Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-2075
CameraSwarm Campaign Compromises 14,500 Dahua IP Cameras Across Ukraine and Russia
Between June 17 and July 22, 2026, a single Russian-speaking operator compromised over 14,530 Dahua IP cameras across Ukraine and Russia using three parallel attack vectors: credential brute-forcing on TCP port 37777, exploitation of CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 via the p2pwn tool, and cloud-relay abuse against cameras behind NAT.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2075, CVE-2021-33044, CVE-2021-33045, CVE-2025-31702 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Operation CameraSwarm |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2021-33044 (added ), CVE-2021-33045 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2021-33044: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2021-33045: 99.5% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2025-31702: 0.4% (37.9th percentile) |
| Affected products | Dahua Technology IPC-HX3XXX Series IP Cameras; Dahua Technology IPC-HX5XXX Series IP Cameras; Dahua Technology IPC-HUM7XXX Series IP Cameras; Dahua Technology DH-IPC-K15P / K35P / K35AP / A35P IP Cameras; Dahua Technology VTO75X95X / VTO65XXX Video Intercoms; Dahua Technology NVR1XXX / NVR2XXX / NVR5XXX / NVR6XX Network Video Recorders; Dahua Technology XVR4xxx / XVR5xxx / XVR7xxx XVR Recorders; Dahua Technology SD1A1 / SD22 / SD49 / SD50 / SD52C / SD6AL PTZ Dome Cameras and 2 more |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-287 |
| Malware | SalatStealer |
| Tools | asleep_scanner, p2pwn, scannerdahua |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts, T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying, T1113 Screen Capture, T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1567.004 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook, T1572 Protocol Tunneling, T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server, T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool and 3 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | government administration, telecoms, critical-infrastructure, commercial |
| Target regions | ukraine, russia, mexico, vietnam, 151 - Eastern Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 11 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-08-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2075 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 24 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: CameraSwarm — Masscan Sweep and Auth Bypass on Dahua Easy4IP (TCP/37777)
Detects masscan-scale scans targeting Dahua Easy4IP protocol on TCP/37777 combined with authentication bypass attempts — the asleep_scanner engine's parallel credential brute-force and p2pwn's CVE-2021-33044/CVE-2021-33045 chain using NetKeyboard ('Not Used' password) or Loopback (127.0.0.1) assertions. Also covers the related community-observed domain sandelo-checker.pw for sibling infrastructure.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1190, T1078.001, T1046, T1595.001
- Data sources: zeek_conn, network_firewall, netflow
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=network sourcetype=bro_conn (dest_port=37777 OR service="dahua" OR service="easy4ip")
| stats count min(ts) as first_seen max(ts) as last_seen by src_ip, dest_ip, proto
| where count > 50
| eval scan_intensity = count / ((last_seen - first_seen) / 60)
| where scan_intensity > 10
| sort - count
| table src_ip, dest_ip, count, scan_intensity, first_seen, last_seen
| eval threat = "CameraSwarm masscan TCP/37777", alert_severity = "high"Microsoft KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemotePort == 37777
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| summarize Connections = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where Connections > 20
| extend ScanIntensity = Connections / datetime_diff('second', LastSeen, FirstSeen) * 60
| where ScanIntensity > 5
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, Connections, ScanIntensity, FirstSeen, LastSeen
| extend Threat = "CameraSwarm masscan TCP/37777", Severity = "high"Sigma
title: CameraSwarm — Masscan-Scale Sweep on Dahua Easy4IP TCP/37777
id: 4a1b6c8d-3e2f-4a5b-9c8d-7e6f5a4b3c2d
status: experimental
description: Detects high-volume connections to Dahua Easy4IP management port TCP/37777 consistent with masscan-scale sweeps (10M pps) against IP camera address space, as used by the asleep_scanner brute-force engine in Operation CameraSwarm. Also covers authentication bypass attempts via CVE-2021-33044 (NetKeyboard 'Not Used' password) and CVE-2021-33045 (Loopback 127.0.0.1 claim).
