# UNC6671 Vishing Campaign Impersonates IT Support to Target 200+ Financial and Enterprise Organizations for Extortion

> Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) is tracking UNC6671, a financially motivated extortion group operating under the brands BlackFile, Redact, Pink, Helix, and Falcon, that vishes employees' personal phones posing as IT helpdesk staff to lure them onto lookalike FIDO2 passkey/MFA-enrollment domains, hijacking Microsoft 365 and Okta SSO sessions in real time via adversary-in-the-middle infrastructure.

- **Published:** 2026-08-09T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-09T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1959
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-unc6671-fido2-passkey-lures-tl-2026-1959.webp?v=232ed529 (Threadlinqs threat intel: UNC6671 IT Support Vishing Extortion: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1959) — Critical severity, 27 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1959
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UNC6671
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)

## Description

UNC6671 (Mandiant/GTIG designation; CrowdStrike tracks related activity as Cordial Spider) emerged in early 2026 running high-volume voice-phishing (vishing) operations against enterprise employees. Callers, spoofing legitimate helpdesk phone numbers, contact victims' personal mobile devices to sidestep corporate security tooling and claim a mandatory FIDO2 passkey migration or MFA update is required. Victims are walked through enrollment on a lookalike SSO/passkey portal (e.g. subdomains of createssopasskey[.]com, addssopasskey[.]com, passkeyhelpdesk[.]com) fronted by adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) reverse-proxy infrastructure that captures usernames, passwords, and real-time MFA codes/session tokens, then relays them to the legitimate Microsoft 365 or Okta login flow to hijack the session live on the call. Once inside, operators register an adversary-controlled MFA device (after removing the victim's own), reset passwords on non-SSO legacy applications, and systematically delete password-reset and security-alert notifications to slow detection. Data theft is then automated against SharePoint, OneDrive, and Okta-fronted applications using python-requests and PowerShell scripts that reuse stolen session cookies (FedAuth) and spoof the Microsoft Office ClientAppId, generating SharePoint audit-log entries as lower-scrutiny FileAccessed events rather than FileDownloaded. GTIG has observed cases exceeding one million exfiltrated SharePoint/OneDrive files. The group monetizes stolen data through extortion: initial ransom demands of $1-3M+ are negotiated down 50-75%, settling near $750,000 in the majority of tracked cases, communicated first via Tox and later via Session messenger, backed by hijacked corporate email/Teams accounts, spam-bombing, threatening voicemails to executives, and swatting. GTIG tracked 141.65 BTC (~$10.69M) across 18 wallets tied to the original 'BlackFile' data-leak site (launched February 6, 2026) between January and May 2026. BlackFile announced a shutdown on May 11, 2026, but GTIG assesses operations continued uninterrupted under the brands Redact, Pink, Helix, and Falcon — infrastructure analysis (54+ root domains sharing the same passkey/SSO naming convention, registrars, and reverse-proxy IPs) shows the brands are tightly linked, most likely as a single group compartmentalizing its operations across public personas, though actor-splintering or a shared-panel ecosystem among affiliates cannot be ruled out. Targeting has escalated from broad opportunistic hits (healthcare, manufacturing, real estate) in April-May 2026 to a deliberate focus on financial services and law firms in July-August 2026 — private equity, M&A, and litigation data maximizes extortion leverage. Reuters/press reporting named Blackstone, Bridgewater Associates, Apollo Global Management, Bain Capital, KKR, TPG, CME Group, Moody's, Clearlake Capital, and the law firms Paul Hastings and Greenberg Traurig as targeted, with Point72, Millennium Management, Two Sigma, and Citadel also reportedly targeted; as of publication no named firm had confirmed a resulting breach. GTIG's tradecraft comparison notes overlap with techniques associated with ShinyHunters (Bling Libra)/Scattered Spider (UNC3944)-style social engineering, but assesses UNC6671 as operating independently.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1566 Phishing
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1556 Modify Authentication Process
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Scripted SharePoint/OneDrive Mass Exfiltration Spoofing Microsoft Office ClientAppId (SPL)** (`TL-2026-1959-SPL-003`)

