# Cavern Manticore's CAV3RN C2 Framework Adds DNS-Based Channel Selection and Google Apps Script Relay

> Iran-linked cluster Cavern Manticore (aka Cav3rn, MOIS-affiliated, overlapping MuddyWater and OilRig sub-group Lyceum) has evolved its modular CAV3RN C2 framework to query DNS A-records under m.studiotikva[.]com before every transaction, using the response's final octet to route traffic through a Google Apps Script relay or a direct HTTPS endpoint. A companion module, HOLLOWGRAPH, hides C2 tasking and exfiltration inside Microsoft 365 calendar events via the Graph API, and the wider toolset overlaps with the TAMECAT surveillance framework used by Iran-linked APT42/TA453. Targeting spans Israeli government/IT-provider entities and, via APT42's parallel operations, nuclear-energy-sector and government personnel.

- **Published:** 2026-08-17T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-17T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2053
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-cavern-manticore-cav3rn-dns-routing-tl-2026-2053.webp?v=d40af0fe (Threadlinqs threat intel: Cavern Manticore CAV3RN DNS Routing: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2053) — High severity, 28 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2053
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Cavern Manticore (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Cavern Manticore (previously tracked under the leetspeak name Cav3rn) is an Iran-nexus threat cluster, assessed as MOIS-affiliated, whose CAV3RN command-and-control framework has been under research-community observation since at least December 2025 (Kaspersky) with a major public disclosure by Check Point Research on 6 July 2026. The framework is modular and plugin-based: an Agent component (`uxtheme.dll`, DLL-sideloaded via a trojanized WinDirStat.exe execution path) loads functional modules for file operations (`mhm.dll`), SQL database access (`db.dll`), LDAP/Active Directory reconnaissance including credential brute-force (`ode.dll`), network reconnaissance (`n-ten.dll`), and SOCKS5/WebSocket tunneling (`n-sws.dll`). Modules are compiled in a deliberate mix of pure .NET Framework (IL-only), Mixed-Mode C++/CLI, and .NET 8 NativeAOT builds, a strategy that raises reverse-engineering cost per sample and keeps most binaries at zero or near-zero AV detection on VirusTotal. Initial access in the Check Point-documented campaign involved abuse of a legitimate SysAid RMM software-deployment feature, consistent with multi-hop compromise through a trusted IT-provider relationship before reaching Israeli government and IT-sector victims.

As of the August 2026 disclosure (Kaspersky Securelist, 'Project CAV3RN continues', 11 August 2026), the communications layer has been rearchitected around a new domain, studiotikva[.]com (first registered February 2024, allowed to expire February 2026, then re-registered 12 May 2026 via Dynadot and re-delegated to RouterHosting LLC infrastructure on 19 May 2026). The updated communication module (`GoogleService.dll`, .NET 8 NativeAOT) and an inter-component broker (`rnp.dll`, masquerading as the RNP OpenPGP library) query DNS A-records at `<nonce><error-state>.<hex-client-id>.m.studiotikva[.]com` before each transaction; the fourth octet of the returned address is a compact control signal that selects a direct HTTPS request to `api.studiotikva[.]com/api/v1/update/check`, a POST to a Google Apps Script deployment at `script.google[.]com/macros/s/{deployment-ID}/exec` acting as a relay to the real backend, or transaction termination, depending on the octet value and the module's tracked error state. The malware can validate whether its Apps Script deployment ID is stale by comparing a digest against a DNS response, and pull a replacement ID via small chunked DNS responses, letting operators rotate the Google-fronted relay without redeploying the implant. To ordinary network monitoring this traffic resembles legitimate access to a Google-hosted automation service.

A companion module, HOLLOWGRAPH (.NET NativeAOT DLL, first observed operating 3 June-9 July 2026 and reported by Group-IB), abuses the Microsoft Graph API through a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox, treating the account's calendar as a two-way dead-drop: operators plant tasking as calendar events dated far in the future (2050-05-13), and the implant reads 'get'/'send' commands and exfiltrates staged files as encrypted calendar attachments, secured with hybrid RSA-OAEP/AES-256-GCM using separate key pairs for inbound and outbound traffic. A secondary DNS-tunneling channel to cloudlanecdn[.]com refreshes Microsoft Entra ID application credentials (tenant ID, client ID, client secret, mailbox) in small AAAA-record chunks, writing results to a local `logAzure.txt`. Group-IB identified at least 12 HOLLOWGRAPH-infected systems (3 actively communicating), all consistent with Israeli targeting, and noted technical overlap with Lyceum at low-to-medium confidence.

