# CISA Red Team Fully Compromises Two Critical Infrastructure Orgs via ADCS ESC1 and AzureHound Cloud Enumeration (AA26-237A)

> CISA advisory AA26-237A, "A Tale of Two SOCs," documents two simultaneous authorized red team assessments — one against a Government Services and Facilities Sector organization, one against a Water and Wastewater Systems Sector organization — that used identical tradecraft (default credentials, phishing, ADCS ESC1 certificate abuse, DCSync/Golden Ticket, AzureHound/ROADrecon cloud enumeration, Microsoft Graph API abuse) to achieve full Active Directory and cloud compromise. One SOC never detected the intrusion amid thousands of higher-severity false positives; the other contained the initial phishing within 2-20 minutes and later caught the cloud-enumeration phase via Entra ID risky-user alerts on the AzureHound user agent and anomalous Graph API volume.

- **Published:** 2026-08-26T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-26T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2161
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-cisa-aa26-237a-red-team-assessment-tl-2026-2161.webp?v=3b8122bf (Threadlinqs threat intel: AA26-237A: One SOC Detected, One Failed: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2161) — High severity, 10 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2161
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 10

## Description

On 2026-08-25, CISA published AA26-237A, comparing two concurrent red team assessments run with the same tradecraft against critical infrastructure organizations to illustrate how detection maturity — not tooling — determines outcome.

Against Organization A (Government Services and Facilities Sector), the red team found a web application still using default credentials for built-in accounts, used that foothold to send phishing emails from a trusted internal address, and landed payloads on four workstations. From there it abused the domain's default Machine Account Quota (MAQ) to add unauthorized machine accounts, then exploited an ESC1-class misconfiguration in Active Directory Certificate Services — templates with `CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` enabled and client-authentication EKUs — to request certificates impersonating privileged accounts. The team recovered cleartext database and service credentials from configuration files (including a `connections.json`-style file) and long-lived, non-expiring static AWS IAM access keys, then pivoted to the cloud by harvesting a Primary Refresh Token and abusing over-permissioned Entra ID applications, ultimately reading mail across the tenant. The SOC never detected any of it: staff were buried under thousands of false-positive alerts (many scored higher-severity than the actual intrusion), multiple siloed SOCs ran different EDR stacks with no shared visibility, and there were no written escalation procedures. The red team confirmed the miss by reading the defenders' own SOC email.

Against Organization B (Water and Wastewater Systems Sector), the same phishing payload was detected on execution and the affected workstations were isolated within 2-20 minutes, cutting off C2 before the intrusion could spread — so the engagement shifted to an assume-breach model from a designated non-privileged host. From there the team found a domain service account's password stored in cleartext inside an XML file on an SCCM distribution point; that account held rights sufficient to perform a DCSync attack and obtain the `krbtgt` hash. The team forged a Golden Ticket and used the resulting Kerberos tickets — via Seamless SSO — to authenticate to Azure without any user's cleartext password, running AzureHound, ROADrecon, and ADConnectDump for cloud enumeration and abusing Microsoft Graph API scopes (Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Chat.Read.All, Files.Read.All, Application.ReadWrite.All, AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All) — at one point re-enabling a disabled, MFA-exempt legacy AD-sync (MSOL_) account, DCSyncing its credentials, and adding a client secret to gain full mailbox access across the organization. The team also reached an OT-network bastion host reached via FTP credentials on a jump server, but outbound access was blocked and no C2 channel was established there. This time Organization B's custom Entra ID risky-user detections — "Unfamiliar sign-in properties" and "Suspicious API traffic" — flagged the AzureHound HTTP user agent and accounts exceeding Graph API request thresholds, and the SOC triaged, coordinated with engineering, and reimaged affected hosts.

