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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-2168

ADCS ESC1 Privilege Escalation: CISA AA26-237A Red Team Findings and CA Database Hunting Methodology

highACTIVE

CISA advisory AA26-237A documents red teams exploiting the AD CS ESC1 certificate-template misconfiguration (CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT + low-privileged enrollment) to escalate from a Machine-Account-Quota-created machine account to arbitrary user/computer impersonation at two critical infrastructure organizations. GuidePoint Security's companion research shows how to hunt this abuse by forensically parsing the CA's ESE database (Windows\System32\CertLog) with Velociraptor, including a fix for a go-ese FILETIME/OLE-double timestamp bug.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2168
Also known asESC1, AD CS ESC1, Certighost
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS); Velociraptor (open-source, Rapid7-sponsored) go-ese ESE database parsing library (used by Velociraptor's CertLog/ESE artifacts)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-284
ToolsADConnectDump, Certipy, Velociraptor, certreq
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1098 Account Manipulation, T1114 Email Collection, T1136 Create Account, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1534 Internal Spearphishing, T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material, T1552 Unsecured Credentials, T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets, T1566 Phishing and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsgovernment services and facilities, water and wastewater systems, critical infrastructure
Target regionsunited states of america
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-08-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2168 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 14 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: DCSync Directory Replication and Golden Ticket Forging via Stolen krbtgt (SPL)

Detects a directory-replication (DCSync) request carrying the Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All / Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set extended-rights GUIDs from a non-domain-controller host, or a subsequent Kerberos TGT (4768) issued with an RC4 encryption downgrade and forwardable+renewable options consistent with Golden Ticket forging — the credential-theft step both AA26-237A red teams used after ESC1/RBCD compromise to pull the krbtgt hash and forge tickets.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1003, T1558, T1098, T1552
  • Data sources: windows_security_eventlog_domain_controllers, active_directory_replication_metadata
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security"
    ( EventCode=4662 (Properties="*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*" OR Properties="*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*" OR Properties="*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*") )
    OR ( EventCode=4768 Ticket_Encryption_Type="0x17" Ticket_Options="0x40810010" )
| lookup domain_controllers.csv host OUTPUT is_dc
| where is_dc!="true"
| eval detection_reason=case(
    EventCode=4662, "DCSync directory-replication request (Get-Changes/Get-Changes-All/Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set) from a non-DC host",
    EventCode=4768, "Anomalous TGT: RC4 (0x17) encryption downgrade with forwardable+renewable golden-ticket-pattern options")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by Account_Name host detection_reason

Microsoft KQL

let TrustedReplicationPrincipals = dynamic(["AADConnectSyncSvc","BackupSvc"]); // Entra Connect / delegated backup accounts
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where (EventID == 4662 and Properties has_any ("1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2","1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2","89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c"))
    or (EventID == 4768 and TicketEncryptionType == "0x17" and TicketOptions == "0x40810010")
| where Computer !endswith "-DC"
| where Account !in (TrustedReplicationPrincipals)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, EventID, TicketEncryptionType, Properties

Sigma

title: DCSync Directory Replication Request from Non-Domain-Controller Host
id: c3d8f912-6e4a-4b7d-9a2f-1d5c8e0b3a44
status: experimental
description: Detects a directory replication (DCSync) request carrying the Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All / Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set extended-rights GUIDs issued from a host that is not a domain controller, consistent with krbtgt secret theft used for downstream Golden Ticket forging (CISA AA26-237A).
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-237a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.t1558.001
    - attack.t1098
    - attack.tool.mimikatz
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4662
        Properties|contains:
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
    filter_dc:
        Computer|endswith: '-DC'
    condition: selection and not filter_dc
falsepositives:
    - Authorized Entra Connect / Azure AD Connect sync servers performing legitimate directory replication
    - Other delegated backup/AV service accounts with authorized replication rights
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Authorized Entra Connect / Azure AD Connect sync servers and delegated backup/AV service accounts performing legitimate replication
  • Legacy appliances without AES Kerberos support that legitimately negotiate RC4 (0x17)

Tuning notes: Maintain the domain_controllers.csv / TrustedReplicationPrincipals allowlist against your actual DC and delegated-replication inventory; correlate hits against the row-1 ESC1 alert for the same account within a short window to prioritize triage.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • AD CS ESC1 Certificate Abuse via MAQ-Created Machine Account (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DCSync Directory Replication and Golden Ticket Forging via Stolen krbtgt (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID Cloud Pivot via PRT Theft, Over-Permissioned Graph Apps, and Pass-the-Ticket (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • AD CS ESC1 Certificate Abuse via MAQ-Created Machine Account (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DCSync Directory Replication and Golden Ticket Forging via Stolen krbtgt (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID Cloud Pivot via PRT Theft, Over-Permissioned Graph Apps, and Pass-the-Ticket (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • AD CS ESC1 Certificate Abuse via MAQ-Created Machine Account (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID Cloud Pivot via PRT Theft, Over-Permissioned Graph Apps, and Pass-the-Ticket (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-08-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 14 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2168.

