# Russian Cyber Espionage Infrastructure Uses Evilginx and OAuth Phishing to Steal Accounts

> Three Russian-nexus clusters — UNC6293 and UNC7005 (subclusters of ICE RELIC/APT29/Cozy Bear/Midnight Blizzard, UNC7005 also tracked as Storm-2945) and the independently-attributed UNC5976 — are compromising government, academic, aerospace, defense, and think-tank accounts across Europe, the US, Ukraine, and Armenia by abusing legitimate authentication features (app-specific passwords, OAuth consent, Microsoft/WhatsApp device-code flows) and Evilginx adversary-in-the-middle reverse-proxy infrastructure rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities. The campaign, active from at least June 2025 through August 2026, bypasses MFA, harvests session cookies/OAuth tokens, and delivers infostealer and RAT payloads (Vidar, Atomic/AMOS, HEADRUSH, CHERRYPIE/ChocoShell, ENGINELIGHT, CornFlake RAT) via credential-theft and malware-as-a-service infrastructure.

- **Published:** 2026-08-27T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-27T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2167
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-unc6293-evilginx-oauth-phishing-tl-2026-2167.webp?v=3c9b0ca6 (Threadlinqs threat intel: UNC6293 Evilginx OAuth Phishing: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-2167) — High severity, 30 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2167
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UNC6293 (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 30 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) publicly linked three distinct but related Russian-nexus clusters conducting large-scale account-compromise operations against individuals and institutions of interest to Russia. UNC6293, first detailed by Google and Citizen Lab in June 2025, is assessed with moderate confidence as an initial-access subcluster of ICE RELIC (the successor tracking name for APT29/Cozy Bear/Midnight Blizzard/Nobelium/BlueBravo). UNC6293 began by impersonating US State Department officials to solicit application-specific passwords (named e.g. 'ms.state.gov') via email and PDF walkthroughs, then evolved by October 2025 to harvesting ASPs entered on attacker phishing sites, and by June 2026 to abusing OAuth by asking targets to relay a post-login 'verification code' after a legitimate sign-in — effectively handing the attacker an OAuth authorization grant. This activity is hosted on Evilginx-style reverse-proxy infrastructure (subdomains of stateaffairs[.]us and related domains such as foreignrelations[.]us, dosportal[.]app, and internationalaffairsportal[.]us) that transparently relays victims to real US State Department pages while capturing credentials, session cookies, and MFA tokens in transit — the classic adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) pattern documented for the open-source evilginx2 framework.

UNC7005 (aka Storm-2945), first identified in February 2026 and linked by Microsoft to Midnight Blizzard, targets academia, diplomatic personnel, and NGOs in Ukraine, Western Europe, and the US with lower operational security than UNC6293 but a heavier malware and infrastructure footprint. UNC7005 conducts Microsoft Entra ID and WhatsApp device-code phishing: victims are lured via spoofed conference/embassy-invite pages (reusing a template across an 'embassy invite' April 2026 lure and a GLOBSEC Forum 2026 spoof in May 2026) into approving a device-code login, or into linking WhatsApp to an attacker-controlled device under the pretense of joining a secure call — after which attacker-injected JavaScript can silently record audio/video during the resulting 'call' or harvest chat credentials. From May 2026, Microsoft/ReliaQuest/Zscaler documented a related sub-campaign, CaptiveCrunch, in which UNC7005/Storm-2945 manipulated shared hospitality-sector Wi-Fi captive portals worldwide to redirect travelers to Microsoft 365 credential-harvesting and device-code phishing pages, escalating from mid-July 2026 into direct AiTM abuse of the Entra ID device-code flow and delivering CornFlake RAT and ChocoShell (CHERRYPIE). In parallel, UNC7005 ran a malware-as-a-service infostealer campaign (May 2026) delivering Vidar (Windows, Go-based, C2 107.189.18.7) and Atomic/AMOS (macOS) via summit-themed phishing, and a smaller ENGINELIGHT Go-malware operation (April–May 2026, C2 statistic-ms.live) distributed from bounce@chamber-ua.org. By July–August 2026, UNC7005 registered domains spoofing the Finnish Operations Center and Microsoft OWA to target the European defense industry directly with OAuth/device-code phishing, including sending legitimate Microsoft OAuth URLs straight to victims and abusing unverified Google Cloud test-mode projects to capture OAuth tokens.

