# 24 Malicious npm Packages Abuse Registry Mirrors as Phishing Infrastructure (Fake Cloudflare/Microsoft Login Pages)

> OX Security identified 24 npm packages (published 2026-08-04 to 2026-08-24) whose only payload is a single HTML file impersonating a Cloudflare Turnstile verification screen; obfuscated JavaScript in the page queries a redirect target and sends visitors on to phishing or attacker-chosen infrastructure. The technique abuses npm/unpkg/npmmirror/Tencent mirrors as free, takedown-resistant hosting and has evolved from a hardcoded typosquat domain to a legitimate key-value service used as a dead-drop resolver.

- **Published:** 2026-08-26T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-26T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2150
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-npm-clickfix-phishing-mirrors-tl-2026-2150.webp?v=8ffdc58a (Threadlinqs threat intel: 24 Malicious npm Packages Host ClickFix: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2150) — Medium severity, 20 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2150
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 20 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Security researcher inf0stache first spotted this technique in July 2026 in an npm package named 'china_airlines,' which rendered a fake Cloudflare verification page and redirected visitors to the attacker domain microcloud[.]homes. In August 2026, OX Security identified a much larger, related cluster of 24 npm packages published between August 4 and August 24, 2026 (e.g. bgzxcuite2, prezdentkxheiw, ndmxchdjxn2, @worrisome/reutil) that repeat the same pattern: each package contains almost nothing but a single index.html styled as a Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA or a Microsoft login page, plus a package.json. Installing or importing these packages does not execute code or infect a developer's machine — OX Security explicitly notes the threat actor's use of npm 'isn't to infect developers who install it, but to use the registry and its mirrors as a safe, validated storage for the malware.' The danger is that mirror services (unpkg, npmmirror, Yarn's registry mirror, and Tencent Cloud's npm mirror) expose individual package files directly over HTTP(S), so a URL like https://unpkg.com/ndmxchdjxn2@1.0.0/index.html renders as a live, fully-functional phishing page hosted on a trusted, high-reputation CDN domain — one that bypasses reputation-based web filtering and survives npm registry takedowns because mirror copies of a removed package persist indefinitely.

The obfuscated JavaScript embedded in the HTML does not hardcode its final destination. The earliest observed variant redirected to the typosquatted domain login[.]microsofte[.]live (a fake Microsoft login lure); the current variant instead queries api.keyval.org, a legitimate free key-value storage API, to fetch an attacker-controlled redirect URL at runtime — a dead-drop resolver pattern (MITRE T1102.001) that lets the operators rotate the phishing/redirect destination without republishing or modifying the npm package itself. At the time of OX Security's research the resolved destination pointed to the legitimate ChatGPT website, which the researchers characterize as inert/benign staging rather than the final intended use — they explicitly warn the same infrastructure 'could be weaponized to deliver ClickFix or any other phishing domains.' The explicit reference to ClickFix (MITRE T1204.004, User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste) signals the intended endgame: using the fake-CAPTCHA page as a lure to get victims to copy-paste and execute an attacker-supplied command, a technique that has driven recent Latrodectus, Lumma Stealer, and NetSupport RAT infections industry-wide.

Severity nuance: GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-35pm-fj6m-m6v6 / OSV MAL-2026-13785, issued for one of the packages (bgzxcuite2, published 2026-08-12), classifies it under CWE-506 (Embedded Malicious Code) and states systems with it installed should be considered 'fully compromised' — OX Security's own analysis contradicts this blanket framing, clarifying that installing the packages is harmless and victims can only be affected after being lured to open the rendered HTML and then following a subsequent ClickFix or credential-phishing flow. This is a live, low-noise campaign (each package saw only 50-300 weekly downloads before removal) that functions as reusable phishing infrastructure rather than a conventional software-supply-chain compromise; it is conceptually related to, but distinct from, the October 2025 'Beamglea' campaign (175 npm packages, documented by Socket) that abused the unpkg CDN in a similar way for credential-harvesting redirects.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Direct Browser Retrieval of Raw index.html from npm/unpkg Mirror CDN (Fake Turnstile/MS Login Delivery)** (`TL-2026-2150-SPL-001`)