Neither organization had Conditional Access enabled for workload identities, letting applications with broad Graph permissions bypass normal Conditional Access rules in both cases. CISA's core recommendation is architectural and procedural: disable `CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` and restrict enrollment on ADCS templates, zero out Machine Account Quota where unneeded, eliminate cleartext credentials and rotate long-lived cloud keys, enforce Conditional Access for workload identities, treat SCCM as a Tier 0 asset, and — the advisory's central point — tune alerting to cut false-positive volume and give SOC staff clear escalation authority, since Organization B's success came from process maturity rather than superior tools.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589.001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials
- T1589.002 Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses
- T1566 Phishing
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link
- T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account
- T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
- T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- T1558.001 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
- T1550.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
- T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1069.002 Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups
- T1615 Group Policy Discovery
- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
- T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**ADCS Enrollment-Rights Recon Through ESC1 Certificate Issuance Impersonating a Privileged Account** (`TL-2026-2161-SPL-001`)

Detects the full ESC1 kill chain CISA AA26-237A used against Organization A: (1) enumeration of certificate-template enrollment rights and privileged-account names via certutil/Certify/Certipy-style tooling, followed by (2) issuance of a client-authentication certificate from a template with CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT enabled where the resulting certificate's Subject Alternative Name / UPN does not match the requesting account. Either stage alone is a strong signal; both together confirm the impersonation-certificate abuse path.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1649, T1069.002, T1087.002
- **Data sources:** windows_security, certification_authority_event_log, sysmon, endpoint_command_line_logging
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=windows sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4886 OR EventCode=4887 OR EventCode=4888)
| rename Requester_Name as requester, Certificate_Template as template, Subject_Alternative_Name as san
| lookup adcs_client_auth_templates template OUTPUT enrollee_supplies_subject
``` flag templates known/observed to carry CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT + client-auth EKU; maintain the lookup from certutil -v -dstemplate ```
| where enrollee_supplies_subject="true"
| eval san_user=replace(san, "^UPN=", "")
| where isnotnull(san_user) AND NOT (san_user=requester)
| eval stage="issuance_mismatch"
| append
    [ search index=edr sourcetype="sysmon" EventCode=1
      (Image="*\\certutil.exe" OR Image="*\\certify.exe" OR Image="*\\certipy*" OR Image="*\\certipy.exe")
      (CommandLine="*find*" OR CommandLine="*-vulnerable*" OR CommandLine="*-dstemplate*")
    | eval requester=User, san_user="(recon-only, no cert yet)", template="(template/enrollment-rights enumeration)", stage="template_recon" ]
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Certificate_Authority) as ca values(stage) as stages_observed by requester, template, san_user
| where count>=1
| sort -last_seen
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let VulnerableTemplates = datatable(TemplateName:string)[
  "WebServerAuth", "UserClientAuth", "LegacyClientAuth"
]; // maintain from a periodic Get-ADCSTemplate / certutil audit
let CertRecon = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("certutil.exe", "Certify.exe", "certipy.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("find", "-vulnerable", "-dstemplate", "template")
| project TimeGenerated = Timestamp, Requester = AccountName, Template = "(enumeration)", SAN = "(recon-only)", Computer = DeviceName, Stage = "template_recon";
let CertIssuance = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID in (4886, 4887, 4888)
| extend Requester = tostring(EventData.RequesterName), Template = tostring(EventData.CertificateTemplate), SAN = tostring(EventData.SubjectAltName)
| where Template in (VulnerableTemplates)
| where isnotempty(SAN) and SAN !contains Requester
| project TimeGenerated, Requester, Template, SAN, Computer, Stage = "issuance_mismatch";
CertRecon
| union CertIssuance
| summarize StagesObserved = make_set(Stage), count(), min(TimeGenerated), max(TimeGenerated) by Requester, SAN, Computer
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: ADCS Enrollment-Rights Recon or ESC1 Certificate Request With SAN/Requester Mismatch
id: 7a1e3c2f-4b6d-4e91-9a5c-1f2d8b6e4a01
status: experimental
