# White House Authorizes Private US Companies to Conduct Offensive Cyber Operations Against Foreign Criminal Networks (NSPM: "Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime")

> President Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum on August 12, 2026 authorizing vetted private companies to conduct offensive Cyber Surveillance Operations and Cyber Effects Operations against foreign cyber-enabled transnational criminal organizations (CE-TCOs), under joint DOJ/DHS oversight via the National Coordination Center, with a $1 million bond/escrow requirement, mandatory annual review, and a prohibition on targeting U.S. persons or domestic systems without prior authorization.

- **Published:** 2026-08-13T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-13T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2012
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-nspm-private-hack-back-memo-tl-2026-2012.webp?v=28688b98 (Threadlinqs threat intel: White House NSPM on Private Hack-Back: Analysis &… (TL-2026-2012) — Informational severity, 11 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2012
- **Severity:** INFORMATIONAL
- **Category:** THREAT_INTEL
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 11

## Description

On August 12, 2026, President Trump signed the National Security Presidential Memorandum "Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime," establishing the first formal U.S. government program permitting vetted private-sector companies to conduct offensive cyber operations against foreign criminal networks. The memorandum is the operational follow-through on Executive Order 14390, "Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens," which Trump signed on March 6, 2026 and which directed the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War (Defense), and Homeland Security, plus the Attorney General, to develop an action plan against cyber-enabled transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) targeting American families, businesses, and critical infrastructure through ransomware, phishing, financial fraud, sextortion, impersonation, and other extortion schemes. EO 14390 also directed the Attorney General to recommend, by June 4, 2026, a Victims Restoration Program to return funds seized from cybercrime TCOs to victims.

The NSPM defines two categories of authorized activity. "Cyber Surveillance Operations" are activities to collect intelligence from information systems without authorization from the owner/operator, or by exceeding authorized access, designed to remain undetected -- language that tracks the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act's (18 U.S.C. Section 1030) "exceeds authorized access" standard. "Cyber Effects Operations" are activities resulting in the manipulation, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction of information systems, networks, and physical or virtual infrastructure. Both are authorized only against "Cyber-Enabled Transnational Criminal Organizations" (CE-TCOs) -- foreign groups conducting cyber-enabled crime against U.S. interests that are not institutional parts of a foreign government.

Program governance runs through the National Coordination Center (NCC), a body established under Executive Order 14159 (January 20, 2025), which will administer a "rigorous vetting" and certification process for Participating Companies covering technical proficiency, operational performance history, facility security, and personnel vetting. Two co-equal Executive Directors -- one designated by the Attorney General, one by the Secretary of Homeland Security -- must jointly coordinate and approve every operation in writing, except operations that would produce a "Critical Outcome": likely loss of life, serious injury, or an action rising to the level of use of force or armed attack under international law, which are categorically prohibited from approval. Participating companies must maintain a bond or escrow of not less than $1 million, forfeitable for non-compliance, and face at least annual review to retain program participation. Operations may not target U.S. persons or systems under U.S. control (as defined via Executive Order 12333) without prior authorization, judicial or otherwise; any unintended U.S.-person or domestic-system targeting must be ceased immediately, subjected to minimization procedures, and reported to the NCC and DOJ. The memorandum cites 18 U.S.C. Section 1030 (CFAA) and 44 U.S.C. Section 3502, and names DOJ, DHS, State, Treasury, the Department of War (Defense), Commerce, Energy, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, CIA, NSA, OMB, and National Security Council components as involved agencies. Federal agencies are expected to issue detailed program requirements and procedures within roughly two months of signing; a classified addendum reportedly addresses target-selection criteria that has not been made public.

The White House frames the program around the scale of consumer harm: American consumers reported $20.8 billion in cyber-enabled crime losses in 2025; 73% of U.S. adults report having experienced an online scam or attack; 98% of Americans view scams as a threat (66% call it a "major" threat); and one in seven young people who experienced sextortion as minors reported self-harm. The fact sheet names ransomware, phishing, financial fraud, sextortion, impersonation scams, non-consensual intimate-image distribution, and deepfake abuse as the targeted crime types, and highlights seniors, children, and low-income families as disproportionately targeted victim populations, without naming specific foreign countries or regions in the public text.

Expert and congressional reaction has been mixed. Veracode co-founder Chris Wysopal called it "a pretty big shift in US cyber policy" that nonetheless stops short of broader "hack-back" authority. Former Cyber Command official Jason Kitka dismissed it as "a perpetual motion machine for billable threats." Jake Williams of Hunter Strategy warned the policy is "half-baked" and that Americans conducting these operations while traveling overseas "could easily be classified as non-uniformed combatants," raising detention risk; reporting separately noted precedent concern around foreign prosecution, citing a Chinese hacker extradited from Italy for offensive work against American firms. House Homeland Security Committee Ranking Member Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS) criticized the administration for acting via presidential memorandum rather than working with Congress to establish clear statutory authorities, legal procedures, and resources. National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross had signaled the administration's direction toward private-sector offensive cyber authority as early as March 2026.

