# Ransom Busters — Rogue ransomware affiliate posing as recovery firm to intercept ransom payments

> A suspected ransomware affiliate operating as 'Ransom Busters' contacts ransomware victims before attacks become public, offering decryption keys and stolen data deletion for $20,000–$60,000. GuidePoint Security GRIT assesses with moderate confidence that this is a single affiliate using their access to steal ransom payments from the RaaS operations they work with (DragonForce, Settra, Anubis). The scheme represents a significant escalation in third-party ransomware interference, eroding the traditional 'pay and decrypt' model by introducing an uncontrollable third party with access to victim data.

- **Published:** 2026-08-19T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-19T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2074
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-ransom-busters-payment-interception-tl-2026-2074.webp?v=0da40754 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Ransom Busters Fake Recovery Extortion: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2074) — High severity, 9 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2074
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Ransom Busters
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 9 (2 shown free below)

## Description

Ransom Busters is a fraudulent persona that contacts organizations hit by ransomware, claiming to have breached the administrative panels of the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations that attacked them. The group offers to permanently delete stolen data from ransomware group servers and provide decryption keys in exchange for $20,000 to $60,000 in Bitcoin, requesting contact with the victim's CEO or IT leadership via ProtonMail. GuidePoint Security's GRIT (Research and Intelligence Team) identified this activity through incident response engagements where the same anomalous tooling, infrastructure, and credentials appeared across two separate ransomware incidents involving different RaaS operations.

GRIT found that the attacker used identical tooling — SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network reconnaissance, s5cmd for high-performance S3-compatible cloud storage exfiltration, and Remotely (an open-source .NET remote monitoring and management tool) for persistent remote access — across incidents involving DragonForce, Settra, and Anubis ransomware. Critically, the same local backdoor account password (Numlock!123) and attacker-controlled hostname (DESKTOP-BBETH6K) appeared in both incidents, strongly indicating a single operator. GRIT assesses with moderate confidence that Ransom Busters is not a legitimate third party but rather a ransomware affiliate 'using its access to steal ransom payments from the ransomware gangs it works with,' effectively double-dipping by collecting both the RaaS affiliate commission and direct victim payments.

Coveware, a ransom negotiation and incident response firm, confirmed responding to at least one such incident where the group contacted the victim via email claiming access to both the decryption key and stolen data. Coveware distinguishes this from traditional 'ambulance chaser' recovery scams that only contact victims after public disclosure — Ransom Busters' pre-public knowledge is 'much more concerning' because paying the original ransomware operator no longer guarantees that all parties with access to the data will honor a non-disclosure agreement.

The scheme creates a trilemma for victims: pay the RaaS gang, pay Ransom Busters, or neither — with no guarantee that any party will not still leak the data. Ransom Busters claimed to have been 'breaking into the servers for over three years' and justified their fees by stating that 'acting without compensation would put their access to the threat actor's infrastructure at risk.' GRIT's principal consultant Justin Timothy noted that the possibility of a legitimate organization is 'extremely unlikely' as it would violate the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). At the time of publication, no confirmed victims had paid Ransom Busters, and GRIT actively discourages payment to any criminal party.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1569 System Services
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Local Backdoor Account Creation and PowerShell Tool Deployment — Ransom Busters Post-Exploitation** (`TL-2026-2074-SPL-002`)