description: Detects certificate-template/enrollment-rights enumeration (Certify/Certipy/certutil) and/or a certificate issued from a vulnerable AD CS template (CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT + client-auth EKU) whose Subject Alternative Name does not match the requesting account, indicating ESC1 recon and/or privilege-escalation abuse.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-237a
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/002/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1649
    - attack.t1069.002
    - attack.t1087.002
    - attack.tool.certify
    - attack.tool.certipy
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: certificationauthority
detection:
    selection_issuance:
        EventID:
            - 4886
            - 4887
            - 4888
    filter_vulnerable_template:
        CertificateTemplate|contains:
            - 'ClientAuth'
            - 'WebServerAuth'
            - 'UserAuth'
    selection_recon:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\certutil.exe'
            - '\Certify.exe'
            - '\certipy.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'find'
            - '-vulnerable'
            - '-dstemplate'
    condition: (selection_issuance and filter_vulnerable_template) or selection_recon
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate enrollment agents requesting certificates on behalf of another user via an approved workflow
    - Smart-card enrollment stations issuing certificates for helpdesk-assisted onboarding
    - PKI administrators or the security team running scheduled Certify/Certipy audits as part of the CISA-recommended template-hardening review
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Approved enrollment-agent workflows issuing certificates on behalf of another principal (helpdesk/smart-card onboarding) — exclude by known enrollment-agent SIDs
- PKI administrators running scheduled Certify/Certipy enrollment-rights audits as part of remediation review — allowlist the audit service account

**Tuning notes:** Maintain the vulnerable-template lookup/datatable from a recurring certutil -v -dstemplate or Certify/Certipy audit of the PKI; alert volume stays near zero once CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT is disabled per CISA's remediation, so any hit post-hardening should page immediately. Chain the recon stage with the issuance-mismatch stage (same requester within a short window) to separate a genuinely malicious enrollment-rights sweep from routine PKI hygiene scans.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Trusted-Sender Phishing Payload Executes Child Process on Workstation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Golden Ticket Indicators — DCSync Precursor, Anomalous Kerberos TGT Encryption, and Seamless-SSO Azure Redemption (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Seamless SSO Kerberos-to-Azure Authentication Without Prior Interactive Sign-In (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Unauthorized Machine Account Creation via Default Machine Account Quota, Followed by Its Use and Network Fan-Out (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Cleartext Credential Access Across SCCM, Application Config, and Saved RDP/FTP Connection Files (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Disabled Legacy MSOL_ Sync Account Re-Enabled and Granted a New Client Secret (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DCSync Directory Replication Request From Non-Domain-Controller Host (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AzureHound / ROADrecon Cloud Enumeration via Distinctive Graph API User-Agent (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

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## Sources

- [A Tale of Two SOCs: Insights From Two Red Team Assessments (AA26-237A)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-237a)
- [CISA Advisory Highlights Red Team Findings to Help Organizations Assess Risk, Identify Threats and Enable Effective Incident Response](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-advisory-highlights-red-team-findings-help-organizations-assess-risk-identify-threats-and)
- [CISA Red Team Fully Compromised Two Critical Infrastructure Orgs](https://securityaffairs.com/197901/hacking/cisa-red-team-fully-compromised-two-critical-infrastructure-orgs.html)
- [CISA Red Team Compromised Two Critical Infrastructure Orgs, One Detected Nothing](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/cisa-red-team-compromised-two-critical.html)
- [Cybersecurity Advisory: A Tale of Two SOCs (Vulnerability Vault)](https://community.opentextcybersecurity.com/vulnerability-vault-228/cybersecurity-advisory-a-tale-of-two-socs-insights-from-two-red-team-assessments-release-date-august-25-2026-365475)
- [A Tale of Two SOCs: Insights From Two Red Team Assessments](https://www.assurantcyber.com/blog/aa26-237a/)
- [A Tale of Two SOCs: Insights From Two Red Team Assessments (mirror)](https://www.hendryadrian.com/a-tale-of-two-socs-insights-from-two-red-team-assessments/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2161