14 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

On 2026-08-25 CISA published AA26-237A, "A Tale of Two SOCs: Insights From Two Red Team Assessments," comparing simultaneous red team engagements against a Government Services and Facilities Sector organization ("Organization A") and a Water and Wastewater Systems Sector organization ("Organization B"). Both red teams used comparable tradecraft and fully compromised the Active Directory domain, sensitive business systems, and cloud resources at each target, but the organizations' detection outcomes diverged sharply: Organization A's SOC never detected the intrusion, while Organization B's SOC isolated the initial workstation compromise within 2-20 minutes and forced the red team into an assume-breach posture for the rest of the assessment.

The central privilege-escalation chain in both engagements combined two Active Directory weaknesses. First, a permissive or default Machine Account Quota (ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota, 10 at Organization A and 1,000 at Organization B) let any authenticated domain user create new machine/computer accounts. Second, both environments contained AD CS certificate templates misconfigured with the ESC1 pattern -- CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT enabled alongside overly broad, low-privileged enrollment rights -- letting the requester supply an arbitrary certificate subject/SAN. By enrolling the MAQ-created machine account against the vulnerable template and supplying a privileged user's or domain controller's identity as the subject, the red teams obtained certificates that authenticated as that identity, achieving domain-level privilege escalation. CISA notes this is the same misconfiguration class behind the recently disclosed domain-takeover exploit chain nicknamed "Certighost," and cites SpecterOps' "Certified Pre-Owned" research as the foundational description of ESC1.

From that foothold, both teams harvested cleartext credentials left in accessible configuration files -- SQL Developer's connections.json and product-preferences.xml at Organization A, and a domain service-account password embedded in an SCCM XML file at Organization B -- and used DCSync to pull AD account secrets including the krbtgt hash, enabling Kerberos ticket forgery and impersonation. Organization A's team additionally found long-lived, non-expiring static AWS IAM access keys in user home directories and abused Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (via AllExtendedRights permissions) for further privilege escalation, then pivoted to Microsoft Entra ID/cloud by stealing Primary Refresh Tokens and abusing over-permissioned Entra ID applications (Graph API scopes including Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Chat.Read.All, Files.Read.All, Application.ReadWrite.All, and AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All) -- including reading the security team's own communications to gauge detection status. Organization B's team used ADConnectDump to extract MSOL/Entra Connect sync credentials and abused Seamless SSO (the AZUREADSSOACC computer account's Kerberos tickets) for cloud impersonation, but was blocked from pivoting into the OT DMZ bastion host by outbound network filtering that prevented C2 callback.

CISA attributes the detection gap at Organization A to organizational rather than tooling failures: siloed SOCs and EDR tooling without centralized visibility, thousands of false-positive alerts masking real signal, limited analyst escalation authority, and a dismissed SCCM alert whose system owner could not be identified. Organization B's rapid containment reflected the opposite: clear escalation paths and tuned alerting.

GuidePoint Security's companion blog (published 2026-08-27) provides the defender-side hunting methodology for the ESC1 abuse step of this chain: rather than relying on live CA auditing (which attackers can suppress or which may not be enabled), GuidePoint parses the CA server's underlying Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) database at Windows\System32\CertLog directly, using custom Velociraptor VQL artifacts to extract the Requests, Certificates, and RequestAttributes tables without touching the live CA service. RequestAttributes exposes the template name and attacker-supplied SAN/UPN values that are the clearest signal of ESC1 abuse -- a certificate requested by a low-privileged or newly created account, against an ESC1-flagged template, carrying a SAN for a privileged identity. During this work GuidePoint identified and fixed a bug in the underlying go-ese Go library: FILETIME byte sequences were being misinterpreted as OLE Automation doubles, causing every DateTime column in the ESE database to resolve to 1899-12-30T00:00:00Z. The fix uses value-range inspection to select the correct decoder per field and shipped in Velociraptor 0.76.6+, restoring accurate timestamps for the certificate-request timeline needed to reconstruct an ESC1 attack.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003 OS Credential Dumping; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets; T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