Detects the creation of local accounts (EventCode 4720) followed by PowerShell process execution (EventCode 4688 or Sysmon EventCode 1) installing RMM tools or performing credential dumping within a 24-hour window. Ransom Busters creates backdoor local accounts with the known password Numlock!123 (T1078.003) on victim systems, then uses PowerShell (T1059.001) to deploy the Remotely RMM tool and execute credential-access tools like Mimikatz (T1003.001). This detection specifically monitors for account names matching the Ransom Busters pattern and correlates with subsequent PowerShell activity deploying Remotely_Service or executing s5cmd.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1078.003, T1059.001, T1003.001
- **Data sources:** windows_security, windows_sysmon, windows_event_log_4720, windows_event_log_4688
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows_security sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720 TargetUserName!=Guest TargetUserName!=Administrator
| search TargetUserName!="*$"
| eval suspicious_account=if(match(TargetUserName,"^(admin|backup|support|helpdesk|temp)[0-9]*$"),1,0)
| search suspicious_account=1
| table _time, TargetUserName, SubjectUserName, ComputerName
| join max=0 type=inner _time span=24h [
    search index=windows_sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
    (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine="*Remotely*" OR "*s5cmd*" OR "*netscan*" OR "*Invoke-Mimikatz*" OR "*procdump*" OR "*lsass*"
    | rename Computer as SysmonComputer
    | table _time, Image, CommandLine, SysmonComputer
]
| eval correlation_window="24h"
| table _time, TargetUserName, SubjectUserName, ComputerName, Image, CommandLine, correlation_window
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let AccountCreation =
    SecurityEvent
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
    | where EventID == 4720
    | where TargetUserName !in ("Guest", "Administrator")
    | where TargetUserName !endswith "$"
    | extend IsSuspicious = iif(TargetUserName matches regex @"^(admin|backup|support|helpdesk|temp)[0-9]*$", true, false)
    | where IsSuspicious == true
    | project AccountCreationTime=TimeGenerated, TargetUserName, SubjectUserName, AccountCreationComputer=Computer;
let ToolDeployment =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
    | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Remotely", "s5cmd", "netscan", "Invoke-Mimikatz", "procdump", "lsass")
    | project ToolDeployTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine;
AccountCreation
| join kind=inner (
    ToolDeployment
) on $left.AccountCreationComputer == $right.DeviceName
| where ToolDeployTime between (AccountCreationTime .. (AccountCreationTime + 24h))
| project AccountCreationTime, TargetUserName, SubjectUserName, AccountCreationComputer, ToolDeployTime, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by AccountCreationTime desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Local Backdoor Account Creation Correlated with PowerShell Tool Deployment
id: e1b6c4d5-7f0a-4e4b-9c6d-0a5b8f9e4c3d
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of local user accounts with suspicious naming patterns followed by PowerShell tool deployment within a 24-hour window. The Ransom Busters affiliate creates backdoor local accounts (T1078.003) with the known password Numlock!123, then uses PowerShell (T1059.001) to deploy Remotely RMM for persistent access, s5cmd for cloud exfiltration, and credential-dumping tools like Mimikatz or ProcDump targeting LSASS (T1003.001).
references:
    - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-dragonforce-ransomware
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-19
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1078.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    category: account_management
detection:
    selection_account:
        EventID: 4720
        TargetUserName|re: ^(admin|backup|support|helpdesk|temp)[0-9]*$
    condition: selection_account
    timeframe: 24h
    correlation:
        - PowerShell execution with Remotely, s5cmd, netscan, or credential-dumping tool references
falsepositives:
    - IT department creating standardized local accounts during system imaging or deployment
    - Authorized RMM tool deployment by corporate IT during incident response or maintenance windows
    - Password auditing tools that create test accounts with similar naming patterns
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Authorized RMM tool deployment by corporate IT during maintenance windows or incident response
- System imaging processes that create standardized local accounts during provisioning

**Tuning notes:** Tune the account-name regex to exclude your IT department's legitimate naming conventions. Correlate account creation events with the specific password hash for Numlock!123 (when available from Active Directory audit or local SAM monitoring). Extend the correlation window to 48h if tool deployment is delayed. Monitor for simultaneous account creation across multiple systems as a stronger indicator of coordinated adversary activity.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Anomalous External Remote Services Authentication via Valid Accounts — Ransom Busters (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Credential Dumping via ProcDump or Mimikatz with Remotely RMM Staging — Ransom Busters (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Remotely RMM Service Installation and SignalR Hub Connection — Ransom Busters C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Remote Desktop Protocol Logon with Attacker Hostname or Backdoor Account — Ransom Busters (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- s5cmd Cloud Storage Exfiltration and Data Archiving — Ransom Busters (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SoftPerfect Network Scanner and Multi-Tool Lateral Movement Preparation — Ransom Busters (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Suspicious External RDP Logon from Known Attacker Hostname — Ransom Busters Initial Access (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SMB Lateral Movement and Service Execution via Admin Shares — Ransom Busters Lateral Movement (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 9)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `protonmail[.]com`
- URL: `hxxps://github[.]com/immense/Remotely`

Full set of 9 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Rogue ransomware affiliate poses as recovery firm to steal payments](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/rogue-ransomware-affiliate-ransom-busters-poses-as-recovery-firm/)
- ['Ransom Busters': Ransomware Actor Poses as Recovery Service](https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/ransom-busters-ransomware-actor-incident-recovery-service)
- [Ransom Busters Claims It Hacked Ransomware Servers, Asks Victims for Up to $60,000](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/ransom-busters-claims-it-hacked.html)
- [Ransomware Affiliates Adopt Fake Recovery Services as New Extortion Revenue Stream](https://cybersecuritytimes.com/ransomware-fake-recovery-services/)
- [Ransomware victims being duped with fake Ransom Buster Email Communication](https://www.cybersecurity-insiders.com/ransomware-victims-being-duped-with-fake-ransom-buster-email-communication/)
- [Coveware by Veeam — Cyber Extortion Payment Trends Q2 2026](https://www.veeam.com/blog/cyber-extortion-payment-trends-q2-2026.html)
- [DragonForce Ransomware — Threat Profile and Technical Analysis](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-dragonforce-ransomware)
- [Anubis Ransomware Threat Profile — Vali Cyber](https://valicyber.com/resources/anubis-threat-profile/)
- [Settra Ransomware — MOXFIVE Threat Analysis](https://www.moxfive.com/resources/settra-ransomware-threat-analysis)
- [CISA — FiveHands Ransomware Analysis Report (AR21-126A)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/analysis-reports/ar21-126a)
- [Coveware Q1 2026 Ransomware Report](https://www.veeam.com/analyst-reports/coveware-report-q1-2026_wp.pdf)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2074
