Threat reportAPTTL-2026-2005
Kimsuky 'Operation GitPower' Integrates Local AI Tooling into AsyncRAT Espionage Campaign
North Korean state-sponsored actor Kimsuky is running Operation GitPower, a spear-phishing campaign against diplomatic missions, military/security organizations, policy and academic communities, and the virtual-asset sector, using an LNK-to-PowerShell infection chain and GitHub-hosted repositories as a C2 channel to deliver RC4-encrypted .NET AsyncRAT payloads disguised as image files.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2005 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Operation GitPower |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (LNK, PowerShell, and Task Scheduler execution surface) |
| Attribution | Kimsuky (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | North Korea |
| Malware | AsyncRAT |
| Tools | lnkbuilder.exe |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1007 System Service Discovery, T1010 Application Window Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1566 Phishing, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service, T1585 Establish Accounts and 1 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration, diplomatic, military, defense, virtual-asset, cryptocurrency, financial-services, policy-research, academic |
| Target regions | south korea, Global (diplomatic missions) |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-08-13, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2005 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Kimsuky GitPower — Randomized All-Caps Scheduled Task Persistence & Self-Deleting Staged Scripts
Detects the Operation GitPower persistence chain: a Scheduled Task registered with a randomized 20-40 character all-uppercase name (e.g. ZHUYHJGTYTFSUHIPOKLKHJHUYGVHGNFH) that fires ~5 minutes after registration and then every 30 minutes, alongside intermediate PowerShell scripts written to %AppData% with random lowercase filenames (e.g. irujkdnjhgttrhdkfdu.ps1) that self-delete after execution to minimize forensic residue.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1053.005, T1007, T1010, T1057, T1033
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
`comment("Kimsuky GitPower persistence: randomized all-caps Scheduled Task (~30min cadence) plus self-deleting staged PowerShell script writes to %AppData%")`
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=11 OR EventCode=1) earliest=-24h@h
| eval appdata_random_script=if(EventCode=11 AND match(TargetFilename, "(?i)\\AppData\\Roaming\\[a-z]{15,30}\.ps1$"), 1, 0)
| eval self_delete=if(EventCode=1 AND like(Image, "%\\cmd.exe") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)del\s+.*\.ps1"), 1, 0)
| eval sched_task=if(EventCode=1 AND like(Image, "%\\schtasks.exe") AND match(CommandLine, "(?i)/create") AND match(CommandLine, "[A-Z]{20,40}"), 1, 0)
| where appdata_random_script=1 OR self_delete=1 OR sched_task=1
| table _time, ComputerName, EventCode, Image, TargetFilename, CommandLine, appdata_random_script, self_delete, sched_task
| sort -_timeMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/create"
| extend TaskNameField = extract(@"/tn\s+\"?([^\"\s]+)\"?", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| extend IsRandomCaps = TaskNameField matches regex @"^[A-Z]{20,40}$"
| where IsRandomCaps == true
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, TaskNameField
| union (
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath has @"\AppData\Roaming\" and FileName matches regex @"^[a-z]{15,30}\.ps1$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName
)
| sort by Timestamp descSigma
title: Kimsuky Operation GitPower - Randomized All-Caps Scheduled Task Persistence
id: 9a2d4e6f-1b3c-4d5e-8f7a-2b3c4d5e6f7a
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of a Scheduled Task whose name is a random 20-40 character all-uppercase string, consistent with the Kimsuky Operation GitPower persistence mechanism that fires ~5 minutes after registration and then every 30 minutes to pull further staged, self-deleting PowerShell scripts from GitHub.
references:
- https://www.genians.co.kr/en/blog/threat_intelligence/kimsuky_ai_llm
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/13
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1007
- attack.t1010
- attack.t1057
- attack.t1033
- attack.group.kimsuky
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_schtasks:
Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '/create'
selection_taskname:
CommandLine|re: '/tn\s+"?[A-Z]{20,40}"?'
