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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-2102

Visa Kernel 3 EMV Protocol Flaw — Zombie Card Relay Attack Enables Expired Contactless Card Purchases

highACTIVE

Researchers from UMass Amherst demonstrated at USENIX Security 2026 that expired Visa contactless cards can complete real purchases via a man-in-the-middle NFC relay attack. The attack exploits how Visa Kernel 3 handles EMV expiration date fields: the terminal-facing Application Expiration Date (Tag 5F24) is not cryptographically bound to the issuer-facing Track 2 Equivalent Data (Tag 57), and modifying it does not invalidate the card's digital signature. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2102
Also known asZombie Card Attack, Zombie Cards Back Online
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsVisa Kernel 3 EMV Contactless Implementation; Multiple Major US Banks Contactless Payment Authorization Systems (Account-Level Validation); Apple Apple Pay via Visa Kernel 3; Google Google Pay via Visa Kernel 3
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-290, CWE-306, CWE-345, CWE-347, CWE-754, CWE-862
ToolsCustom NFC relay framework (CardEmulator + POSEmulator)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1078 Valid Accounts, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1553.002 Code Signing, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, T1565.002 Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation, T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware, T1588.006 Obtain Capabilities: Vulnerabilities, T1684.001 Impersonation, T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinance, retail, ecommerce
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources12 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-21, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2102 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 4 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Expired Contactless Card Authorization — Post-Reissue Dual Transaction Detection

Detects contactless transactions authorized against PANs where the physical card has passed its printed expiration date AND a replacement card has already been issued to the same account. In the Zombie Card attack, Bank A continued processing payments from both the expired original card and its replacement against the same account, indicating account-level rather than instrument-level authorization.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1078, T1656, T1588.006
  • Data sources: card_management_system, payment_authorization_logs
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=card_management sourcetype=card_issuance_log
  | stats latest(_time) as last_reissue_time by account_id, replaced_card_pan
  | outputlookup card_reissue_lookup.csv
  | eval reissue_window_days = (now() - last_reissue_time) / 86400
  | where reissue_window_days <= 90
| index=payment_auth sourcetype=payment_authorization
  | eval card_expired = if(strptime(card_expiry, "%m/%y") < strptime(auth_date, "%Y-%m-%d"), 1, 0)
  | where card_expired = 1
  | search [| inputlookup card_reissue_lookup.csv | fields account_id, replaced_card_pan | rename replaced_card_pan AS card_pan]
  | stats dc(auth_id) as auth_count, sum(transaction_amount) as total_amount, values(merchant_name) as merchants, earliest(_time) as first_auth, latest(_time) as last_auth by account_id, card_pan
  | where auth_count >= 1
  | eval auth_span_hours = (last_auth - first_auth) / 3600
  | eval detection_score = case(
      total_amount > 500, "CRITICAL",
      auth_span_hours > 24, "HIGH — sustained expired card usage",
      1=1, "MEDIUM"
    )
  | table account_id, card_pan, auth_count, total_amount, merchants, first_auth, last_auth, auth_span_hours, detection_score
  | sort - total_amount

Microsoft KQL

let reissue_lookback_days = 90;
CardReissueEvent_CL
| where EventTimestamp_t > ago(reissue_lookback_days * 1d)
| summarize ReissueTime = max(EventTimestamp_t) by AccountId_s, ReplacedCardPAN_s
| join kind=rightsemi (
    PaymentAuthorization_CL
    | where TransactionInterface_s == "contactless_nfc"
    | extend CardExpired = iif(TransactionDate_t > CardExpiryDate_t, true, false)
    | where CardExpired == true
) on $left.ReplacedCardPAN_s == $right.CardPAN
| summarize AuthCount = dcount(AuthorizationId_g), TotalAmount = sum(TransactionAmount_d), Merchants = make_set(MerchantName_s), FirstAuth = min(TransactionDate_t), LastAuth = max(TransactionDate_t) by AccountId_s, CardPAN
| extend AuthSpanHours = datetime_diff('hour', LastAuth, FirstAuth)
| extend DetectionScore = case(
    TotalAmount > 500, "CRITICAL",
    AuthSpanHours > 24, "HIGH - sustained expired card usage",
    "MEDIUM"
  )
| project AccountId_s, CardPAN, AuthCount, TotalAmount, Merchants, FirstAuth, LastAuth, AuthSpanHours, DetectionScore
| order by TotalAmount desc

