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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-2001

"Zoomsday" Flaws (CVE-2026-53413, CVE-2026-53414, CVE-2026-53415) Let One Zoom Meeting Participant Attack Another

criticalPATCHED

Three memory-safety bugs in the annotation parser shared by Zoom Workplace, Zoom Rooms, the Zoom Meeting SDK, and the Zoom Workplace VDI Client for Windows let one meeting participant send crafted annotation protocol data to crash another participant's client, leak process memory, or achieve zero-click remote code execution.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2001, CVE-2026-53413, CVE-2026-53414, CVE-2026-53415
Also known asZoomsday
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS8.3 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
First disclosed
EPSSCVE-2026-53415: 0.4% (40.5th percentile); CVE-2026-53413: 0.4% (33.8th percentile); CVE-2026-53414: 0.3% (27.1th percentile)
Affected productsZoom Communications Zoom Workplace; Zoom Communications Zoom Workplace VDI Client for Windows; Zoom Communications Zoom Rooms; Zoom Communications Zoom Meeting SDK
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-787, CWE-126, CWE-416
ToolsFrida, IDA
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1106 Native API, T1113 Screen Capture, T1123 Audio Capture, T1125 Video Capture, T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution, T1499.004 Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation, T1587.004 Develop Capabilities: Exploits, T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool, T1588.007 Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, government administration, financial-services, health, education, professional-services
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources14 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2001 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 15 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Zoom Process Crash Immediately Followed by Unexpected Child Process — Zoomsday Exploitation Signature

Detects the observable exploitation chain for the Zoomsday annotation-parser bugs (CVE-2026-53413 stack buffer overflow in CAnnoFormatBlock::Deserialize; CVE-2026-53415 use-after-free in CAnnoObjAutoMetaShape/message-type-75). A Zoom process crashes or is abnormally terminated during an active meeting and, within a short window, an unrelated browser, shell, or script interpreter is spawned as its child — the exact pattern A Security demonstrated on macOS arm64, where a hijacked function epilogue (control of X19/X21/X30) pivoted through a shared-cache execvp gadget to launch Safari. A meeting client has no legitimate reason to launch a browser, shell, or interpreter.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1203, T1499.004
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, macos_unified_log, edr_process_telemetry
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

( index=sysmon OR index=edr ) EventCode=1
[ search (index=wineventlog source="WinEventLog:Application" EventCode=1000) OR (index=macos_unified_log process IN ("zoom.us","CptHost","aomhost") message="*EXC_BAD_ACCESS*" OR message="*crashed*")
  Application_Name="*zoom*" OR process IN ("zoom.us","CptHost","ZoomRooms.exe","aomhost")
  | eval crash_time=_time
  | table crash_time, host
  | rename host as host_join ]
( ParentImage="*\\zoom.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\CptHost.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\ZoomRooms.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\aomhost.exe" OR ParentImage="*/zoom.us*" OR ParentImage="*/CptHost*" )
( Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe","*\\powershell.exe","*\\pwsh.exe","*\\wscript.exe","*\\cscript.exe","*\\mshta.exe","*/bin/bash","*/bin/sh","*/bin/zsh","*python*","*/usr/bin/osascript","*Safari*","*Google Chrome*","*firefox*") )
| eval spawn_delta=abs(_time-crash_time)
| where spawn_delta<=30
| table _time host host_join ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image CommandLine User spawn_delta
| sort - _time

Microsoft KQL

let ZoomCrashes = DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("AppCrashEvent", "AppHangEvent")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("zoom.exe","CptHost.exe","ZoomRooms.exe","aomhost.exe","zoom.us")
| project CrashTime = Timestamp, DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("zoom.exe","CptHost.exe","ZoomRooms.exe","aomhost.exe","zoom.us")
| where FileName has_any ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","bash","sh","zsh","python.exe","osascript","Safari","chrome.exe","firefox.exe")
| join kind=inner (ZoomCrashes) on DeviceId
| where Timestamp between (CrashTime .. (CrashTime + 30s))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, CrashTime

Sigma

title: Zoom Process Crash Followed by Unexpected Child Process (Zoomsday Exploitation Signature)
id: 7c3e9a1e-1f4a-4b2b-9d7a-2e6f0b8c4a11
status: experimental
description: Detects a Zoom process crashing/restarting and then spawning a browser, shell, or script interpreter within a short window, consistent with exploitation of the Zoomsday annotation-parser memory-corruption bugs (CVE-2026-53413, CVE-2026-53415).
references:
    - https://a.security/blog/asecurity-zoomsday
    - https://www.zoom.com/en/trust/security-bulletin/zsb-26015/
    - https://www.zoom.com/en/trust/security-bulletin/zsb-26017/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1499.004
    - cve.2026.53413
    - cve.2026.53415
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\zoom.exe'
            - '\CptHost.exe'
            - '\ZoomRooms.exe'
            - '\aomhost.exe'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
    condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
    - Correlate against a preceding Zoom crash/hang event (Application Error, Event ID 1000) within 30 seconds; without that correlation this pattern alone is noisier.
level: high