Legal analysis (Lawfare) identifies substantial unresolved risk: the CFAA's exemption for "lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity" has never been tested in court as applied to private contractors acting on the government's behalf, leaving participating companies exposed to prosecution risk despite informal government assurances pending congressional action. Cross-border operations also risk violating foreign computer-crime statutes -- the U.K. Computer Misuse Act and German criminal code are cited as examples -- creating litigation, prosecution, and diplomatic-incident exposure, particularly given that technical attribution of an adversary's true identity and infrastructure remains imperfect despite improvements since earlier "hack-back" policy debates; misidentification or unaccounted collateral effects could harm innocent third parties and expose companies to CFAA and tort liability.

The NSPM sits alongside a parallel legislative effort: Rep. David Schweikert (R-AZ) introduced the Scam Farms Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act (H.R. 4988, originally the Cybercrime Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act, introduced August 20, 2025), which would have Congress exercise its Article I authority to let the President issue formal "letters of marque and reprisal" -- a mechanism last used against Britain in the War of 1812 and dormant since World War II -- against cyber-enabled scam-farm operators, framing scam-farm fraud against Americans as an "act of war." Coverage of the bill and the broader hack-back debate points to "scam farms" concentrated in Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Cambodia) as a major source of the fraud losses the NSPM cites, with some Southeast Asian scam-center operations reported as tied to Chinese-government-linked networks. This represents a departure from decades of U.S. policy that reserved offensive cyber operations exclusively to government entities such as U.S. Cyber Command, and revives a long-running, previously rejected "hack-back" and "active cyber defense" policy debate in a new, more centrally supervised form.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1590 Gather Victim Network Information
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1485 Data Destruction
- T1565 Data Manipulation

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**CE-TCO Impact — Anti-Recovery Destruction Chained With Financial-Theft Indicators (SPL)** (`TL-2026-2012-SPL-003`)

The NSPM's 'Cyber Effects Operations' category and the CE-TCO ransomware/fraud activity it targets converge on the same impact-stage outcomes: Financial Theft (T1657) via beneficiary/routing manipulation and fraudulent wire transfers, Data Destruction (T1485) via shadow-copy and backup-catalog deletion that removes recovery options ahead of encryption or wipe, and Data Manipulation (T1565) via unauthorized record tampering. This detection fires when a destructive anti-recovery command executes on a host and correlates it against concurrent financial-transaction or database-audit anomalies from the same actor — the pattern most consistent with an active, high-severity CE-TCO impact operation.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1657, T1485, T1565
- **Data sources:** windows_security_eventlog, sysmon, wiretransfer_audit, database_audit
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=win sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4688
  New_Process_Name IN ("*vssadmin.exe","*wbadmin.exe","*bcdedit.exe")
  (CommandLine="*delete*shadows*" OR CommandLine="*delete catalog*" OR CommandLine="*recoveryenabled*no*" OR CommandLine="*bootstatuspolicy*ignoreallfailures*")
| eval actor_user=Account_Name
| stats count as destructive_cmd_count values(CommandLine) as commands earliest(_time) as first_destructive_event by actor_user ComputerName
| join type=left actor_user
    [ search index=finance sourcetype="wiretransfer:audit" (action="beneficiary_change" OR action="wire_initiated") earliest=-24h
      | stats count as finance_change_count values(new_beneficiary_account) as new_beneficiaries by initiated_by
      | rename initiated_by as actor_user ]
| join type=left actor_user
    [ search index=database sourcetype="db:audit" statement_type="UPDATE" outside_change_window=true earliest=-24h
      | stats count as unauthorized_db_updates values(table_name) as modified_tables by db_user
      | rename db_user as actor_user ]
| where destructive_cmd_count>0
| table actor_user ComputerName commands destructive_cmd_count first_destructive_event finance_change_count new_beneficiaries unauthorized_db_updates modified_tables
| sort -destructive_cmd_count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let DestructiveCommands = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("vssadmin.exe","wbadmin.exe","bcdedit.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows","delete catalog","recoveryenabled no","ignoreallfailures")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine;
let FinanceChanges = FinancialTransactionEvents_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Action_s in ("beneficiary_change","wire_initiated")
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy_s, NewBeneficiaryAccount_s;
DestructiveCommands
| join kind=leftouter (FinanceChanges) on $left.AccountName == $right.InitiatedBy_s
| summarize DestructiveCmdCount = count(), Commands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine), FinanceChangeCount = countif(isnotempty(NewBeneficiaryAccount_s)) by AccountName, DeviceName
| where DestructiveCmdCount > 0
| project AccountName, DeviceName, DestructiveCmdCount, Commands, FinanceChangeCount
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Shadow Copy And Backup Catalog Deletion Via Vssadmin, Wbadmin, Or Bcdedit
id: 3a7c1f92-8e4d-4b1a-9c2e-1f928e4d4b1a
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of vssadmin, wbadmin, or bcdedit with arguments that delete shadow copies or the backup catalog, or disable recovery options — the standard destructive/anti-recovery precursor used before Data Destruction (T1485) or Data Manipulation (T1565) impact actions such as ransomware detonation or record tampering.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-14
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1485
  - attack.t1565
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\vssadmin.exe'
      - '\wbadmin.exe'
      - '\bcdedit.exe'
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'delete catalog'
      - 'recoveryenabled no'
      - 'ignoreallfailures'
  condition: selection_img and selection_cli
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate backup-administration maintenance windows
  - IT-authorized disk-space remediation
level: high
---
title: Beneficiary Or Payment-Routing Change Followed By High-Value Wire Transfer
id: 7d2e9b41-5f6a-4c8e-9a1d-2e9b415f6a4c
status: experimental
description: Detects a change to a payment beneficiary or routing detail followed by a wire-transfer initiation from the same actor — the core Financial Theft (T1657) pattern used in business-email-compromise and CE-TCO fraud schemes.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-14
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1657
logsource:
  category: application
  service: financial_transaction_audit
detection:
  selection_change:
    Action: 'beneficiary_change'
  selection_wire:
    Action: 'wire_initiated'
  condition: selection_change and selection_wire
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate vendor payment-detail updates followed by a routine transfer
level: high
---
title: Correlation - Destructive Command Execution With Concurrent Financial Fraud Indicators
id: b4f8a123-6c2d-4e9f-8a1b-f8a1236c2d4e
status: experimental
correlation:
  type: temporal
  rules:
    - 3a7c1f92-8e4d-4b1a-9c2e-1f928e4d4b1a
    - 7d2e9b41-5f6a-4c8e-9a1d-2e9b415f6a4c
  group-by:
    - AccountName
  timespan: 24h
  condition:
    gte: 1
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate backup-administration maintenance windows executing vssadmin/wbadmin as part of scheduled retention policy
- IT-authorized disk-space remediation clearing old shadow copies
- Legitimate vendor payment-detail updates followed by a routine, pre-approved transfer