Detects UNC6671's automated data-theft stage: high-volume SharePoint/OneDrive FileAccessed or FileDownloaded events generated by python-requests or PowerShell scripts replaying stolen FedAuth session cookies while spoofing ClientAppName 'Microsoft Office' and ClientAppId d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c — the technique GTIG observed exfiltrating over one million files per intrusion while evading FileDownloaded-tier scrutiny.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1530, T1213, T1537, T1048, T1005, T1550
- **Data sources:** o365_management_activity, sharepoint_audit_log, onedrive_audit_log
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=o365 sourcetype="o365:management:activity" Workload IN ("SharePoint","OneDrive")
(Operation="FileAccessed" OR Operation="FileDownloaded" OR Operation="FileSyncDownloadedFull")
(UserAgent="python-requests/2.28.1" OR UserAgent="WindowsPowerShell/5.1" OR match(UserAgent,"python-requests") OR match(UserAgent,"PowerShell"))
| eval spoofed_office=if(ClientAppId="d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c" AND match(UserAgent,"python-requests|PowerShell"),"true","false")
| stats count dc(SourceFileName) as unique_files values(SourceFileName) as sample_files by UserId ClientIP UserAgent ClientAppId Operation spoofed_office
| where unique_files>50 OR (spoofed_office="true" AND count>10)
| sort -unique_files
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Workload in ("SharePoint","OneDrive")
| where Operation in ("FileAccessed","FileDownloaded","FileSyncDownloadedFull")
| where UserAgent has_any ("python-requests", "WindowsPowerShell")
| extend SpoofedOffice = (ClientAppId == "d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c" and (UserAgent has "python-requests" or UserAgent has "PowerShell"))
| summarize FileCount = dcount(SourceFileName), SampleFiles = make_set(SourceFileName, 20), IPs = make_set(ClientIP, 10) by UserId, UserAgent, ClientAppId, Operation, SpoofedOffice
| where FileCount > 50 or (SpoofedOffice == true and FileCount > 10)
| sort by FileCount desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Scripted Mass SharePoint/OneDrive File Access via python-requests or PowerShell Spoofing Microsoft Office ClientAppId
id: b4f1e2a9-8c3d-47f6-a1b2-9e5d3c7f0a44
status: experimental
description: Detects high-volume SharePoint/OneDrive FileAccessed/FileDownloaded events generated by non-browser clients (python-requests, WindowsPowerShell) spoofing the ClientAppName "Microsoft Office" while using ClientAppId d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c — the scripted exfiltration tooling UNC6671 uses to harvest over a million files per intrusion using hijacked FedAuth session cookies.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/blackfile-vishing-extortion-operation/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-09
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1530
    - attack.t1213.002
    - attack.t1005
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1537
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.001
    - attack.actor.unc6671
logsource:
    category: cloud
    product: m365
    service: audit.sharepoint
detection:
    selection_operation:
        Operation:
            - 'FileAccessed'
            - 'FileDownloaded'
            - 'FileSyncDownloadedFull'
    selection_useragent:
        UserAgent|contains:
            - 'python-requests'
            - 'PowerShell'
    condition: selection_operation and selection_useragent
falsepositives:
    - Authorized backup, eDiscovery, or migration scripts using python-requests/PowerShell against SharePoint/OneDrive with a legitimate, non-spoofed ClientAppId — verify ClientAppId d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c is not paired with these user agents.
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Authorized backup, eDiscovery, or migration scripts using python-requests/PowerShell against SharePoint/OneDrive — verify these do not carry ClientAppId d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c, which is specifically the spoofed value observed in UNC6671 tooling.

**Tuning notes:** Tighten the unique_files/count thresholds to your tenant's normal script-driven access baseline; add source IP enrichment against the known exfiltration proxy IPs (23.234.75.84, 195.140.213.114, 195.140.213.115) to raise confidence, and treat FileAccessed with this signature as equivalent severity to FileDownloaded since UNC6671 deliberately exploits that scrutiny gap.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- UNC6671 Vishing-Lure AiTM Passkey/SSO Domain Access (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fraudulent MFA Enrollment / Legacy Password Reset Following Failed Authentication (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Scripted SharePoint/OneDrive Mass Exfiltration Spoofing Microsoft Office ClientAppId (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UNC6671 Vishing-Lure AiTM Passkey/SSO Domain Access (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fraudulent MFA Enrollment / Legacy Password Reset Following Failed Authentication (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Scripted SharePoint/OneDrive Mass Exfiltration Spoofing Microsoft Office ClientAppId (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UNC6671 Vishing-Lure AiTM Passkey/SSO Domain Access (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fraudulent Okta MFA Enrollment Following Vished-Session Auth Failure (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `31.7.56[.]61`
- Domain: `myoktasso[.]com`
- IP address: `31.7.56[.]52`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Hackers impersonate IT support to breach leading financial companies](https://securityaffairs.com/196800/security/hackers-impersonate-it-support-to-breach-leading-financial-companies.html)
- [Welcome to BlackFile: Inside a Vishing Extortion Operation](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/blackfile-vishing-extortion-operation/)
- [UNC6671 Rebrands: Multi-Brand Vishing Extortion Targets Financial Services and Enterprise Cloud Environments](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc6671-targets-financial-services-and-enterprise-cloud-environments)
- [UNC6671 Vishing Attacks Target Personal Phones to Steal SaaS Data](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/unc6671-vishing-attacks-target-personal.html)
- [Hedge fund cyberattacks tied to BlackFile-linked UNC6671 extortion group](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hedge-fund-cyberattacks-tied-to-blackfile-linked-unc6671-extortion-group/)
- [Blackstone, KKR and CME targeted in vishing wave tied to BlackFile crew](https://siliconangle.com/2026/08/06/blackstone-kkr-cme-targeted-vishing-wave-tied-blackfile-crew/)
- [Vishing group UNC6671 now focuses on extorting M&A firms](https://www.scworld.com/news/vishing-group-unc6671-now-focuses-on-extorting-ma-firms)
- [Vishing Extortion Group UNC6671 Rebrands After Making Millions](https://www.securityweek.com/vishing-extortion-group-unc6671-rebrands-after-making-millions/)
- [Google Links Redact Extortion Group to BlackFile Rebrand](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/redact-extortion-group-blackfile/)
- [UNC6671 Rebrands BlackFile Into Redact, Pink, Helix, and Falcon Extortion Operations](https://www.technadu.com/google-links-unc6671-to-multiple-extortion-brands-after-blackfiles-apparent-retirement/633045/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1959
