Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-1967
Origin-Validation Bypass in Connective (Nitro Software Belgium) eID Browser Extension Enables PIN Theft, Signature Forgery, and Drive-By RCE Across 2M+ Belgian Users
Researcher James Arnott (Bay Area Labs) disclosed that the Connective signing browser extension, deployed by 8 of Belgium's 10 largest banks and 60+ government agencies, forwarded native-messaging commands to its local host binary without verifying which website issued them. Any web page could silently read unprotected eID card data, recover a user's eID PIN via a reversible token cipher, forge legally-binding eIDAS signatures, and achieve drive-by remote code execution by directing the native host to load an attacker-supplied library.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-1967 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Dis-Connective |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Affected products | Nitro Software Belgium Connective signing browser extension (Chrome Web Store ID kclpjmhngbacampgcdojmiedamjbgjjm) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-346, CWE-73, CWE-22, CWE-1204, CWE-284 |
| Tools | dis-connective |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1036 Masquerading, T1056 Input Capture, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, T1552 Unsecured Credentials, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1574 Hijack Execution Flow, T1583 Acquire Infrastructure |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | finance, government administration |
| Target regions | belgium, Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-08-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1967 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 13 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Connective eID Native-Messaging Host Spawned Following Untrusted-Origin Browsing (Silent Card Read)
Detects the Connective/Nitro Software Belgium eID native-messaging host process being launched by a browser shortly after the browser navigated to a domain outside the known Belgian eID relying-party allow-list (belgium.be/fgov.be/csam.be/doccle.be/certif.iamfas.belgium.be). This is the precondition the Dis-Connective origin-validation-bypass chain relies on to silently issue GET_READERS/READ_FILE/READ_RECORD/COMPUTE_SIGNATURE commands from an attacker-controlled web page and pull the citizen's full eID card data (name, National Register Number, X.509 certs) without any origin check.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1583, T1203, T1005
- Data sources: sysmon_event3_network, sysmon_event1_process_creation, microsoft_defender_device_network_events, microsoft_defender_device_process_events
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon EventCode=3 (Image="*\\chrome.exe" OR Image="*\\firefox.exe" OR Image="*\\msedge.exe")
| eval known_origin=if(match(DestinationHostname, "(?i)(\.belgium\.be|\.fgov\.be|^csam\.be$|^doccle\.be$|^certif\.iamfas\.belgium\.be$)"), "trusted", "untrusted")
| where known_origin="untrusted"
| rename ProcessGuid as BrowserProcessGuid, _time as nav_time
| join type=inner BrowserProcessGuid
[ search index=sysmon EventCode=1 (ParentImage="*\\chrome.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\firefox.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\msedge.exe")
(Image="*connective*" OR Image="*nitro*host*" OR CommandLine="*native-messaging*")
| rename ParentProcessGuid as BrowserProcessGuid, _time as spawn_time, Image as HostImage, CommandLine as HostCommandLine ]
| eval delta_sec=abs(spawn_time-nav_time)
| where delta_sec<=30
| table nav_time, host, user, DestinationHostname, HostImage, HostCommandLine, delta_sec
| sort -nav_timeMicrosoft KQL
let TrustedOrigins = dynamic(["belgium.be","fgov.be","csam.be","doccle.be","certif.iamfas.belgium.be"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","firefox.exe","msedge.exe")
| where not(RemoteUrl has_any (TrustedOrigins))
| project NavTime=Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessId, RemoteUrl
| join kind=inner (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","firefox.exe","msedge.exe")
| where FileName has_any ("connective","nitro") or ProcessCommandLine has "native-messaging"
| project SpawnTime=Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessId, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
) on DeviceName, InitiatingProcessId
| where SpawnTime between ((NavTime) .. (NavTime + 30s))
| project SpawnTime, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, FileName, ProcessCommandLineSigma
title: Connective eID Native-Messaging Host Spawned From Browser After Untrusted Navigation
id: 7c3e4a10-4f1b-4c2a-9d6e-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects the Connective/Nitro Software Belgium eID native-messaging host process being spawned by a browser process, the precondition abused by the Dis-Connective origin-validation-bypass chain to silently invoke card commands from an untrusted web origin.
references:
- https://www.securityweek.com/critical-flaws-discovered-in-belgian-eid-software-used-by-2-million-people/
- https://github.com/Am-I-Being-Pwned/dis-connective
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-10
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1583
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
selection_child:
Image|contains:
- 'connective'
- 'nitro'
CommandLine|contains: 'native-messaging'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
- Legitimate eID-authenticated sessions on whitelisted belgium.be/fgov.be/csam.be/doccle.be origins (correlate with the preceding page-navigation domain to suppress)
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate eID transactions on whitelisted government/bank/itsme domains that were not yet added to the local allow-list; update the trusted-origin list before tuning severity down
Tuning notes: Maintain the trusted-origin allow-list (belgium.be, fgov.be, csam.be, doccle.be, certif.iamfas.belgium.be, itsme domains) centrally and update it whenever a new relying party onboards Connective; widen the correlation window past 30s only if native-host handshake latency is observed to be higher in the environment.
