the works

GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf is a CVSS 10.0 SQL injection vulnerability in Metabase, a widely deployed open-source and cloud business-intelligence/analytics platform. The flaw lives in the unauthenticated password-reset endpoint, /api/session/reset_password: by injecting SQL through this endpoint, a remote attacker with no credentials can manipulate the Metabase application database directly, ultimately forging or obtaining a valid administrator session. Once inside, the attacker can modify application configuration, read and export any data reachable through Metabase's connected data-source integrations, and steal the stored credentials Metabase holds for those connected databases and warehouses. Neither the GHSA advisory, the Metabase vendor blog, nor any of the news coverage that was reviewed publishes the specific SQL injection payload or the vulnerable query construction — the exact injection mechanics inside the endpoint's code are not public.

The vulnerability affects self-hosted Metabase in the 1.58.0 through 1.63.3 release lines (precisely: >=1.58.0,<1.58.24; >=1.59.0,<1.59.21; >=1.60.0,<1.60.17; >=1.61.0,<1.61.11; >=1.62.0,<1.62.9; >=1.63.0,<1.63.5); it is fixed in 1.58.24, 1.59.21, 1.60.17, 1.61.11, 1.62.9, and 1.63.5. Version 1.57 and earlier are unaffected. Metabase Cloud instances were patched automatically by the vendor. No CVE has been assigned to the flaw as of publication (confirmed via search of CVE aggregators as of 2026-08-08); it is tracked solely under its GitHub Security Advisory identifier, GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf.

Metabase confirmed active, in-the-wild exploitation predating its own discovery of the bug: on August 3, 2026, attackers used the flaw against Metabase Cloud instances belonging to Framework (a laptop/PC manufacturer), Tally (an online form-builder SaaS), and LexisNexis (a data/legal-analytics broker, which confirmed its "Metabase API" was impacted and disconnected the affected third-party-hosted systems while investigating, without disclosing full exposure details). This LexisNexis Metabase incident is distinct from and unrelated to LexisNexis's separate, earlier February 2026 AWS/React2Shell breach attributed to the actor FulcrumSec. Framework's exposure covered customer names, email addresses, login IP addresses, billing/shipping addresses, phone numbers, company names, and (for business customers) VAT/EIN and billing email addresses; payment and order data were not touched. Tally's exposure covered user email addresses and one-way password hashes; submitted form content was not accessed. Metabase notified Framework on or around August 6, shipped patches the same day, and disclosed the vulnerability publicly on August 6-7, 2026; Framework emailed all of its customers on August 7 attributing the incident to "an upstream cyberattack at Metabase."

The defining exploitation signature documented by Metabase and corroborating outlets is a two-request pattern in access logs: an unauthenticated POST to /api/session/reset_password returning HTTP 400, immediately followed by a GET to /api/user/current returning HTTP 200 — the latter confirming a successfully hijacked administrator session. Metabase CEO Sameer Al-Sakran told reporters: "If you find that pattern in your application logs or in your Metabase server ingress logs, it is likely that your instance has been compromised." Metabase's incident-response guidance for potentially compromised instances is to purge the core_session table, review and delete unrecognized API keys (indicating attackers may mint new API keys as a persistence mechanism after forging admin access), audit administrator accounts for unauthorized changes/creation, rotate credentials for every database connected to Metabase, and review data-warehouse and Metabase query/access logs for signs of prior exploitation. The vulnerability is not yet listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of 2026-08-08 (unrelated older Metabase entry CVE-2021-41277, a GeoJSON API local-file-inclusion flaw, is already KEV-listed but is a separate, prior vulnerability).

This is not Metabase's first maximum-impact unauthenticated flaw: CVE-2023-38646 (CVSS 9.8), a pre-authentication remote-code-execution bug rooted in a SQL injection against Metabase's H2 JDBC driver via the /api/setup/validate endpoint, was patched in July 2023 after roughly 20,000 internet-exposed instances were identified by researchers. GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf repeats the pattern of an unauthenticated endpoint reachable pre-login providing a path to full SQL injection and administrative compromise, this time exploited as a genuine zero-day before any public advisory existed, and — with at least three confirmed, independent Metabase Cloud tenants (Framework, Tally, LexisNexis) hit in the same narrow pre-disclosure window — consistent with attackers having systematically identified and targeted multiple internet-exposed/hosted Metabase instances rather than exploiting a single known target.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-1940