Detects direct HTTP GET requests to npm registry mirror CDNs (unpkg.com, npmmirror.com, Tencent Cloud npm mirror, Yarn registry mirror) for a package's raw index.html file — the delivery mechanism OX Security documented for 24 npm packages whose only payload is a fake Cloudflare Turnstile or Microsoft login page. Legitimate package-manager traffic requests tarballs/metadata via registry.npmjs.org or resolves through npm/yarn/pnpm clients with characteristic Accept/User-Agent headers; a browser navigating straight to a mirror's /index.html path is the phishing-page-render trigger.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1608, T1195, T1566, T1036
- **Data sources:** web_proxy, zscaler, palo_alto_threat, dns
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy (sourcetype=squid:access OR sourcetype=zscaler:web OR sourcetype=pan:threat) dest_host IN ("unpkg.com", "npmmirror.com", "registry.npmmirror.com", "mirrors.cloud.tencent.com", "registry.yarnpkg.com")
| rex field=uri_path "(?<pkg_path>[^/]+@[0-9\.]+/index\.html)"
| where isnotnull(pkg_path)
| eval is_browser_ua=if(match(http_user_agent, "(?i)(Mozilla|Chrome|Safari|Edg)") AND NOT match(http_user_agent, "(?i)(npm|yarn|pnpm|node-fetch|axios)"), 1, 0)
| where is_browser_ua=1 AND method="GET" AND (status=200 OR status=304)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(uri_path) as paths by src_ip, dest_host, http_user_agent
| where count>=1
| sort -last_seen
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("unpkg.com", "npmmirror.com", "registry.npmmirror.com", "mirrors.cloud.tencent.com")
| where RemoteUrl matches regex @"[^/]+@[0-9.]+/index\.html"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "iexplore.exe", "brave.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), Hits=count(), Paths=make_set(RemoteUrl) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by LastSeen desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Direct Browser Access to npm Mirror CDN Raw index.html (Fake CAPTCHA/Login Phishing Delivery)
id: 9c3f2a4e-1b6d-4e7a-8f21-6d0b5a9c2e11
status: experimental
description: Detects a browser process fetching a package's raw index.html directly from an npm mirror CDN (unpkg, npmmirror, Tencent Cloud npm mirror), matching the OX Security-documented technique of hosting fake Cloudflare Turnstile / Microsoft login phishing pages as npm package payloads.
references:
  - https://www.ox.security/blog/research-clickfix-phishing-npm-packages/
  - https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/24-npm-packages-abuse-unpkg-mirrors-to.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-26
tags:
  - attack.resource-development
  - attack.t1608
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1195
  - attack.t1566
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1036
  - cwe.506
  - cwe.451
logsource:
  category: proxy
  product: web
detection:
  selection_host:
    c-uri|contains:
      - 'unpkg.com'
      - 'npmmirror.com'
      - 'registry.npmmirror.com'
      - 'mirrors.cloud.tencent.com'
  selection_path:
    c-uri|re: '[^/]+@[0-9.]+/index\.html'
  filter_client:
    cs-user-agent|contains:
      - 'npm/'
      - 'yarn/'
      - 'pnpm/'
      - 'node-fetch'
      - 'axios'
  condition: selection_host and selection_path and not filter_client
falsepositives:
  - Developers or security researchers intentionally auditing a package's raw mirror contents in a browser
  - Automated SBOM/dependency-scanning tools that render or fetch HTML payloads for static analysis
level: medium
```

**Known false positives:**

- Developers or researchers manually browsing to a package's mirror URL to audit its contents
- Automated dependency/SBOM scanners that fetch and render package HTML assets for static analysis

**Tuning notes:** Extend the dest_host/RemoteUrl allowlist as new mirror hosts are confirmed (e.g. additional Yarn/Verdaccio mirrors); allowlist known internal SBOM/SCA tooling user-agents to cut noise; narrow to first-seen-per-host in the last 24h once a baseline of legitimate mirror traffic is established.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Sentinel: Browser Navigation to Spoofed Cloudflare Turnstile / Microsoft Login Page Hosted on npm Mirror (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sentinel: Clipboard-Paste Command Execution Chained to Fake Turnstile/Login Page Visit (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sentinel: keyval.org Dead-Drop Query Chained to Newly-Resolved External Redirect Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma: Web Proxy Access to Malicious npm-Mirror-Hosted Phishing HTML (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma: ClickFix Encoded-Command Execution via Explorer-Spawned Interpreter (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma: DNS/Proxy Query for keyval.org Dead-Drop Resolver Endpoint (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix-Style Run-Dialog Command Execution Following npm-Mirror Phishing Page Visit (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Dead-Drop Resolver Callback to [indicator] Followed by Redirect to Rotated Phishing Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 20)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `login[.]microsofte[.]live`
- Domain: `microcloud[.]homes`
- Domain: `api[.]keyval[.]org`

Full set of 20 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [24 Malicious npm Packages](https://cybersecuritynews.com/24-malicious-npm-packages/)
- [ClickFix Phishing Pages Discovered in 24 npm Packages](https://www.ox.security/blog/research-clickfix-phishing-npm-packages/)
- [24 npm Packages Abuse unpkg Mirrors to Host Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA Pages](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/24-npm-packages-abuse-unpkg-mirrors-to.html)
- [Hackers abuse npm mirrors to host phishing redirect pages](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-npm-mirrors-to-host-phishing-redirect-pages/)
- [MAL-2026-13785 — bgzxcuite2 malicious package report](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13785)
- [GHSA-35pm-fj6m-m6v6 — bgzxcuite2 embedded malicious code](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35pm-fj6m-m6v6)
- [npm package registry entry — bgzxcuite2@1.0.0](https://www.npmjs.com/package/bgzxcuite2/v/1.0.0)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2150
