# ADCS ESC1 Privilege Escalation: CISA AA26-237A Red Team Findings and CA Database Hunting Methodology

> CISA advisory AA26-237A documents red teams exploiting the AD CS ESC1 certificate-template misconfiguration (CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT + low-privileged enrollment) to escalate from a Machine-Account-Quota-created machine account to arbitrary user/computer impersonation at two critical infrastructure organizations. GuidePoint Security's companion research shows how to hunt this abuse by forensically parsing the CA's ESE database (Windows\System32\CertLog) with Velociraptor, including a fix for a go-ese FILETIME/OLE-double timestamp bug.

- **Published:** 2026-08-27T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-08-27T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2168
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-adcs-esc1-privilege-escalation-tl-2026-2168.webp?v=613b1141 (Threadlinqs threat intel: ADCS ESC1 Privilege Escalation: Analysis & Hunting (TL-2026-2168) — High severity, 14 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-2168
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 14

## Description

On 2026-08-25 CISA published AA26-237A, "A Tale of Two SOCs: Insights From Two Red Team Assessments," comparing simultaneous red team engagements against a Government Services and Facilities Sector organization ("Organization A") and a Water and Wastewater Systems Sector organization ("Organization B"). Both red teams used comparable tradecraft and fully compromised the Active Directory domain, sensitive business systems, and cloud resources at each target, but the organizations' detection outcomes diverged sharply: Organization A's SOC never detected the intrusion, while Organization B's SOC isolated the initial workstation compromise within 2-20 minutes and forced the red team into an assume-breach posture for the rest of the assessment.

The central privilege-escalation chain in both engagements combined two Active Directory weaknesses. First, a permissive or default Machine Account Quota (ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota, 10 at Organization A and 1,000 at Organization B) let any authenticated domain user create new machine/computer accounts. Second, both environments contained AD CS certificate templates misconfigured with the ESC1 pattern -- CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT enabled alongside overly broad, low-privileged enrollment rights -- letting the requester supply an arbitrary certificate subject/SAN. By enrolling the MAQ-created machine account against the vulnerable template and supplying a privileged user's or domain controller's identity as the subject, the red teams obtained certificates that authenticated as that identity, achieving domain-level privilege escalation. CISA notes this is the same misconfiguration class behind the recently disclosed domain-takeover exploit chain nicknamed "Certighost," and cites SpecterOps' "Certified Pre-Owned" research as the foundational description of ESC1.

From that foothold, both teams harvested cleartext credentials left in accessible configuration files -- SQL Developer's connections.json and product-preferences.xml at Organization A, and a domain service-account password embedded in an SCCM XML file at Organization B -- and used DCSync to pull AD account secrets including the krbtgt hash, enabling Kerberos ticket forgery and impersonation. Organization A's team additionally found long-lived, non-expiring static AWS IAM access keys in user home directories and abused Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (via AllExtendedRights permissions) for further privilege escalation, then pivoted to Microsoft Entra ID/cloud by stealing Primary Refresh Tokens and abusing over-permissioned Entra ID applications (Graph API scopes including Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Chat.Read.All, Files.Read.All, Application.ReadWrite.All, and AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All) -- including reading the security team's own communications to gauge detection status. Organization B's team used ADConnectDump to extract MSOL/Entra Connect sync credentials and abused Seamless SSO (the AZUREADSSOACC computer account's Kerberos tickets) for cloud impersonation, but was blocked from pivoting into the OT DMZ bastion host by outbound network filtering that prevented C2 callback.

CISA attributes the detection gap at Organization A to organizational rather than tooling failures: siloed SOCs and EDR tooling without centralized visibility, thousands of false-positive alerts masking real signal, limited analyst escalation authority, and a dismissed SCCM alert whose system owner could not be identified. Organization B's rapid containment reflected the opposite: clear escalation paths and tuned alerting.

GuidePoint Security's companion blog (published 2026-08-27) provides the defender-side hunting methodology for the ESC1 abuse step of this chain: rather than relying on live CA auditing (which attackers can suppress or which may not be enabled), GuidePoint parses the CA server's underlying Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) database at Windows\System32\CertLog directly, using custom Velociraptor VQL artifacts to extract the Requests, Certificates, and RequestAttributes tables without touching the live CA service. RequestAttributes exposes the template name and attacker-supplied SAN/UPN values that are the clearest signal of ESC1 abuse -- a certificate requested by a low-privileged or newly created account, against an ESC1-flagged template, carrying a SAN for a privileged identity. During this work GuidePoint identified and fixed a bug in the underlying go-ese Go library: FILETIME byte sequences were being misinterpreted as OLE Automation doubles, causing every DateTime column in the ESE database to resolve to 1899-12-30T00:00:00Z. The fix uses value-range inspection to select the correct decoder per field and shipped in Velociraptor 0.76.6+, restoring accurate timestamps for the certificate-request timeline needed to reconstruct an ESC1 attack.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1566 Phishing
- T1534 Internal Spearphishing
- T1136 Create Account
- T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1098 Account Manipulation
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1114 Email Collection
- T1078 Valid Accounts

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**DCSync Directory Replication and Golden Ticket Forging via Stolen krbtgt (SPL)** (`TL-2026-2168-SPL-002`)