selection_appdata_script:
TargetFilename|re: '\\AppData\\Roaming\\[a-z]{15,30}\.ps1$'
condition: (selection_schtasks and selection_taskname) or selection_appdata_script
falsepositives:
- Third-party installers or auto-update agents that register scheduled tasks with GUID-like uppercase names
- Legitimate PowerShell tooling that stages random-named scripts in %AppData% before immediate cleanup (rare)
level: highKnown false positives:
- Third-party installers or auto-update agents that register scheduled tasks with GUID-like uppercase names
- Software packaging tools that stage temporary scripts with randomized names in %AppData% before self-cleanup
Tuning notes: Baseline your environment's legitimate scheduled-task naming conventions (GUID vs. random-uppercase) before enabling this at alert level; correlate the scheduled-task hit with the co-occurring %AppData%\Roaming random-named .ps1 write within the same 30-minute recurrence window to raise confidence and suppress single-signal noise.
- Kimsuky GitPower — LNK-Launched Space-Padded PowerShell Loader · unlock with TL Creds
- Kimsuky GitPower — Randomized All-Caps Scheduled Task Persistence & Self-Deleting Staged Scripts · unlock with TL Creds
- Kimsuky GitPower — AsyncRAT C2 Callback & GitHub API Beacon Channel · unlock with TL Creds
- Kimsuky GitPower — LNK-Launched Space-Padded PowerShell Loader · unlock with TL Creds
- Kimsuky GitPower — Randomized All-Caps Scheduled Task Persistence & Self-Deleting Staged Scripts · unlock with TL Creds
- Kimsuky GitPower — AsyncRAT C2 Callback & GitHub API Beacon Channel · unlock with TL Creds
- Kimsuky GitPower — LNK-Launched Space-Padded PowerShell Loader · unlock with TL Creds
- Kimsuky GitPower — AsyncRAT C2 Callback & GitHub API Beacon Channel · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-08-13, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2005.
Sample indicators (3 of 27)
- IP address:
112.216.9[.]171 - Domain:
stoks[.]great-site[.]net - File hash:
02ebc2356f9f700bbdac444cdefa0da2
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
3 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Genians (original discloser) found the same servers running an offline local-LLM stack (Ollama, GPT4All with a configured LocalDocs RAG database, Msty) plus AI development tooling (Cursor, LLaMaSharp, Microsoft Semantic Kernel, Whisper) that the operator is using to author AI-generated decoy documents and prototype document-analysis/automation workflows against stolen material.
Genians (2026-08-10) documents Operation GitPower as a continuation of long-running Kimsuky spear-phishing activity rather than a new campaign. Victims receive ZIP archives containing a malicious LNK disguised as a business document (honorarium requests, embassy correspondence, investment strategy packs). The LNK carries an ~3,800-character embedded PowerShell command padded with roughly 300 consecutive spaces and false shortcut metadata to hide its content from casual inspection, and decodes its payload with a custom bitwise Base64 routine rather than a standard cmdlet. The first-stage script fetches a decoy PDF from the GitHub Raw Content API (URL assembled via string concatenation to evade static string matching), displays it to the victim, and in the background writes an intermediate script to %AppData%\irujkdnjhgttrhdkfdu.ps1. Persistence is established via a hidden Scheduled Task with a randomized all-caps name (e.g. ZHUYHJGTYTFSUHIPOKLKHJHUYGVHGNFH) that fires ~5 minutes after registration and then every 30 minutes, pulling further staged scripts from GitHub (priujghtjytfcghffgt.txt, bhjfjkfgrtwehjbfgcf.txt) that self-delete after execution to minimize forensic residue. GitHub API polling doubles as a lightweight C2/beacon channel, using hardcoded personal access tokens and encoding host identity as <IP>-<MMDD_HHMM>-XXX-kkk.txt.
The final payload is one of several RC4-encrypted .NET AsyncRAT builds disguised as PNG image files (apple.png, fox.png, lion.png, rabbit.png, wolf.png) hosted in public GitHub repositories; a companion utility (rTom.exe_r) performs the RC4 decryption on the endpoint. Recovered C2 IPs are compiled directly into the AsyncRAT binaries, including a South Korea-hosted address (112.216.9[.]171); a link-local test address (169.254.33[.]137) surfaced in operator logs as an OPSEC failure.