Sigma

title: Expired Card Authorization — Post-Issuance Dual Transaction Detection
id: c49d5e63-a8f7-60a9-c12b-d3e4f5a6b7c8
status: experimental
description: Detects contactless payment authorizations from card PANs that have passed their printed expiration date AND where a replacement card has already been issued for the same account. In the Zombie Card relay attack, issuers using account-level (PAN-only) validation continue to authorize expired cards alongside active replacements.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-21
modified: 2026-08-21
tags:
  - attack.persistent
  - attack.t1078
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1656
  - attack.resource_development
  - attack.t1588.006
logsource:
  product: payment_authorization
  category: card_issuance_lifecycle
  definition: Card management system logs recording card issuance, reissue events, and authorization transactions with expiry dates and account identifiers
detection:
  selection:
    TransactionInterface|contains: contactless_nfc
  condition_expired:
    CardExpired: true
  condition_reissue:
    ReplacementCardIssued|contains: true
  condition: selection and condition_expired and condition_reissue
falsepositives:
  - Cardholder using replacement card while original card was found after reissue
  - Authorized secondary cardholder using original card before return
  - Prepaid or gift card reload scenarios where the account receives multiple cards
  - Corporate credit card programmes where multiple cards are issued to the same account
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Cardholder finds original card after reissue and uses it before legitimate destruction
  • Authorized secondary cardholder using the original card before it is returned
  • Corporate or commercial card programmes where multiple cards share the same account

Tuning notes: Cross-reference card reissue records with authorization logs; prioritize cases where both the expired original and replacement card transact within hours of each other; exclude known multi-card corporate accounts; monitor for escalating transaction amounts

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Contactless NFC Relay — Duplicate ATC & Sequential Transaction Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Issuer Account-Level Validation Bypass — Instrument-Level Check Absence · unlock with TL Creds
  • NFC Relay APDU Man-in-the-Middle — Session Hijack Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Contactless EMV Tag 5F24 Modification — Expiration Date Manipulation Signature · unlock with TL Creds
  • Digital Wallet Expired Card Steering — CTQ 'Go Online if Expired' Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Card Certificate Validity Overlap — Post-Expiry ARQC Acceptance Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Contactless NFC Relay Attack — Anomalous Transaction Timing Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • EMV TVR Zeroing Anomaly — Kernel 3 Spec B.1.1 Indicator · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-21, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 4 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2102.

4 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Mastercard, American Express, and Discover were unaffected. No CVE assigned; Visa acknowledged and was reproducing the attack as of publication.

Researchers Raja Hasnain Anwar, Gerard DeCunha, and Muhammad Taqi Raza from the University of Massachusetts Amherst Khwarizmi Lab presented the paper 'Zombie Cards Back Online: Reviving Expired Credit Cards for Contactless Payments' at the 35th USENIX Security Symposium (August 12-14, 2026). The attack demonstrates a fundamental design gap in EMV contactless payments: card expiration is enforced as a transaction policy check performed by the POS terminal rather than as a cryptographically verified property of the card itself.

The attack uses two off-the-shelf NFC-capable Android phones — a CardEmulator placed near the POS terminal and a POSEmulator placed near the target expired card — communicating over Wi-Fi to create a relay. During the Data Retrieval phase of the EMV transaction, the relay intercepts the card's READ RECORD response containing the Application Expiration Date (Tag 5F24) and modifies it from an expired date to a future date. The POS terminal sees a valid, unexpired card.

Visa Kernel 3 is uniquely vulnerable due to three structural weaknesses. First, Tag 5F24 is excluded from the Signed Dynamic Application Data (SDAD) — the RSA-based offline data authentication (fDDA) signature does not cover the expiration date, so modifying it does not break cryptographic verification. Second, Kernel 3 specifies that the Terminal Verification Results (TVR) forwarded to the issuer shall be set to all zeros (per Visa specification section B.1.1), preventing the issuing bank from ever learning that the terminal's local expiration check was bypassed. Third, the Card Transaction Qualifier (CTQ) settings for digital wallets (Apple Pay, Google Pay) steer expired transaction outcomes toward online authorization rather than hard rejection, deferring the decision to the issuer which receives a clean TVR.

The researchers tested across five major US banks using SumUp POS terminals. Bank A approved zombie transactions up to $500 in lab testing and completed real purchases of $2.79 at a retail merchant and $3.19 at a grocery merchant. Bank B detected the modification but accepted some transactions. A third bank tested on Discover's kernel detected the edit and declined. The attack also succeeded at most banks when the CDCVM (Consumer Device Cardholder Verification Method) flag was manipulated. Notably, the relay completes well within Visa's 500-millisecond command timing limit — the relay adds approximately 415ms average with ~50ms for date modification.

The underlying cause is that card expiry exists as two representations — Tag 5F24 for the terminal and Tag 57 (Track 2 Equivalent Data) for the issuer — and Visa Kernel 3 does not cryptographically bind them together nor ensure end-to-end integrity. Card certificates issued by banks often remain valid beyond the printed expiration date to accommodate reissue overlaps, so expired cards retain valid cryptographic keys to generate legitimate Authorization Request Cryptograms (ARQCs) for online authorization. Issuers that validate at the Account Level (checking only whether the PAN exists) rather than the Instrument Level (checking the specific card instance, expiry, and Application Transaction Counter) will authorize the modified transaction.