The broader toolset referenced alongside Cavern/CAV3RN includes TAMECAT, a modular PowerShell-based surveillance/collection framework associated with Iran-linked APT42 (closely associated with TA453) and analyzed by DarkAtlas. TAMECAT performs host/network discovery, arbitrary command execution, browser credential and cookie theft (targeting Edge/Chrome via the DevTools Protocol), Outlook .ost mailbox collection, and screenshot capture, communicating over HTTPS to Netlify-hosted endpoints with Discord/Telegram as secondary C2 channels. Delivery in the associated 'SpearSpecter' campaign (deployment evidence from late April 2026) uses spear-phishing with podcast/conference pretexts leading to a PDF-themed Windows shortcut (`Document.pdf.lnk`) that triggers a `search-ms:` URI, WebDAV access via `rundll32.exe davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie`, and an obfuscated PowerShell loader chain; an alternate route uses macro-enabled OOXML workbooks that drop registry-persisted (`HKCU\Software\Classes\Key`, RunOnce) PowerShell controllers. DarkAtlas also documents APT42's systematic use of generative AI across the operation lifecycle - target research, persona/pretext generation, multilingual lure translation, and malware coding/debugging - explicitly tying the toolset to defense officials, government personnel, think-tank researchers, and nuclear-energy-sector individuals, including a March 2026 operation against a US think-tank employee during an active US-Iran conflict window.

While Check Point, Group-IB, and DarkAtlas each hedge their attribution (technical overlaps with MuddyWater/Lyceum for Cavern/CAV3RN and HOLLOWGRAPH; APT42/TA453 for TAMECAT) rather than issuing a single unified actor name, the shared Iran-MOIS nexus, overlapping TTPs (DLL sideloading, abuse of trusted cloud services for C2, modular .NET/PowerShell tradecraft), and convergent targeting of Israeli and nuclear-energy/government entities are why they are tracked together as part of the same reporting cluster.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1218.011 Rundll32
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1550.001 Application Access Token
- T1087.002 Domain Account
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1114.001 Local Email Collection
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1071.004 DNS
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**APT42 SpearSpecter LNK Lure - search-ms and WebDAV DavSetCookie Chain** (`TL-2026-2053-SPL-001`)

Detects the APT42 SpearSpecter initial-access chain observed alongside Cavern Manticore/CAV3RN reporting: a PDF-themed Windows shortcut (Document.pdf.lnk) that triggers a search-ms: URI and rundll32.exe davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie to open a WebDAV session and stage the follow-on PowerShell loader.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.001, T1204.002, T1218.011
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_events
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval is_webdav=if(match(Image,"(?i)\\rundll32\.exe$") AND match(CommandLine,"(?i)davclnt\.dll") AND match(CommandLine,"(?i)DavSetCookie"),1,0)
| eval is_lnk_lure=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)\.pdf\.lnk"),1,0)
| eval is_search_ms=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)search-ms:"),1,0)
| where is_webdav=1 OR is_lnk_lure=1 OR is_search_ms=1
| eval stage=case(is_webdav=1,"webdav_davsetcookie", is_lnk_lure=1,"pdf_lnk_lure", is_search_ms=1,"search_ms_uri")
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen count by ComputerName, User, Image, ParentImage, CommandLine, stage
| sort - last_seen
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "rundll32.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "davclnt.dll" and ProcessCommandLine has "DavSetCookie")
   or ProcessCommandLine has ".pdf.lnk"
   or ProcessCommandLine has "search-ms:"
| extend Stage = case(ProcessCommandLine has "DavSetCookie", "webdav_davsetcookie",
                       ProcessCommandLine has ".pdf.lnk", "pdf_lnk_lure",
                       "search_ms_uri")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Stage
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: APT42 SpearSpecter LNK Lure - search-ms and WebDAV DavSetCookie Chain
id: 8f2a1c4e-6b3d-4e9a-9c1f-2a7d5e8b3f01
status: experimental
description: Detects the APT42 SpearSpecter initial-access chain seen alongside Cavern Manticore/CAV3RN activity - a PDF-themed .lnk lure (Document.pdf.lnk) that triggers a search-ms: URI and rundll32.exe davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie to open a WebDAV session and stage the follow-on PowerShell loader.
references:
    - https://darkatlas.io/blog/apt42-ai-assisted-phishing-tamecat-analysis
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/hollowgraph-malware-hides-c2-and-stolen.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/18
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.actor.apt42
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    sel_webdav:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'davclnt.dll'
            - 'DavSetCookie'
    sel_lnk:
        CommandLine|contains: '.pdf.lnk'
    sel_searchms:
        CommandLine|contains: 'search-ms:'
    condition: 1 of sel_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative WebDAV client usage (rare via rundll32 invocation in normal workflows)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate administrative WebDAV client usage that invokes davclnt.dll via rundll32 in normal IT workflows (rare)