Defense Evasion

T1078.004 Cloud Accounts

Discovery

T1087.004 Cloud Account

Persistence

T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Collection

T1213 Data from Information Repositories

lateral-movement

T1550.004 Web Session Cookie

Credential Access

T1552 Unsecured Credentials

Impact

T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Reconnaissance

T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning

Affected products and versions in Metabase Zero-Day (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf) Exploited in the

  • Metabase — Metabase (self-hosted and Metabase Cloud)
    Vulnerable versions: >=1.58.0,<1.58.24; >=1.59.0,<1.59.21; >=1.60.0,<1.60.17; >=1.61.0,<1.61.11; >=1.62.0,<1.62.9; >=1.63.0,<1.63.3
    Fixed in: 1.58.24; 1.59.21; 1.60.17; 1.61.11; 1.62.9; 1.63.5

Remediation for Metabase Zero-Day (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf) Exploited in the

Patches

  • Metabase 1.58.24
  • Metabase 1.59.21
  • Metabase 1.60.17
  • Metabase 1.61.11
  • Metabase 1.62.9
  • Metabase 1.63.5

Immediate actions

  • Upgrade Metabase to a patched release: 1.58.24, 1.59.21, 1.60.17, 1.61.11, 1.62.9, or 1.63.5, matching your current branch
  • If immediate upgrade is not possible, block public access to the /api/session/reset_password endpoint at the perimeter or reverse proxy
  • Purge all rows from the core_session table to invalidate any attacker-forged administrator sessions

Workarounds

  • Block or restrict access to /api/session/reset_password until patched
  • Metabase Cloud instances were patched automatically by the vendor and require no customer action beyond post-incident credential rotation

Longer-term hardening

  • Review and delete unrecognized or unauthorized Metabase API keys
  • Audit administrator accounts for unauthorized creation or modification
  • Rotate credentials for every database and data warehouse connected to Metabase
  • Review data-warehouse and Metabase query/access logs for evidence of prior exploitation or data export
  • Monitor access logs for the POST /api/session/reset_password (400) followed by GET /api/user/current (200) signature

Weaknesses (CWE) in Metabase Zero-Day (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf) Exploited in the

CWE-89, CWE-306

Timeline of Metabase Zero-Day (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf) Exploited in the

  • Metabase patches CVE-2023-38646 (CVSS 9.8), a pre-auth RCE via SQL injection in the H2 JDBC driver reachable through /api/setup/validate, after roughly 20,000 internet-exposed instances were identified — the vulnerability-class precedent for this 2026 zero-day.
  • Attackers exploit the then-unknown GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf SQL injection flaw against Metabase Cloud instances belonging to Framework, Tally, and LexisNexis.
  • Metabase ships patched releases across all affected branches (1.58.24, 1.59.21, 1.60.17, 1.61.11, 1.62.9, 1.63.5); Metabase Cloud instances are patched automatically.
  • Metabase publishes its 'Security Update' blog post and GitHub publishes the GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf security advisory disclosing the unauthenticated SQL injection flaw.
  • Metabase notifies Framework that its Metabase Cloud instance was compromised via the zero-day.
  • LexisNexis confirms its 'Metabase API' was impacted by the incident and disconnects the affected third-party-hosted systems while investigating; this is a separate incident from LexisNexis's earlier February 2026 AWS/React2Shell breach.
  • Tally confirms exposure of user email addresses and one-way password hashes; forms and submitted answers were not accessed.
  • Framework emails all customers disclosing the breach, attributing it to 'an upstream cyberattack at Metabase'; names, emails, phone numbers, and addresses were exposed but payment data was not.
  • Metabase CEO Sameer Al-Sakran publicly states that finding the POST /api/session/reset_password (400) followed by GET /api/user/current (200) pattern in application or ingress logs indicates a compromised instance.
  • The Hacker News, BleepingComputer, Security Affairs, and other outlets report confirmed active in-the-wild exploitation and publish the reset_password/user-current attack signature for defenders.

Sources cited for Metabase Zero-Day (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf) Exploited in the

Threats related to Metabase Zero-Day (GHSA-vwf4-m7j8-wcjf) Exploited in the

Detection coverage for TL-2026-1940

As of 2026-08-08, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1940 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 9 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

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