- Connective eID Native-Messaging Host Spawned Following Untrusted-Origin Browsing (Silent Card Read) · unlock with TL Creds
- Arbitrary DLL Load / Polyglot PDF-DLL Masquerade by Connective Native Host (Drive-By RCE) · unlock with TL Creds
- Spoofed eID PIN Dialog, pinToken Key/Ciphertext Exfiltration, and Cross-Portal Session Reuse (AiTM / Valid-Account Abuse) · unlock with TL Creds
- Connective eID Native-Messaging Host Spawned Following Untrusted-Origin Browsing (Silent Card Read) · unlock with TL Creds
- Arbitrary DLL Load / Polyglot PDF-DLL Masquerade by Connective Native Host (Drive-By RCE) · unlock with TL Creds
- Spoofed eID PIN Dialog, pinToken Key/Ciphertext Exfiltration, and Cross-Portal Session Reuse (AiTM / Valid-Account Abuse) · unlock with TL Creds
- Arbitrary DLL Load / Polyglot PDF-DLL Masquerade by Connective Native Host (Drive-By RCE) · unlock with TL Creds
- Spoofed eID PIN Dialog, pinToken Key/Ciphertext Exfiltration, and Cross-Portal Session Reuse (AiTM / Valid-Account Abuse) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-08-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 13 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1967.
Sample indicators (3 of 13)
- Domain:
certif[.]iamfas[.]belgium[.]be - Domain:
csam[.]be - Domain:
doccle[.]be
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 13 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
On 2026-08-10, at DEF CON, security researcher James Arnott of Bay Area Labs publicly disclosed a chain of critical design flaws in Connective, the Chrome/Firefox browser extension (Chrome Web Store ID `kclpjmhngbacampgcdojmiedamjbgjjm`) published by Nitro Software Belgium, an EU eIDAS Qualified Trust Service Provider. Connective bridges web pages to Belgium's national eID smart-card infrastructure (ISO 7816 / PKCS#11 / PKCS#15) via a native-messaging host that talks to the card reader over PC/SC. Roughly 2 million weekly active users rely on the extension, including 8 of Belgium's 10 largest banks, 60+ government agencies, and the itsme national identity layer (7.5M+ users) for services such as CSAM.be ("My Digital Keys"), Tax-on-Web, MyGov, and MyPension.
The root cause is that the extension acts as a 'thin communication layer' that relays every native-host command without validating the origin of the requesting web page; origin checking existed only as an undocumented, non-transparent client-side check rather than a real allow-list (unlike the government's own BeIDConnect extension, which hard-whitelists belgium.be/fgov.be). This let Arnott chain three exploit primitives, all demonstrated end-to-end and documented in the companion PoC repository 'dis-connective':
1. Silent card reading: any page could invoke card commands (bit-0/bit-2 feature set: GET_READERS, READ_FILE, VERIFY_PIN, COMPUTE_SIGNATURE, COMPUTE_AUTHENTICATION, SELECT_MAESTRO, GET_PROCESSING_OPTIONS, READ_RECORD) and pull the citizen's full name, birth data, National Register Number, address, photo, and all five on-card X.509 certificates — none of which are PIN-protected on the card. 2. PIN theft and signature forgery: the extension let the requesting page fully control the PIN-prompt's `entry_title`/`entry_message` text (enabling a spoofed, official-looking dialog), and the native host returned a `pinToken` to the extension that leaked both the ciphertext and its own decryption key in one 48-byte, base64-encoded blob (even-indexed bytes 0-30 = AES-128 key, bytes 32+ = ciphertext, decrypted with a hardcoded IV of `a6` repeated 16 times, AES-128-CBC). Recovering the PIN let the attacker drive further signature operations — since the eID authentication key remains active card-side until the card is removed, and the non-repudiation key needs only one fresh PIN entry per use — enabling forged, legally non-repudiable eIDAS qualified signatures. 3. Drive-by RCE: the `GET_READERS` command accepted an arbitrary `library` path (e.g. `..\..\..\..\Downloads\lib.dll`) that the native host passed straight into `LoadLibraryA()` with no validation, executing attacker-controlled code at the logged-in user's privilege level from a single page visit. Because Chrome flags raw `.dll` downloads, Arnott demonstrated bypassing that control with a polyglot file named `frien.dlly_reminder.pdf`.