UNC5976, active since March 2026 and assessed as a separate Russian-nexus cluster (possibly a different intelligence service), focuses on military, aerospace, defense-industrial, NGO, and think-tank targets in Ukraine and Armenia. It automates OAuth token theft using fake file-sharing domains (verify-drive[.]com, drive.google.verify-drive[.]com) paired with attacker-owned Google Cloud projects: victims see an automatic 'Continue with Google' popup, complete a legitimate OAuth login, and are silently redirected through a malicious script that exfiltrates the resulting access token. UNC5976 also distributed HEADRUSH, a malicious Excel add-in leading to an HTA downloader, from a domain masquerading as a Ukrainian research institute, likely targeting a Ukrainian aerospace/imaging company. Following GTIG's disruption of its Google-hosted infrastructure, UNC5976 has migrated to non-Google cloud providers.

Across all three clusters, the unifying tradecraft is abuse of legitimate identity and authentication workflows — app-specific passwords, OAuth consent screens, and device-code/QR-based linking — rather than a software vulnerability, making the activity resistant to traditional patch-based remediation and dependent on identity-layer controls (phishing-resistant MFA, ASP restriction, OAuth-grant auditing, and device-link monitoring) for detection and response.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1583.006 Web Services
- T1585.002 Email Accounts
- T1588.001 Malware
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.007 JavaScript
- T1550.001 Application Access Token
- T1497.001 System Checks
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1123 Audio Capture
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1090.002 External Proxy

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Evilginx AiTM / OAuth-Lure Phishing Domain Contact — stateaffairs.us Cluster** (`TL-2026-2167-SPL-001`)

Detects web/proxy traffic to the UNC6293/UNC7005/UNC5976 Evilginx2 reverse-proxy and OAuth-lure phishing domains (stateaffairs.us, foreignrelations.us, dosportal.app, internationalaffairsportal.us, my-invite.org, owa-ms365.com/m365-owa.com/ms365-device.com, foc-share.com, verify-drive.com family, chamber-ua.org, mail.kiis.co.uk) or their known hosting IPs. These sites transparently relay victims to real State Department / Microsoft OWA pages while an Evilginx-style reverse proxy captures credentials, session cookies, and OAuth 'verification codes' in transit.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1583.001, T1557, T1090.002
- **Data sources:** proxy, dns, device_network_events, email_url_info
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy (sourcetype=corporate_proxy OR sourcetype=zscaler OR sourcetype="bluecoat:proxysg" OR sourcetype=pan:threat)
| eval phish_domain=case(
    like(dest_domain, "%stateaffairs.us%"), "stateaffairs.us",
    like(dest_domain, "%foreignrelations.us%"), "foreignrelations.us",
    like(dest_domain, "%dosportal.app%"), "dosportal.app",
    like(dest_domain, "%internationalaffairsportal.us%"), "internationalaffairsportal.us",
    like(dest_domain, "%my-invite.org%"), "my-invite.org",
    like(dest_domain, "%owa-ms365.com%") OR like(dest_domain, "%m365-owa.com%") OR like(dest_domain, "%ms365-device.com%"), "owa-spoof-cluster",
    like(dest_domain, "%foc-share.com%"), "foc-share.com",
    like(dest_domain, "%verify-drive.com%"), "verify-drive-cluster",
    like(dest_domain, "%chamber-ua.org%"), "chamber-ua.org",
    like(dest_domain, "%kiis.co.uk%"), "mail.kiis.co.uk",
    dest_ip="151.236.15.213" OR dest_ip="185.158.250.155" OR dest_ip="93.127.160.28" OR dest_ip="104.194.159.150", "known-hosting-ip",
    1=1, null())
| where isnotnull(phish_domain)
// AiTM reverse proxies often relay a real login POST and set a session cookie header shortly after
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(http_method) as methods by src_user, src_ip, dest_domain, dest_ip, phish_domain
| where count > 0
| sort -count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let PhishDomains = dynamic(["stateaffairs.us","foreignrelations.us","dosportal.app","internationalaffairsportal.us","my-invite.org","owa-ms365.com","m365-owa.com","ms365-device.com","foc-share.com","verify-drive.com","chamber-ua.org","mail.kiis.co.uk"]);
let PhishIPs = dynamic(["151.236.15.213","185.158.250.155","93.127.160.28","104.194.159.150"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (PhishDomains) or RemoteIP in (PhishIPs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessFileName
| join kind=leftouter (
    EmailUrlInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where Url has_any (PhishDomains)
    | project EmailUrl_Timestamp = Timestamp, RecipientEmailAddress, Url
  ) on $left.RemoteUrl == $right.Url
| summarize Hits = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| order by Hits desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Evilginx AiTM / OAuth-Lure Phishing Domain Contact (UNC6293/UNC7005/UNC5976)
id: a1e4c2d0-6b3a-4f1e-9c7d-2b8f5a3e1d40
status: experimental
description: Detects proxy/DNS traffic to Evilginx2 reverse-proxy and OAuth-verification-code lure domains used by Russian-nexus clusters UNC6293, UNC7005 (Storm-2945), and UNC5976 to relay victims to real login pages while harvesting credentials, session cookies, and OAuth grants.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/distinct-clusters-target-individuals-of-interest-to-russia
    - https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9003/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-08-27
tags:
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.t1583.001
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1557
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.002
    - attack.tool.evilginx2
    - attack.g.unc6293
logsource:
    category: proxy
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_domain:
        c-uri|contains:
            - 'stateaffairs.us'
            - 'foreignrelations.us'
            - 'dosportal.app'
            - 'internationalaffairsportal.us'
            - 'my-invite.org'
            - 'owa-ms365.com'
            - 'm365-owa.com'
            - 'ms365-device.com'
            - 'foc-share.com'
            - 'verify-drive.com'
            - 'chamber-ua.org'
            - 'mail.kiis.co.uk'
    selection_ip:
        dst_ip:
            - '151.236.15.213'
            - '185.158.250.155'
            - '93.127.160.28'
            - '104.194.159.150'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers or automated threat-intel crawlers deliberately visiting known IOCs for enrichment
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers, sandboxes, or automated threat-intel crawlers deliberately visiting the listed domains/IPs for enrichment or takedown work

