# Dark Caracal Expands Espionage Arsenal with GoCaracal Framework and AsioGate Backdoor

> Dark Caracal, a Lebanese mercenary espionage group with medium-confidence links to the General Directorate of General Security (GDGS), has fielded GoCaracal, a previously undocumented modular Go-based framework, alongside an updated Bandook variant, the C++ AsioGate backdoor (first reported by Kaspersky in February 2026), and a novel Ethereum smart-contract C2 fallback dubbed BulletproofC2. Arctic Wolf Labs documented the tooling during a June 2026 intrusion at a Venezuelan communications organization, part of a broader phishing campaign targeting Spanish-speaking Latin America.

- **Published:** 2026-08-26T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-26T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2158
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-dark-caracal-asiogate-toolkit-tl-2026-2158.webp?v=2b026280 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Dark Caracal AsioGate Backdoor Expansion: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2158) — High severity, 28 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2158
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Dark Caracal (Lebanon)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Arctic Wolf Labs disclosed a refreshed Dark Caracal malware arsenal deployed against a Venezuelan communications organization in June 2026, with moderate-confidence spillover into Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Uruguay. The intrusion began with Spanish-language, tax/financial-themed phishing emails carrying a weaponized SVG attachment. The SVG embeds a Base64-encoded shortened URL that redirects the victim's browser through an intermediate redirector to getpdfdigital[.]cloud, an attacker-controlled staging site, which serves a 7-Zip archive containing a lightweight GoCaracal implant (tf-oficina004a9.exe). That implant deploys a Delphi loader, which in turn delivers an extended GoCaracal build plus a payload of the Bandook remote-access trojan.

GoCaracal is a previously undocumented modular framework written in Go. Arctic Wolf reconstructed its development across four phases from January to July 2026: a January foundation phase building core communications and host-profiling code; a February-April phase reorganizing the codebase into reusable modules and adding antivirus/security-software discovery and interactive shell functionality; a May-June phase expanding the extended build with self-update capability; and a June-July phase operationalizing a blockchain-based C2 fallback and registering new delivery domains. GoCaracal's lightweight build uses a custom packet protocol with AES-GCM encryption and numeric packet identifiers; its extended build adds code/shellcode injection, an interactive command shell for the operator, and the ability to query the Ethereum blockchain for C2 configuration via public eth_getStorageAt JSON-RPC calls.

The most novel element is BulletproofC2: a custom Solidity smart contract (0x03D605f13A74Bfb6149078122FcF62BD6d8799d8) deployed to Ethereum mainnet on 2026-05-20 after prior trials on the Sepolia testnet, which stores a single owner-mutable value (observed holding both public IPs and RFC 1918 addresses) that infected hosts poll to learn current C2 infrastructure. Three additional, apparently identical contracts were deployed from the same management wallet (0x7D321FE277f8c25aaC14aF1BA3Fc34953242052F), giving the operators a resilient, censorship-resistant fallback channel that is difficult to take down via conventional domain/IP blocking.

Alongside GoCaracal, Dark Caracal deployed an updated Bandook variant with randomized command identifiers (replacing the historical sequential @0001-@0136 numbering) and obfuscated, generically named plugin exports, with a reduced set of roughly 82 command handlers versus older builds. Persistence on both malware families relies on Windows Registry Run-key manipulation, including a concealed NTUSER.MAN artifact tied to the Run-key workflow. GoCaracal infrastructure preferentially uses AEZA Group hosting, while Bandook C2 infrastructure is hosted primarily via AlexHost.

Arctic Wolf attributes the campaign to Dark Caracal (MITRE ATT&CK G0070) with medium confidence, based on the continued use of Bandook, recurring Delphi-loader characteristics, Spanish-language tax-themed phishing lures, malicious-SVG delivery, URL-shortener abuse, document-themed staging infrastructure, and consistent LATAM targeting matching the group's established pattern. Dark Caracal has been linked with medium confidence to Lebanon's General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) since at least 2012, and has historically targeted governments, businesses, journalists, and activists using malware including Bandook, CrossRAT, FinFisher, and the Android RAT Pallas. The group's most recent prior documented LATAM operation used Poco RAT against banking, manufacturing, healthcare, pharmaceutical, and logistics enterprises in Venezuela, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Ecuador via similar Spanish-language invoice-themed phishing. Arctic Wolf assesses GoCaracal is augmenting, not yet replacing, Bandook, with functional overlap in remote access, execution, payload delivery, and intelligence collection.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1012 Query Registry
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1573 Encrypted Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GoCaracal Extended Build / Bandook Persistence, Discovery & Injection (SPL)** (`TL-2026-2158-SPL-002`)

