# Ransomware Attack Vectors: Cyble Maps Five Endpoint Blind Spots Behind the 2025-2026 Ransomware Surge

> Cyble's August 2026 landscape report maps five recurring endpoint blind spots ransomware operators exploit for access and persistence: abused remote-access tooling (VPN/RDP/RMM), credential harvesting on compromised endpoints, vendor/supply-chain island hopping, unpatched OT/ICS bridged to corporate IT, and highly targeted business-email phishing. It documents Qilin affiliates abusing WinSCP, AnyDesk, and ScreenConnect for lateral movement plus BYOVD to disable EDR, and CRIL-tracked operators using Mimikatz and NirSoft utilities for credential theft.

- **Published:** 2026-08-22T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-22T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2110
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-qilin-endpoint-blind-spot-exploitation-tl-2026-2110.webp?v=4a7f8f1a (Threadlinqs threat intel: Qilin: Five Endpoint Blind Spots: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2110) — Medium severity, 18 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2110
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** RANSOMWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Qilin
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 18
- **CVEs:** CVE-2025-68947

## Description

Cyble published "Ransomware Attack Vectors and Endpoint Blind Spots" on 2026-08-21, synthesizing its 2025-2026 ransomware telemetry into five recurring blind spots that operators exploit to gain and keep access. The report sits against a landscape in which Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) tracked 6,604 ransomware attacks in 2025 (up 52% from 4,346 in 2024), catalogued 57 new ransomware groups and 27 new extortion groups, and identified more than 350 new ransomware strains, the majority built on the MedusaLocker, Chaos, and Makop codebases. Emerging groups adopted double extortion immediately to maximize leverage.

Blind spot 1 (remote-access abuse): Qilin affiliates abuse WinSCP, AnyDesk, and ScreenConnect for lateral movement, then pivot across SMB, RDP, WinRM, and PsExec, typically exfiltrating within 3-5 days of initial access before detonating a Rust-based encryptor. In October 2025, Qilin was observed combining a Linux-based ransomware payload deployed on Windows hosts (via WinSCP/Splashtop) with a BYOVD exploit in a hybrid attack chain, and in 2025 the group added a DDoS capability as a third extortion lever alongside encryption and leak-site pressure.

Blind spot 2 (credential harvesting on compromised endpoints): CRIL tracks a staged credential-theft toolkit combining Mimikatz with NirSoft utilities (WebBrowserPassView, BypassCredGuard, SharpDecryptPwd) and a WDigest registry modification that forces Windows to cache plaintext credentials, feeding downstream LSASS dumping. This is frequently paired with BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) to blind EDR/AV before the credential toolkit or encryptor runs; documented 2025-2026 BYOVD cases include a December 2025 Talos-tracked DeadLock ransomware loader abusing a vulnerable Baidu Antivirus driver to kill EDR processes and disable Windows Defender, and a February 2026 Reynolds ransomware sample that embedded a vulnerable NsecSoft driver (CVE-2025-68947) directly in its payload.

Blind spot 3 (vendor/supply-chain island hopping): nation-state actor Silk Typhoon breached MSPs and cloud/remote-management providers via VPN zero-days, password spraying, and misconfigured privileged access, then pivoted into downstream customer environments using inherited admin credentials and compromised service principals. China-aligned PlushDaemon trojanized a South Korean VPN vendor's installer with the SlowStepper backdoor, turning a trusted remote-access tool into an espionage vector. On the ransomware side, newly emerged groups RALord/Nova, Warlock, Sinobi, The Gentlemen, and BlackNevas specifically targeted software supply chains, concentrating on the IT & ITES, Technology, and Transportation & Logistics sectors, while Cl0p's exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities produced downstream supply-chain impact across more than 118 entities globally. Software supply-chain attacks overall rose 93% year-over-year to 297 in 2025, with ransomware groups responsible for more than half.

Blind spot 4 (OT/ICS bridged to corporate IT): 119 ransomware groups targeted industrial organizations in 2025, a 49% increase from 80 in 2024, and 3,300 industrial organizations were hit versus 1,693 in 2024, with manufacturing the most-targeted vertical. Only 30% of OT networks retain monitoring capable of detecting an intrusion before operational impact, 81% of assessed environments have poor IT/OT segmentation, and the all-time average OT ransomware dwell time is 42 days -- IT/OT convergence lets ransomware that lands on the corporate network reach the plant floor largely unseen.

Blind spot 5 (targeted business-email phishing): phishing and malicious email account for roughly 37% of ransomware initial access. Highly targeted, often AI-generated phishing now achieves click rates up to 54% versus 12% for conventional lures, and the fastest 2025 intrusions reached data exfiltration in as little as 72 minutes from initial access.