Separately, Genians found the operator's own infrastructure running an experimental offline AI stack: Ollama (with generated SSH keys evidencing an actual local run, not just a download), GPT4All with a populated localdocs_v3.db confirming a working LocalDocs RAG configuration for querying stolen documents, and Msty as a second local-model front end. A NuGet package cache under Pictures\zzz\nupkg contained LLaMaSharp (with CUDA GPU backends), Microsoft.SemanticKernel, Microsoft.Agents.AI, LangChain.providers.llamasharp, and OpenAI/Azure.AI.OpenAI packages — indicating the operator is prototyping C#/.NET tooling that calls locally-hosted or commercial LLMs, consistent with public reporting that the underlying models are open-weight releases (e.g. Llama/Mistral/Gemma-class) run through Ollama rather than anything custom-trained. Whisper speech-to-text archives (faster-whisper.7z, whisper.7z) and a Korean-language guide on extracting text from audio point to planned use for transcribing intercepted calls/meetings. Cursor AI installers and edit history (including a file named Pumpfun-AI-Attack-Defence-Requirements.md) show the operator using an AI code editor in its own development workflow. AI-generated decoy PDFs on virtual-asset and investment themes carry python-docx/WPS 文字 authoring metadata and near-identical batch-generation timestamps (05:00 AM on 2026-03-11 and 2026-03-24), consistent with automated, templated lure production. Genians assesses this as a research/integration phase — assembling and testing existing open-source tooling rather than training or fielding a novel model — with no confirmed instance yet of the AI stack running live against a victim.
Attribution to Kimsuky/North Korea rests on multiple independent indicators: reuse of a publicly documented LNK-builder tool (lnkbuilder.exe) traceable to a September 2023 GitHub repository; an RTF/Gzip header-obfuscation technique matching a February 2024 Kimsuky campaign; PowerShell/Git-based C2 patterns consistent with the 2023 'FlowerPower' campaign; a non-existent 'Arirang' system-manufacturer string matching known North Korean device branding; Chinese-language WPS Office 2019 metadata; Dubeolsik-layout keystroke reconstruction showing North Korean spelling variants (e.g. 싸이트 vs. 사이트, 리력 vs. 이력) retained after backspace corrections; North Korean vocabulary in the operator's own search history (including virtual-asset reconnaissance queries); persistent Astrill VPN usage; and a GitHub account (brandonleeodd93-blip, registered to brandonleeodd.93@gmail.com) used to host the payload repositories. Fortinet independently corroborated attacks on South Korean targets from the same tooling family. The activity is consistent with Kimsuky's broader 2025-2026 trend of using generative AI for lure content, including a previously reported 2025 campaign using ChatGPT-generated South Korean military ID card images.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Discovery
T1007 System Service Discovery; T1010 Application Window Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Persistence
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Initial Access
Exfiltration
T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block egress to identified C2 IPs (112.216.9.171, 170.205.29.83, 170.205.30.227, 185.27.134.140, 27.102.137.126, 27.102.137.159, 27.102.138.44) and domain stoks.great-site.net
- Alert on outbound connections to the GitHub Raw Content/Contents API from non-developer endpoints, especially in diplomatic, defense, and virtual-asset business units
- Block or sandbox execution of .LNK files delivered inside ZIP email attachments at the mail gateway
- Hunt for the observed scheduled-task pattern (randomized all-caps 32-character task name, ~30-minute recurrence) and for PowerShell scripts written to %AppData% with random non-standard filenames
Workarounds
- Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging and AMSI to capture the obfuscated Base64/bitwise-decoded payload at runtime even when static detection misses it
- Restrict LNK execution from removable media, Downloads, and archive-extraction paths via GPO/AppLocker
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR/behavioral detection tuned to LNK-spawned-PowerShell-to-scheduled-task chains rather than static content signatures, since AI-authored lures remove the translation/formatting tells defenders previously relied on
- Apply Attack Surface Reduction / AppLocker rules blocking PowerShell or cmd.exe as a child process of Explorer-launched LNK files from Downloads, Temp, or archive-extraction paths
- Inventory endpoints and servers for unauthorized local-LLM stacks (Ollama, GPT4All, Msty) as a novel compromise indicator, not just a policy violation
- Extend threat-hunting playbooks to cover GitHub-as-C2 patterns: personal-access-token abuse, periodic raw-content polling, and image-file-disguised payload staging in public repos
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (LNK, PowerShell, and Task Scheduler execution surface)
Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific — abuses built-in LNK shell-link, PowerShell, and Task Scheduler functionality rather than a software vulnerability
Timeline
- The LNK-weaponization tool later reused as lnkbuilder.exe is published to a public GitHub repository, later linked to this campaign via tool reuse.