Detects post-exploitation behavior from the Delphi loader (7676230602qq.exe) that delivers the GoCaracal extended build (vrjdl_21812.exe) and the updated Bandook RAT payload: Registry Run-key persistence including the concealed NTUSER.MAN artifact, security-software and process discovery, registry querying, process/shellcode injection into system processes, and browser credential-store access.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1547.001, T1055, T1518.001, T1012, T1555.003, T1056.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_registry_events, windows_security, m365_defender_device_registry_events, m365_defender_device_events
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
(
  (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*" (Image="*\\vrjdl_21812.exe" OR Image="*\\7676230602qq.exe" OR Details="*AppData\\Roaming*" OR Details="*NTUSER.MAN*"))
  OR (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*NTUSER.MAN*")
  OR (EventCode=8 (SourceImage="*\\vrjdl_21812.exe" OR SourceImage="*\\7676230602qq.exe"))
  OR (EventCode=10 TargetImage IN ("*\\lsass.exe","*\\explorer.exe","*\\svchost.exe") SourceImage IN ("*\\vrjdl_21812.exe","*\\7676230602qq.exe"))
  OR (EventCode=1 ParentImage IN ("*\\vrjdl_21812.exe","*\\7676230602qq.exe") (CommandLine="*tasklist*" OR CommandLine="*wmic*process*" OR CommandLine="*reg query*" OR CommandLine="*Uninstall*"))
  OR Hashes IN ("*8C03D072DF2E1BF14B0C00A8AB99834138C8B69F301849BF09CB44394E916015*","*0A6DA70548F14834ACB8960689A589B48FF422F8385AE445A281AAB77045FE22*","*A2CDF2FE741DE4B13AD2298B387A6C32DA4A94DA180AE75BF8547386AEE7376B*")
)
| eval technique=case(EventCode=13 OR match(CommandLine,"NTUSER\.MAN"),"T1547.001_run_key_persistence", EventCode=8,"T1055_process_injection", EventCode=10,"T1055_process_access", match(CommandLine,"tasklist|wmic|reg query"),"T1518.001_T1012_discovery", true(),"gocaracal_bandook_artifact")
| stats count, values(technique) as techniques, earliest(_time) as first_seen, latest(_time) as last_seen by ComputerName, Image, User
| where count > 0
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let DropperHashes = dynamic(["8c03d072df2e1bf14b0c00a8ab99834138c8b69f301849bf09cb44394e916015","0a6da70548f14834acb8960689a589b48ff422f8385ae445a281aab77045fe22","a2cdf2fe741de4b13ad2298b387a6c32da4a94da180ae75bf8547386aee7376b"]);
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has @"CurrentVersion\Run" and (InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("vrjdl_21812.exe","7676230602qq.exe") or RegistryValueData has "AppData\\Roaming" or RegistryValueData has "NTUSER.MAN")
| extend Technique = "T1547.001_run_key_persistence"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Detail = RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName, Technique
| union (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where SHA256 in (DropperHashes) or FileName in~ ("vrjdl_21812.exe","7676230602qq.exe")
    | extend Technique = "T1055_gocaracal_bandook_delivery"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Detail = ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName = FileName, Technique
)
| union (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("vrjdl_21812.exe","7676230602qq.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("tasklist", "wmic process", "reg query")
    | extend Technique = "T1518.001_T1012_discovery"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Detail = ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, Technique
)
| union (
    DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType has "CredentialStore" or ActionType has "BrowserCredential"
    | extend Technique = "T1555.003_browser_credential_access"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Detail = ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName, Technique
)
| sort by Timestamp asc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Dark Caracal GoCaracal/Bandook Persistence, Discovery, and Injection Post-Exploitation Chain
id: 9c2d3e4f-5a6b-4c7d-8e9f-0a1b2c3d4e5f
status: experimental
description: Detects Registry Run-key persistence (including the concealed NTUSER.MAN artifact), security-software/process discovery, and process injection consistent with GoCaracal extended build and updated Bandook post-exploitation activity in the Dark Caracal 2026 LATAM campaign.
references:
    - https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/dark-caracal-reloaded-new-malware-same-hunting-grounds/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-26
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1518.001
    - attack.t1012
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1555.003
    - attack.g0070
    - attack.tool.bandook
logsource:
    category: registry_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_run_key:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run\'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\vrjdl_21812.exe'
            - '\7676230602qq.exe'
    selection_appdata_or_ntuserman_value:
        TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run\'
        Details|contains:
            - 'AppData\Roaming'
            - 'NTUSER.MAN'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software installers writing Run-key entries under AppData (verify binary hash/path against known-good inventory before escalating)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Endpoint management or AV/EDR agents performing legitimate process/registry discovery and Run-key writes under AppData; scope to the named binaries and hashes to reduce noise

**Tuning notes:** Keylogging (T1056.001) and browser credential access (T1555.003) rarely leave a discrete Sysmon/registry event on their own — pair this detection with DLL/API-hook EDR telemetry (SetWindowsHookEx, browser credential DB file reads) where available, and update dropper hashes as new Delphi-loader/GoCaracal-extended-build samples surface.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Dark Caracal SVG Phishing to GoCaracal Staging & Dropper Execution (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoCaracal Extended Build / Bandook Persistence, Discovery & Injection (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoCaracal/Bandook C2 Beaconing & BulletproofC2 Ethereum RPC Fallback (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Dark Caracal SVG Phishing to GoCaracal Staging & Dropper Execution (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoCaracal Extended Build / Bandook Persistence, Discovery & Injection (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoCaracal/Bandook C2 Beaconing & BulletproofC2 Ethereum RPC Fallback (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Dark Caracal SVG Phishing to GoCaracal Staging & Dropper Execution (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoCaracal/Bandook C2 Beaconing & BulletproofC2 Ethereum RPC Fallback (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `109.120.187[.]217`
- Domain: `getpdfdigital[.]cloud`
- File hash: `1e499c815146124c4a6d2b48c99068b980ad74e1a2cfd16013f8d75a9425a0ca`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Dark Caracal Reloaded: New Malware, Same Hunting Grounds](https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/dark-caracal-reloaded-new-malware-same-hunting-grounds/)
- [Dark Caracal adds new malware to cyber espionage arsenal](https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/dark-caracal-adds-new-malware-cyber-espionage-arsenal)
- [Dark Caracal delivers brand-new backdoor using SVG-based techniques](https://content.kaspersky-labs.com/fm/site-editor/0d/0dbe39494a07eb39cd9e117ac26fcb1c/source/dark-caracal-delivers-brand-new-backdoor-using-svg-based-techniques.pdf)
- [Dark Caracal, Group G0070](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070/)
- [Dark Caracal Uses Poco RAT to Target Spanish-Speaking Enterprises in Latin America](https://thehackernews.com/2025/03/dark-caracal-uses-poco-rat-to-target.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2158