**Tuning notes:** Suppress known backup-administration service accounts and scheduled-task windows for the destructive-command leg; require dual-control/approval-workflow context on the finance leg (e.g., no matching change-ticket ID) before treating a beneficiary_change+wire_initiated pair as high-confidence fraud.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- CE-TCO Initial Access — Credential-Phishing Click Into Anomalous Valid-Account Sign-In (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CE-TCO Post-Exploitation — Executive/Payroll Impersonation Paired With Bulk Data Harvesting (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CE-TCO Impact — Anti-Recovery Destruction Chained With Financial-Theft Indicators (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CE-TCO Initial Access — Credential-Phishing Click Into Anomalous Valid-Account Sign-In (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CE-TCO Post-Exploitation — Executive/Payroll Impersonation Paired With Bulk Data Harvesting (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CE-TCO Impact — Anti-Recovery Destruction Chained With Financial-Theft Indicators (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CE-TCO Initial Access — Credential-Phishing Click Into Anomalous Valid-Account Sign-In (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CE-TCO Post-Exploitation — Executive/Payroll Impersonation Paired With Bulk Data Harvesting (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [White House authorizes private US companies to hack foreign criminal networks](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/08/13/usa-private-companies-offensive-cyber-operations/)
- [Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime (National Security Presidential Memorandum)](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/08/expanding-capabilities-to-combat-transnational-cyber-enabled-crime/)
- [Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Expands Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/08/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-expands-capabilities-to-combat-transnational-cyber-enabled-crime/)
- [Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens (Executive Order 14390)](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/03/combating-cybercrime-fraud-and-predatory-schemes-against-american-citizens/)
- [Trump turns to private sector in offensive hacking operations memo](https://cyberscoop.com/trump-memo-private-sector-offensive-hacking/)
- [In a first, US will allow some private firms to carry out cyberattacks](https://techcrunch.com/2026/08/13/in-a-first-us-will-allow-some-private-firms-to-carry-out-cyberattacks/)
- [Trump taps cyber firms to go on offensive against criminals](https://therecord.media/trump-cyber-crime-offensive)
- [Trump Deputizes Private Companies for Offensive Cyber Strikes Against Foreign Criminals](https://www.techtimes.com/articles/324233/20260813/trump-deputizes-private-companies-offensive-cyber-strikes-against-foreign-criminals.htm)
- [Trump Enlists Private Sector to Boost Cyber-Offensive Arsenal](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-13/trump-enlists-private-sector-to-boost-cyber-offensive-arsenal)
- [Cybersecurity & Tech Executive Branch: Trump Admin Cyber Strategy Centers Private Sector in Offensive Cyber Operations](https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/trump-admin-cyber-strategy-centers-private-sector-in-offensive-cyber-operations)
- [America Wants to Hack the Planet](https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/america-wants-to-hack-the-planet)
- [H.R.4988 - Scam Farms Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act of 2025 (bill text)](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/4988/text)
- [Schweikert Introduces Cybercrime Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act to Combat Foreign Scam Syndicates](https://schweikert.house.gov/2025/08/20/schweikert-introduces-cybercrime-marque-and-reprisal-authorization-act-to-combat-foreign-scam-syndicates/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2012
