# "City-Forum" Campaign Mass-Enumerates Salesforce Experience Cloud and ServiceNow Portals via Guest Access

> A ~17-month, unattributed data-harvesting campaign dubbed 'City-Forum' abuses overly permissive Guest User access on Salesforce Experience Cloud (Aura and Lightning Web Runtime) and ServiceNow Service Portal sites to enumerate and scrape exposed records at scale, with one victim organization logging over 560,000 enumeration events. No CVE or platform vulnerability is involved; the campaign exploits customer-side guest-access misconfiguration only.

- **Published:** 2026-08-12T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-12T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1999
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-city-forum-guest-access-abuse-tl-2026-1999.webp?v=6ef300c5 (Threadlinqs threat intel: City-Forum SaaS Enumeration: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-1999) — High severity, 7 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-1999
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** DATA_BREACH
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 7 (2 shown free below)

## Description

City-Forum is a large-scale, cross-platform data-harvesting campaign first identified by security research firm Reco and reported publicly on 2026-08-12 by cybersecuritynews.com and SecurityWeek. The campaign has been continuously active since at least March 2025 (roughly 17 months at time of disclosure), targeting telecommunications providers, banks and financial-services firms, enterprise software vendors (including security and data-privacy companies), and public-sector portals. It is notable as the first observed in-the-wild exploitation of Salesforce's UI-API guest surface, and for operating a single unified toolset against two separate SaaS platforms simultaneously rather than a platform-specific script.

Mechanically, the campaign abuses the Guest User identity that every Salesforce Experience Cloud site provisions for unauthenticated visitors. Against the legacy Aura framework, the actor's tooling calls the `getConfigData` and `getItems` Aura actions to automate enumeration of Accounts, Contacts, and Cases objects exposed to guest sharing rules; one victim organization's telemetry recorded over 560,000 such enumeration events across the campaign window. Against newer Lightning Web Runtime (LWR) sites, the tooling queries the GraphQL-based UI-API data layer and was observed systematically probing across API versions v56.0 through v66.0, while also probing self-registration flows for a path from unauthenticated guest access to an authenticated (self-registered) session. Against ServiceNow, the same toolset floods the Service Portal's effectively undocumented `POST /api/now/sp/search` endpoint to enumerate Knowledge Base articles and service-catalog items exposed to public/guest search, with both authenticated and unauthenticated probe requests returning HTTP 201. Researchers describe the tooling as a single custom Go binary capable of driving both the Salesforce and ServiceNow attack paths, distinguishing it from off-the-shelf tools such as AuraInspector.

Infrastructure has been unusually static for a scraping operation: the same IP (158.220.87.79, a Contabo GmbH VPS in Germany) and domain (city-forum.com, which gives the campaign its name) have been used without rotation for the full ~17-month duration, and scraping requests carry the Go-http-client/1.1 default User-Agent. Researchers explicitly decline to attribute the activity to a known actor or group ('We don't know who this is, and we're not ruling anyone in or out'), and are careful to distinguish City-Forum from the separate, earlier ShinyHunters campaign (publicly disclosed March 2026) that used a modified version of Mandiant's AuraInspector auditing tool against Salesforce Aura guest-access misconfigurations at 300-400 organizations — a related but distinct incident cited by researchers only for comparison.

No CVE applies: this is exploitation of customer-configured guest-user permissions (excessive object/field access, permissive sharing rules, self-registration exposure, and overly broad ServiceNow search-source/Knowledge-Base 'Can Read' settings), not a defect in either platform. Salesforce and Reco both published hardening guidance alongside the disclosure: disable the 'API Enabled' permission on guest profiles unless required, keep org-wide defaults Private with guest sharing rules capped to Read-only, disable unnecessary self-registration, and restrict ServiceNow Knowledge Base/Catalog visibility away from permissive 'Any User' settings.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning
- T1595.003 Wordlist Scanning
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1583.004 Server
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1136.003 Cloud Account
- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
- T1213.004 Customer Relationship Management Software
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Salesforce Aura/LWR Guest Enumeration & ServiceNow sp/search Flood (City-Forum)** (`TL-2026-1999-SPL-001`)