- A prior Kimsuky campaign disguised as a 'New Year Opinion Column' is publicly reported using the same RTF/Gzip header-obfuscation technique later observed in Operation GitPower payloads.
- Genians assesses Kimsuky began using AI-generated phishing decoy documents around the start of 2026.
- An AI-generated decoy PDF (virtual-asset/investment theme) is created with a python-docx/WPS 文字 authoring signature at 05:00:04 AM, consistent with automated batch generation.
- A second AI-generated decoy PDF batch is created at 05:00:44 AM, matching the same automated-generation signature as the March 11 batch.
- The Hacker News corroborates the Genians findings, citing Fortinet's independent observation of attacks against South Korean users using related tooling.
- Genians publishes 'Kimsuky Integrates AI into Attack Operations,' the original disclosure naming Operation GitPower, detailing the LNK-to-PowerShell/GitHub-C2/AsyncRAT chain and the operator's offline AI stack (Ollama, GPT4All LocalDocs, Msty, LLaMaSharp, Semantic Kernel, Cursor, Whisper).
- QuoIntelligence's Weekly Threat Intelligence Snapshot (Week 33 2026) flags the Operation GitPower AI-tooling campaign in its cyber-highlights roundup, prompting this hunt.
Sources cited
- Kimsuky Integrates AI into Attack Operations, From AI-Generated Decoy Documents to a Local LLM genians.co.kr · Vendor report · 2026-08-10
- Kimsuky Builds Offline AI Stack to Boost Phishing and Automate Malware Development The Hacker News · News · 2026-08-10
- Threat Intelligence Snapshot: Week 33 2026 quointelligence.eu · News · 2026-08-13
- Kimsuky Uses Local LLMs, AI-Generated Lures and GitHub C2 to Deploy AsyncRAT cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-08-11
- North Korean Spy Group Kimsuky Built Offline AI Lab on Attack Servers to Analyze Stolen Files techtimes.com · News · 2026-08-10
- Report: North Korea's Kimsuky Turns AI Into a Crypto Hacking Weapon news.bitcoin.com · News · 2026-08-11
- North Korean Hackers Explore AI Transcription for Stolen Calls and Meetings gbhackers.com · News · 2026-08-11
More from Kimsuky
- October 2026 Major APT Group Trends: State-Sponsored Targeting of Dev Environments, Cloud and Network Equipment (CVE-2022-21894, CVE-2026-20127)
- NodeLinkRAT: New North Korea-Linked (Kimsuky, moderate confidence) Node.js RAT Abusing Public Note Services as C2
- Kimsuky (APT43) Dot-Padded LNK Spear-Phishing Tradecraft: Detection and Exploitation Analysis
- North Korean Threat Actors Operationalize AI Across Tradecraft (Jade/Coral/Jasper/Diamond/Onyx/Pearl/Sapphire/Emerald Sleet; ProcmacSteal)
- NSFOCUS Monthly APT Insights August 2026: Lazarus MISTPEN/ForestTiger/RelayShell Campaign with CVE-2026-68820, UAC-0099 LUNCHPOKE/BURNYBEAR/MATCHBOIL.V2, CVE-2026-42897 Exchange OWA Exploitation
- QR-Code Phishing (Quishing) Bypassing Corporate Email Security; Kimsuky QR Spearphishing
Previous and next in apt
- Suspected China-Linked Actor Runs Near-Autonomous AI Agent Campaign (Hermes/OpenClaw) Against Taiwan Government, Nuclear Safety Agency, and Energy Sector Previous report
- Suspected China-Linked Actor Runs Near-Autonomous Multi-Agent AI Attack on Taiwan Government, Nuclear Safety Agency, and Energy Sector (Hermes + OpenClaw) Next report
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.