Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-2071
Password spraying attacks surge 155x as hackers exploit MFA gaps via Azure CLI / ROPC flow
Huntress observed a 155-fold increase in credential spraying attacks during H1 2026, with over 81 million login attempts recorded in a single two-week window targeting Microsoft Azure CLI via the deprecated ROPC OAuth 2.0 grant. The ROPC flow bypasses MFA and Conditional Access Policies by sending credentials directly to the /token endpoint, minting user-delegated tokens without any interactive challenge.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2071 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | LSHIY password spray campaign, FranTech password spray wave, 3xK Tech password spray wave |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Azure CLI; Microsoft Entra ID (Conditional Access); Microsoft Microsoft 365 |
| Tools | Microsoft Azure CLI |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1078 Valid Accounts, T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing, T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying, T1133 External Remote Services, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server, T1584.004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server, T1589.001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials, T1589.003 Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | government administration, education, finance, health, technology, manufacturing |
| Target regions | North America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 11 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-08-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2071 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 15 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Entra ID ROPC Authentication Flow Detected — Azure CLI
Detects ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) OAuth 2.0 grant flow authentication attempts targeting the Azure CLI application in Entra ID sign-in logs. The ROPC flow bypasses MFA and Conditional Access Policy evaluation by sending credentials directly to the /token endpoint, enabling the credential spraying campaign documented by Huntress (LSHIY/FranTech/3xK Tech). The Azure CLI App ID (04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46) combined with AuthenticationProtocol='ropc' is the definitive exploitation signal.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1110.003, T1078.004, T1133
- Data sources: azure:monitor:aad, SigninLogs
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=azure sourcetype="azure:monitor:aad" operationName="Sign-in activity" AuthenticationProtocol="ropc" appId="04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46"
| eval threat_score = case(
match(userAgent, "(?i)node-fetch") OR match(userAgent, "(?i)BAV2ROPC"), "high",
1=1, "medium"
)
| eval risk_tag = case(
cidrmatch("2a0a:d683::/32", src_ip) OR cidrmatch("2605:6400::/32", src_ip) OR cidrmatch("2605:6404::/32", src_ip), "known_abuse_infrastructure",
src_ip="198.98.56.227" OR src_ip="198.98.56.205" OR src_ip="198.98.56.215", "known_abuse_infrastructure",
1=1, "monitor"
)
| eval enriched_risk = case(
threat_score="high" AND risk_tag="known_abuse_infrastructure", "CRITICAL",
threat_score="high", "HIGH",
1=1, "MEDIUM"
)
| table _time, identity, appDisplayName, src_ip, userAgent, AuthenticationProtocol, location, risk_tag, threat_score, enriched_risk, resultType, resultSignature
| sort - _timeMicrosoft KQL
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where AuthenticationProtocol == "ropc"
| where AppId == "04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46"
| extend ThreatScore = case(
UserAgent contains "node-fetch" or UserAgent contains "BAV2ROPC", "high",
"medium"
)
| extend RiskTag = case(
ipv6_is_in_range(IPAddress, "2a0a:d683::/32") or ipv6_is_in_range(IPAddress, "2605:6400::/32") or ipv6_is_in_range(IPAddress, "2605:6404::/32") or IPAddress in ("198.98.56.227", "198.98.56.205", "198.98.56.215"), "known_abuse_infrastructure",
"monitor"
)
| extend EnrichedRisk = case(
ThreatScore == "high" and RiskTag == "known_abuse_infrastructure", "CRITICAL",
ThreatScore == "high", "HIGH",
"MEDIUM"
)
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, AppDisplayName, IPAddress, UserAgent, AuthenticationProtocol, Location, RiskTag, ThreatScore, EnrichedRisk, ResultType, Status
| sort by TimeGenerated descSigma
title: Entra ID ROPC Authentication Flow Detected via Azure CLI
id: a8b3c4d5-6e7f-4a5b-8c9d-0e1f2a3b4c5d
status: experimental
description: Detects ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) OAuth 2.0 grant flow authentication attempts targeting the Azure CLI application in Entra ID sign-in logs. The ROPC flow bypasses MFA and Conditional Access Policies, and is actively abused in the LSHIY/FranTech/3xK Tech credential spraying campaign.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/lshiy-password-spray-attack
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/reference-error-codes
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-19
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1110.003
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1078.004
- attack.t1133
- cve.2026.0000
logsource:
product: azure
service: entra_id
detection:
selection:
AuthenticationProtocol: ropc
AppId: 04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legacy applications that legitimately use ROPC for credential migration
- Authorized automation scripts using Azure CLI with ROPC that have not been migrated to managed identities
- Development environments where ROPC is explicitly required for testing
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legacy migration scripts using Azure CLI with ROPC grant
- Authorized non-interactive automation for CI/CD pipelines
- Development environments with ROPC explicitly enabled for testing
Tuning notes: Baseline normal ROPC usage per tenant over 14 days — authorized Azure CLI automation should be migrated to device code flow or managed identities. Exclude known service accounts that have been explicitly approved for ROPC use. Set alert threshold to trigger on any ROPC + Azure CLI combination from an IP outside the organization's approved ranges.