Discovery

T1018 Remote System Discovery

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1566 Phishing

Privilege Escalation

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1098 Account Manipulation

Defense Evasion

T1078 Valid Accounts

Collection

T1114 Email Collection

Persistence

T1136 Create Account

Lateral Movement

T1534 Internal Spearphishing; T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information

Remediation

Patches

  • Upgrade Velociraptor to 0.76.6 or later to pick up the corrected go-ese FILETIME/OLE-double timestamp decoder

Immediate actions

  • Set the Machine Account Quota (ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota) to 0 domain-wide unless a specific, documented operational need requires otherwise
  • Inventory all AD CS certificate templates for CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT enabled combined with low-privileged/broad enrollment rights (the ESC1 pattern) and remediate or disable them immediately
  • Hunt the CA server's Windows\System32\CertLog ESE database with Velociraptor 0.76.6+ (or later) for certificate requests where the RequestAttributes SAN/UPN identity does not match the low-privileged requester

Workarounds

  • Manually audit AD CS templates for ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT plus broad enrollment permissions using certutil or PSPKI while template hardening is scheduled
  • Restrict or remove cleartext credential storage in developer tool configuration files (e.g. SQL Developer connections.json/product-preferences.xml) and SCCM configuration exports pending centralized secrets management

Longer-term hardening

  • Require certificate manager approval and restrict autoenrollment on sensitive/impersonation-capable templates
  • Move long-lived static cloud credentials (e.g. AWS IAM access keys) to temporary, SSO-issued credentials with enforced expiration
  • Establish automated Primary Refresh Token / OAuth refresh-token revocation procedures and Conditional Access policies for workload identities
  • Audit and reduce Graph API application permissions (Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Files.Read.All, Application.ReadWrite.All, AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All) to least privilege
  • Centralize SOC visibility across all EDR/SIEM tooling, define clear analyst escalation authority, and tune alerting to reduce false-positive volume that can mask real intrusions
  • Segment IT/OT networks and enforce strict egress filtering from OT DMZ bastion hosts

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS)
    Vulnerable versions: Any AD CS deployment with a certificate template that has CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT enabled combined with low-privileged enrollment rights (the ESC1 misconfiguration), regardless of Windows Server version
    Fixed in: Templates reconfigured to disable ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT, restrict enrollment to appropriate principals, and require manager approval
  • Velociraptor (open-source, Rapid7-sponsored) — go-ese ESE database parsing library (used by Velociraptor's CertLog/ESE artifacts)
    Vulnerable versions: Versions prior to 0.76.6, where FILETIME byte sequences were misdecoded as OLE Automation doubles, resolving all DateTime fields to 1899-12-30T00:00:00Z
    Fixed in: 0.76.6 and later, which added value-range inspection to select the correct FILETIME vs. OLE-double decoder

Timeline

  • Organization B: red team reaches the OT DMZ bastion host but is blocked from establishing command-and-control into the OT network by outbound egress filtering.
  • Organization B: red team continues under an assume-breach model, finds a cleartext SCCM service-account password, and runs DCSync to obtain the krbtgt secret.
  • Organization B: red team spearphishes users with malicious links; SOC detects and quarantines the initial compromise within 2-20 minutes.
  • Organization A: red team steals Primary Refresh Tokens and abuses over-permissioned Entra ID applications to read security-team email and pivot into cloud resources, undetected throughout.
  • Organization A: red team harvests cleartext credentials from SQL Developer config files and long-lived static AWS IAM keys, reaching three sensitive business systems undetected.
  • Organization A: red team identifies an AD CS template with CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT enabled (ESC1) and requests certificates impersonating privileged user and computer accounts.
  • Organization A: red team abuses the default Machine Account Quota (10) to create a controlled machine account.
  • Organization A: red team gains initial access via default credentials in a public-facing web application, then uses internal email to send phishing messages, compromising four workstations.
  • CISA publishes AA26-237A, "A Tale of Two SOCs," detailing two simultaneous red team assessments against critical infrastructure organizations.
  • GuidePoint Security identifies and fixes a go-ese library bug that misdecoded FILETIME values as OLE doubles, shipped in Velociraptor 0.76.6+.
  • GuidePoint Security publishes a blog detailing how to hunt ESC1 abuse by forensically parsing the CA server's ESE database (Windows\System32\CertLog) with Velociraptor.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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