**Tuning notes:** Baseline rundll32.exe davclnt.dll invocations in the environment first (some legitimate WebDAV redirector use exists); suppress on hosts where IT explicitly uses search-ms: for approved file-share shortcuts, and prioritize alerts where the lure filename matches the *.pdf.lnk pattern.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Obfuscated PowerShell Loader Spawned from Explorer (TAMECAT/SpearSpecter Loader Chain) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- LDAP Brute Force and AD Reconnaissance Consistent with Cavern Manticore ode.dll Module (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HOLLOWGRAPH Microsoft 365 Calendar Dead-Drop C2 and Entra ID Token Abuse (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Macro-Enabled OOXML Workbook Spawning Script Host with RunOnce Persistence (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TAMECAT Browser Credential Theft via DevTools Protocol and Non-Outlook .ost Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HOLLOWGRAPH DNS Tunneling and TAMECAT Netlify-Hosted C2 / SOCKS5 Tunneling (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cavern Manticore uxtheme.dll DLL Sideload via Trojanized WinDirStat.exe (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CAV3RN DNS-Based Channel Selection and Google Apps Script C2 Relay (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `144.172.115[.]17`
- Domain: `studiotikva[.]com`
- File hash: `904784c9943d019da332bea2cd03996f`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Cavern C2 Uses DNS and Google Apps Script for Stealthy Command-and-Control](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/cavern-c2-uses-dns-and-google-apps.html)
- [Project CAV3RN uses Google Apps Script for stealthy C2 in Israel](https://securelist.com/project-cav3rn-continues/120991/)
- [Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/)
- [HOLLOWGRAPH: Turning Microsoft 365 Calendars into Covert Command-and-Control Channels](https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hollowgraph-microsoft-365/)
- [APT42: AI-Assisted Rapport Phishing and a More Resilient TAMECAT](https://darkatlas.io/blog/apt42-ai-assisted-phishing-tamecat-analysis)
- [Iran-Linked Hackers Use New Cavern C2 Framework to Target Israeli Organizations](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/iran-linked-hackers-use-new-cavern-c2.html)
- [HollowGraph Malware Hides C2 and Stolen Files in Microsoft 365 Events Dated 2050](https://thehackernews.com/2026/07/hollowgraph-malware-hides-c2-and-stolen.html)
- [New HollowGraph malware uses Microsoft Graph for stealthy C2 comms](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-hollowgraph-malware-uses-microsoft-graph-for-stealthy-c2-comms/)
- [New HollowGraph Malware Abuses Microsoft 365 Calendar for C&C Communication](https://www.securityweek.com/new-hollowgraph-malware-abuses-microsoft-365-calendar-for-cc-communication/)
- [Project CAV3RN Uses Google Apps Script and DNS to Hide C2 Traffic in Israeli Cyberespionage Attacks](https://gbhackers.com/project-cav3rn-uses-google-apps/)
- [APT42 Uses AI-Assisted Phishing and TAMECAT Backdoor to Target Defense Officials](https://gbhackers.com/apt42-uses-ai-assisted-phishing/)
- [Cavern Manticore Abuses SysAid RMM and WinDirStat DLL Sideloading to Deploy C2 Framework](https://cybersecuritynews.com/cavern-manticore-abuses-sysaid-rmm-and-windirstat-dll-sideloading/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2053