- Entra ID ROPC Authentication — ASN-Based Infrastructure Tracking · unlock with TL Creds
- Password Spray Account Lockout — ROPC Smart Lockout Trigger Detection · unlock with TL Creds
- Cross-Tenant ROPC Authentication Anomaly Detection · unlock with TL Creds
- Entra ID ROPC — Azure CLI Successful Authentication from Known Abuse Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
- ROPC Authentication — Automated User-Agent Strings (node-fetch, BAV2ROPC) · unlock with TL Creds
- Entra ID Password Spray — IPv4 to IPv6 Infrastructure Rotation Tracking · unlock with TL Creds
- High-Volume Failed ROPC Authentication — Password Spray Indicator · unlock with TL Creds
- Successful ROPC Authentication from Anomalous Origin — Compromised Account Indicator · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-08-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 15 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2071.
Sample indicators (3 of 15)
- IP address:
198.98.56[.]227 - URL:
hxxps://login[.]microsoftonline[.]com/{tenant}/oauth2/v2.0/token - IP address:
198.98.56[.]205
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 15 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
78 accounts were compromised across 64 organizations; attackers leveraged BYOIP infrastructure from LSHIY LLC, FranTech, and 3xK Tech hosting providers with sustained volumes of ~1.5 million attempts per day.
Huntress documented a massive, ongoing automated password spray campaign targeting Microsoft 365 environments via Azure CLI, originating from a network of hosting providers offering minimal oversight. The campaign represents a 155-fold increase in credential spraying attacks across the Huntress customer base in H1 2026, with mean failed attacks of ~1,964 per month per tenant (median 804), indicating heavy skew toward the most targeted organizations.
At the core of the attack is the Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) OAuth 2.0 grant, a legacy authentication flow deprecated in OAuth 2.1. Originally designed to help migrate legacy auth to OAuth, ROPC allows an application to trade a username and password directly at the /token endpoint for a user-delegated access token. Unlike interactive OAuth flows, ROPC never passes through the authorization endpoint where Conditional Access Policies (CAPs) are evaluated, meaning MFA challenges are never triggered. The attack specifically targeted Microsoft's Azure CLI application, using the ROPC flow to authenticate against tenant /token endpoints.
Of 78 compromised accounts analyzed across 23 businesses, only 8 had no MFA at all. The remaining 15 had MFA implemented but misconfigured: MFA was scoped to specific apps (e.g., Admin Portals) rather than covering all cloud apps; scoped to specific user groups (e.g., Admins Only) that excluded compromised accounts; conditioned on trusted locations that attacker IPs evaded due to inconsistent IPv6 geolocation; left in report-only mode (configured but never enforced); or in one case, a policy explicitly named "Block Azure CLI" that did not actually block Azure CLI. The ROPC flow was simply not covered by the existing CAP configurations.
The adversary infrastructure evolved through three distinct hosting providers. The initial wave (June 2026) originated from LSHIY LLC (AS32167, AS955), using the IPv6 range 2a0a:d683::/32. LSHIY's Bring Your Own IP (BYOIP) offering allowed the attacker to peer their own IP address ranges through LSHIY's network, evading Microsoft's Smart Lockout and other reputation-based detection. After Huntress reported the abuse, LSHIY suspended the user's service in early July. The attacker immediately migrated to FranTech (AS53667) using IPv6 ranges 2605:6400::/32 and 2605:6404::/32, with 87% of targeted accounts overlapping with the LSHIY wave. A third wave then moved to 3xK Tech GmbH (AS200373), a German ISP previously identified as the largest source of ASN DDoS attacks by Cloudflare. On 3xK Tech, the attacker shifted from IPv6 to IPv4, rotating through approximately 12,800 IPs with each limited to ~900 attempts, restoring volume to ~1.5 million login attempts per day.
The attack methodology followed a multi-stage pattern: reconnaissance via LinkedIn, company websites, and prior breach dumps to collect valid usernames; assembly of password lists from breached credential combo lists, common passwords, company name variants, and seasonal terms; low-and-slow spraying with one password per account and delays between attempts to avoid lockout thresholds; and credential reuse from previously breached username/password pairs that were never rotated. Huntress observed no post-compromise activity, leading researchers to assess that the attacker was validating credentials for sale on the dark web.
Detection signals include anomalous IP geolocation (logins from China for US-based organizations), failed login volume analysis, ASN-based tracking of the three hosting providers, and ROPC-specific authentication protocol detection in Entra ID sign-in logs. The AuthenticationProtocol field in SigninLogs contains the value 'ropc' for these flows, and Azure CLI logins use the UserAgent 'node-fetch' when automated. The Azure CLI app ID is 04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46. Elastic has published a prebuilt detection rule for Entra ID OAuth ROPC Grant logins.