Cyble's own Jan-Apr 2025 Ransomware Threat Landscape report frames the acute end of this trend: global ransomware incidents rose 86% quarter-over-quarter, Cl0p alone accounted for 28% of that period's activity, and in February-March 2025 Cl0p compromised more than 330 victims via Oracle E-Business Suite exploitation -- described as the most intense ransomware surge publicly recorded to that point. Newly emerged groups such as Devman, Sinobi, Warlock, and Gunra concentrated heightened attacks on Government & LEA and Energy & Utilities critical-infrastructure targets during the same window.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1566 Phishing
- T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1003.001 LSASS Memory
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Unauthorized RMM/Remote-Access Tool Execution (AnyDesk/ScreenConnect/WinSCP)** (`TL-2026-2110-SPL-001`)

Detects execution of AnyDesk, ScreenConnect/ConnectWise Control, or WinSCP outside an approved allow-list — the primary blind-spot-1 initial-access/persistence vector Qilin affiliates abuse for lateral movement per Cyble's 2025-2026 ransomware telemetry (6,604 attacks in 2025).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1219, T1133, T1199
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_telemetry
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(anydesk|screenconnect|connectwisecontrol)\.exe$") OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)(anydesk|screenconnect|winscp)") OR match(Image, "(?i)winscp\.exe$")
| stats earliest(_time) as first_time latest(_time) as last_time count by host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage
| where count > 0
| eval alert_reason="Unauthorized/unexpected RMM tool execution (AnyDesk/ScreenConnect/WinSCP) — Qilin remote-access abuse pattern"
| table first_time, last_time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, count, alert_reason
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has_any ("AnyDesk.exe", "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe", "ConnectWiseControl.Client.exe", "WinSCP.exe")
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("anydesk", "screenconnect", "winscp")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| extend AlertReason = "Remote-access/RMM tool execution outside approved allow-list (Qilin blind-spot #1: WinSCP/AnyDesk/ScreenConnect abuse)"
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Unauthorized RMM/Remote-Access Tool Execution (AnyDesk/ScreenConnect/WinSCP)
id: 6f1a2e10-9c3d-4b7a-8e21-1a2b3c4d5e01
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of RMM/remote-access binaries (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, WinSCP) abused by Qilin affiliates for initial persistence and lateral tool transfer.
references:
  - https://cyble.com/blog/ransomware-attack-vectors-endpoint-blind-spots/
  - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uncovering-qilin-attack-methods-exposed-through-multiple-cases/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-22
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1219
  - attack.t1133
  - attack.t1199
  - attack.tool.anydesk
  - attack.tool.screenconnect
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\AnyDesk.exe'
      - '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
      - '\ConnectWiseControl.Client.exe'
      - '\WinSCP.exe'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Approved IT helpdesk use of an allow-listed RMM tool
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate IT helpdesk sessions using an already-approved, allow-listed RMM tool with a ticketed change record

**Tuning notes:** Seed an allow-list of approved RMM tool binaries/hashes and their authorized operator accounts; suppress matches from that pairing and alert only on new binaries, new operators, or execution outside change-managed maintenance windows.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Targeted Phishing Delivery Followed by Office-Spawned LOLBin Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- BYOVD Vulnerable-Driver Load Disabling EDR/Defender (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Single Account Driving RMM Sessions (AnyDesk/ScreenConnect) Across Multiple Hosts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- WinSCP-Staged Cross-Platform Payload Drop (Linux-on-Windows Hybrid Chain) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Suspicious Process Access to LSASS Memory (Mimikatz-Class Credential Dumping) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Vendor/MSP-Trusted Session Followed by Bulk Outbound Transfer (Island-Hopping Pre-Extortion Exfil) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- WDigest Plaintext-Credential Caching + Mimikatz/NirSoft Credential Toolkit Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Valid-Account SMB/RDP/WinRM/PsExec Lateral Movement Burst (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [Ransomware Attack Vectors and Endpoint Blind Spots](https://cyble.com/blog/ransomware-attack-vectors-endpoint-blind-spots/)
- [Ransomware Threat Landscape: Jan-Apr 2025 Report](https://cyble.com/resources/research-reports/ransomware-threat-landscape-jan-apr-2025/)
- [Ransomware Attacks And Supply Chain Threats In 2025](https://cyble.com/blog/ransomware-attacks-supply-chain-threat-landscape/)
- [10 New Ransomware Groups Of 2025 & Threat Trends For 2026](https://cyble.com/knowledge-hub/10-new-ransomware-groups-of-2025-threat-trend-2026/)
- [Qilin Ransomware Combines Linux Payload With BYOVD Exploit in Hybrid Attack](https://thehackernews.com/2025/10/qilin-ransomware-combines-linux-payload.html)
- [Uncovering Qilin attack methods exposed through multiple cases](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uncovering-qilin-attack-methods-exposed-through-multiple-cases/)
- [BYOVD Attack Surge: 54 EDR Killers Exploiting 35 Signed Vulnerable Drivers in 2026](https://bellatorcyber.com/blog/edr-killers-byovd-signed-vulnerable-drivers-2026)
- [Manufacturing Cybersecurity Statistics 2026: OT Risk & Ransomware](https://deepstrike.io/blog/manufacturing-cybersecurity-statistics)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2110