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-20
references:
- https://hunt.io/blog/operation-cameraswarm-dahua-cameras-compromised
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33044
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33045
- https://github.com/S0Ulle33/asleep_scanner
- https://github.com/thebadinteger/p2pwn
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1078.001
- attack.t1046
- attack.t1595.001
- cve.2021.33044
- cve.2021.33045
- attack.tool.asleep_scanner
- attack.tool.p2pwn
logsource:
category: network
product: zeek
service: conn
detection:
selection_dest_port:
dest_port: 37777
selection_volume:
- conn_state: 'S0'
- conn_state: 'REJ'
- conn_state: 'RSTO'
condition: selection_dest_port and selection_volume
falsepositives:
- Internal IoT monitoring platforms polling camera health via Easy4IP
- Security research scanning from authorized IP ranges
- Legitimate mass camera deployments performing bulk firmware checks
level: highKnown false positives:
- Internal IoT monitoring platforms polling camera health via Easy4IP
- Security research scanning from authorized IP ranges
Tuning notes: Adjust the connection count threshold (50) based on baseline legitimate traffic volume. For environments with Dahua camera fleets, add exceptions for known NVR/VMS monitoring IPs. Correlate with firewall logs to identify scanning originating from outside authorized management subnets. The scan_intensity divisor prevents false positives from slow, long-duration scanning.
- CameraSwarm — Dahua Authentication Bypass via NetKeyboard or Loopback Assertion · unlock with TL Creds
- CameraSwarm — Backdoor Account and Credential Harvesting Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- CameraSwarm — Operator C2 Infrastructure Detection and Lateral Movement Indicators · unlock with TL Creds
- CameraSwarm — Dahua Easy4IP Brute-Force and Enumeration via asleep_scanner · unlock with TL Creds
- CameraSwarm — P2P Relay Protocol Tunneling and Screen Capture Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
- CameraSwarm — Offline Recovery Code Generation (seria2/asfefwq.py) and Cloud-Level Access · unlock with TL Creds
- CameraSwarm — Backdoor Account Creation and Credential Capture on Dahua Cameras · unlock with TL Creds
- CameraSwarm — Credential Exfiltration Over Telegram Bot API via VKontakte Channel · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-08-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 24 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2075.
Sample indicators (3 of 24)
- IP address:
154.86.119[.]60 - Domain:
rogue-orbit-ryzhuuxu[.]expresshost[.]cloud - File hash:
694bfbe44bcd9b4844e15294be74dafe86ff8ae40b8b1067f4dae70a6ef75da8
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 24 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The operator's exposed HTTP server yielded 407 MB of operational data including source code, logs, credentials, camera snapshots, and shell history. A persistent backdoor account (p2pwn/p2password) survives password changes and factory resets on 1,923+ devices.
Hunt.io discovered the CameraSwarm campaign when their AttackCapture system crawled an unprotected HTTP directory on the operator's server (154.86.119.60) on July 23, 2026, recovering 2,616 files across 234 subdirectories (407 MB). The exposure was caused by a Python HTTP server bound to 0.0.0.0:80 from /root, preserved in the operator's shell history.
The campaign employed three parallel attack methods. First, a purpose-built asyncio credential brute-force engine (asleep_scanner, publicly available under the handle d34db33f-1007) targeted Dahua's Easy4IP binary protocol on TCP/37777, compromising 12,324 unique IPs. The engine used masscan at 10 million packets per second, first sweeping Russian address space then the global IPv4 range. It implemented adaptive concurrency scaling to 4,000 workers, kernel tuning for connection tracking, and Dahua-specific binary protocol opcodes (0xA0 login, 0xA8 channel enumeration, 0x11 snapshot capture). Captured credentials and snapshots were exfiltrated to a Telegram channel with a hardcoded VKontakte community link. The engine also produced SMART PSS-compatible XML exports for Dahua's enterprise camera management platform.
Second, the p2pwn tool (a compiled Go binary, SHA-256: 694bfbe44bcd9b4844e15294be74dafe86ff8ae40b8b1067f4dae70a6ef75da8) chained CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 — both critical authentication bypass vulnerabilities (CVSS 9.8, CISA KEV since August 2024). CVE-2021-33044 exploits unconditional trust in clients identifying as NetKeyboard hardware controllers, sending the literal string 'Not Used' as the password. CVE-2021-33045 exploits the firmware reading the claimed source address from the request body rather than the TCP connection, claiming to originate from 127.0.0.1. After bypass, p2pwn installs the account p2pwn/p2password over RPC, which survives password changes and, on most firmware, factory resets. Approximately 1,923 cameras were compromised via this vector across 11 runs.