Detects the City-Forum initial-access pattern: unauthenticated Guest User calls to the Salesforce Aura getConfigData/getItems actions or LWR UI-API GraphQL endpoint, and/or high-volume POST requests to the undocumented ServiceNow POST /api/now/sp/search endpoint, especially from the campaign's known static source IP (158.220.87.79), domain (city-forum.com), or the default Go-http-client/1.1 User-Agent used by the campaign's custom Go binary.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1190, T1595.002, T1595.003, T1583.001, T1583.004
- **Data sources:** web_proxy_logs, waf_logs, salesforce_event_monitoring, servicenow_transaction_log
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=web sourcetype=proxy OR sourcetype=access_combined
(uri_path="*/aura*" AND (uri_query="*getConfigData*" OR uri_query="*getItems*" OR http_content="*getConfigData*" OR http_content="*getItems*"))
OR (uri_path="/api/now/sp/search" AND http_method=POST)
OR src_ip="158.220.87.79"
OR uri_domain="city-forum.com"
| eval attack_indicator=case(
    match(uri_path,"(?i)aura"),"salesforce_aura_enumeration",
    match(uri_path,"(?i)/api/now/sp/search"),"servicenow_sp_search_flood",
    1=1,"known_infra_hit")
| eval known_bad_ua=if(match(http_user_agent,"(?i)Go-http-client"),1,0)
| stats count as request_count, values(uri_path) as endpoints, dc(uri_path) as unique_endpoints, values(status) as status_codes, earliest(_time) as first_seen, latest(_time) as last_seen by src_ip, http_user_agent, attack_indicator, known_bad_ua
| where request_count > 100 OR src_ip="158.220.87.79" OR known_bad_ua=1
| sort - request_count
| table src_ip, http_user_agent, attack_indicator, request_count, unique_endpoints, endpoints, status_codes, first_seen, last_seen
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let KnownBadIP = dynamic(["158.220.87.79"]);
let KnownBadDomain = "city-forum.com";
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has_any ("/aura", "getConfigData", "getItems", "/api/now/sp/search") or SourceIP in (KnownBadIP) or RequestURL has KnownBadDomain or DestinationHostName has KnownBadDomain
| extend AttackIndicator = case(RequestURL has "aura", "salesforce_aura_enumeration", RequestURL has "/api/now/sp/search", "servicenow_sp_search_flood", "known_infra_hit")
| extend KnownBadUA = iff(RequestClientApplication has "Go-http-client", 1, 0)
| summarize RequestCount = count(), Endpoints = make_set(RequestURL), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIP, RequestClientApplication, AttackIndicator, KnownBadUA
| where RequestCount > 100 or SourceIP in (KnownBadIP) or KnownBadUA == 1
| project SourceIP, RequestClientApplication, AttackIndicator, RequestCount, Endpoints, FirstSeen, LastSeen
| order by RequestCount desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Salesforce Aura/LWR Guest Enumeration or ServiceNow sp/search Flood (City-Forum)
id: 7c1e2a44-2f3b-4d6a-9a8e-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects unauthenticated Guest User enumeration of Salesforce Aura getConfigData/getItems actions or LWR UI-API, and high-volume POST requests to the undocumented ServiceNow /api/now/sp/search endpoint, consistent with the City-Forum campaign's custom Go-based scraping tool.
references:
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/salesforce-and-servicenow-targeted-in-attacks/
    - https://www.securityweek.com/stealthy-city-forum-attacks-target-salesforce-and-servicenow-with-custom-toolset/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-12
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1595.002
    - attack.t1595.003
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
    - attack.t1583.004
    - attack.tool.city_forum_go_binary
logsource:
    category: proxy
    product: web
detection:
    selection_aura:
        cs-uri-stem|contains: '/aura'
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - 'getConfigData'
            - 'getItems'
    selection_servicenow:
        cs-method: 'POST'
        cs-uri-stem: '/api/now/sp/search'
    selection_known_infra:
        c-ip: '158.220.87.79'
    selection_known_domain:
        cs-host|contains: 'city-forum.com'
    selection_known_ua:
        cs-user-agent|startswith: 'Go-http-client'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Salesforce Aura framework traffic from authenticated internal integrations using a Go HTTP client
    - Internal load-testing or synthetic-monitoring tools that reuse the default Go-http-client User-Agent
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate internal Go-based integrations or synthetic monitoring hitting the same Aura/UI-API endpoints with the default Go-http-client User-Agent
- Authorized security-vendor guest-access assessment tooling (e.g. Salesforce Health Check scans) run against the same site

**Tuning notes:** Baseline the org's known integration source IPs/User-Agents and suppress them; lower the request_count threshold for smaller sites where 100 requests/day already indicates automation. No community (TL_OSINT_Scan) corroboration exists yet for 158.220.87.79 or city-forum.com at time of writing — treat the IOC match as high-confidence but keep the behavioral (Aura action / sp/search) clauses as the durable long-term detection since infrastructure may rotate.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Salesforce Aura/LWR Guest Enumeration & ServiceNow sp/search Flood (City-Forum) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Guest-to-Authenticated Self-Registration Abuse & LWR UI-API Version Sweep (City-Forum) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sustained Mass Enumeration & Automated Exfiltration of Guest-Exposed CRM/Knowledge-Base Data (City-Forum) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Salesforce Aura/LWR Guest Enumeration & ServiceNow sp/search Flood (City-Forum) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Guest-to-Authenticated Self-Registration Abuse & LWR UI-API Version Sweep (City-Forum) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sustained Mass Enumeration & Automated Exfiltration of Guest-Exposed CRM/Knowledge-Base Data (City-Forum) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Guest-to-Authenticated Self-Registration Abuse & LWR UI-API Version Sweep (City-Forum) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sustained Mass Enumeration & Automated Exfiltration of Guest-Exposed CRM/Knowledge-Base Data (City-Forum) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 7)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `158.220.87[.]79`
- Domain: `city-forum[.]com`

Full set of 7 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Salesforce and ServiceNow Targeted in Attacks](https://cybersecuritynews.com/salesforce-and-servicenow-targeted-in-attacks/)
- [Stealthy 'City-Forum' Attacks Target Salesforce and ServiceNow With Custom Toolset](https://www.securityweek.com/stealthy-city-forum-attacks-target-salesforce-and-servicenow-with-custom-toolset/)
- [Reco Blog: AI Agent Security News, Research & Insights](https://www.reco.ai/blog)
- [ShinyHunters Utilize Public Audit Tool to Scan for Vulnerable Salesforce Aura Instances](https://rhisac.org/threat-intelligence/shinyhunters-sf-aura/)
- [Best Practices and Considerations When Configuring the Guest User Profile](https://help.salesforce.com/s/articleView?id=platform.networks_guest_profile_best_practices.htm&language=en_US&type=5)
- [Protecting Your Data: Essential Actions to Secure Experience Cloud Guest User Access](https://www.salesforce.com/blog/protecting-your-data-essential-actions-to-secure-experience-cloud-guest-user-access/)
- [ShinyHunters claims ongoing Salesforce Aura data theft attacks](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shinyhunters-claims-ongoing-salesforce-aura-data-theft-attacks/)
- [ShinyHunters 'Breach 400 Companies' via Salesforce Experience Cloud](https://www.salesforceben.com/shinyhunters-breach-400-companies-via-salesforce-experience-cloud/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-1999