Arnott's write-up also demonstrates a full CSAM.be government-portal account takeover using malicious ad-frame delivery, a single spoofed PIN dialog, and silent follow-on signing. Nitro Software Belgium was notified and shipped an incomplete origin-check fix on 2026-05-08 (~146 days after initial report); researchers found it bypassable and re-engaged on 2026-05-19; a complete fix landed 2026-06-01 (GET_READERS library-loading disabled, `pinToken` replaced with a server-side UUID reference); full origin-check enforcement was rolled out 2026-07-22. No CVE has been assigned as of disclosure. Nitro offered a $200 bug-bounty payment and did not respond to SecurityWeek's request for comment.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1056 Input Capture
Defense Evasion
T1036 Masquerading; T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
Initial Access
Execution
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
Credential Access
T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
Resource Development
Remediation
Patches
- 2026-05-08: first (incomplete) fix — remote/server-side origin check added
- 2026-06-01: complete fix — GET_READERS arbitrary-library loading disabled; pinToken caching moved server-side behind a UUID reference
- 2026-07-22: full origin-check enforcement deployed
Immediate actions
- Confirm the Connective browser extension has updated to the build released after the 2026-07-22 origin-enforcement rollout; users on unpatched builds should disable/remove the extension before browsing untrusted sites
- Banks, government agencies, and itsme-integrated services should review eID-authenticated logins and electronic-signature events for accounts active before 2026-07-22 for signs of unauthorized signing or credential reuse
- Treat any eID PIN entered through a Connective-triggered dialog before the patch as potentially compromised and advise affected users accordingly
Workarounds
- Disable or remove the Connective browser extension except when actively performing an eID-authenticated transaction
- Where available, use the government-maintained BeIDConnect extension (belgium.be/fgov.be origin whitelist only) in place of Connective for government service sign-in
Longer-term hardening
- Enforce strict, server-verifiable origin allow-listing for any browser-extension-to-native-host bridge that grants access to smart-card or other cryptographic hardware, following the BeIDConnect model of whitelisting only belgium.be/fgov.be
- Redesign PIN-handling so raw PIN material and its decryption key are never returned to, or transit through, the browser extension/web-page layer
- Canonicalize and validate all file/library paths accepted by native-host commands (e.g. GET_READERS) to eliminate path traversal to attacker-controlled DLLs
- Migrate the extension off Manifest V2 and minimize the native-messaging command surface reachable from arbitrary web content
Affected and fixed versions
- Nitro Software Belgium — Connective signing browser extension (Chrome Web Store ID kclpjmhngbacampgcdojmiedamjbgjjm)
Vulnerable versions: all builds prior to the 2026-07-22 origin-enforcement release
Fixed in: builds released on or after 2026-07-22
Timeline
- Nitro Software Belgium deploys a first, incomplete fix — a server-side remote origin check — approximately 146 days after the vulnerability was first reported to the vendor.
- Researchers determine the May 8 origin-check fix is incomplete/bypassable and re-engage Nitro Software Belgium.
- Nitro ships a complete fix: the GET_READERS arbitrary-library-loading command is disabled and pinToken handling is changed to a server-side UUID reference instead of returning the raw token to the web page.
- Full server-side origin-check enforcement is rolled out across the Connective extension, closing the remaining bypass window.
- James Arnott (Bay Area Labs) publishes the full technical write-up "8 out of 10 Banks in Belgium HATE This One Weird eID RCE" on amibeingpwned.com, alongside the dis-connective PoC repository.
- Public disclosure at DEF CON and coverage by SecurityWeek; Nitro Software Belgium offers a $200 bug-bounty payment and does not respond to SecurityWeek's request for comment; no CVE has been assigned.
Sources cited
- 8 out of 10 Banks in Belgium HATE This One Weird eID RCE - Am I Being Pwned? amibeingpwned.com · Research · 2026-08-07
- Am I Being Pwned - free browser-extension scanner amibeingpwned.com · Research
- Am I Being Pwned - organization scanner amibeingpwned.com · Research
- CSAM.be - My Digital Keys (eGov profile) csam.be · Vendor report
- CSAM login via eID card reader (certif.iamfas.belgium.be) certif.iamfas.belgium.be · Vendor report
- eID Belgium - official eID software eid.belgium.be · Vendor report
- GitHub - Am-I-Being-Pwned/dis-connective: Belgian eID Vulnerability Analysis & PoC GitHub · Proof of concept
- GitHub - roelderickx/connective-plugin-linux: Linux replacement for the Connective Plugin GitHub · Code repository
- Critical Flaws Discovered in Belgian eID Software Used by 2 Million People SecurityWeek · News · 2026-08-10
Previous and next in vulnerability
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.