Microsoft's recommended mitigation is the userStrongAuthClientAuthNRequired setting, which enforces strong authentication at the client level and blocks ROPC flows outright. Additional mitigations include requiring MFA for all users, all cloud apps, and all client app types unconditionally; restricting Azure CLI application access for non-admin users; and disabling the ROPC grant type where possible. The campaign is not targeting any specific industry but rather opportunistically targeting organizations with poor password hygiene or improperly configured Conditional Access Policies.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services
Credential Access
T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing; T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying; T1528 Steal Application Access Token
Resource Development
T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1584.004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server
Reconnaissance
T1589.001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials; T1589.003 Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Enable userStrongAuthClientAuthNRequired in Entra ID to block ROPC flows outright
- Audit Conditional Access Policies to ensure MFA covers all cloud apps, all users, and all client app types
- Restrict Azure CLI application access for non-admin users
- Block legacy authentication flows including ROPC and device code flow
- Review sign-in logs for AuthenticationProtocol='ropc' combined with Azure CLI AppDisplayName
Workarounds
- Disable the ROPC grant type in tenant settings where legacy app compatibility is not required
- Block IPv6 ranges 2a0a:d683::/32, 2605:6400::/32, 2605:6404::/32 at perimeter
- Block ASNs AS32167, AS53667, AS200373 for authentication traffic
- Set Conditional Access policies to 'All Cloud Apps' and 'All Client App Types' including 'Other clients'
Longer-term hardening
- Transition to passwordless authentication methods (FIDO2, Windows Hello, Microsoft Authenticator)
- Replace user accounts in automation with managed identities or service principals
- Implement continuous access evaluation (CAE) for real-time policy enforcement
- Deploy SIEM rules for ROPC authentication monitoring across all tenants
- Establish baseline of normal ROPC usage per app/user over 14 days, then alert on deviations
Affected and fixed versions
Timeline
- IPv6 address maintainer in LSHIY LLC range (locked-ioc-2) created, marking the start of attack infrastructure preparation
- Steady trickle of account compromises begins at 2-4 accounts per day across Huntress-protected tenants
- 12 accounts compromised in a single day, the highest single-day count before the major spike
- Major spike: 30 accounts compromised across 23 businesses in a single day; Huntress analysis shows 15 of 23 had MFA but it was not configured to cover the ROPC flow
- End of two-week observation window: 78 accounts compromised across 64 organizations with 81 million+ login attempts recorded
- Huntress publishes initial blog post 'No (Bad) CAP: Inside an Ongoing LSHIY Password Spray Attack' documenting the campaign
- LSHIY LLC suspends BYOIP user after Huntress abuse report; attacks from the locked-ioc-2 range cease
- Activity shifts to 3xK Tech GmbH (AS200373) as a third hosting provider, using IPv4 with ~12,800 rotating IPs at ~900 attempts per IP
- Attackers migrate spray activity to FranTech (AS53667) using IPv6 ranges locked-ioc-3 and locked-ioc-4; 87% of targeted accounts overlap with the LSHIY wave
- Attackers restore spray volume to approximately 1.5 million login attempts per day from 3xK Tech, matching the LSHIY-era peak
- Huntress publishes update noting the 3xK Tech IPv4 low-and-slow approach, the shift from IPv6 to IPv4, and the per-IP volume limitation
- BleepingComputer publishes comprehensive summary of the campaign, noting the 155x increase in password spraying across H1 2026
Sources cited
- Elastic — Prebuilt Detection Rule: Entra ID OAuth ROPC Grant Login Detected elastic.co · Advisory · 2026-07-01
- Huntress — No (Bad) CAP: Inside an Ongoing LSHIY Password Spray Attack Huntress · Research · 2026-06-30
- Huntress — Twist the Nozzle on Password Spraying: A Tradecraft Tuesday Recap Huntress · Research · 2026-08-19
- Huntress — Railway. LSHIY. Different Auth Flows, but the Same Lesson We Keep Skipping Huntress · Research · 2026-07-15
- Huntress — Password Spraying Attacks in Microsoft 365: Detection, Tools & Defense Huntress · Research · 2026-07-10
- FNDSEC — Evading EntraID Conditional Access Policies via Cross-Tenant ROPC blog.fndsec.net · Research · 2026-01-13
- IntrusionLabs — FranTech AS53667 SSH Brute-Force Campaign intrusionlabs.io · Research · 2026-02-27
- Hive Security — LSHIY Password Spray: ROPC and MFA Gaps hivesecurity.gitlab.io · Blog · 2026-07-05
- KQL Search — Azure CLI Spray Detection Query (ASN 53667) kqlsearch.com · Blog · 2026-07-12
- Modern42 — Conditional Access Resource Exclusions + SIEM Detection modern42.com · Blog · 2026-07-08
- BleepingComputer — Password spraying attacks surge 155x as hackers exploit MFA gaps BleepingComputer · News · 2026-08-19
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.