Known false positives:

  • A user manually clicking a mailto:/http(s):// link shared in Zoom chat can also cause Zoom to spawn a browser; this pattern requires a preceding crash/restart event within 30 seconds, which link-clicking does not produce.
  • Zoom's own auto-updater briefly launching an installer/helper process during a scheduled update window.

Tuning notes: Baseline and exclude known-legitimate Zoom child processes by exact path/hash (ZoomUpdater, ZoomClipsUninstaller, installer helpers) and their normal execution windows; keep the crash-to-spawn correlation window tight (<=30s) to suppress unrelated child-process noise.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Known Zoomsday Exploit-Kit Signature — Oversized Annotation Channel Count / ExtChild Heap-Spray Pattern · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zoom Process Camera, Microphone, or Screen-Recording Access Outside an Active Meeting State · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cross-Participant Crash-to-Exploit Signature Within a Single Meeting Session · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zoom Meeting Client Spawning Browser, Shell, or Script Interpreter · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zoom Client Process Loading an Unsigned or Anomalous Native Module · unlock with TL Creds
  • Suspicious Outbound Connection Initiated by a Video-Conferencing Client Descendant Process · unlock with TL Creds
  • Anomalous Native Module Load Into Zoom Process Following Crash-Relaunch Cycle · unlock with TL Creds
  • Outbound Network Connection From Process Descended From Zoom Meeting Client · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 15 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2001.

15 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Israeli research firm A Security ("Zoomsday") built working exploits in under a day using AI-assisted reverse engineering; Zoom shipped client and server-side fixes between June and August 2026 and there is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation.

On 2026-08-11 Zoom published three coordinated security bulletins — ZSB-26015, ZSB-26016, and ZSB-26017 — for a cluster of annotation-feature vulnerabilities that Israeli offensive-security firm A Security named "Zoomsday." All three flaws live in the code that deserializes annotation/whiteboard objects Zoom's proprietary protocol passes directly between meeting participants, meaning one attendee can attack another attendee's client without going through any server-side content filter that would normally apply to shared files or chat.

CVE-2026-53413 (CVSS 3.1: 8.3, CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write) is a stack buffer overflow in the `CAnnoFormatBlock::Deserialize` routine (found in the Android client's `libannotate.so` and its cross-platform equivalents): the function contains four fixed 128-byte buffers but trusts a wire-supplied 32-bit character count when copying into them, so an oversized count overwrites adjacent stack memory including saved registers and the return address. A Security's proof-of-concept sent a 745-byte AddObj protocol data unit (opcode 0x10001, object flags bit 3 for TextFrame) with an oversized fourth channel count (0x100, eight times the 128-byte buffer capacity) to overflow a 704-byte `CAnnoTextFrame` stack variable; on macOS arm64 they hijacked the function epilogue to control registers X19-X30 and pivoted through a single shared-cache gadget (`MOV X0,X19; MOV X1,X21; BL execvp`) to launch Safari with no PAC or stack-canary protection engaged. Register planting placed the gadget address in the link register (X30), the path `/Applications/Safari.app/Contents/MacOS/Safari` in X19, and an argv pointer `{path, NULL}` in X21; one leaked pointer was enough to rebase the entire shared-cache block as a unit and defeat ASLR. On Android, the team sprayed `ExtChild` objects (592-byte heap size class) to place a controlled neighbor object adjacent to the overflow source, then corrupted only the low, ASLR-invariant byte of that neighbor's C++ vtable pointer so a subsequent virtual-call dispatch redirected within the vulnerable module without needing a separate information leak; the corruption was triggered via the un-gated teardown path reachable from RemoveObj/ModifyObj wire operations, which invoke a destructor virtual call on the sprayed object.

CVE-2026-53414 (CVSS 3.1: 6.5, CWE-126 Buffer Over-read) is a companion flaw in the same annotator: Zoom allocates a glyph buffer sized `2 × count + 2` bytes from an attacker-declared character count but fills it from however many bytes actually arrived on the wire (a short body), exposing the uninitialized/adjacent heap tail back to the sender. That leaked memory can contain live code pointers, vtable addresses, and resource strings useful for defeating ASLR in a follow-on exploit chain, and at minimum reliably crashes the receiving client (denial of service).