Detects a directory-replication (DCSync) request carrying the Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All / Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set extended-rights GUIDs from a non-domain-controller host, or a subsequent Kerberos TGT (4768) issued with an RC4 encryption downgrade and forwardable+renewable options consistent with Golden Ticket forging — the credential-theft step both AA26-237A red teams used after ESC1/RBCD compromise to pull the krbtgt hash and forge tickets.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1003, T1558, T1098, T1552
- **Data sources:** windows_security_eventlog_domain_controllers, active_directory_replication_metadata
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security"
    ( EventCode=4662 (Properties="*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*" OR Properties="*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*" OR Properties="*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*") )
    OR ( EventCode=4768 Ticket_Encryption_Type="0x17" Ticket_Options="0x40810010" )
| lookup domain_controllers.csv host OUTPUT is_dc
| where is_dc!="true"
| eval detection_reason=case(
    EventCode=4662, "DCSync directory-replication request (Get-Changes/Get-Changes-All/Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set) from a non-DC host",
    EventCode=4768, "Anomalous TGT: RC4 (0x17) encryption downgrade with forwardable+renewable golden-ticket-pattern options")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by Account_Name host detection_reason
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let TrustedReplicationPrincipals = dynamic(["AADConnectSyncSvc","BackupSvc"]); // Entra Connect / delegated backup accounts
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where (EventID == 4662 and Properties has_any ("1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2","1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2","89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c"))
    or (EventID == 4768 and TicketEncryptionType == "0x17" and TicketOptions == "0x40810010")
| where Computer !endswith "-DC"
| where Account !in (TrustedReplicationPrincipals)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, EventID, TicketEncryptionType, Properties
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: DCSync Directory Replication Request from Non-Domain-Controller Host
id: c3d8f912-6e4a-4b7d-9a2f-1d5c8e0b3a44
status: experimental
description: Detects a directory replication (DCSync) request carrying the Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All / Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set extended-rights GUIDs issued from a host that is not a domain controller, consistent with krbtgt secret theft used for downstream Golden Ticket forging (CISA AA26-237A).
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-237a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/08/27
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.006
    - attack.t1558.001
    - attack.t1098
    - attack.tool.mimikatz
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4662
        Properties|contains:
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
    filter_dc:
        Computer|endswith: '-DC'
    condition: selection and not filter_dc
falsepositives:
    - Authorized Entra Connect / Azure AD Connect sync servers performing legitimate directory replication
    - Other delegated backup/AV service accounts with authorized replication rights
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Authorized Entra Connect / Azure AD Connect sync servers and delegated backup/AV service accounts performing legitimate replication
- Legacy appliances without AES Kerberos support that legitimately negotiate RC4 (0x17)

**Tuning notes:** Maintain the domain_controllers.csv / TrustedReplicationPrincipals allowlist against your actual DC and delegated-replication inventory; correlate hits against the row-1 ESC1 alert for the same account within a short window to prioritize triage.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- AD CS ESC1 Certificate Abuse via MAQ-Created Machine Account (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DCSync Directory Replication and Golden Ticket Forging via Stolen krbtgt (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Entra ID Cloud Pivot via PRT Theft, Over-Permissioned Graph Apps, and Pass-the-Ticket (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AD CS ESC1 Certificate Abuse via MAQ-Created Machine Account (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DCSync Directory Replication and Golden Ticket Forging via Stolen krbtgt (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Entra ID Cloud Pivot via PRT Theft, Over-Permissioned Graph Apps, and Pass-the-Ticket (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AD CS ESC1 Certificate Abuse via MAQ-Created Machine Account (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Entra ID Cloud Pivot via PRT Theft, Over-Permissioned Graph Apps, and Pass-the-Ticket (SPL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [Hunting Abuse: Detecting Privilege Escalation Through the ADCS Database](https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/detecting-privilege-escalaction-through-adcs/)
- [CISA Advisory AA26-237A: A Tale of Two SOCs - Insights From Two Red Team Assessments](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-237a)
- [CISA Advisory Highlights Red Team Findings to Help Organizations Assess Risk, Identify Threats and Enable Effective Incident Response](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-advisory-highlights-red-team-findings-help-organizations-assess-risk-identify-threats-and)
- [CISA Red Team Compromised Two Critical Infrastructure Orgs, One Detected Nothing](https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/cisa-red-team-compromised-two-critical.html)
- [A Tale of Two SOCs: Insights From Two Red Team Assessments](https://www.assurantcyber.com/blog/aa26-237a/)
- [Cybersecurity Advisory A Tale of Two SOCs: Insights From Two Red Team Assessments](https://community.opentextcybersecurity.com/vulnerability-vault-228/cybersecurity-advisory-a-tale-of-two-socs-insights-from-two-red-team-assessments-release-date-august-25-2026-365475)
- [A Tale of Two SOCs: Insights From Two Red Team Assessments (summary)](https://www.hendryadrian.com/a-tale-of-two-socs-insights-from-two-red-team-assessments/)
- [CISA Red Team Compromises Active Directory and Critical Business Systems](https://cyberpress.org/cisa-red-team-compromises-active-directory/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-2168