**Tuning notes:** Maintain the domain/IP list as a lookup table refreshed from the harness's threat_iocs feed so newly registered spoof domains (the actors rotate registrars/registrant emails such as given956@2200freefonts.com and chikolimdrid@gmail.com) are picked up automatically; add TLS JA3/JA3S fingerprinting on the Evilginx reverse-proxy handshake if available to catch not-yet-listed subdomains of the same infrastructure.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Device-Code / Embassy-Invite Phishing Link Click — UNC7005 Conference Lure Template (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- WhatsApp Device-Link / Attacker-Injected JavaScript Call Recording Indicator (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Captive-Portal / Hospitality Wi-Fi AiTM Redirect (CaptiveCrunch) to CornFlake RAT / ChocoShell Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS Resolution of Evilginx / OAuth-Lure Phishing Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HEADRUSH Excel Add-In to HTA Downloader / ENGINELIGHT-CHERRYPIE PowerShell Execution Chain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound Connection to Vidar/HEADRUSH File-Hash-Confirmed Hosts or Community-Corroborated Sibling C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Suspicious ASP / OAuth Consent Grant / Device-Code Approval — Identity Provider Abuse (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Infostealer / RAT C2 Beaconing — Vidar, ENGINELIGHT, CHERRYPIE, CornFlake RAT (incl. Dead-Drop Resolver Abuse) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 30)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `151.236.15[.]213`
- Domain: `stateaffairs[.]us`
- File hash: `c66f20f2e39eb2f6a0a4cdbe0d955e5f`

Full set of 30 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Russian Cyber Espionage Infrastructure Uses Evilginx and OAuth Phishing to Steal Accounts](https://gbhackers.com/russian-cyber-espionage/)
- [Distinct Clusters Target Individuals of Interest to Russia](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/distinct-clusters-target-individuals-of-interest-to-russia)
- [Suspected Russian Hackers Abuse Google OAuth and WhatsApp Linking to Hijack Accounts](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/suspected-russian-hackers-abuse-google.html)
- [CaptiveCrunch: Midnight Blizzard targets travelers worldwide for malware delivery and credential theft](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/31/captivecrunch-midnight-blizzard-targets-travelers-worldwide-for-malware-delivery-and-credential-theft/)
- [Midnight Blizzard launches CaptiveCrunch](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/captivecrunch-midnight-blizzard-weaponizes-hotel-wi-fi-captive-portals)
- [evilginx2, Software S9003](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9003/)
- [Russia-Linked Hackers Exploit Legitimate Login Flows to Bypass 2FA and Steal Account Access](https://gbhackers.com/russian-cyber-espionage-clusters/)
- [Fake Conferences, OAuth and WhatsApp: Inside Russia's New Espionage Tactics](https://securityaffairs.com/197630/apt/fake-conferences-oauth-and-whatsapp-inside-russias-new-espionage-tactics.html)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2167