CVE-2026-53415 (CVSS 3.1: 8.3, CWE-416 Use After Free) involves annotation message type 75 (`CAnnoObjAutoMetaShape`), which deserializes linked-list pointers from network data and unlinks them without validation, producing a write-what-where primitive that can also be driven to remote code execution. Unlike the other two, this bug was found independently by Zoom's own internal Offensive Security team (credited on ZSB-26017) before A Security's report; A Security's own researcher Lidor Elias is credited for its triage.

Underlying all three is a dispatcher validation gap in `CAnnoPduFactory::create`: Zoom's annotation message handler fails to check sender role or message origin, so it accepts AddObj annotation objects (0x10001) from any participant even in contexts meant to be restricted to acknowledgement-only messages (0x10002, differing from AddObj by a single opcode value) — letting an attacker's malformed drawing reach every other attendee in the meeting rather than being filtered. The protocol also routes annotation traffic over a direct, individually addressed channel per participant pair, letting an attacker target one specific victim from the sharer seat rather than broadcasting to the whole meeting.

A Security says it produced working exploits for the RCE-class bugs "in under a day, using fewer than 20 prompts" against publicly available frontier AI models. The workflow began with static analysis: researchers used IDA to disassemble the Android client (build v7.0.4, 121 native libraries) and built an AI-assisted static pre-ranker that scored every function reachable from a JNI entry point against dangerous-sink calls (memcpy/strcpy/sprintf-style copies, computed-size allocators), weighted by CWE severity, function size, and call depth — producing a ranked queue of 3,762 functions across 70 libraries. `libannotate.so` ranked only 45th on that static list; the team pivoted to dynamic tracing with Frida (referred to in A Security's writeup as "Frida MCP") once static ranking alone proved unproductive, exercising each meeting feature live while monitoring library loads and function invocations, which surfaced the annotation feature as the highest-value, protocol-reachable target despite its low static rank. Subsequent AI prompts reverse-engineered the proprietary annotation opcode set by mapping serialize/deserialize function pairs, audited the deserialization routines for memory-safety bugs, helped construct PDU payloads that traversed normal parsing paths, and identified the control-flow-hijack gadgets used on each target architecture. The firm frames the result as evidence that a capability class "previously only available to nation-state threat actors" now has a same-day production barrier; lead researcher Idan Levcovich (credited for CVE-2026-53413/53414) is quoted stating "the barrier to building this class of exploit has collapsed, and it will not come back."

A Security's writeup is explicit about what an attacker inherits once code is running inside the vulnerable process: "Code running inside these applications inherits their permissions, which in a conferencing client means camera, microphone and screen recording," and separately, "Once the nefarious code is running on the victim's device, the threat actor can quietly steal personal data, switch on the microphone or camera to spy on the target, or install other malicious software." The researchers also stress the one-to-many exposure of a single crafted message inside a call: "In a large call, that's a room full of targets from a single message, with no safe seat in it." On the detection side, A Security recommends alerting on a meeting client spawning an unrelated interpreter or browser process — "A meeting client has no reason to launch a browser, a shell or a script interpreter, so block it where you can and alert on it everywhere; our exploit made zoom.us open Safari." None of this — data theft, live audio/video capture, or additional malware installation — was demonstrated beyond the Safari-launch proof-of-concept; A Security frames it as the capability class the RCE unlocks given the OS-level permissions Zoom clients typically hold, not an observed payload.

Zoom rates the bugs High (CVSS 8.3 max) rather than Critical, a gap Zoom and reporters attribute to CVSS requiring User Interaction (UI:R) in the vector for the RCE-class CVEs — i.e., the victim must be in a meeting state where their client is set to receive/render annotation data — while A Security markets the class as "zero-click" because no explicit click or approval is needed beyond that meeting state, and there is no visible cue to the victim that an attack occurred. Zoom's disclosed remediation timeline shows the client-side fix for the CVE-2026-53413/53414 exploit path landing in Zoom Workplace v7.1.0 on 2026-06-22 (about two weeks after the 2026-06-10 report), a server-side mitigation for endpoints that had not yet updated on 2026-07-15, and the CVE-2026-53415 client fix in v7.1.5 on 2026-07-20 — all roughly three weeks to two months ahead of the coordinated public disclosure on 2026-08-11/12. A Security's own remediation notes flag that the 2026-07-15 server-side mitigation depends on Zoom's servers being able to inspect meeting content to filter malformed annotation objects, so meetings running with end-to-end encryption enabled do not benefit from that interim server-side filter and remain exposed until every participant's client is patched. As of publication neither CISA's KEV catalog nor any reviewed source shows in-the-wild exploitation or public weaponized exploit code; A Security's writeup gives exploit construction detail (opcode, buffer sizes, gadget, register planting, heap-spray object sizing) but not a drop-in tool.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture; T1123 Audio Capture; T1125 Video Capture