Third, the cloud-relay attack exploited Dahua's P2P relay infrastructure (easy4ipcloud.com:8800) to reach cameras behind NAT using only serial numbers. The relay uses fixed AES-256-OFB keys and IVs identical across every Dahua client ever shipped, with session-specific keys derived via PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (20,000 iterations). The operator's tooling recovered that 89.4% of live serials returned an open, no-authentication channel. Approximately 283 cameras were reached through this vector. The scannerdahua toolkit further automated serial enumeration across 13 serial prefixes, each brute-forced across a 5-hex-digit suffix (1,048,576 candidates per prefix).
An offline recovery-code generation tool (seria2/asfefwq.py) replicated Dahua's account-recovery flow, deriving valid recovery codes from serial numbers alone — granting cloud-level administrative access independent of device credentials. The hardcoded console title 'CCTV Scanner | discord.gg/cctv' indicates the tool was sourced from a Dahua-exploitation Discord community.
The operator also staged a UPX-packed Windows binary (xeno.exe/1.exe, SHA-256: de03a0ae5c7aa0c237ae36a649875f986fd9701ac06857dd214054367ce5090c) classified as SalatStealer — a Go-based commodity credential and cryptocurrency stealer sold as a service. A five-method PowerShell Defender evasion script was staged alongside it, targeting C:\ wholesale with SYSTEM-context scheduled tasks and Group Policy registry keys, indicating an intended enterprise victim. The identical binary appeared on a second host (185.132.53.56) two days later.
The operator's server hosted a cloned/masqueraded rbc.ru certificate on port 443, shared across over 11,000 addresses worldwide on proxy-typical ports, attributed to a shared proxy-tool default certificate rather than a compromise of RBC or Qrator. A 'Telemt Panel' React SPA management interface was observed on port 8080 (July 28-August 1, 2026), consistent with a Rust-based MTProto circumvention proxy (MTProxyMax).
The article assesses with moderate confidence that the transferable recovery-code design and enterprise-format export pipeline indicate the toolkit was built to hand access to a third party, but this falls short of a confirmed commercial operation. Dahua exploitation is common ground across multiple actors, including a separate Iran-aligned cluster and a Telnet-based Dahua DVR campaign.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery
Execution
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Initial Access
T1078.001 Valid Accounts: Default Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Credential Access
T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying
Collection
Persistence
T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account
Exfiltration
T1567.004 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook
Command and Control
Resource Development
T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
Reconnaissance
T1595.001 Scanning IP Blocks; T1596.005 Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases
defense-impairment
Remediation
Patches
- Apply Dahua SA-2021-0130 firmware patches (available since September 2021) addressing CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045
- Apply firmware updates addressing CVE-2025-31702 (post-authentication privilege escalation)
- Apply mid-2024 or later firmware that restricts P2P relay serial-number-only access
Immediate actions
- Audit all Dahua camera account lists for the account 'p2pwn' and remove it
- Rotate every stored credential on compromised cameras (the chain performs a nine-call credential drain)
- Block TCP port 37777 at perimeter firewalls
- Isolate IoT/camera devices on a separate VLAN with no direct internet access
- Assume recovery codes generated during the campaign remain valid — removing the backdoor account does not invalidate them
Workarounds
- Disable P2P/Easy4IP in camera settings (Settings > Network > Access Platform)
- Block outbound connections to Dahua relay backend addresses (165.154.164.0/23, 128.14.224.0/20, AS135377 UCLOUD)
- Use VPN for remote camera access instead of direct internet exposure
- Change default credentials on all cameras and disable unused accounts
Longer-term hardening
- Disable P2P relay on all cameras where not actively required
- Implement network segmentation for all IoT/surveillance devices
- Deploy behavioral detection for Dahua-specific protocol anomalies
- Monitor for Defender exclusion paths set to C:\, CIM method invocations against MSFT_MpPreference, and unscheduled Group Policy refreshes on Windows estates
- Replace Dahua cameras with patched firmware or alternative vendors where possible