The findings were disclosed to Visa and affected banks in May 2025 with a follow-up in December 2025. Visa acknowledged the report and it passed initial triage, with Visa's red team undergoing attack reproduction. No fixes, CVEs, or mitigations had been publicly confirmed as of the paper's presentation at USENIX Security 2026. The paper recommends cryptographically binding Tag 5F24 into SDAD, removing the TVR zero-out in Kernel 3, enforcing issuer-side instrument-level validation (PAN-and-expiry combination rather than PAN alone), and ensuring end-to-end expiry consistency across all transaction participants.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Persistence

T1078 Valid Accounts

Command and Control

T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol

defense-impairment

T1553.002 Code Signing; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

credential-access

T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Impact

T1565.002 Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation

Resource Development

T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware; T1588.006 Obtain Capabilities: Vulnerabilities

stealth

T1684.001 Impersonation

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Issuers should validate transactions at the Instrument Level (checking PAN + expiry + ATC) rather than Account Level (PAN only)
  • Cardholders should destroy expired cards by cutting through the chip and magnetic stripe before disposal; dispose of remains in separate trash receptacles
  • Retailers and acquirers should verify that POS terminals are using EMV kernels that cryptographically bind expiry data
  • Issuers should reject authorization requests where TVR indicates expired application was detected and overridden

Workarounds

  • Disable contactless transactions on expired cards at the issuer level
  • Implement issuer-side monitoring for transactions from cards with mismatched expiry dates across authorization fields
  • Deploy POS terminals with additional verification of offline data authentication results

Longer-term hardening

  • Visa must include Tag 5F24 in SDAD so the expiration date is covered by the card's RSA signature
  • Visa must revise Kernel 3 specification to forward genuine TVR values to issuers rather than zeroing them out
  • Payment networks should mandate end-to-end consistency between terminal-facing and issuer-facing expiry representations
  • EMVCo should standardize cryptographic binding of lifecycle metadata across all kernels
  • Consider deployment of relay resistance protocols (PayPass-RRP, L1RP, or UWB-based PURE) in POS terminals
  • Certificate issuance policies should align certificate validity with card lifecycle and expiry dates

Affected and fixed versions

  • Visa — Kernel 3 EMV Contactless Implementation
    Vulnerable versions: All versions of Kernel 3 as specified in VSDC Contact & Contactless U.S. Acquirer Implementation Guide
  • Multiple Major US Banks — Contactless Payment Authorization Systems (Account-Level Validation)
    Vulnerable versions: Issuers validating at Account Level (PAN-only check)
  • Apple — Apple Pay via Visa Kernel 3
    Vulnerable versions: All versions using Visa Kernel 3 CTQ settings
  • Google — Google Pay via Visa Kernel 3
    Vulnerable versions: All versions using Visa Kernel 3 CTQ settings

Timeline

  • Researchers Raja Hasnain Anwar, Gerard DeCunha, and Muhammad Taqi Raza disclose the Zombie Card vulnerability to Visa and affected US banks, including detailed technical findings and attack reproduction steps
  • Follow-up disclosure outreach to Visa; Visa acknowledges the report, it passes initial triage, and Visa's red team begins reproducing the attack
  • Paper 'Zombie Cards Back Online: Reviving Expired Credit Cards for Contactless Payments' accepted at the 35th USENIX Security Symposium
  • Researchers confirm the attack on SumUp POS terminals in controlled laboratory conditions using custom NFC relay software on two Android phones, validating the full APDU interception and Tag 5F24 modification chain
  • Researchers conduct live field testing at retail merchants and grocery stores using their own expired and replaced Visa cards; successful real purchases of $2.79 at retail and $3.19 at grocery merchants completed at Bank A
  • Paper presented at USENIX Security 2026 conference in Baltimore, MD; full technical details of the Kernel 3 vulnerability, relay architecture, bank testing results across five major US banks, and countermeasure proposals released publicly
  • The Register publishes first major media coverage; Visa declines to comment on the record; no fixes confirmed
  • TechSpot, UMass Amherst News, Cybersecurity News, and The Hacker News publish articles detailing the Zombie Card attack; UMass researchers issue cardholder disposal guidance (demagnetize strip, destroy chip, shred card)
  • Visa has not deployed fixes; Kernel 3 continues to be deployed in millions of POS terminals globally; attack remains feasible for any attacker with two NFC-capable Android phones
  • Security Affairs publishes coverage; attack remains unpatched with no CVE assigned and no confirmed mitigations from Visa; global impact across Visa contactless payment infrastructure

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.

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