Execution

T1106 Native API; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Impact

T1499.004 Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation

Resource Development

T1587.004 Develop Capabilities: Exploits; T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool; T1588.007 Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence

Remediation

Patches

  • Zoom Workplace 7.1.5 / 7.0.6
  • Zoom Workplace VDI Client for Windows 7.0.11 / 6.6.16
  • Zoom Rooms 7.1.5
  • Zoom Meeting SDK 7.1.5

Immediate actions

  • Update all Zoom Workplace clients (desktop and mobile, every platform) to v7.1.5, or the v7.0.6 LTS build
  • Update Zoom Rooms deployments and any application embedding the Zoom Meeting SDK to v7.1.5
  • Update Zoom Workplace VDI Client for Windows to v7.0.11, or the v6.6.16 LTS build
  • Confirm exposure to Zoom's server-side annotation-origin-validation mitigation (deployed 2026-07-15) for any fleet endpoints that cannot be patched immediately

Workarounds

  • Disable or restrict meeting annotation/whiteboard permissions for participants on clients that cannot yet be updated
  • Avoid enabling annotation in meetings that include external or untrusted participants until all attendee clients are confirmed patched
  • Be aware that Zoom's 2026-07-15 server-side mitigation cannot inspect or filter malicious annotation objects in end-to-end-encrypted meetings; unpatched clients in E2EE meetings remain fully exposed regardless of the server-side fix

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce Zoom client auto-update policy via MDM/endpoint management so clients do not drift onto unpatched builds
  • Include third-party conferencing/collaboration clients (Zoom, Teams, Webex, etc.) in routine vulnerability and asset-inventory scanning rather than limiting coverage to OS and browser software
  • Subscribe to and triage Zoom's ZSB security-bulletin feed the same way OS vendor advisories are tracked
  • Evaluate whether meeting annotation/whiteboard needs to be enabled by default org-wide, given it is now a demonstrated cross-participant attack surface

Affected and fixed versions

  • Zoom Communications — Zoom Workplace
    Vulnerable versions: before 7.1.5 (all platforms); before 7.0.6 (LTS branch)
    Fixed in: 7.1.5; 7.0.6
  • Zoom Communications — Zoom Workplace VDI Client for Windows
    Vulnerable versions: before 7.0.11; before 6.6.16
    Fixed in: 7.0.11; 6.6.16
  • Zoom Communications — Zoom Rooms
    Vulnerable versions: before 7.1.5 (all platforms); before 7.1.0 per ZSB-26015
    Fixed in: 7.1.5
  • Zoom Communications — Zoom Meeting SDK
    Vulnerable versions: before 7.1.5 (all platforms); before 7.1.0 per ZSB-26015
    Fixed in: 7.1.5

Timeline

  • A Security discovers the annotation memory-corruption vulnerability while dynamically tracing the Zoom Android client (v7.0.4) with Frida after an AI-assisted static analysis pass across 3,762 functions in 70 native libraries ranked it only 45th.
  • A Security confirms zero-click remote code execution primitives across multiple client platforms (macOS arm64 via a shared-cache execvp gadget; Android via ExtChild heap spray and vtable corruption).
  • A Security reports the vulnerability cluster to Zoom.
  • Zoom acknowledges receipt of the vulnerability report.
  • Zoom deploys a client-side fix (Zoom Workplace v7.1.0) addressing the CVE-2026-53413/CVE-2026-53414 exploit path.
  • Zoom deploys a server-side mitigation to protect endpoints still running earlier, unpatched client versions; the mitigation cannot inspect or filter malicious annotation objects in end-to-end-encrypted meetings.
  • Zoom ships the client-side fix for CVE-2026-53415 (use-after-free in CAnnoObjAutoMetaShape) in Zoom Workplace v7.1.5.
  • Zoom publishes security bulletins ZSB-26015, ZSB-26016, and ZSB-26017; CVE-2026-53413, CVE-2026-53414, and CVE-2026-53415 are assigned; A Security publishes its "Zoomsday" technical writeup crediting Idan Levcovich and Lidor Elias.
  • Malwarebytes, The Hacker News, SecurityWeek, Security Affairs, and other outlets report publicly on the Zoomsday flaws.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 14 sources; published ; last updated —.

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