Affected and fixed versions
- Dahua Technology — IPC-HX3XXX Series IP Cameras
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before June 2021
Fixed in: Firmware 2.800.0000000.29.r.210630 and later - Dahua Technology — IPC-HX5XXX Series IP Cameras
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before June 2021
Fixed in: SA-2021-0130 patched firmware - Dahua Technology — IPC-HUM7XXX Series IP Cameras
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before June 2021
Fixed in: SA-2021-0130 patched firmware - Dahua Technology — DH-IPC-K15P / K35P / K35AP / A35P IP Cameras
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before June 2021
Fixed in: SA-2021-0130 patched firmware - Dahua Technology — VTO75X95X / VTO65XXX Video Intercoms
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before December 2019
Fixed in: SA-2021-0130 patched firmware - Dahua Technology — NVR1XXX / NVR2XXX / NVR5XXX / NVR6XX Network Video Recorders
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before December 2019
Fixed in: SA-2021-0130 patched firmware - Dahua Technology — XVR4xxx / XVR5xxx / XVR7xxx XVR Recorders
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before December 2019
Fixed in: SA-2021-0130 patched firmware - Dahua Technology — SD1A1 / SD22 / SD49 / SD50 / SD52C / SD6AL PTZ Dome Cameras
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before June 2021
Fixed in: SA-2021-0130 patched firmware - Dahua Technology — TPC-BF1241 / TPC-BF2221 / TPC-SD2221 Thermal Cameras
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before June 2021
Fixed in: SA-2021-0130 patched firmware - OEM Rebrands (Amcrest, Lorex, Annke, Swann, RVi, ST-XVR, QVC, AC-D, SNR) — Rebranded Dahua Cameras and Recorders
Vulnerable versions: Firmware before June 2021
Fixed in: Check individual vendor for Dahua-based firmware updates
Timeline
- Earliest operating system generation recorded on the operator VPS address (locked-ioc-9) — Ubuntu 22.04 with OpenSSH 8.9p1
- CameraSwarm campaign begins: VPS activated with speedtest measuring uplink at 11:24:08 UTC; masscan rate configured at 10 million packets per second
- Operator server transitions to Debian 13 (OpenSSH 10.0p2) — OS used for the remainder of the campaign
- Operator server transitions from Ubuntu 22.04 to Ubuntu 24.04 (OpenSSH 9.6p1 on port 20001)
- Brute-force engine (asleep_scanner) deployed; largest single credential haul recovered, skewed toward Mexican and Vietnamese consumer ISP ranges
- Operator first tested the P2P cloud relay workflow against cameras behind NAT
- Targeting shifted to Russian and CIS telecom netblocks after initial Mexican/Vietnamese sweeps
- p2pwn CVE-2021-33044/CVE-2021-33045 authentication bypass chain deployed against Ukrainian camera ranges, nearly 3 weeks after relay testing began
- Largest wave of activity; campaign concludes after 35 days with 14,530+ cameras compromised
- Hunt.io AttackCapture system crawls the operator's exposed HTTP directory at 11:45 UTC, recovering 2,616 files (407 MB) across 234 subdirectories
- SalatStealer binary (identical SHA-256) restaged on second host locked-ioc-10 under original filename locked-ioc-14
- Telemt Panel (React SPA management interface, consistent with MTProxyMax) observed active on port 8080 of the operator server, observed through August 1
- Hunt.io notified relevant national CERTs and Dahua PSIRT of the campaign findings
- Hunt.io publishes Operation CameraSwarm technical report detailing the full attack chain, infrastructure, and IOCs
Sources cited
- CVE-2021-33044 - NVD Detail NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2021-10-06
- CVE-2021-33045 - NVD Detail NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2021-10-06
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog - CVE-2021-33044 CISA · Government advisory · 2024-08-21
- Operation CameraSwarm: Over 14,000 Dahua cameras compromised across Ukraine and Russia hunt.io · Research · 2026-08-18
- Dahua Security Advisory SA-2021-0130 dahuasecurity.com · Vendor report · 2021-09-01
- SalatStealer Go-Compiled RAT Analysis intel.breakglass.tech · Research · 2025-07-01
- CVE-2025-31702 - Dahua EoP Research (ITRES Labs) labs.itresit.es · Research · 2025-10-15
- p2pwn - Dahua Camera Exploitation Tool GitHub · Code repository · 2026-01-01
- asleep_scanner - Dahua DVR Brute-Forcing Tool GitHub · Code repository · 2025-01-01
- Dahua Authentication Bypass PoC (PacketStorm) packetstormsecurity.com · Proof of concept · 2021-10-06
- Hackers compromise 14,500 Dahua web cameras in 35-day campaign BleepingComputer · News · 2026-08-19
Other reports on CVE-2021-33044
Previous and next in threat intel
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.